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THE 


ANALOGY    OF   RELIGION, 

TO    THE 


TO   WHICH  ARE   ADDED 

TWO  BRIEF  DISSERTATIONS? 

L  OX  PERSONAL  IDENTITY.— 11.  ON  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 


BY 

JOSEPH    BUTLER,  D,aL. 


Ejus  [Analogiae]  haec  vis  est,  ut  id  quod  dubium  est  ad  aliquid  simile,  de  quo  non  quferitur, 
referat  ut  incerta  certis  probet. — Quintil.  1.  i.  c.  d. 


AN  INTRODUCTION,  NOTES,  CONSPECTUS,  AND  AMPLE  INDEX, 

y  -^ 

HOWARD  MALCOM,  D.D. 

PRESIDENT   OF   THE  UNIVERSITY,  LEWISBURG,   PENNSYLVANIA. 


SIXTH       EDITION. 

PHILADELPHIA: 
J.    B.    LIPPINCOTT   &    CO. 

1869. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1857,  by 

J.  B.  LIPPIXCOTT  &  CD. 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  in  and  for  the 

Eastern  District  of  Pennsylvania. 


CONTENTS. 


FAGB 

Editor's  Introduction 6 

"        Preface 19 

"        Conspectus 21 

Author's  Advertisement 66 

"        Introduction 67 

PART   I. 

OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 

Chap.  L— A  Future  Life 77 

Chap.  II. — The  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and  Punishments 95 

Chap.  III. — The  Moral  Government  of  God ^ 105 

Chap.  IV. — Probation,  as  implying  Trial,  Difficulties,  and  Danger 128 

Chap.  V. — Probation,  as  intended  for'^Moral  Discipline  and  Improvement.  136 

Chap.  VL — The  Opinion  of  Necessity,  considered  as  influencing  Practice.  157 

Chap.  VII. — The  Government  of  God,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Consti- 
tution, imperfectly  comprehended 171 

Conclusion 1S$ 

3 


4  CONTENTS. 

PART  II. 

OF  KEVEALED  RELIGION. 

PAQI 

Chap.  I. — The  Importance  of  Christianity 186 

Chap.  II. — The  supposed  Presumption  against  a  Revelation,  considered 

as  miraculous 202 

Chap.  III. — Our  Incapacity  of  judging,  what  were  to  be  expected  in  a 
Revelation;  and  the  Credibility,  from  Analogy,  that  it  must  con- 
tain things  appearing  liable  to  Objections 209 

Chap.  IV. — Christianity,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Constitution,  imper- 
fectly comprehended 223 

Chap.  V. — The  Particular  System  of  Christianity;  the  Appointment  of  a 

Mediator,  and  the  Redemption  of  the  World  by  him 230 

Chap.  VI. — "Want  of  Universality  in  Revelation;  and  of  the  supposed 

Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it 247 

Chap.  VIL— The  Particular  Evidence  for  Christianity 263 

Chap.  VIII. — Objections  against  arguing  from  the  Analogy  of  Nature  to 

Religion 296 

CoNCLnsioN 306 


DISSERTATIONS. 

Dissertation  I. — Personal  Identity 317 

DissEBTATiON  11. — The  Nature  of  Virtue 324 

Index  to  Part  1 338 

Index  to  Part  II , 343 


€Vits}x's  fntrobutiifln. 


Joseph  Butler  was  born  at  "Wantage,  England,  May  18th,  1692, 
the  youngest  of  eight  children.  The  biographies  of  that  day  were 
few  and  meagre ;  and  in  few  cases  is  this  so  much  to  be  regretted  as 
in  Butler's.  It  would  have  been  both  interesting  and  profitable  to 
trace  the  development  and  occupations  of  one  of  the  mightiest  of 
human  minds.  But  no  cotemporary  gathered  up  the  incidents  of  his 
life,  and  now  all  efi'orts  to  elicit  them  have  been  without  success. 

His  father  was  a  prosperous  dry-goods  merchant,  who,  at  the  time 
of  his  son's  birth,  had  retired  from  business  with  a  competency,  and 
resided  in  a  suburban  mansion  called  "  The  Priory,"  still  in  existence. 

Being  a  non-conformist,  he  educated  Joseph  at  a  "dissenting'^ 
academy  at  Gloucester,  under  Samuel  Jones,  a  gentleman  of  great 
ability,  and  a  skilful  instructor,  who  raised  up  some  of  the  greatest 
men  of  their  day.* 

It  was  while  a  member  of  this  academy,  and  about  the  age  of 
twenty-one,  that  Butler  disclosed  to  the  world  his  wonderful  power  of 
abstract  reasoning,  in  his  famous  correspondence  with  Samuel  Clarice, 
in  relation  to  that  eminent  author's  "Demonstration  of  the  Being  and 
Attributes  of  God."  This  correspondence  is  now  generally  inserted 
at  the  end  of  that  work. 

Mr.  Butler  having  deliberately  adopted  Episcopal  views,  and  re- 
solved to  unite  himself  with  the  Established  Church,  his  father,  with 
praiseworthy  liberality,  sent  him  to  Oxford,  where  he  entered  Oriel 
College,  March,  1714.  Of  his  college  life  there  is  no  account;  nor 
of  the  time  and  place  of  his  ordination.  He  removed  to  London 
in  1718,  on  receiving  the  appointment  of  "Preacher  at  the  Rolls." 
His  famous  Fifteen  Sermons  were  preached  in  that  chapel,  and 
published  before  resigning  the  place,  with  a  dedication  to  Sir  Joseph 
Jekyl,  "as  a  parting  mark  of  gratitude  for  the  favors  received  during 
his  connection  with  that  learned  society." 

*  Among  these  were  Jones,  author  of  the  admirable  Treatise  on  the  Canon 
of  the  New  Testament :    Lardner,  Maddox,  Chandler,  Archbishop  Seeker,  &c. 

1*  6 


6  editor's  introduction. 

One  of  Butler's  warmest  college  friends  was  Edward  Talbo^ 
second  son  of  a  clergyman  wlio  afterwards  became  Bishop  of  Durham. 
This  admirable  young  man  died  of  smallpox ;  in  his  last  hours  re- 
commending Butler  to  his  father's  patronage ;  and  scarcely  had  that 
gentleman  attained  the  see  of  Durham,  before  he  gave  Mr.  B.  the 
living  of  Haughton,  from  whence  he  transferred  him,  in  1725,  to  the 
richer  benefice  of  Stanhope. 

On  receiving  this  honorable  and  lucrative  appointment,  he  re- 
signed the  Lectureship  at  the  Bolls,  and  in  the  autumn  of  1726  retired 
to  his  beautiful  residence  at  Stanhope.  Here,  without  a  family  to 
occupy  his  time,  he  devoted  himself  to  his  great  work,  the  Analogy; 
using  horseback  exercise,  seeing  little  company,  living  abstemiously . 
and  caring  for  his  flock. 

Seven  years  thus  rolled  away ;  when  to  draw  him  from  what  seemed 
to  his  friends  too  great  retirement  and  application,  Lord-Chancellor 
Talbot  made  him  his  chaplain,  and  afterwards,  in  1736,  gave  him  a 
prebend's  stall  in  Rochester.  In  1736,  Butler  being  now  forty-four, 
Caroline,  consort  of  George  II.,  appointed  him  "  Clerk  of  the  Closet," 
an  office  which  merely  required  his  attendance  at  the  Queen's  apart- 
ments every  evening,  from  seven  to  nine. 

Being  now  in  London,  convenient  to  the  press,  and  enjoying  both 
leisure  and  competency,  he  published  his  immortal  Analogy — ^the 
cherished  work  of  his  life.  The  Queen  was  delighted  with  the  book, 
and  made  herself  master  of  its  glorious  array  of  reasoning.  But  she 
died  the  same  year,  and  he  lost  not  only  a  patroness,  but  a  friend. 
He  returned  to  his  benefice  at  Stanhope,  the  income  of  which  had 
been  held  during  his  residence  in  London. 

On  her  death-bed,  the  Queen  had  urged  her  husband  to  promote 
her  honored  chaplain  to  a  bishopric ;  and  next  year,  the  see  of 
Norwich  becoming  vacant,  the  Bishop  of  Bristol  was  translated  to  it, 
and  the  see  of  Bristol  given  to  Butler.  Bristol  was  the  poorest 
bishopric  in  England,  its  emoluments  being  but  $2,000  per  annum; 
less  than  those  of  the  rectorship  of  Stanhope.  Butler  distinctly 
disclosed  his  disappointment  in  his  letter  to  the  minister  Walpole, 
accepting  the  position;  and  declared  that  he  did  not  think  it  "very 
suitable  to  the  condition  of  his  fortune,  nor  answerable  to  the  recom- 
mendation with  which  he  was  honored."  The  king  was  not  dis- 
pleased at  this  candor,  and  in  1740  improved  his  income  by  giving 
him,  in  addition  to  his  bishopric,  the  profitable  and  influential  office 
of  Dean  of  St.  Paul's.     Butler,  who  had  retained  the  living  of  Stan- 


editor's  introduction.  T 

nope  along  with  his  bishopric,  now  resigned  that  rectorship.  *'  The 
rich  revenues,"  says  Professor  Fitzgerald,  "  of  the  Deanery  of  St.  Paul^ 
enabled  him  to  gratify  his  taste  at  Bristol."  He  expended  about 
$25,000  in  improving  and  beautifying  the  episcopal  residence  and 
gardens.  He  fostered  useful  charities,  and  employed  his  wealth  for 
others  rather  than  for  himself. 

In  1750,  upon  the  death  of  Dr.  Edward  Chandler,  Bishop  of 
Durham,  Butler  was  promoted  to  that  see,  the  most  honorable  and 
lucrative  in  England.  He  had  before  been  offered  the  Primacy,  on 
the  death  of  Archbishop  Potter,  but  declined  it,«with  the  remark  that 
**  it  was  too  late  for  him  to  try  to  support  a  falling  church."  On 
assuming  his  diocese  at  Durham,  Butler  delivered  and  published  his 
famous  Charge  to  the  Clergy,  upon  "  The  Use  and  Importance  of 
External  Religion."  He  was  at  once  assailed  vigorously,  in  pamph- 
lets and  papers,  by  Archdeacon  Blackburn,  the  Rev.  T.  Lindsay,  and 
others,  on  the  charge  of  Popery ;  an  imputation  which  is  still  some- 
times cast  upon  him,  and  which  finds  some  slender  support  in  his 
setting  up  a  marble  cross  over  the  communion-table  at  Bristol.  That 
he  never  was  a  Papist,  is  now  so  evident,  that  we  can  account  for  the 
imputation  only  by  the  strong  jealousy  of  the  Romish  Church  then 
prevalent. 

Butler  now  became  still  more  munificent.  His  private  charities 
were  exceedingly  generous,  and  his  public  ones  seemed  sometimes  to 
border  on  extrav?  q;ance.  He  gave  §2,000  a  year  to  the  county  hospital, 
and  often  gave  away  thousands  of  dollars  at  a  time.  But  though 
quite  lavish  in  buildings  and  ornaments,  as  well  as  in  benevolence, 
he  was  remarkably  frugal  in  his  personal  expenses.  It  is  said  of 
him,  by  Rev.  John  Newton,  that  on  one  occasion,  when  a  distin- 
guished visitor  dined  with  him  by  appointment,  the  provision  con- 
sisted of.  a  single  joint  of  meat,  and  a  pudding.  The  bishop  remarked 
to  his  guest  on  that  occasion,  that  he  "  had  long  been  disgusted  with 
the  fashionable  expense  of  time  and  money  in  entertainments,  and 
was  determined  that  it  should  receive  no  countenance  from  his 
example." 

Of  his  amusements  we  know  little  except  that  he  took  much  horse- 
back exercise,  and  often  employed  his  secratary,  Mr.  Emms,  to  play 
for  him  on  the  organ. 

Butler  held  the  see  of  Durham  less  than  two  years.  Symptoms 
of  general  physical  decay  betrayed  themselves  about  the  time  of 
his  promotion,   and  in   spite  of  all   that  skill   and   affection  coula 


8 

prompt,  he  sunk  to  rest  June  16tli,  1752,  aged  sixty.  He  was  never 
married 

A  considerable  number  of  his  sermons  and  charges  have  been 
printed,  but  are  too  philosophical  to  be  generally  read.  His  great 
work  is  the  Analogy,  published  in  1736,  and  from  that  day  read  and 
admired  by  every  highly-cultivated  mind.  He  was  induced  to  write 
by  a  state  of  things  very  remarkable  in  the  history  of  religion. 
Debauchery  and  infidelity  were  almost  universal,  not  in  any  one  class 
of  society  but  in  all.  England  had  reached  the  culminating  point 
of  irreligion,  and  the  firm  re-establishment  of  Episcopacy  had  as  yet 
done  nothing  to  mend  the  nation's  morals.  Piety  was  deemed  a  mark 
of  ignorance  and  vulgarity,  and  multitudes  of  those  who  professed  it 
were  persecuted  to  dungeons  and  death. 

Infidel  writers,  warmed  into  life  by  court  corruption,  became  more 
numerous  and  audacious  than  ever  before.  Their  methods  of  attack- 
ing Christianity  were  various ;  but  the  most  successful  then,  as 
always,  was  to  impugn  certain  doctrines  and  declarations  of  the 
Sacred  Scriptures,  as  irrational,  and  hence  reject  the  whole.  They 
generally  admitted  the  Being  and  perfection  of  God,  and  extolled  the 
sufficiency  of  natural  religion ;  but  denied  any  revelation,  or  any 
necessity  for  one.  The  verdict  of  the  world  was  that  the  Bible  is  not 
authentic,  that  man  is  not  accountable,  nor  even  probably  immortal, 
that  God  neither  rewards  nor  punishes,  and  that  present  indulgence, 
as  far  as  our  nature  admits,  is  both  wise  and  safe. 

Bishop  Downam,"^  one  of  the  most  learned  of  the  clergy,  in  the 
early  part  of  the  seventeenth  century  v^rites  thus:  "In  these  times, 
if  a  man  do  but  labor  to  keep  a  good  conscience,  though  he  meddle 
not  with  matters  of  state,  if  he  make  conscience  of  swearing,  sanctify 
the  Sabbath,  frequent  sermons,  or  abstain  from  the  common  corrup- 
tions of  the  times,  he  shall  straightway  be  condemned  for  a  puritan, 
and  be  less  favored  than  either  a  carnal  gospeller,  or  a  close  Papist." 

It  was  considered  settled,  especially  in  polite  circles,  that  Chris- 
tianity, after  so  long  a  prevalence,  had  been  found  out  to  be  an  im- 
posture. The  clergy,  as  a  body,  did  nothing  to  dispel  this  moral 
gloom,  but  rather  increased  it  by  their  violent  and  scandalous  con- 
duct. In  the  sad  language  of  Bishop  Warburton,  *'  Religion  had 
lost  its  hold  on  the  minds  of  the  people."  He  adds  with  great  point, 
**  Though  a  rule  of  Hglit  may  direct  the  philosopher  to  a  principle  of 

*  Sermon  at  Spittle,  on  Abraham's  trial 


editor's  introduction.  9 

action ;  and  the  point  of  Jionor  may  keep  up  the  thing  called  man- 
ners, among  gentlemen :  yet  nothing  but  religion  can  ever  fix  a  sober 
standard  of  behavior  among  the  common  people/'  Even  the  uni- 
versities vv^ere  on  the  side  of  irreligion ;  for  professorships,  as  well  as 
pulpits,  were  given  to  men,  not  for  positive  worth  and  fitness,  but  for 
possessing  qualities  then  most  in  vogue  with  those  who  held  the 
appointing  power.  Such  were  the  trying  times  which  had  driven  our 
pilgrim  fathers  to  seek  a  home  amid  the  wilds  of  an  unexplored  con- 
tinent, and  to  face  the  dangers  of  sea  and  savage. 

It  must  ever  be  regarded  as  among  the  highest  instances  of  God's 
bringing  good  out  of  evil,  that  this  outrageous  rampancy  of  infidelity 
brought  out  a  host  of  champions  for  the  truth  of  His  word ;  who 
boldly  met  the  odium  of  discipleship,  and  waged  battle  in  such  style 
that  the  Deistical  controversy  was  settled  forever.  Never  was  a  dis- 
pute more  determined  on  both  sides,  and  never  was  victory  more 
complete.  Literary  infidelity  not  only  recoiled,  but  was  routed  ;  and 
can  never  again  prevail.  Henceforth,  no  scholar  will  ever  treat  the 
evidences  of  Christianity  as  a  subject  of  ridicule  or  contempt. 

"When  we  contrast  the  stupendous  learning,  and  powerful  logic,  of 
the  Christian  writers  of  that  century,  with  the  superficial  and  almost 
contemptible  productions  of  the  writers  against  whom  they  contended, 
we  are  tempted  to  wonder  why  such  power  should  be  requisite  to 
overthrow  such  weakness.  But  we  must  remember,  that  frail  logic 
and  shallow  considerations,  will  persuade  men  to  indulge  their  vices ; 
while  the  soundest  reasonings  and  the  most  impressive  inducements, 
with  difiiculty  lead  them  to  self-restraint  and  true  holiness. 

The  infidel  writers  of  that  day  have  sunk  into  such  oblivion  that 
their  works  are  now  seldom  found  but  in  great  libraries ;  and  even 
well-educated  persons  scarcely  know  more  of  them  than  their  names. 
Yet  so  perfectly  did  their  principles  accord  with  the  temper  of  the 
times  and  the  universal  depravity  of  the  carnal  heart,  that  they 
enjoyed  the  highest  popularity  with  all  classes.  Forever  honored  be 
the  names  of  that  noble  band,  who,  in  face  of  such  odds,  established 
the  authority  of  the  Bible,  and  left  the  advocates  of  atheism  and  im- 
morality without   a  lurking-place.*     In   this   noble   cohort   Butler 

*  Among  them  were  Cudworth,  born  1617;  "Intel.  Syst.  of  the  Universe:" 
Boyle,  1626,-  "Things  above  Reason:"  Stillixgfleet,  1635;  "Letters  to  a 
"V)pist:"  Sir  I.Newton,  1642;  "Observations  on  Prophecy:"  Leslu:,  1630 ; 
*'  Short  Method   wiih  Deists :"    Lowth,  1661,    Vindic.  of  the  Divide  Authoi 


10  editor's  introduction. 

btands  conspicuous :  and  to  him,  I  think,  more  than  to  all  the  others, 
is  to  be  atti'ituted  the  sudden  and  total  overthrow  of  infidelity,  when 
it  was  in  its  glor/. 

As  a  metaphysician,  few  have  equalled  him.  What  he  added  to 
the  science,  has  ever  since  remained  a  part  of  it,  which  can  be  said 
of  scarcely  another.  He  advanced  more  that  was  new,  fortified  old 
positions  more  ably,  and  applied  speculation  to  religion  more  usefully 
than  any  before  him.  Our  language  furnishes  no  profounder  thinking. 
Merely  to  understand  him  is  an  honorable  distinction,  and  requires 
no  small  previous  training  of  the  power  of  attention.  As  a  polemic, 
he  is  keen,  sagacious,  candid,  patient,  persevering,  calm,  inventive, 
and  profound ;  every  page  indicates  that  repose  of  mind,  which  belongs 
only  to  true  greatness,  combined  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  subject. 
So  far  as  I  am  able  to  judge,  he  never  presses  a  consideration  beyond 
its  just  limits,  and  seldom  introduces  an  illustration  which  has  not 
the  force  of  an  argument.     Fallacies  he  seems  to  abolish  at  a  touch. 

The  Analogy  employed  much  of  his  life.  It  was  begun  in  his 
twentieth  year,  but  was  not  published  till  he  was  forty-five.  Such  a 
mode  of  writing  never  makes  large  books,  for  the  matte.-*,  constantly 
revised,  becomes  constantly  condensed.  The  Analogy  is  so  con- 
densed, as  that  to  make  a  satisfactory  synopsis  is  scarcely  practicable. 
Hence,  though  my  Conspectus  and  notes  have  aided  my  pupils  to 
understand  and  remember  the  argument,  they  do  not  in  any  measure 
obviate  the  necessity  of  studying  the  book  itself.  If  they  do  not 
increase  the  number  of  those  who  shall  studiously  peruse  the  book 
itself,  my  aim  and  expectations  will  be  disappointed. 

To  this  work  no  reply  has  ever  been  attempted !  Extensive  as  is 
its  diffusion,  and  great  as  is  its  acknowledged  influence,  infidelity  has 
had  the  highest  inducements  to  attempt  to  set  it  aside.  Written  for 
a  present  purpose,  and  most  signally  accomplishing  it,  it-  is  yet  so 
written  as  to  endure,  in  full  value,  through  all  coming  time.     It  is 


of  the  Bible:  King,  1669;  "Origin  of  Evil:"  Sam.  Clark,  1675;  "Evidences 
of  Nat.  and  Rev.  Religion:"  Waterland,  16S3;  "Scripture  Vindicated:" 
Lardxer,  16S4;  "Credibility  of  Gospel  History:"  Leland,  1691;  "View  of 
Oeistical  Writers,"  and  "Advantage  and  Necessity  of  Rev. :"  Chandler,  1693; 
'Definition  of  Cbristianity,"  on  "  Prophecy,"  Ac. :  Warbdrton,  1698;  "Di- 
vine Leg.  of  Moses;"  Bishop  Newton,  1704;  "On  the  Prophecies:"  Watson, 
1737  :  "Apology  for  Christianity,"  (against  GibbonJ  and  also  "  Apology  for  tha 
Bible,"  (against  Paine.) 


editor's  introduction.  U 

undoul'tedly  "the  most  original  and  the  most  profound  work  extant, 
in  any  Idnguage,  on  the  philosophy  of  religion/''*  "the  most  argu- 
mentative and  philosophical  defence  of  Christianity  ever  submitted 
to  the  vs^orld.'^t 

Writers  in  defence  of  Christianity  had,  before  Butler,  amply  dis- 
cussed the  several  departments  of  evidences ;  but  still  there  remained 
objections.  The  structure  of  the  globe,  the  course  of  nature,  the 
organization  of  animals,  &c.  were  affirmed  to  contradict  revelation. 
Its  doctrines  and  duties,  moreover,  were  pronounced  inconsistent  with 
sound  reason.  Butler  repeats  none  of  the  old  arguments,  but  confines 
himself  to  the  showing  that  the  declarations  of  revelation  are  in  per- 
fect harmony  with  facts  seen  daily  in  the  world,  and  which  all  admit. 
That  the  world  might  not  have  been  ordered  and  governed  otherwise, 
he  does  not  choose  to  dispute.  Taking  things  as  they  are,  and  closely 
studying  the  connection  between  one  thing  and  another,  we  ought  to 
inquire  what  course  of  action  on  our  part,  will  conform  to  the  needs 
of  such  a  nature  and  such  circumstances.  Our  bodies  are  constructed 
of  parts,  all  adapted  to  each  other,  and  also  to  one  general  end.  So 
too,  our  souls.  And  the  two  together  have  relations  and  adaptations, 
which  may,  to  some  extent  at  least,  indicate  what  is  designed  to  be 
the  general  end  of  our  existence.  If  Christianity  befits  these  several 
parts  of  our  mixed  nature  and  their  obvious  uses,  then  there  is  no- 
thing incongruous  between  the  two ;  and  no  objections  against  Chris- 
tianity can  be  drawn  from  the  course  of  nature.  On  the  contrary,  all 
seems  to  be  governed  as  the  gospel  declares  it  is,  and  shows  that  the 
Author  of  man  and  the  Author  of  the  Bible  is  the  same.  This  is  still 
more  impressive  when  we  consider  that  we  have  a  moral  faculty;  for 
it  is  the  very  object  and  business  of  this  faculty  to  deal  with  right 
and  wrong,  good  and  evil ;  the  facts  and  magnitudes  of  which  are 
obvious  in  the  course  of  nature.  If  Christianity  does,  in  an  especial 
manner,  hejit  this  faculty,  if  it  is  adapted  to  promote  our  general 
rectitude  and  happiness,  and  if  it  contains  no  principle  which  is  not 
discernible  in  the  government  of  the  visible  world,  then  there  is  no 
discrepancy  between  Christianity  and  Providence. 

This  is  Butler's  position.  lie  confines  himself  to  proving  such  an 
analogy  between  revelation  and  the  daily  course  of  things,  as  that 
nothing  known  in  the  universe  can  be  ojQTered  in  disproof  of  Chris* 

*  McIntosh  :  "  Progress  of  Ethical  Philosophy." 
I  Brougham  :  "  Disc,  on  Nat.  Theology." 


12  EDITUK  S   INTRODUCTION. 

tianity.  The  mode  of  Avarfare  was  new.  Without  professing  to 
prove  Christianity  to  be  true,  he  demonstrates  that  it  cannot  h\. 
proved  to  be  false ;  and  that  if  it  be  even  probable,  the  rejection  of  it 
is  a  gross  folly  and  a  tremendous  hazard.  Every  objection  against  it 
he  proves  to  be  equally  forcible  against  facts  which  constantly  occur, 
and  which  all  admit,  though  none  profess  to  understand.  Thus  leav 
ing  the  ramparts  of  the  church  to  be  guarded  by  the  mighty  men 
who  had  valiantly  maintained  its  defence,  he  quietly  walked  out  into 
the  camp  of  the  enemy,  and  spiked  every  gun ! 

It  has  been  said  that  the  whole  argument  of  the  "Analogy"  seems 
to  be  built  on  Ecclesiasticus  xlii.  24:  "All  things  are  double,  one 
against  the  other,  and  God  hath  made  nothing  imperfect."  If  it  be 
so,  it  involves  no  disparagement  to  have  received  thus  the  seminal 
idea  of  this  immortal  work.  Who  else  has  so  gloriously  discerned 
and  expanded  the  profound  philosophy  of  the  son  of  Sirac  ?  Others 
have  uttered  sentiments  which  seem  to  involve  the  whole  exposition 
of  Butler.  Origen  affirms  that  "he  who  believes  the  Scripture  to 
have  proceeded  from  Ilim  who  is  the  Author  of  nature,  may  well  ex- 
pect to  find  the  same  sort  of  difficulties  in  it,  as  are  found  in  nature." 
Shall  we  assign  to  Origen  the  whole  credit  of  the  "Analogy"?  As 
well  might  we  bestow  all  our  admiration  for  the  delightful  papers  of 
Addison,  in  the  Spectator,  to  the  classical  authors  from  whom  he 
selected  appropriate  mottoes!  By  such  a  rule,  the  entire  merit  of 
this  most  Christian  work  of  Butler  should  be  attributed  to  the  pagan 
Quintilian,  from  whom  he  derives  the  motto  which  so  appropriately 
graces  his  title-page. 

A  rapid  sketch  of  the  outline  of  the  argument  will  aid  the  student 
at  his  outset.  He  begins  by  taking  for  granted  the  existence  of  an 
intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of  the  universe.  Then,  from  the  con- 
ditions and  changes  observed  in  the  visible  world,  he  argues  the  folly 
of  objecting  to  revelation  on  account  of  doctrines  which  do  but 
declare  the  same  general  laws  and  the  same  principles  of  govern- 
ment. That  there  is  this  harmony,  he  proves ;  and  hence  the  proba- 
bility that  the  same  sort  of  government  will  prevail  hereafter,  which 
prevails  now.  He  demonstrates  that  man  is  under  exactly  such  a 
probation  in  this  world,  and  as  to  this  world,  as  revelation  affirms 
him  to  be  under,  as  to  the  next ;  and  that  embarrassments  produced 
by  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  involve  nature  no  less  than  religion.  He 
then  evinces  the  need  that  man  should  be  placed  in  a  state  of  train- 
iti^and  trial,  if  he  is  ever  to  be  qualified  for  better  conditions;  and 


editor's  introduction.   '  13 

thai  this  -World,  as  ^ow  governed,  is  exactly  adapted  to  give  that 
training,  and  to  produce  such  a  character  as  will  insure  happiness 
under  any  possible  contingencies.     This  is  the  argument  of  Part  I. 

Proceeding  to  examine  Christianity,  he  discusses  its  importance,  its 
proofs,  the  unavoidableness  of  its  containing  strange  things,  the 
absurdity  of  expecting  fully  to  comprehend  its  statements,  and  the 
abundance  of  its  evidence  for  candid  minds,  though  they  are  not, 
and  ought  not  to  be,  irresistible.  He  answers  not  only  the  objections 
to  Christianity,  but  the  objections  against  its  proofs ;  which  he  shows 
are  very  different  things.  Though  he  keeps  rigidly  to  the  refutation 
of  objections,  and  nowhere  meddles  with  the  direct  evidence  of  Chris- 
tianity, yet,  by  removing  every  objection,  he  does  in  fact  confirm  its 
claims.  This  clearing  away  of  objections,  after  the  usual  proofs  are 
presented,  crowns  and  completes  the  evidence.  Thus  the  ultimate 
result  of  a  study  of  his  book  is  not  only  negative  but  positive ;  and 
such  has  been  its  effect  on  every  candid  and  competent  student. 

AVe  should  remember  that  we  have  no  right  to  require  the  removal 
of  objections,  and  that  therefore  the  whole  of  Butler's  work  is  in  fact 
supererogatory;  a  concession  and  kindness  to  such  as  have  doubts, 
either  honest  or  captious.  Our  only  rightful  demand  of  Christianity 
is  for  credentials.  It  presents  these  in  its  nature,  its  miracles,  its 
prophecies,  its  propagation,  its  influence,  and  its  success.  If  these 
are  competent,  we  should  bow  to  its  teachings.  To  suppose  that  we 
are  capable  of  judging  of  the  propriety  of  all  God's  law,  or  even  to 
understand  his  reasons  for  it,  if  they  were  disclosed,  is  absurd. 

It  is  true  we  naturally  presume  that  a  revelation  in  words,  and  a 
revelation  by  natural  objects  and  the  visible  order  of  things,  would 
coincide ;  but  to  find  out  the  fact  or  the  extent  of  such  coincidence, 
is  not  our  first  business.  We  are  to  weigh  the  testimony  in  favor  of 
religion,  embrace  it,  if  sufficient,  and  attribute  the  obscurity  of  any 
part,  to  our  present  want  of  capacity.  The  solution  of  difficulties 
serves  to  confirm  our  faith  in  Christianity,  but  has  no  place  in  our 
ground  of  reception:  and  we  have  no  right  to  wait  for  such  solution, 
however  painful  and  embarrassing  jnay  be  the  difficulties. 

Another,  and  perhaps  even  more  important,  use  of  the  "Analogy," 
is  to  dissipate  the  prejudices  and  objections  to  Christianity  which 
prevent  a  candid  study  of  its  evideuces.  These  prepossess  and  poison 
the  mind,  and  obstruct  or  abate  the  force  of  the  best  arguments. 
Few,  if  any,  after  a  careful  examination  of  the  positive  evidences  of 
Christianity,  conclude  them  to  be  inadequate.     But  many  are  they, 

2 


14  editor's  introduction. 

who  iiL,ving  heard  objections  which  their  scanty  learning  does  not 
enable  them  to  answer,  and  their  no  less  scanty  interest  in  the  subject 
does  not  induce  them  to  examine,  or  which  their  inclinations  lead 
them  to  cherish,  cast  it  all  aside.  In  this  way  they  relieve  themselveg 
from  the  labor  of  investigation,  as  well  as  their  compunctions  of 
conscience ;  while  they  indulge  both  their  love  of  sin  and  pride  of 
singularity. 

An  instance  of  the  use  of  this  book  to  such  a  mind,  we  have  in  the 
case  of  Chalmers.  He  had  read,  when  a  young  man,  several  infidel 
productions.  Their  semblance  of  logic  and  learning,  and  supercilious 
confidence  of  style,  disposed  him  to  regard  all  religion  as  mere  super- 
stition. His  mind  was  poisoned.  Accustomed  as  he  had  been  to  the 
positive  and  precise  reasonings  of  mathematics,  he  could  not  find 
similar  proofs  for  Christianity.  But  he  Avas  induced,  by  some  friends, 
to  study  Butler's  Analogy.  This,  as  he  expresses  it,  took  Christianity 
"  out  of  the  class  of  unlikelihoods.''  It  brought  him  to  the  investi- 
gation, as  if  the  evidence  was  neither  plus  nor  minus.  He  examined 
the  evidences  as  he  would  have  done  a  declaration  that  Cicero  weighed 
just  one  hundred  and  fifty  pounds ;  open  to  the  smallest  proof  or 
presumption  on  the  positive  side  of  the  question.  Delivered  from 
prejudice,  not  only  against  Christianity  but  against  its  proofs,  he  soon 
saw  the  madness  of  deism,  and  immovably  accepted  the  word  of 
God,  though  he  did  not,  at  that  time,  feel  its  transforming  power 
on  his  own  heart.  Long  afterwards  he  writes,  "I  cannot  render 
Bufiicient  homage  to  the  argument,  which  first,  addressing  itself  to  the 
suhjed-matter  of  Christianity,  relieves  it  of  all  disproof,  and  pro- 
nounces it  worthy  of  a  trial ;  and  then,  addressing  itself  to  the  evi- 
dence of  Christianity,  relieves  it  of  all  objections,  and  makes  good,  to 
that  evidence,  all  the  entireness  and  efficiency  which  natively  belong 
to  it."  Years  afterwards  he  said,  "Butler  made  me  a  Christian." 
That  it  did  far  more  for  him  than  to  efi*ect  his  change  of  sentiment, 
that  it  continued  to  be  a  light  in  his  firmament,  is  touchingly  told  in 
the  Preface  of  his  Bridgewater  Treatise,  where  he  says,  "  I  have 
derived  greater  aid  from  the  views  and  reasonings  of  Butler,  than  I 
have  been  able  to  find,  besides,  in  the  whole  range  of  our  extant 
authorship." 

To  the  sincere  believer  in  the  word  of  God  the  study  of  Butler  is 
of  great  use.  Doubts  are  among  Satan's  tried  weapons,  and  often 
haunt  the  holiest,  especially  if  of  a  contemplative  turn.  They  see 
goodness  oppressed,  and  vice  rampant;  the  world  ruled  by  wuktd 


EDITOR  S    INTRODUCTION.  l6 

men,  and  truth  making  its  way  with  difficulty.  Their  heans  are 
traitorous,  their  surroundings  full  of  temptation,  and  the  direct  evi- 
dence of  Christianity  they  may  never  have  studied.  To  such  the 
analogical  argument  comes  with  full  power,  meets  a  candid  exami- 
nation, and  prevails. 

To  no  Christian  is  this  book  so  useful  as  the  minister.  He  is  con- 
stantly confronted  by  the  difficulties  which  Butler  so  triumphantly 
handles.  Here  he  Ife  furnished,  not  only  with  a  shield  to  protect  his 
own  mind  from  subtle  darts,  but  a  sword  to  demolish  the  cavil,  and 
defend  the  system  of  which  he  is  a  public  teacher. 

To  all  persons  this  book  is  of  great  value.  We  arrive  at  certainty 
in  but  few  of  our  decisions,  and  are  often  obliged,  even  in  matters  of 
great  moment,  to  act  on  probability.  Thus  we  employ  precautions 
when  an  evil  is '  not  certain  to  occur.  If  the  evil  would  be  very 
serious,  we  adopt  the  precaution,  when  there  is  but  little  probability, 
or  perhaps  a  bare  possibility,  of  its  occurrence.  Now,  Butler  has 
shown  that  if  the  proofs  of  revelation  were  weak,  nay,  if  it  had  abso- 
lutely no  proof,  nay  further,  if  on  fair  examination  there  appeared 
not  even  a  probability  of  its  truth,  still  there  would  remain  a  possi- 
hility,  and  this  alone,  considering  the  tremendous  issues  at  stake, 
should  make  every  man  a  Christian.  This  argument  cannot  be 
applied  to  Mahometanism  or  any  other  religion,  because  against  those 
much  may  be  advanced  as  disproof.  Our  author,  having  shown  the 
utter  absence  of  disproof,  shuts  us  up  to  the  reception  of  Christianity, 
were  its  truth  barely  possible. 

There  have  not  been  wanting  persons  to  disparage  the  "  Analogy," 
because  it  affords,  as  they  say,  no  direct  proof  of  revelation.  As  well 
might  we  demand  a  discussion  of  chemistry  in  a  work  on  astronomy. 
Scores  of  writers  pi^ove  Christianity,  and  here  we  have  one  to  relieve 
us  from  the  difficulties  which  beset  it,  and  objections  which  still 
remain.  There  is  an  aspect  in  which  the  Analogy  may  be  said  to 
contribute  the  best  of  proof.  What  can  go  further  towards  establish- 
ing a  point,  than  to  demonstrate  that  there  is  no  proof  of  the  con- 
trary? What  can  show  the  fallacy  of  a  set  of  objections,  more  than 
to  prove  that  they  might  be  urged  with  no  less  force  against  the 
obvious  course  of  nature?  This  use  of  analogy  is  conformable  to  the 
severest  logic,  and  though  offering  no  pretence  of  positive  argument, 
goes  far  towards  establishing  full  conviction.  "The  probabilities," 
«ays  Stewart,  "resulting  from  a  concurrence  of  different  analogies, 


16  editor's  introduction. 

may  riso  so  high  as  to  produce  an  effect  on  the  belief  scarcely  di* 
cingiiishable  from  moral  certainty." 

When  it  is  considered  that  Butler's  argument  is  wholly  in  addition 
to  the  cumulative  mass  of  direct  and  almost  irresistible  evidence, 
and  removes  even  the  objections  which  attend  the  subject,  we  see  the 
rejection  of  Christianity  to  be  inexpressibly  rash  and  absurd.  We 
see  the  skeptic  condemned  at  his  own  bar,  for  acting  in  the  most 
momentous  of  all  possible  concerns,  in  a  manner  khe  very  opposite  of 
that  which  he  calls  sensible  and  prudent  in  his  ordinary  affairs.  The 
"Analogy"  establishes,  beyond  cavil,  strong presu7nptioiis  that  Chris- 
tianity is  true,  aside  from  all  inspection  of  its  proofs.  The  man, 
therefore,  who  really  understands  this  book,  and  refuses  to  be  a 
Christian,  is  led  by  his  lusts  and  not  his  reason. 

Some  admirers  of  this  book  have  lamented  as  a  defect,  its  want  of 
evangelical  tincture,  and  its  exclusive  reference  to  natural  things. 
To  me,  this  is  a  prime  recommendation.  Were  it  otherwise,  the 
reasoning  would  be  in  a  circle.  The  very  structure  of  the  argument 
demands  that  it  should  avoid  quotations  from  the  Bible. 

It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  some  expressions,  taken  just 
as  they  stand,  without  qualification  by  the  current  of  the  argument, 
tend  to  lead  astray.  For  instance,  "There  is  nothing  in  the  human 
mind  contrary  to  virtue."  "Men^s  happiness  and  virtue  are  left  to 
themselves."  "  Religion  requires  nothing  which  we  are  not  well 
able  to  perform."  "Our  repentance  is  accepted,  to  eternal  life." 
"Our  relations  to  God  are  made  known  by  reason."  Such  expres- 
sions are  not  to  be  taken  alone,  but  as  explained  by  the  general  drift 
of  sentiment  and  doctrine.  No  one  can  be  familiar  with  his  works, 
without  finding  the  fullest  evidence  that  Christianity  was  to  Butler 
infinitely  more  than  a  creed  or  a  ritual.  Nor  should  we  forget  that 
such  expressions  are  not  to  be  interpreted  by  the  tenor  of  the 
"Analogy"  only,  but  by  that  of  his  whole  'Works.' 

Even  if  it  be  judged  that  he  everywhere  fails  to  express  himself  in 
such  phrase  as  we  usually  call  evangelical,  it  should  be  remembered 
that  he  was  a  Church-of-England  man,  at  a  time  when  there  was  a 
powerful  reaction  against  the  evangelism  of  the  Puritans,  and  when 
a  real  lack  of  en\otional  piety  was  general  in  his  church. 

That  he  did  not  enjoy  in  his  last  illness,  which  extended  over  a 
long  period,  that  sustaining  sense  of  the  love  of  Christ  which  hearty 
Christians  generally  feel,  is  certain.  A  friend,  trying  to  relieve  his 
depression,  reminded  him  of  his  excellent  life,  and  espeeiaiiv  nis 


editor's  introduction.  17 

vricle  liberalities.  He  immediately  replied,  "lam  but  a  steward! 
All  is  His,  intrusted  to  me,  to  promote  his  glory  and  the  good  of 
mankind ;  how  can  I  know  that  I  have  not  abused  the  trust  ?  I 
reflect  on  all  these  things,  and  they  fill  my  soul  with  terror  by  the 
feeling  of  responsibility  they  awaken.^' 

On  another  occasion,  his  chaplain  sought  to  soothe  his  troubled  spirit 
by  referring  to  the  extensive  influence  of  his  Analogy  in  reclaiming 
skeptics.  His  reply  was,  "  I  began  the  Analogy  with  a  view  to  the 
glory  of  God ;  but  as  I  proceeded,  visions  of  the  fame  it  might  bring 
me  mingled  themselves  with  my  motives,  and  all  was  polluted  and 
made  sinful !  The  book  may  be  a  blessing  to  others,  but  it  weighs  like 
lead  on  my  soul."  "Admit  all  this,"  tenderly  replied  the  chaplain; 
"yet  has  not  Jesus  said,  'Whosoever  cometh  unto  me  shall  in  no  wise 
be  cast  out'  V  Instantly  the  Bishop  raised  himself  in  the  bed,  exclaim- 
ing, "How  wonderful  that  the  force  of  this  passage  never  struck 
me  before!  'AVhosoever,' — all,  all!  'In  nowise,' — no  amount  of 
sin  can  prevent  acceptance !  Christ's  righteousness  will  hide  the 
iniquities  of  all  who  accept  his  offer  of  mercy  V 

From  that  time,  for  weeks,  Butler  spoke  to  all  who  approached 
him,  of  a  full  and  free  salvation.  He  died  triumphantly  repeating 
this  passage. 

If  all  that  is  said  of  the  lack  of  evangelical  sentiment  in  Butler  or 
his  book  be  conceded,  it  certainly  cannot  impair  either  the  value  of 
the  analogical  argument,  or  the  force  of  our  author's  use  of  it. 

Various  circumstances  conspire  to  make  the  study  of  "  The 
Analogy"  difficult.  The  nature  of  the  reasoning — the  conciseness, 
and  often  obscurity  of  the  style — the  dislocation  of  parts  by  frequent 
digressions — the  arrest  of  a  close  course  of  reasoning  to  answer 
objections — and  the  abstruseness  of  the  subject  itself — combine  to 
make  the  full  comprehension  of  its  import  difficult.  Mackintosh  says, 
"  No  thinker  so  great,  was  ever  so  bad  a  writer.'^  But  this,  like  some 
other  objections  of  Sir  James,  is  stated  too  strongly..  The  language 
is  good,  sinewy  Saxon,  and  will  endure  when  much  that  is  now 
Jailed  fine  writing,  will  seem  grotesque.  Still  it  is  possible  to 
write  philosophy  in  better  phrase,  as  has  been  shown  by  at  least 
two  great  men,  Berkeley  and  Stewart.  Had  Butler  but  possessed  the 
glowing  style  of  Berkeley,  or  the  smooth,  graceful,  and  transparent 
diction  of  Dugald  Stewart,  his  work,  instead  of  serving  only  for  close 
thinkers,  or  a  college  text-book,  would  have  been  read  by  all  classes, 
and  banished  that  vulgar  infidelity  which  flippant  writers  still  di&- 
B  2* 


J8 

seminiite.  That  it  is  thus  restricted  in  its  influence  is  a  misfortune 
to  the  world.  But  he  wrote  for  a  class,  and  did  his  work  completely. 
Literary  infidelity  was  conquered.  Vulgar,  ignorant,  licentious 
infidelity,  will  always  exist,  and  is  even  now  deplorably  prevalent. 
Both  Europe  and  America  contain  conceited  and  malignant  igno- 
ramuses, who  by  their  sneers,  their  cavils,  and  their  audacity,  make 
havoc  of  souls.  Of  these,  Tom  Paine  is  a  type,  whose  book,  the 
contempt  of  cultivated  minds,  continues  to  be  sold  and  read.  For 
this  class  of  persons,  "Baxter's  Call,"  or  "Alleine's  Alarm,"  are 
far  more  suitable  than  treatises  on  the  evidences  of  Christianity,  or 
even  Butler's  Analogy. 


^bitor's  f  refacj. 


The  text  is  the  result  of  a  careful  collation  of  the  various  principal 
editions.  Occasionally  solecisms  are  corrected,  and  a  "word  transposed 
or  put  in  italics,  when  a  sentence  could  thus  be  made  perspicuous. 
The  author  had  a  fashion  of  beginning  a  large  proportion  of  his  sen- 
tences with  "  and,''  "  but,"  "  now,"  "  indeed,"  "  however,"  &c.,  which 
often  served  to  perplex,  and  in  such  cases  they  have  been  omitted. 
Long  paragraphs,  comprehending  different  topics,  have  been  so 
divided  as  to  correspond  with  the  true  analysis ;  which  will  greatly 
assist  the  student  in  detecting  the  successive  stages  of  the  argument. 
Special  pains  has  been  taken  to  correct  and  improve  the  punctuation. 
Hundreds  of  sentences  have  thus  been  rendered  more  perspicuous, 
and  many  which  were  obscure,  have  been  made  lucid.  In  no  respect 
was  Butler's  style,  as  printed,  so  defective. 

The  Conspectus  is  made  much  ampler  than  any  other,  for  this 
reason :  that  students  are  apt  to  content  themselves  with  such  help 
instead  of  mastering  the  full  discussion  by  the  author.  In  the  present 
case  they  cannot  so  do,  for  such  is  the  fulness  of  the  Conspectus,  that 
if  they  master  this,  they  have  mastered  the  subject  itself  in  full. 

Notes  by  the  present  editor  are  distinguished  from  those  of  the 
author  by  being  enclosed  in  brackets.  They  are  designed  to  open  out 
further  views,  to  elucidate  the  text,  to  facilitate  extended  researches, 
and  to  suggest  topics  for  conversation  in  the  class-room. 

The  Index  has  cost  far  more  labor  than  would  be  supposed,  and 

may  not  be  of  much  benefit  to  the  undergraduate.     Its  advantages 

\^  ill  not  be  small  to  him  in  after  life  when  he  desires  to  recur  to  par- 

19 


20 

ticular  topics.  The  general  scliolar  will  find  it  enable  him  to  make 
use  of  the  book  for  occasional  reference.  "Without  it  the  work  is  not 
complete  for  the  class-room,  still  less  for  the  library. 

That  students  of  the  Analogy  need  help,  is  confessed ;  and  all 
attempts  to  furnish  it  have  been  kindly  received.  As  is  remarked  by 
Bishop  Wilson,  "His  argument,  clear  and  convincing  as  it  is  to  a 
prepared  mind,  is  not  obvious  to  the  young  reader,  whose  experience 
of  life  being  small,  and  his  habits  of  reflection  feeble,  has  not  the 
furniture  necessary  for  comprehending,  at  first,  the  thoughts  and 
conclusions  of  such  a  mind.  The  style  is  too  close,  too  negligent,  too 
obscure,  to  be  suitable  for  the  young.^' 

If  it  be  asked  why,  with  several  existing  helps  to  the  study  of  the 
Analogy,  I  ofier  another,  I  frankly  reply,  because  I  have  found  none 
of  them  satisfactory,  either  to  the  public  or  to  myself. 


Some  teachers  prefer  their  text-books  to  be  accompanied  by  a  set 
of  questions.  Such  will  find  in  this  edition  all  they  desire.  They 
have  only  to  enunciate  each  sentence  of  the  Conspectus  in  the 
interrogative  form,  and  they  will  have  every  possible  question 
prepared  to  their  hand. 


€m^tdn  0f  %  ^wt^wr's  lutotarimn^ 


I.  What  is  probable  evidence  ? 

1*  It  differs  from  demonstration  in  that  it  admits  of  degrees;  of  all  degrees. 
1.)  One  probability  does  not  beget  assurance. 
2.)  But  the  slightest  presumption  makes  a  probability, 
3.)  The  repetition  of  it  may  make  certainty. 
2.  What  constitutes  probability  is  likeness;  in  regard  to  the  event  itself,  or  its 
kind  of  evidences,  or  its  circumstances. 
1.)  This  daily  affords  presumptions,  evidence,  or  conviction  :  according  as  it 

is  occasional,  common,  or  constant. 
2.)  Measures  our  hopes  and  fears. 
3.)  Regulates  our  expectations  as  to  men's  conduct. 
4.)  Enables  us  to  judge  of  character  from  conduct. 
3*  It  is  an  imperfect  mode  of  judging,   and  adapted  to  beings  of  limited 

capacities. 
4.  Where  better  evidence  cannot  be  had,  it  constitutes  moral  obligation,  even 
though  great  doubts  remain. 
1.)  We  are  as  much  bound  to  do  what,  on  the  whole,  appears  to  be  best,  as 

if  we  hieic  it  to  be  so. 
2.)  In  questions  of  great  moment,  it  is  reasonable  to  act  when  the  favorable 

chances  are  no  greater  than  the  unfavorable. 
3.)  There  are  numberless  cases  in  which  a  man  would  be  thought  distracted 
if  he  did  not  act,  and  that  earnestly,  where  the  chances  of  success  were 
greatly  against  him, 

II.  The  use  and  application  of  probabilities. 

Shall  not  go  further  into  the  nature  of  probable  evidence,  nor  inquire  why 
likeness  begets   presumption    and  conviction;    nor  how  far   analogical 
reasoning  can  be  reduced  to  a  system;  but  shall  only  show  how  just  and 
conclusive  this  mode  of  reasoning  is. 
X*  In  determining  our  judgments  and  practice. 

1.)  There  may  be  eases  in  which  its  s^alue  is  doubtful. 
2.)  There  may  be  seeming  analogies,  which  are  not  really  such. 
3.)  But  as  a  mode  of  argument,  it  is  perfectly  just  and  conclusive. 
it*  In  noting  correspondencies  between  the  different  parts  of  God's  govenip 
ment. 

21 


22  CONSPECTUS   OF   INTRODUCTION. 

3  )  We  may  expect  to  find  the  same  sort  of  difficulties  in  tlie  Bible,  as  we  do 

in  Nature. 
2.)  To  deny  the  Bible  to  be  of  God,  because  of  these  difficulties,  requires  U8 

to  deny  that  the  world  was  made  by  him. 
3.)  If  there  be  a  likeness  between  revelation  and  the  system  of  nature,  it 

affords  a  presumption  that  both  have  the  same  author. 
4.)  To  reason  on  the  construction  and  government  of  the  world,  without 

settling  foundation-principles,  is  mere  hypothesis. 
5.)  To  apply  principles  which  are  certain,  to  cases  which  are  not  applicable, 

is  no  better. 
6.)  But  to  join  abstract  reasonings  to  the  observation  of  facts,  and  argue, 
from  known  present  things,  to  what  is  likely  or  credible,  must  be 
right. 
7.)  We  cannot  avoid  acting  thus,  if  we  act  at  all. 
3*  In  its  application  to  religion,  revealed,  as  well  as  natural.     This  is  the  use 
which  will  be  made  of  analogy  in  the  following  work.     In  so  using  it, 
1.)  It  will  be  taken  for  proved  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Creator  and 
Ruler. 
— There  are  no  presumptions  against  this,  prior  to  proof. 
— There  are  proofs : — from  analogy,  reason,  tradition,  &c. 
— The  fact  is  not  denied  by  the  generality  of  skeptics. 
2.)  No  regard  will  be  paid  to  those  who  idly  speculate  as  to  how  the  world 
might  have  been  made  and  governed. 
— Such  prating  would  amount  to  this  : 

•  All  creatures  should  have  been  made  at  first  as  happy  as  they 

could  be. 

•  Nothing  of  hazard  should  be  put  upon  them. 

•  Should  have  been  secured  in  their  happiness. 
.  All  punishments  avoided. 

— It  is  a  sufficient  reply  to  such  talk  that  mankind  have  not  faculties 
for  such  speculations. 
3.)  We  are,  to  some  extent,  judges  as  to  ends;  and  may  conclude  that  Na- 
ture and  Providence  are  designed  to  produce  virtue  and  happiness; 
but  of  the  means  of  producing  these  in  the  highest  degree,  we  are  not 
competent  judges. 
— We  know  not  the  extent  of  the  universe  j 
— Nor  even  how  one  person  can  best  be  brought  to  perfection. 
— We  are  not  often  competent  to  judge  of  the  conduct  of  each  other. 
— ^As  to  God,  we  may  presume  that  order  will  prevail  in  his  universe; 
but  are  no  judges  of  his  modes  for  accomplishing  this  end. 
4.)  Instead  of  vainly,  and  perhaps  sinfully,  imagining  schemes  for  God's 
conduct,  we  must  study  what  is. 
— Discovering  general  laws. 

— Comparing  the  known  course  of  things  with  what  revelation  teaches 
us  to  expect. 

III.  The  force  of  this  use  of  Analogy. 
1*  Sometimes  is  practically  equivalent  to  proof. 
2*  Confirms  what  is  otherwise  proved. 


CONSPECTUS   OF   INTRODUCTION.  23 

3*  Shows  that  the  system  of  revelation  is  no  more  open  to  ridicule,  than  tho 
system  of  nature. 

4.  Answers  almost  all  ohjections  against  religion. 

5.  To  a  great  extent  answers  objections  against  the proo/a  of  religion. 

IV.   General  scope  of  the  book. 

1.  The  divine  government  is  considered,  as  containing  in  it. 
Chap.  1.  Man's  future  existence. 

"     2.  In  a  state  of  reward  or  punishment. 

"      3.  This  according  to  our  behavior. 

"      4.  Our  present  life  probationary. 

"      5.  And  also  disciplinary. 

"      6.  Notwithstanding  the  doctrine  of  necessity. 

"     7.  Or  any  apparent  want  of  wisdom  or  goodness. 
2*  Revealed  religion  is  considered, 
Chap.  1.  As  important. 

"      2.  As  proved  by  miracles. 

"      3.  As  containing  strange  things. 

"     4.  As  a  scheme  imperfectly  comprehended. 

*'      5.  As  carried  on  by  a  mediator. 

"      6.  As  having  such  an  amount  of  evidence  as  God  saw  fit  to  girt 

"     7.  As  having  sufficient  and  full  evidence. 


&m$i^ttim  tit  %  ^natogs. 


PART  I. 

CHAPTER    L 

A   FUTURE    LIFE. 


Will  not  discuss  the  subject  of  identity;  but  will  consider  what  analogy  sug- 
gests from  changes  which  do  not  destroy;  and  thus  see  whether  it  is  not 
probable  that  we  shall  live  hereafter. 

I.   The  probabilities  that  we  shall  survive  death. 

J .  It  is  a  law  of  nature  that  creatures  should  exist  in  different  stages,  and 
in  various  degrees  of  perfection. 
— Worms  turn  into  flies. 
— Eggs  are  hatched  into  birds. 

— Our  own  present  state  is  as  different  from  our  stat«  in  the  womb,  M 
two  states  of  the  same  being  can  be. 


24  CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

—That  we  shall  hereafter  exist  in  a  state  as  different  from  the  present  &A 

the  present  is  from  our  state  in  the  womb,  is  according  to  analogy. 
2*  We  now  have  capacities  fur  happiness,  action,  misery,  &c.,  and  there  is 
always  a  probability  that  things  will  continue  as  they  are,  except  when 
experience  gives  us  reason  to  think  they  will  be  altered.  This  is  a  gene- 
ral law;  and  is  our  ojili/  natural  reason  for  expecting  the  continuance  of 
any  thing. 
3.  There  is  no  reason  to  apprehend  that  death  will  destroy  us. 

If  there  was,  it  would  arise  from  the  nature  of  death  3  or  from  the  analogy 

of  nature. 
1.)  Not  from  the  nature  of  death. 
— We  know  not  what  death  is. 
— But  only  some  of  its  effects. 

— These  effects  do  not  imply  the  destruction  of  the  living  agent. 
— We  know  little  of  what  the  exercise  of  our  powers  depends  upon;  and 

nothing  of  what  the  poicers  themselves  depend  on. 
— We  may  be  unable  to  exercise  our  powers,  and  yet  not  lose  them — 

e.g.  sleep,  swoon. 
2.)  Not  from  analogy. 

— Reason  shows  no  connection  between  death  and  our  destruction, 

— We  have  no  faculties  by  which  to  trace  any  being  beyond  it. 

— The  possession  of  living  powers,  up  to  the   very  moment  when  our 

faculties  cease  to  be  able   to   trace  them,  is  a  probability  of  their 

continuing. 
— We  have  already  survived  wonderful  changes. 
— To  live  after  death  is  analogous  to  the  course  of  nature. 

II.  Presumptions  against  a  future  life. 

1.  That  death  destroys  us. 

Ans.  1.  This  is  an  assumption  that  we  are  compound  and  material  beings,  and 
hence  discerptible ;  which  is  not  true. 
1.)  Consciousness  is  a  single,  indivisible  power,  and  of  course  the  subject  ot 

it  must  be. 
2.)  The  material  body  is  not  ourself. 

3.)  We  can  easily  conceive  of  our  having  more  limbs,  or  of  a  different  kind, 
or  of  having  more  or  fewer  senses,  or  of  having  no  bodies  at  all,  or  of 
hereafter  animating  these  same  bodies,  remodelled. 
4.)  The  dissolution  of  a  succession  of  new  and  strange  bodies,  would  have 
no  tendency  to  destroy  us. 
Ans.  2.  Though  the  absolute  simplicity  of  the  living  being  cannot  be  provei  by 
ex2)erimcnt,  yet  facts  lead  us  so  to  conclude.     We  lose  limbs,  <fcc. 
Our  bodies  were  once  very  small,  but  we  might,  then,  have  lost  part 
of  them.     There  is  a  constant  destruction  and  renewal  going  on. 
1.)  Thus  we  see  that  no  certain  hulk  is  necessary  to  our  existence,  and  unless 
it  were  proved  that  there  is,  and  that  it  is  larger  than  an  indissoluble 
atom,  there  is  no  reason  to  presume  that  death  destroys  us,  even  if  we 
are  discerptible. 
2.)  The  living  agent  is  not  an  internal  material  organism,  whioh  dies  -witli 
the  body.     Because 


CONSPifCTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY.  25 

—Our  only  ground  for  this  presumption  is  our  relation  to  other  systemf 

of  matter.     But  we  see  these  are  not  necessary  to  us. 
—It  will  not  do  to  say  that  lost  portions  of  the  body  were  not  essential-^ 

who  is  to  determine? 
—The  relation  between  the  living  agent,  and  the  most  essential  parts  of 
the  body,  is  only  one  by  which  they  mutually  affect  each  other. 
8.)  If  we  regard  our  body  as  made  up  of  organs  of  sense,  we  come  to  the 
same  result. 
— We  see  with  the  eyes,  just  as  we  do  with  glasses.     The  eye  is  not  a 

recipient,  any  more  than  a  telescope. 
—It  is  not  pretended  that  vision,  hearing,  &c.  can  be  traced  clear  up  to 
the  percipient ;    but  so  far  as  we  can  trace  perceptions,  the  organ 
does  not  perceive. 
— In  dreams  we  perceive  without  organs. 

— When  we  lose  a  limb  we  do  not  lose  the  directing  poicer ;  we  could 
move  a  new  one,  if  it  could  be  made,  or  a  wooden  one.  But  the 
limb  cut  off  has  no  power  of  moving. 
—Thus,  our  loss  of  the  organs  of  perception  and  motion,  not  being  the 
destruction  of  the  power,  there  is  no  ground  to  think  that  the  de- 
struction of  other  organs  or  instruments  would  destroy  «s. 
Objection.  These  observations  apply  equally  to  brutes. 

Ans.  1.  Be  it  so.     Perhaps  they  are  immortal : — may  hereafter  improve :  we 
know  not  what  latent  powers  they  may  have. 
1.)  The    human  being  at  one  period  looks  as  little  likely  to   make   great 
intellectual  attainments ;  for  a  long  time  he  has  capacities  for  virtue 
and  religion,  but  cannot  use  them. 
2.)  Many  persons  go  out  of  the  world  who  never  became  able  to  exercise 
these  capacities;  e.g.  infants. 
Ans.  2.  If  brutes  were  immortal,  it  does  not  prove  them  to  be  moral  agents. 
1.)  It  may  be  necessary,  for  aught  we  know,  that  there  should  be  living 

creatures  not  moral  agents,  nor  rational. 
2.)  All  difficulties  as  to  what  would  become  of  them,  are  founded  in  our 
ignorance. 
2*  That  our  souls,  though  not  material,  so  depend  upon  the  bodily  structure, 

that  we  cannot  survive  its  destruction. 
Ans.  1.  Reason,  memory,  &c.  do  not  depend  on  the  body,  as  perceptions  by 
the  senses  do.     Death  may  destroy  those  instruments,  and  yet  not 
destroy  the  poioers  of  reflection. 
Ana.  2.  Human  beings  exist,  here,  in  two  very  different  states,  each  having  its 
own  laws:  sensation   and  reflection.     By  the  first  we  feel;  by  the 
second  we  reason  and  will. 
1.)  Nothing  which  we  know  to  be  destroyed  at  death,  is  necessary  to  reflect- 
ing on  ideas  formerly  received. 
2.)  Though  the  senses  act  like  scaffolds,  or  levers,  to  bring  in  ideas,  yet  when 
once  in,  we  can  reflect,  &c.  without  their  aid. 
A*».  3,  There  are  diseases  which  prove  tatal,  «fec.,  yet  do  not,  in  any  part  of 
their  course,  impair  the  intellect;  and  this  indicates  that  they  do  not 
destroy  it. 


26  CONSPECTUS    or   THE   ANALOGY. 

i.)  In  the  diseases  alluded  to,  persons  have  their  reflective  power^  in  full, 

the  very  moment  before  death. 
2.)  Now,  why  should  a  disease,  at  a  certain  degree,  utterly  destroy  powers 

which  were  not  even  affected  by  it,  up  to  that  point? 
3*  That  death  at  least  suspends  our  reflective  powers,  or  interrupts  our  con- 
tinuing to  exist  in  the  like  state  of  reflection  which  we  do  now. 
Ana.  There  appears  so  little  connection  between  our  powers  of  sensation  and 

our  powers  of  reflection   that  we   cannot  presume  that   what   might 

destroy  the  former,  could  even  suspend  the  latter. 
1.)  We  daily  see  reason,  memory,  &c.  exercised  without  any  assistance,  that 

we  know  of,  from  our  bodies. 
2.)  Seeing  them  in  lively  exercise  to  the  last,  we  must  infer  that  death  is  not 

a  discontinuance  of  their  exercise,  nor  of  the  enjoyments  and  sufferings 

of  such  exercise. 
3.)  Our  posthumous  life  may  be  but  a  going  on,  with  additions.     Like  the 

change  at  our  birth — which  produced  not  a  suspension  of  the  faculties 

we  had  before,  nor  a  total  change  in  our  state  of  life ;  but  a  continuance 

of  both,  with  great  alterations. 
4.)  Death  may  but  at  once  put  us  into  a  higher  state  of  life,  as  our  birth 

did ;  our  relation  to  bodily  organs  may  be  the  only  hinderance  to  our 

entering  a  higher  condition  of  the  reflective  powers. 
5.)  Were  we  even  sure  that  death  would  suspend  our  intellectual  powers,  it 

would  not  furnish  even  the  lowest  probability  that  it  would  destroy 

them. 
Ohjec.  From  the  analogy  of  plants. 
Ans.  This  furnishes  poets  with  apt  illustrations  of  our  frailty,  but  affords  no 

proper  analogy.      Plants  are  destitute  of  perception  and  action,  and 

this  is  the  very  matter  in  question. 

EEMARKS. 

1.  It  has  been  shown,  that  confining  ourselves  to  what  we  know,  we  see  no 

probability  of  ever  ceasing  to  be : — it  cannot  be  concluded  from  the  reason 
of  the  thing: — nor  from  the  analogy  of  nature. 

2.  We  are  therefore  to  go  upon  the  belief  of  a  future  existence. 

3*  Our  going  into  neio  scenes  and  conditions,  is  just  as  natural  as  our  coming 

into  the  world. 
4.  Our  condition  may  naturally  be  a  social  one. 

5*  The  advantages  of  it  may  naturally  be  bestowed,  according  to  some  fixed 
law,  in  proportion  to  one's  degrees  in  virtue. 
1.)  Perhaps  not  so  much  as  now  hy  society;  but  by  God's  more  immediate 

action. 
2.)  Yet  this  will  be  no  less  natural,  i.e.  stated,  fixed,  or  settled. 
3.)  Our  notions  of  what  is  natural,  are  enlarged  by  greater  knowledge  of  God 

and  his  works. 
4.)  There  may  be  some  beings  in  the  world,  to  whom  the  whole  of  Chris- 
tianity is  as  natural  as  the  visible  course  of  nature  seems  to  us. 
6.  These  probabilities  of  a  future  life,  though  they  do  not  satisfy  curiosity, 
answer  all  the  purposes  of  religion,  as  well  as  demonstration. 
1.)  Even  a  demonstration  of  a  future  state,  would  not  demonstrate  religion, 
but  would  be  reconcilable  with  atheism. 


CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY.  27 

2.)  But  as  religion  implies  a  future  state,  any  presumption  against  such  a 

state,  would  be  a  presumption  against  religion. 
3.)  The  foregoing  observations  remove  all  presumptions  of  that  sort,  and 

prove  to  a  great  probability,  a  fundamental  doctrine  of  religion. 


CHAPTER  ir. 

THE    GOVERNMENT    OF    GOD   BY   REWARDS   AND   PUNISHMENTS. 

The  question  of  a  future  life  is  rendered  momentous  by  our  capacity  for 
happiness  and  misery. 

Especially  if  that  happiness  or  misery  depends  on  our  present  conduct. 

"We  should  feel  the  deepest  solicitude  on  this  subject. 

And  that  if  there  were  no  proof  of  a  future  life  and  interest,  other  than  the 
probabilities  just  discussed. 

I.  In  the  present  world  our  pleasures  and  pains  are,  to  a  great  extent, 

in  our  oxon  power, 

1.  We  see  them  to  be  consequences  of  our  actions. 

2.  And  we  can  foresee  these  consequences. 

3.  Our  desires  are  not  gratified,  without  the  right  kind  of  exertion. 

4.  By  prudence  we  may  enjoy  life;  rashness,  or  even  neglect  may  make  us 

miserable. 
5*  Why  this  is  so  is  another  matter. 

1.)  It  may  be  impossible  to  be  otherwise. 

2.)  Or  it  may  be  best  on  the  whole. 

3.)  Or  God's  plan  may  be  to  make  only  the  good  happy. 

4.)  Or  the  whole  plan  may  be  incomprehensible  to  us. 
Ohjec.  It  may  be  said  ''  this  is  only  the  course  of  nature." 
Ans.  It  is  granted  :  but 

1.  The  course  of  nature  is  but  the  will  of  God.      We  admit  that  God  is  the 

natural  governor  of  the  world :  and  must  not  turn  round  and  deny  it 
because  his  government  is  uniform. 

2.  Our  natural  foresight  of  the  consequences  of  actions,  is  his  appointment. 

3.  The  consequences  themselves,  are  his  appointment. 

4.  Our  ability  to  foresee  these  consequences,  is  God's  instruction  how  we  are 

to  act. 
Ohjec.  By  this  reasoning  we  are  instructed  to  gratify  our  appetites,  and  such 

gratification  is  our  reward  for  so  doing. 
Ans.  Certainly  not.    Foreseen  pleasures  and  pains  are  proper  motives  to  action 
in  general;    but  we  may,  in  particular  cases,    damage    ourselves  by 
indulgence.     Our  eyes  are  made  to  see  with,  but  not  to  look  at  every 
thing  : — for  instance  the  sun. 
It  follows,  from  what  has  been  said,  that 

II.  We  are,  now,  actually  under  God^s  government,  in  the  strictest 

sense. 
I.  i  dmittiug  that  there  is  a  God,  it  is  not  so  much  a  matter  of  speculation,  aa 
of  experience,  that  he  governs  us. 


28  CONSPECTUS  or  the  analogy. 

2.  The  annexii\g  of  pleasures  and  pains  to  certain  actions,  and  giving  notice 

of  them,  is  the  very  essence  of  government. 
3*  Whether  by  direct  acts  apon  us,  or  by  contriving  a  general  plan,  does  not 
affect  the  argument. 
1.)  If  magistrates  could  make  laws  which  should  execute  themselves,  their 

goA-ernment  would  be  far  more  perfect  than  it  is. 
2.)  God's  making  fire  burn  us,  is  as  much  an  instance  of  government,  as  if 
he  directly  h)Jlicted  the  burn,  whenever  we  touched  fire. 
4.  Hence  the  analogy  of  nature  shows  nothing  to  render  incredible  the  Bible 
doctrine  of  God's  rewarding  or  punishing  according  to  our  actions. 

Additional  remarks  on  Punishment. 

As  men  object  chiefly  to  future  punishment,  it  is  proper  to  show  further  that 
the  course  of  administration,  as  to  present  punishment,  is  analogous  to  what 
religion  teaches  as  to  the  future. 

Indeed  they  add  credibility  to  it. 

And  ought  to  raise  the  most  serious  apprehension. 

I.  Circumstances  to  he  observed  touching  present  punishments. 

1.  They  often  follow  acts  which  produce  present  pleasure  or  advantage. 

2.  The  sufferings  often  far  exceed  the  pleasui'e  or  advantage. 

3.  They  often  follow  remotely. 

4.  After  long  delay  they  often  come  suddenly. 

5.  As  those  remote  effects  are  not  certainly  foreseen,  they  may  not  be  thought 

of  at  the  time ;  or  if  so,  there  is  a  hope  of  escaping. 

6.  There  are  opportunities  of  advantage,  which  if  neglected  do  not  recur. 

7.  Though,  in  some  cases,  men  who  have  sinned  up  to  a  certain  point,  may 

retrieve  their  affairs,  yet  in  many  cases,  reformation  is  of  no  avail. 

8.  Inconsiderateness  is  often  as  disastrous  as  wilful  wrong-doing. 

9.  As  some  punishments  by  civil  government,  are  capital,  so  are  some  natural 

punishments. 
1.)  Seem  intended  to  remove  the  offender  out  of  the  way. 
2.)  Or  as  an  example  to  others. 

II.  These  things  are  not  accidental,  but  proceed  from  fixed  laws. 

1.  They  are  matters  of  daily  experience. 

2.  Proceed  from  the  general  laws,  by  which  the  world  is  governed. 

III.  They  so  closely  resemble  what  religion  teaches,  as  to  future  punish- 

ment, that  both  might  be  expressed  in  the  same  words. 

e.g.  Proverbs,  oh.  i. 

The  analogy  sufficiently  answers  all  objections  against  the  Scripture  doctrine 
of  future  punishment,  such  as 

1.)  That  our  frailty  or  temptations  annihilate  the  guilt  of  vice. 

2.)  Or  the  objection  from  necessity. 

3.)  Or  that  the  Almighty  cannot  be  contradicted. 

4.)  Or  that  he  cannot  be  offended. 


CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY.  29 


REMARKS. 

1.  Such  reflections  are  terrific,  but  ought  to  be  stated  and  considered. 

3.  Disregard  of  a  hereafter  cannot  be  justified  by  any  thing  short  of  a 
demonstration  of  atheism.  Even  skeptical  doctrines  afi"ord  no  justifi- 
cation. 

3.  There  is  no  pretence  of  reason  for  presuming  that  the  licentious  will  not 
find  it  better  for  them  that  they  had  never  been  born. 


CHAPTER  III. 

MORAL     GOVERNMENT    OF     GOD. 

As  the  structure  of  the  world  shows  intelligence,  so  the  mode  of  distributing 
pleasure  and  pain,  shows  government.  That  is,  God's  natural  government, 
such  as  a  king  exercises  over  his  subjects. 

But  this  does  not,  at  first  sight,  determine  what  is  the  moral  character  of 
such  government. 

I.  What  is  a  moral  or  righteous  government? 

1.  Not  mere  rewarding  and  punishing. 

2.  But  doing  this  according  to  character. 

3.  The  perfection  of  moral  government  is  doing  this  exactly, 
Ohjec.  God  is  simply  and  absolutely  benevolent. 

Ans.  Benevolence,  infinite  in  degree,  would  dispose  him  to  produce  the  greatest 

possible  happiness,  regardless  of  behaviour.     This  would  rob  God  of 

other  attributes ;  and  should  not  be  asserted  unless  it  can  be  proved. 

And  whether  it  can  be  proved  is  not  the  point  now  in  hand. 

The  question  is  not  whether  there  may  not  be,  in  the  universe,  beings  to 

whom  he  manifests  absolute  benevolence,  which  might  not  be  incompatible  with 

justice;  but  whether  he  treats  us  so. 

4.  It  must  be  owned  to  be  vastly  difficult,  in  such  a  disordered  world,  to  esti- 

mate with  exactness  the  overplus  of  hanpiness  on  the  side  of  virtue:  and 
there  may  be  exceptions  to  the  rule.  But  it  is  far  from  being  doubtful 
that  on  the  whole,  virtue  is  happier  than  vice,  in  this  world. 

II.  The  beginnings  of  a  righteous  administration,  are  seen  in  nature. 
1.  It  has  been  proved  (ch.  ii.)  that  God  governs :  and  it  is  reasonable  to  sup- 
pose that  he  would  govern  righteously. 

1.)  Any  other  rule  of  government  would  be  harder  to  account  for. 
2.)  The  Bible  doctrine   that  hereafter  the  good  shall  be  happy,  and  the 
wicked  miserable,  is  no  more  than  an  expectation  that  a  method  of 
government,  now  begun,  shall  be  carried  on. 
'i.  The  opposite  consequences  of  prudence  and  rashness,  show  a  right  consti- 
tution of  nature;  and  our  ability  to  foresee  and  control  these  consequences, 
shows  that  we  are  under  moral  law. 
?.  God  has  so  constructed  society  that  vice,  to  a  great  degree,  is  actually 
punished  by  it. 
1.)  Without  this,  society  could  not  exist. 


80  CONSPECTUS   OP  THE  ANALOGY. 

2.)  "[This  i    God's  government,  through  society;  and  is  as  natural,  as  society; 
3.)  Since  .he  course  of  things  is  God's  appointment,  men  are  unavoidably 
accountable  for  their  behaviour. 
Ohjec.  Society  often  punishes  good  actions,  and  rewards  wickedness. 
Ans.  1.  This  is  not  necessary,  and  consequently  not  natural. 

2.  Good  actions   are  never  punished  by   society  o«  good,  but  because 
considered  bad. 
4*  By  the  course  of  nature,  virtue  is  rewarded,  and  vice  punished,  as  such, 
which  proves  a  moral  government;  as  will  be  seen  if  we  rightly  distin- 
guish between  actions  and  their  qualities. 
1.)  An  action  may  produce  present  gratification  though  it  be  wrong :   in 
which  case  the  gratification  is  in  the  act,  not  the  morality  of  it:  in  other 
cases  the  enjoyment  consists  wholly  in  the  quality  of  virtuousness. 
2.)  Vice   is   naturally   attended   with   uneasiness,    apprehension,   vexation, 
remorse,  &c. 
— This  is  a  very  different  feeling  from  that  produced  by  mere  misfortune. 
— Men  comfort  themselves  under  misfortune,  that  it  was  not  their  own  fault. 
3.)  Honest  and  good  men  are  befriended  as  such. 

4.)  Injuries  are  resented  as  implying  fault;  and  good  oflSces  are  regarded 
with   gratitude   on  account  of  the  intention,  even  when  they  fail  to 
benefit  us. 
— This  is  seen  in  family  government,  where  children  are  punished  for 

falsehood,  fretfulness,  <fec.,  though  no  one  is  hurt. 
— And  also  in  civil  government,  where  the  absence  or  presence  of  ill 
intention  goes  far  in  determining  the  penalty  of  wrong-doing, 
5.)  The  whole  course  of  the  world,  in  all  ages  and  relations,  turns  much  upon 

approbation  and  disapprobation. 
6.)  The  very  fact  of  our  having  a  moral  nature,  is  a  proof  of  our  being 
under  God's  moral  government. 
— "We  are  placed  in  a  condition  which  unavoidably  operates  on  our  moral 

nature. 
— Hence  it  arises  that  reward  to  virtue  and  reprobation  of  vice,  as  such, 
is  a  rule,  never  inverted.     If  it  be  thought  that  there  are  instances 
to  the  contrary,  (which  is  not  so,)  they  are  evidently  monstrous. 
— The  degree  in  which  virtue  and  vice  receive  proper  returns,  is  not  the 
question  now,  but  only  the  thing  itself,  in  some  degree. 
7.)  It  is  admitted  that  virtue  sometimes  suffers,  and  vice  prospers ;  but  this 

is  disorder,  and  not  the  order  of  nature. 
8.)  It  follows,  that  we  have  in  the  government  of  the  world,  a  declaration 
from  God,  for  virtue  and  against  vice.    So  far  as  a  man  is  true  to  virtue, 
is  he  on  the  side  of  the  divine  administration.     Such  a  man  must  have 
a  sense  nf  security,  and  a  hope  of  something  better. 
S,  This  hope  is  confirmed  by  observing  that  virtue  has  necessary  tendencies 
beyond  their  present  efi"ects. 
1.)  These  are  very  obvious  with  regard  to  individuals. 
2.)  Are  as  real,  though  not  so  patent,  in  regard  to  society. 

— The  power  of  a  society  under  the  direction  of  virtue,  tends  to  prevail 
over  power  not  so  directed,  just  as  power  under  direction  of  reason, 
tends  to  prevail  over  brute  force. 


CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY.  81 

— As  this  may  not  be  conceded,  wo  will  notice  how  the  case  stands, 
as  to  reason  : 

•  Length  of  time,  and  proper  opportunity,  are  necessary  for  reason 

to  triumph  over  brutes. 
.  Kational  beings,  disunited,  envious,  unjust,  and  treacherous,  may 
be  overcome  by  brutes,  uniting  themselves  by  instinct:  but  this 
would  be  an  inverted  order  of  things. 
—A  like  tendency  has  virtue  to  produce  superiority. 

•  By  making   the  good  of   society,  the  object  of  every  member 

of  it. 

•  By  making  every  one  industrious  in  his  own  sphere. 

•  By  uniting  all  in  one  bond  of  veracity  and  justice. 

3.)  If   the  part  of  God's  government  which  we  see,  and  the  part  we   io 
not  see,  make  up  one  scheme,  then  we  see  a  tendency  in  virtue  to 
superiority. 
4.)  But  to  produce  that  superiority  there  must  be 
— A  force  proportioned  to  the  obstacles. 
• — Sufficient  lapse  of  time. 

— A  fair  field  of  trial ;  such  as  extent  of  time,  adequate  occasions,  and 
opportunities  for  the  virtuous  to  unite. 
5.)  These  things  are  denied  to  virtue  in   this  life,  so  that  its  tendencies, 

though  real,  are  hindered. 
6.)  But  it  may  have  all  requisite  advantages  hereafter. 
— Eternity  will  be  lasting  enough. 
— Good  men  will  unite ;  as  they  cannot  do  now,  scattered  over  the  earth, 

and  ignorant  of  one  another. 
— Other  orders  of  virtuous  beings  will  join ;  for  the  very  nature  of  virtue 
is  a  bond  of  union. 
7.)  The  tendency  of  such  an  order  of  things,  so  far  as  seen  by  vicious  beings 
in  any  part  of  the  universe,  would  be  to  the  amendment  of  all  who 
were  capable  of  it,  and  their  recovery  to  virtue. 
8.)  All  this  goes  to  show  that  the  hinderances  to  virtue  are  contingent,  and 

that  its  beneficial  tendencies  are  God's  declarations  in  its  favor. 
9.)  If  the  preceding  considerations  are  thought  to  be  too  speculative,  wo 
may  easily  come  to  the  same  result  by  reflecting  on  the  supremacy 
which  any  earthly  nation  would  attain,  by  entire  virtue  for  many  ages. 

REMARKS. 

Consider  now  the  general  system  of  religion.  The  government  of  the  world 
is  one ;  it  is  moral ;  virtue  shall  in  the  end  prevail  over  wickedness ;  and  to 
see  the  importance  and  fitness  of  such  an  arrangement  we  have  only  to 
consider  what  would  be  the  state  of  things,  if  vice  had  these  advantages,  or 
virtue  the  contrary. 

Objec,  Why  may  not  things  be  now  going  on  in  other  worlds,  and  continue 

always   to  go  on  in  this  world,  in  the  same  mixed  and  disordered 

state  as  at  present? 

An8.  We  are  not  proving  that  God's  moral  government  is  perfect,  or  the  truth 

of  religion,  but  only  seeing  what  there  is  in  the  course  of  nature,  to 

confirm  it,  supposing  it  to  be  known.     Were  there  nothing  to  judge  by, 


82  CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

but  the  y  resent  distribution  of  pleasure  and  pain,  we  should  have  no 
ground  to  conclude  that  hereafter  we  should  be  rewarded  or  punished 
exactly  according  to  our  deserts.  But  even  then  there  would  bo  no 
indication  that  vice  is  better  than  virtue.  Still  the  preceding  observa- 
tions confirm  the  doctrine  of  future  retribution ;  for, 

1.)  They  show  that  the  Author  of  nature  is  not  indifferent  to  virtue 
and  vice. 

2.)  That  future  distributive  justice  would  differ  not  in  hind,  but  in  degree 
only,  from  God's  present  government.  It  would  be  the  effect,  towards 
which  we  see  the  tendency. 

3.)  That  higher  rewards  and  punishments  may  he  hereafter. 

4.)  That  we  should  expect  it  to  be  so ',  because  the  tendencies  of  vice  and 
virtue  are  immutable,  while  the  hinderances  are  only  artificial. 


[This  enumerates  the   steps  of  the  argument,  in  the  foregoing  chapter,  in 
i  condensed  a  form  as  possible.] 


CHAPTER    IV. 

OF   A   STATE   OF   PROBATION. 


The  doctrine  of  probation  comprehends  several  particulars.  But  the  most 
common  notion  is  that  our  future  interests  are  depending ;  and  depending  on 
ourselves.  And  that  we  have  opp)ortunities  for  both  good  and  bad  conduct, 
and  temjytotions  to  each. 

This  is  not  exactly  the  same  as  our  being  under  moral  government;  for  it 
implies  allurement  to  evil,  and  diflaculties  in  being  good. 

Hence  needs  to  be  considered  by  itself. 

Doctrine.  The  natural  government  of  Gob,  in  this  world,  puts  us  on 

TRIAL  AS  TO  THE  THINGS  OF  THIS  WORLD;  AND  SO  IMPLIES,  WHAT 
RELIGION  TEACHES,  THAT  HIS  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  PUTS  US  OX 
TRIAL   AS    TO   A   FUTURE    "WORLD. 

I.  So  far  as  we  are  tempted  to  do  what  will  damage  our  future  temporal 
interests,  so  far  we  are  under  probation  as  to  those  interests. 

1.  The  annexing   of   pleasures   and  pains   to   actions,  as  good  or  bad,  and 

enabling  us  to  foresee  their  effect,  implies  that  our  interests,  in  part  at 
least,  depend  on  ourselves. 

2.  We  often   hlame  ourselves  and  others  for  evils,  as  resulting  from   mis- 

conduct. 
3*  It  is  very  certain  that  we  often  miss  possible  good,  and  incur  evils,  not  for 

want  of  knowing  better,  but  through  our  fault. 
4*   Every  one   speaks  of  the  hazards  of  young  persons,  from  othei   ouusei 

than  ignorance. 


CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY.  3^ 

II.  These  natural  or  teinporal  trials   are   analogous  to  our  moral 

and  religious  trial. 

1.  In  both  cases,  what  constitutes  the  trial,  is  either  in  our  circumstances 
or  in  our  nature. 
1.)  Some  would  do  right  but  for  violent  or  extraordinary  temptations. 
2.)  Others  will  seek  evil,  and  go  out  of  their  way  after  wicked  indulgence, 

when  there  are  no  external  temptations. 
3.)  But  even  those  who  err  through  temptation,  must  have  that  within  which 

makes  them  susceptible  of  temptation. 
4.)  So  that  we  are  in  a  like  state  of  probation  with  respect  to  both  present 
and  future  interests. 
2*  If  we  proceed  to  observe  how  mankind  behave  in  both  capacities,  we  see 
the  same  analogy. 
1.)  Some  scarcely  look  beyond  the  present  gratification. 
2.)  Some  are  driven  by  their  passions  against  their  better  judgment  and 

feeble  resolutions. 
3.)  Some  shamelessly  go  on  in  open  vice. 

4.)  Some  persist  in  wrong-doing,  even  under  strong  apprehensions  of  future 
misery. 
3«  The  analogy  is  no  less  plain  in  regard  to  the  influence  of  others  upon  us. 
1.)  Bad  example. 
2.)  Wrong  education. 
3.)  Corruptions  of  religion. 

4.)  General  prevalence  of  mistakes  as  to  true  happiness. 
4.  In  both  cases  negligence  and  folly  bring  difficulty  as  well  as  vice. 

III.  The  disadvantages  we  labor  under  from  our  fallen  and  disordered 

state,  are  the  same,  in  relation  to  both  earthly  and  future  interests. 

This  disadvantage  affords  no  ground  of  complaint ;  for, 

1.  We  viay  manage  to  pass  our  days  in  comfort  and  peace. 

2.  And  so  may  we  obtain  the  security  and  comfort  of  religion. 

3.  We  might  as  well  complain  that  we  are  not  a  higher  order  of  beings. 


1*  """t  is  thus  proved  that  the  state  of  trial,  which  religion  says  we  are  in,  is 
credible;  for  it  exactly  corresponds  to  what  we  see. 
1.)  If  from  birth  till  death  we  were  in  a  constant  security  of  enjoyment, 
without  care  or  correctness,  it  would  be  a  presumption  against  religion. 
2.)  It  might,  if  we  had  no  experience,  be  urged  that  an  infinitely  good  Being 
would  not  expose  us  to  the  hazard  of  misery.     This  is  indeed  a  diffi- 
culty, and  must  remain  so ;  but  still  the  course  of  nature  is  as  it  is. 
3.)  The  miseries  which  we  bring  on  ourselves  are  no  more  unavoidable  than 
our  deportment. 
1,  It  has  been  proved  that  we  are  in  danger  of  miscarrying  as  to  our  interests, 

both  present  and  future. 
3»  The  sum  of  the  whole  is,  that  as  we  do  not  have  present  enjoyments  and 
honors  forced  upon  us,  in  spite  of  misconduct,  so  this  may  be  the  case, 
as  to  that  chief  and  final  good  which  religion  proposes. 
C 


34  CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

CHAPTER  V. 

PROBATIOi'J    INTENBED    FOR   MORAL    DISCIPLINE   AND    IMPROVEMENT. 

Why  we  should  be  placed  in  the  condition  spoken  of  in  the  last  chapter,  is 
a  question  which  cannot  be  answered.  It  may  be  that  we  could  not  under- 
stand, if  told.  And  if  we  could,  it  might  injure  us  to  know,  just  now.  It 
certainly  is  consistent  with  God's  righteous  government. 

Religion  tells  us  that  we  are  so  placed  in  order  to  become  qualified  for 
a  better  state. 

This,  though  a  very  partial  answer  to  the  inquiry  why  we  are  so  placed, 
answers  an  infinitely  more  important  question, — viz. :  What  is  our  business 
here  f 

I.  We  are  ^placed  in  this  state  of  trial,  for  our  improvement  in 
virtue,  as  the  requisite  qualification  for  future  security  and 
happiness. 

1.  Every  creature  is  designed  for  a  particular  way  of  life. 

1.)   Happiness  depends  on  the  congruity  between  a  creature's  nature  and  its 

circumstances. 
2.)   Man's  character  might  be   so   changed  as  to  make  him  incapable  of 

happiness  on  earth. 
3.)  Or  he  might  be  placed,  without  changing  his  nature,  in  a  world  where  he 
must  be  wretched,  for  want  of  the  proper  objects  to  answer  to  his 
desires. 
4.)  So  that  without  determining  what  is  the  future  condition  of  good  men, 
we  know  there  must  be  necessary  qualifications  to  make  hs  capable  of 
enjoying  it. 
2*  Human  beings  are  so  constituted  as  to  become  fit  for  new  and  different 
conditions. 
1.)  We  not  only  acquire  ideas,  but  store  them  up. 
2.)  We  can  become  more  expert  in  any  kind  of  action.  ^ 

3.)  And  can  make  settled  alterations  in  our  tempers. 
4.)  We  can  form  habits — both  bodily  and  mental. 

As  these  operate  in  producing  radical  changes  in  human  character,  we  will 
look  for  a  moment  at  the  process. 

— Neither  perceptions,  nor  knowledge,  are  habits;  though  necessary  to 

forminy  them. 
— There  are  habits  of  perception,  however,  and  habits  of  action :  the 

former  are  passive,  the  latter  active. 
— Habits  of  body  are  produced  by  external  acts,  and  habits  of  mind  by 

the  exertion  of  principles;  i.e.  carrying  them  out. 
— Resolutions  to  do  well  are  acts,  and  may  help  towards  forming 
good  habits.  But  mere  theorizing,  and  forming  pictures  in  the 
mind,  not  only  do  not  help,  but  may  harden  the  mind  to  a 
contrary  course. 
—Passive  impressions,  by  repetition  grow  weaker.  Thus  familiarity  with 
danger  lessens  fear 


CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY.  85 

— Hence  active  habits  maybe  formed  and  strengthened,  by  acting  accord* 
ing  to  certain  motives  or  excitements,  which  grow  less  sensibly  felt 
and  less  and  less  felt,  as  the  habit  strengthens. 

•  Thus  the  sight  of  distress  excites  the  passive  emotion  of  pity, 

and  the  active  principle  of  benevolence.  But  inquiring  out 
cases  of  distress  in  order  to  relieve  them,  causes  diminished 
sensitiveness  at  the  sight  of  misery,  and  stronger  benevolence 
and  aptitude  in  relieving  it. 
.  So  admonition,  experience,  and  example,  if  acted  upon,  produce 
good;  if  not,  harden. 
6.)  The  formation  of  a  habit  may  be  imperceptible  and  even  inexplicable, 

but  the  thing  itself  is  matter  of  certain  experience. 
6.)  A  habit  once  formed,  the  action  becomes  easy  and  often  pleasurable: 
opposite  inclinations  grow  weaker :  difficulties  less  :  and  occasions  more 
frequent. 
7.)  Thus,  a  new  character,  in  several  respects,  is  formed. 
3.  We  should  not  have  these  capacities  for  improvement  and  for  the  recon- 
struction of  character,  if  it  were  not  necessary. 
1.)  They  are  necessary,  even  as  to  this  life. 

— We  are  not  qualified,   at  first,  for  mature  life:    understanding   and 

strength  come  gradually. 
— If  we  had  them   in  full,   at  birth,   we   should  at  first  be  distracted 
and  bewildered,  ani  our  faculties  would  be  of  no  use  previous  to 
experience.     Ignorant  of  any  employment,  we   could   not   provide 
for  ourselves. 
■ — So  that  man  is  an  unformed,  unfinished  creature,  even  as  to  this  world, 
till  he  acquire  knowledge,  experience,  and  habits. 
2.)  Provision  is  made  for  our  acquiring,  in  youth,  the  requisite  qualities  for 
manhood. 
— Children  learn,  from  their  very  birth, 

•  The  nature  and  use  of  objects. 

•  The  subordinations  of  domestic  life. 
.  The  rules  of  life. 

— Some  of  this  learning  is  acquired  so  insensibly,  as  to  seem  like  in- 
stinct; but  some  requires  great  care  and  labor,  and  the  doing  of 
things  we  are  averse  to. 

—According  as  we  act  during  this  formative  period,  is  our  character 
formed;  and  our  capacity  for  various  stations  in  society  determined. 

— Early  opportunities  lost,  cannot  be  recovered. 
3.)  Our  state  of  discipline  throughout  this  life,  for  another,  is  exactly  of  the 

^   same  kind :  and  comprehended  under  one  general  law. 

— If  we  could  not  see  how  the  present  discipline  fitted  us  for  a  higher 
life,  it  would  be  no  objection. 

•  We  do  not  know  how  food,  sleep,  &c.  enlarges  the  child's  body; 

nor  would  we  expect  such  a  result,  prior  to  experience. 

•  Nor  do  children  understand  the  need  of  exercise,  temperance, 

restraint,  &c. 
—We  thus   see  a  general  analogy  of  Providence   indicating  that  the 
present  life  is  preparatory. 


S6  CONSPECTUS    OP   THE   ANALOGY. 

4*  If  virtue  is  a  necessary  qualification  for  future  happiness,  then  we  see  otir 
need  of  the  moral  culture  of  our  present  state. 
1.)  Analogy  indicates  that  our  future  state  will  be  social. 

—Nature  furnishes   no   shadow   of  unreasonableness   in   the    Scripture 

doctrine  that  this  future  community  will  be  under  the  more  imme- 
diate government  of  God. 
—Nor  the  least  proof  that  its  members  will  not  require  the  exercise  of 

veracity,  justice,  &c.  towards  each  other;  and  that  character  which 

results  from  the  practice  of  such  virtues. 
•^Certainly  the  universe  is  under  moral  government;   and  a  virtuous 

character  must,  in  some  way,  be  a  condition  of  happiness  in  that 

state. 
2.)  We  are  deficient,  and  in  danger  of  deviating  from  what  is  right. 
— We  have  desires  for  outward  objects-. 

—The  times,  degrees,  &o.  of  gratifying  these  desires,  are,  of  right,  sub- 
ject to  the  control  of  the  moral  principle. 
—But  that  principle   neither   excites  them,  nor  prevents   their  being 

excited. 
—They  may  exist,  when  they  cannot  be  lawfully  gratified,  or  gratified 

at  all. 
—When    the   desire   exists,   and   the   gratification  is  unlawful,  we  are 

tempted. 
3.)  The  only  security  is  the  principle  within.  , 

— The  strengthening  of  this  lessens  the  danger. 
— It  may  be  strengthened,  by  discipline  and  exercise. 
•  Noting  examples. 

.  Attending  to  the  right,  and  not  to  preference. 
«  Considering  our  ti'ue  interests. 
— When  improved,  it  becomes,  in  proportion  to  its  strength,  our  security 

from  the  dangers  of  natural  propensions. 
—Virtue,   become  habitual  by  discipline,  is  improved  virtue ;  and  im- 
proved virtue  must  produce  increased  happiness,  if  the  government 

of  the  world  is  moral. 
4.)  Even  creatures  made  upright  may  fall. 

— The   fall   of  an  upright  being,  is  not  accounted  for  by  the  nature  of 

liberty ;    for  that  would  only  belaying  that  an  event   happened 

because  it  might  happen. 
—But  from  the  very  nature  of  propensions. 
—A  finitely  perfect  being  would  have  propensions  corresponding  to  its 

surroundings;  its  understanding;  and  its  moral  sense;  and  all  these 

in  due  proportions. 
—Such  a  being  would  have  propensions,  though  the  object  might  not 

be  present,  or  the  indulgence  might  be  contrary  to  its  moral  sense  j 

and    this   would   have    some  tendency,    however   small,  to   induce 

gratification. 
—The  tendency  would  be  increased  by  the  frequency  of  occasions;  and 

yet  more  by  the  least  indulgence,  even  in  thought;  till,  under  peculiar 

conjunctures,  it  would  become  efi"ect. 
— The  first  transgression  might  so  utterly  disorder  the  constitution,  and 


CONSPECTUS   OF   THE    ANALOGY.  3 

change  the  proportions  of  forces,  as  to  lead  to  a  repetition  of  irregu- 
larities; and  henco  to  the  construction  of  bad  habits,  and  a  depraved 
character. 
5.)   On  the  contrary,  a  finitely  perfect  being  may  attain  higher  virtue,  and 
more  security,  by  obeying  the  moral  principle. 
— For   the   danger  would   lessen,   by  the   increased    submissiveness   of 

propensions. 
— The  moral  principle  wovTld  gain  force  by  exercise. 
6.)  Thus  vice  is  not  only  criminal,  but  degrading;  and  virtue  is  not  only 
right,  but  improving. 
— The  degree  of  improvement  may  be  such  that  the  danger  of  sinning 

may  be  almost  infinitely  lessened. 
— Yet  the  security  may  always  be  the  habits  formed  in  a  state  of  dis- 
cipline; making  such  a  state  altogether  fit  and  necessary. 
7.)  This  course  of  reasoning  is  vastly  stronger  when  applied  to  fallen  and 
corrupt  creatures. 
— The  upright  need  improvement;  the  fallen  must  be  renewed. 
— Discipline  is  expedient  for  the  one;  necessary  for  the  other;  and  of  a 
severer  sort. 

II.  The  present  world  is  peculiarly  fit  for  such  discipline  as  we  need. 

1.  Surrounding  evils  tend  to  produce  moderation,  practical  knowledge,  <fec. 

very  different  from  a  mere  speculative  knowledge  of  our  liability  to  vice 
and  misery. 

2.  Our  experience  in  this  world,  with   right  views  and  practice,  may  leave 

eternal  impressions  for  good. 
3*  Every  act  of  self-government  in  the  exercise  of  virtue,  must,  from  the  very 
make  of  our  nature,  form  habits  of  virtue,  and  a  more  intense  virtuous 
principle. 
4.  Resolute  and  persevering  resistance  to  particular  and  violent  temptations,  is 
a  continued  act  of  virtue,  and  that  in  a  higher  degree  than  if  the  seduction 
were  transient  and  weak. 
5*  Self-denial  is  not  essential  to  virtue,  but  is  almost  essential  to  discipline  and 
improvement. 
1.)  Because  actions  materially  virtuous,  which  have  no  difficulty,  but  agree 
with  our  inclinations,  may  be  done  merely  from  inclination,  and  so  not 
be  really  virtuous. 
2.)  But  when  they  are  done  in  face  of  danger  and  difficulty,  virtuousness  is 
increased,  and  confirmed  into  a  habit. 
Objec.  1.  As  our  intellectual  or  physical  powers  may  be  overtasked,  so  may  our 

moral. 
Ana.  This  may  be  so  in  exceptional  cases,  but  it  does  not  confute  the  argument. 
In  general,  it  holds  good.     All  that  is  intended  to  be  proved  is,  that  this 
world  is  intended  to  be  a  state  of  improvement,  and  is  fitted  for  it. 
1.)  Some   sciences   which   of  themselves   are    highly   improving,  require    a 

trying  measure  of  attention,  which  some  will  not  submit  to. 
2.)  It  is  admitted  that  this  world  disciplines  many  to  vice:  but  this  vicious- 
ness   of  many  is  the  very  thing  which   makes  the  world  a  virtuous 
discipline  to  good  men.     The  ivhole  end  in  placing  mankind  as  they 
4 


6h  CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

are  ■we  know  not;  but  these  things  are  evident — the  virtues  of  soma 
are  exercised : — and  so  exercised  as  to  be  improved :  and  improved 
beyond  what  they  would  be  in  a  perfectly  virtuous  community. 
S.)  That  all,  or  even  the  generality,  do  not  improve,  is  no  proof  that  their 
improvement  was  not  intended.  Of  seeds  and  animals  not  one  in  a 
million  comes  to  perfection ;  yet  such  as  do,  evidently  answer  an  end 
for  -which  they  were  designed.  The  appearance  of  icaste  in  regard  to 
seeds,  &o.  is  just  as  unaccountable,  as  the  ruin  of  moral  agents. 

Objec.  2.  Eectitude   arising   from  hope  and   fear,   is   only  the   discipline  of 
self-love. 

Ans.  Obedience  is  obedience,  though  prompted  by  hope  or  fear:  and  a  course 
of  such  obedience,  forms  a  habit  of  it :  and  distinct  habits  of  various 
virtues,  by  repressing  inclination  whenever  justice,  veracity,  &c. 
require. 
Beside,  veracity,  justice,  regard  to  God's  authority,  and  self-interest,  are 
coincident;  and  each,  separately,  a  just  principle.  To  begin  a  good 
life  from  either  of  them,  and  persist,  produces  that  very  character 
which  corresponds  to  our  relations  to  God,  and  secures  happiness. 

ObJec.  3.  The  virtues  requisite  for  a  state  of  afflictions,  and  produced  by  it,  are 
not  wanted  to  qualify  us  for  a  state  of  haj^piness. 

Ans.  Such  is  not  the  verdict  of  experience.  Passive  submission  is  essential  to 
right  character.  Prosperity  itself  begets  extravagant  desires ;  and 
imagination  may  produce  as  much  discontent  as  actual  condition. 
Hence,  though  we  may  not  need  patieitce  in  heaven,  we  shall  need  that 
temper  which  is  formed  by  patience. 
Self-love  would  always  coincide  with  God's  commands,  when  our  interest 
was  rightly  understood ;  but  it  is  liable  to  error.  Therefore,  habits  of 
resignation  are  necessary,  for  all  creatures;  and  the  proper  discipline 
for  resignation  is  affliction. 

Objec.  4.  The  trouble  and  danger  of  such  discipline,  might  have  been  avoided 
by  making  us  at  once,  what  we  are  intended  to  become. 

Ans.  What  we  are  to  be,  is  the  effect  of  what  we  are  to  do.  God's  natural 
government  is  arranged  not  to  save  us  from  trouble  or  danger,  but  to 
enable  and  incline  us  to  go  through  them.  It  is  as  natural  for  us  to 
seek  means  to  obtain  things,  as  it  is  to  seek  the  things ;  and  in  worldly, 
things  we  are  left  to  our  choice,  whether  to  improve  our  powers  and  so 
better  our  condition,  or  to  neglect  improvement  and  so  go  without  the 
advantage. 
Analogy,  therefore,  makes  the  same  arrangement  credible,  as  to  a  future 
state. 

III.  This   stale  of  discipline   may  be  necessary  for   the   display   of 
character. 

1.  Not  to  the  all-knowing  Being,  but  to  his  creation,  or  pai-t  of  it,  and  in  manj 

ways  which  we  know  not, 

2.  It  may  be  a  means  in  disposing  of  men  according  to  character. 
3*  And  of  showing  creation  that  they  are  so  disposed  of. 

4.  Such  display   of  character  certainly  contributes,  largely,  to  the   genera? 
course  of  things  considered  in  this  chapter. 


CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOaY. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OF   NECESSITY    AS    INFLUENCING    CONDUCT. 

Fatalists  have  no  right  to  object  to  Christianity,  for  they  of  course  hold 
the  doctrine  to  be  compatible  with  what  they  see  in  nature. 

The  question  is,  whether  it  be  not  equally  compatible  with  what  Chris- 
tianity teaches. 

To  argue  on  the  supposition  of  so  great  an  absurdity  as  necessity,  is  puzzling; 
and  the  obscurity  and  puzzle  of  the  argument  must  therefore  be  excused. 

I.  Necessity  does  not  destroy  the  proof  of  an  intelligent  Author  and 
Governor  of  the  world. 

1.  It  does  not  exclude  design  and  deliberation. 

1.)  This  is  matter  of  actual  experience  and  consciousness. 

— Necessity  does  not  account  for  the  existence  of  any  thing,  but  is  only  a 
circumstance  relating  to  its  origin.     Instance  the  case  of  a  house: 
the  fatalist  admits  that  it  had  a  builder,  and  the  only  question  would 
be,  was  he  obliged  to  build  it  as  he  did  ? 
2.)  It  is  the  same  as  to  the  construction  of  the  world.     To  say  it  exists  by 
necessity  must  mean  it  had  a  maker,  who  acted  by  necessity:    for 
necessity  is  only  an  abstract  notion,  and  can  do  nothing. 
3.)  We  say  God  exists  by  neccss^tjs  because  we  intuitively  discern  that  there 
must  be  an  infinite  Being,  prior  to  all  causes;  but  we  cannot  say  that 
every  thing  so  exists.     The  fact  that  many  changes  in  nature  are  pro- 
duced by  man's  contrivance  is  a  proof  of  this. 
4.)  Thus  though  the  fatalist  does  not  choose  to  mean  by  necessity  an  agent 

acting  necessarily,  he  is  obliged  to  mean  this. 
5.)  And  it  also  follows  that  a  thing's  being  done  by  necessity  does  not  exclude 
design. 
2*  It  does  not  exclude  a  belief  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  religion. 
.  1.)  Suppose  a  fatalist  to  educate  a  child  on  his  own  principles, — viz. :  that 
he  cannot  do  otherwise  than  he  does;  and  is  not  subject  to  praise  or 
blame. 
(It  might  be  asked,  would  he,  if  possessed  of  common  sense,  so  educate 

his  child?) 
— The  child  would  be  delighted  with  his  freedom;  but  would  soon  prove 

a  pest,  and  go  to  destruction. 
^He  would  meet  with  checks  and  rebuffs,  which  would  teach  him  that  he 

toas  accountable. 
— He  would,  in  the  end,  be  convinced  either  that  his  doctrine  was  wrong, 
or  that  he  had  reasoned  inconclusively  upon  it,  and  misapplied  it. 
2,)  To  apply  fatalism  to  practice,  in  any  other  way,  would  be  found  equally 

fallacious ;  e.g.  that  he  need  not  take  care  of  his  life. 
3.)  No  such  absurdity  follows  the  doctrine  of  freedom. 

— Reasoning  on  this  ground  is  justified  by  all  experience.  ^ 

—The  constitution  of  things  is  as  if  we  were  free. 


40  CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

4.)  If  the  doctrine  of  necessity  be  true,  and  yet,  when  we  apply  it  to  life, 
always  misleads  us ;  how,  then,  can  we  be  sure  it  would  not  mislead  us 
with  respect  to  future  interests  ? 
5.)  It  follows  that  if  there  are  proofs  of  religion  on  the  supposition  of  free- 
dom, they  are  just  as  conclusive  on  the  supposition  of  necessity. 
3.  It  does  not  refute  the  notion  that  God  has  a  will  and  a  character. 

1,)  It  does  not  hinder  ua  from  having  a  will  and  a  character;  from  being 

cruel,  or  benevolent,  or  just,  <fec. 
2.)  If  necessity  be  plead  as  the  excuse  for  crime,  it  equally  excuses  the 
punisJiment  of  crime;  for  if  it  destroys  the  sin  of  the  one,  it  destroys 
the  sin  of  the  other. 
3.)  The  very  assumption  of  injustice  in  punishing  crime,  shows  that  we  can- 
not rid  ourselves  of  the  notion  of  justice  and  injustice. 
Objec.  If  necessity  be  reconcilable  with  the  character  of  God,  as  portrayed  in 
Christianity,  does  it  not  destroy  the  proof  that  he  has  that  character ; 
and  so  destroy  the  proofs  of  religion  ? 
An8.  No.     Happiness  and  misery  are  not  our  fate,  but  the  results  of  our  con- 
duct.    God's  government  is  that  of  a  father  and  a  magistrate;  and  his 
natural  rule  of  government  must  be  veracity  and  justice.     We  shall 
proceed  to  show  that, 

II.  Necessity  does  not  destroy  the  proofs  of  religion. 

1.  It  is  a  plain  fact  that  God  rewards  and  punishes. 

1.)  He  has  given  us  a  moral  facult}',  by  which  we  discern  between  actions, 

and  approve  or  disapprove,  &c. 
2.)  This  implies  a  rxde,  a  peculiar  kind  of  rule;    i.e.  one  from  which  we 

cannot  depart  without  being  self-condemned. 
3.)  The  dictates  of  our  moral  faculty  are  God's  laws,  with  sanctions.     It  not 

only  raises  a  sense  of  duty,  but  a  sense  of  security  in  obeying,  and 

danger  in  disobeying;  and  this  is  an  explicit  sanction. 
4.)  God's  government  must  conform  to  the  nature  he  has  given  us;  and  we 

must  infer  that  in  the  upshot  happiness  will  follow  virtue,  and  misery 

vice. 
6.)  Hence  religious  worship  is  a  duty,  if  only  as  a  means  of  keeping  up  the 

sense  of  this  government. 
6.)  No  objection  from  necessity  can  lie  against  this  course  of  proof. 

— The  conclusion  is  wholly  and  directly  from  facts;  not  from  what 
might  appear  to  us  to  be  fit,  but  from  what  his  actions  tell  us  he 
wills. 

2,  Natural  religion  has  external  evidence  which  necessity,  if  true,  does  not 

affect. 
1.)  Suppose   a   person    convinced    of  the    truths   of    natural   religion,   but 
ignorant  of  history,  and  of  the  present  state  of  mankind,  he  would 
inquire: 
— How  this  religion  came? 
— How  far  the  belief  of  it  extended? 

— If  he  found  that  some  one  had  totally  propounded  it,  as  a  deduction 
of  reason,  then,  though  its  evidences  from  reason  would  not  be  i^u* 
paired,  its  history  would  furnish  no  further  proof. 


CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY.  4i 

2.)  But  such  an  one  would  find,  on  the  contrary, 

— That  essentially  it  had  been  professed  in  all  countries. 

— And  can  be  traced  up  through  all  ages. 

— And  was  not  reasoned  out,  but  revealed. 
3.)  These  things  are  of  great  weight. 

— Showing  natural   religion   to  be  conformed  to  the  common  sense  of 
mankind. 

— And  either  that  it  was  revealed,  or  forces  itself  upon  the  mind. 

— The   rude    state   of  the  early  ages   leads  to  the  belief  of  its   being 
revealed,  and  such  is  the  opinion  of  the  learned. 
J)arly  pretences  to  revelation  indicate  some  original  real  one  from  which 

they  were  copied. 

— The  history  of  revelation  is  as  old  as  history  itself. 

—Such  a  fact  is  a  proof  of  religion,  against  which  there  is  no  pre- 
sumption. 

— And  indicates  a  revelation  prior  to  the  examination  of  the  book  said 
to  contain  it;    and  independent  of  all  considerations  of  its  being 
corrupted,  or  darkened  by  fables. 
•  It  is  thus  apparent  that  the  external  evidence  of  religion  is  considerable} 

and  is  not  affected  by  the  doctrine  of  necessity. 


1.  The  danger  of  taking  custom,  &c.  for  our  moral  rule. 
1.)  We  are  all  liable  to  prejudice. 

2.)  Reason  may  be  impaired,  perverted,  or  disregarded. 
3.)  The  matter  in  hand  is  of  infinite  moment. 

2.  The  foregoing  observations  amount  to  practical  proof. 

Objec.    Probabilities   which    cannot   be    confuted,   may  be    overbalanced   by 
greater  probabilities :    much  more  by  demonstration.     Now,  as  the 
doctrine  of  necessity  must  be  true,  it  cannot  be  that  God  governs  us 
as  if  we  were  free  when  he  knows  we  are  not. 
Ana.  This  brings  the  matter  to  a  point,  and  the  answer  is  not  to  be  evaded, — 
viz.:    that  the  whole  constitution   and   course   of  things   shows  this 
reasoning  to  be  false,  be  the  fallacy  where  it  may. 
The  doctrine  of  freedom  shows  where, — viz. :  in  supposing  ourselves  neces- 
sary agents  when  in  fact  we  are  free. 
Admitting  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  the  fallacy  evidently  lies  in  denying 
that  necessary  agents  are  accountable;  for  that  they  are  rewarded  and 
punished  is  undeniable. 

vONCLiJSiON. — It  follows  that  necessity,  if  true,  neither  proves  that  God  will 
not  make  his  creatures  happy  or  miserable  according  to  their  conduct,  nor 
destroys    the  proofs  that  he  will  do  so.     That   is,  necessity,  practically,  ia 


4* 


42  CONSPECTUS   OF  THE   ANALOGY. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

DIVINE    GOVERNMENT    A    SCHEME    IMPERFECTLY    COMPREHENDED. 

Moral  government,  as  a  fact,  has  now  been  considered;  it  remains  for  ua 
to  remove  objections  against  its  wisdom  and  goodness.  A  thing  Dving  true 
does  not  prove  it  to  be  good. 

In  arguing  as  to  its  truth,  analogy  could  only  show  it  to  be  credible.  But,  if 
a  moral  government  be  admitted  as  a  fact,  analogy  makes  it  credible  that  it  is 
a  scheme  or  system,  and  that  man's  comprehension  of  it  is  necessarily  so 
limited,  as  to  be  inadequate  to  determine  its  injustice. 

This  we  shall  find  to  be  the  case. 
Doctrine.    On  the   supposition  that  God  exercises   moral   government, 

THE  ANALOGY  OF   NATURE   TEACHES    THAT    IT   MUST   BE  A  SCHEME, 
AND    ONE    QUITE    BEYOND    OUR    COMPREHENSION. 

I.    The  ordering  of  nature  is  a  scheme;    and  makes  it   credible  by 
analogy,  that  moral  government  is  a  scheme. 

1.  The  parts  curiously  correspond  to  each  other;  individuals  to  individuals, 

species  to  species,  events  to  events ;  and  all  these  both  immediate  and 
remote. 

2.  This  correspondence  embraces  all  the  past,  and  all  the  future;  including 

all  creatures,  actions,  and  events. 
1.)  There  is  no  event,  which  does  not  depend  for  its  occurrence  on  some 
further  thing,  unknown  to  us;  we  cannot  give  the  whole  account  of 
any  one  thing. 
2.)  Things  apparently  the  most  insignificant,  seem  to  be  necessary  to  others, 
of  the  greatest  importance. 
3*  If  such  is  God's  natural  government,  it  is  credible  that  such  is  his  moral 
government. 
1.)  In  fact  they  are  so  blended  as  to  make  one  scheme. 

— One  is  subservient  to  the  other,  just  as  the  vegetable  kingdom  subserves 

the  animal,  and  our  animal  organization  subserves  our  mental. 
—Every  act  of  God  seems  to  look  beyond  the  occasion,  and  to  have 

reference  to  a  general  plan. 
—There  is  evidently  a  previous  adjustment. 

•  The  periods,  &c.  for  trying  men. 

•  The  instruments  of  justice. 

•  The  kinds  of  retribution. 

2.)  The  whole  comprises  a  system,  a  very  small  part  of  which  is  known  to 

us :  therefore  no  objections  against  any  part  can  be  insisted  on. 
3.)  This  ignorance  is  universally  acknowledged,  except  in  arguing  against 
religion.      That  it  ought  to  be  a  valid  answer  to   objections  against 
religion,  we  proceed  to  show. 
— Suppose  it  to  be  asserted  that  all  evils  might  have  been  prevented  by 
repeated  interpositions ;  or  that  more  good  might  have  been  so  pro- 
duced ;  which  would  be  the  utmost  that  could  be  said  :  still, 
—Our  ignorance  would  vindicate  religion  from  any  objections  arising 
from  apparent  disorders  in  the  world. 


CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY.  43 

— The  government  of  the  world  might  bo  good,  even  on  those  supposi 

tions  ;  for  at  most  they  could  but  suggest  that  it  might  be  beHer. 
— At  any  rate,  they  are  mere  assertions. 

— Instances  may  be  alleged,  in  things  much  less  out  of  reach,  of  supposi- 
tions palpably  impossible,'which  all  do  not  see  to  be  so :  nor  any, 
at  first  sight. 
4.)  It  follows  that  our  ignorance  is  a  satisfactory  answer  to  all  objections 
against  the  divine  government. 
— An   objection  against  an  act  of  Providence,  no  way  connected  with 
any  other  thing,   as  being  unjust,  could  not  be  answered  by  our 
ignorance. 
— But  when  the  objection  is  made  against  an  act  related  to  other  and 

unknown  acts,  then  our  ignorance  is  a  full  answer. 
— Some  unknown  relation,  or  unknown  impossibility,  may  render  the  act 
not  only  good,  but  good  in  the  highest  degree. 
II.    Consider  some  particular  things,  in  the  natural  government  of 
God,   the  like  of  which  we  may  infer,   hy  analogy,  to  he  con- 
tained in  his  moral  government. 
1.  Xo  ends  are  accomplished  without  means. 

1.)  Often,  means  very  disagreeable  bring  the  most  desirable  results. 

2.)  How  means  produce  ends,  is  not  learned  by  reason,  but  experience. 

3.)  In  many  cases,  before  experience,  we  should  have  expected  contrary 

results. 
4.)  Hence  we  may  infer  that  those  things  which  are  objected  against  God's 

moral  government,  produce  good. 
5.)  It  is  evident  that  our  not  seeing  how  the  means  work  good,  or  their 
seeming  to  have  an  opposite  effect,  offers  no  presumption  against  their 
fitness  to  work  good. 
8.)  They  may  not  only  be  fit,  but  the  only  means  of  ultimate  good. 
Objec.  Though  our  capacity  of  vice  and  misery  may  promote  virtue,  and  our 
suffering  for  sin  be  better  than  if  we  were  restrained  by  force,  yet  it 
would  have  been  better  if  evil  had  not  entered  the  world. 
Ana.    It   is    granted  that  though  sinful  acts  may  produce  benefits,  to  refrain 
from  them  would  produce  more.    We  have  curative  pains,  yet  pain  is 
not  better  than  health. 
3.  Natural  government  is  carried  on  by  general  laws. 

1.)  Nature  shows  that  this  is  best:  all  the  good  we  enjoy  is  because  there 
are  general  laws.     They  enable  us  to  forecast  for  the  procurement  of 
good. 
2.)  It  may  not  be  possible,  by  general  laws,  to  prevent  all  irregularities,  or 

remedy  them. 
3.)   Direct   interpositions   might   perhaps   remedy  many  disorders    arising 
under  them,  but  this  would  have  bad  effects. 
— Encouraging  improvidence. 
— Leaving  us  no  rule  of  life. 

— Every  interposition  would  have  distant  effects :  so  that  we  could  not 
guess  what  would  be  the  whole  result. 
.  If  it  be  replied  that  those  distant  effects  might  also  be  corrected 
by  direct  interpositions— this  is  only  talking  at  random. 


44  CONSPECTUS  or  the  analogy. 

Objec,  If  we  are  so  ignorant  as  this  whole  argument  supposes,  we  are  tod 
ignorant  to  understand  the  proofs  of  religion. 

Ans.  1.  Total  ignorance  of  a  subject  precludes  argument,  but  partial  ignorance 
does  not.  We  may,  in  various  degrees,  know  a  man's  character,  and 
the  way  he  is  likely  to  pursue  certain  ends;  and  yet  not  know  how  he 
onrfht  to  act  to  gain  those  ends.  In  this  case  objections  to  his  mode 
of  pursuing  ends  may  be  answered  by  our  ignorance,  though  that  be 
docs  act  in  a  certain  manner  is  capable  of  proof.  So  we  may  have 
evidence  of  God's  character  and  aims,  and  yet  not  be  competent  judges 
as  to  his  measures.  Our  ignorance  is  a  good  answer  to  the  difficulties 
of  religion,  but  no  objection  to  religion  itself. 

Ans.  2.  If  our  ignorance  did  invalidate  the  proofs  of  religion,  as  well  as  the 
objections,  yet  is  it  undeniable  that  moral  obligations  remain  un- 
affected by  our  ignorance  of  the  consequences  of  obedience  or  viola- 
tion. The  consequences  of  vice  and  virtue  may  not  be  fully  known, 
yet  it  is  credible  that  they  may  be  such  as  religion  declares :  and  this 
credibility  is  an  obligation,  in  point  of  prudence,  to  abstain  from  sin. 

^n«.  3.  Our  answers  to  the  objections  against  religion,  are  not  equally  valid 
against  the  proofs  of  it. 
[Answers  rehearsed.] 

Ans.  4.  Our  answers,  though  they  may  be  said  to  be  based  on  our  ignorance, 
are  really  not  so,  but  on  what  analogy  teaches  concerning  our  igno- 
rance,— viz. :  that  it  renders  us  incompetent  judges.     They  are  based 
.     on  experience,  and  what  we  do  knoic  ;  so  that  to  credit  religion  is  to 
trust  to  experience,  and  to  disregard  it  is  the  contrary. 

CONCLUSION. 

1.  The  reasoning  of  the  last  chapter  leads  us  to  regard  this  life  as  part  of  a 
larger  plan  of  things. 
1.)  AVhether  we   are  connected  with  the  distant  parts  of  the  universe,  is 
uncertain ;  but  it  is  very  clear  we  are  connected,  more  or  less,  with 
present,  past,  and  future. 
2.)  We  are  evidently  in  the  midst  of  a  scheme,  not  fixed  but  progressive; 
and  one  equally  incomprehensible,  whether  we  regard  the  present,  past, 
or  future. 
2*  This  scheme   contains   as  much  that  is  wonderful  as  religion  does :    for 
it  certainly  would  be  as  wonderful  that  all  nature  came  into  existence 
without  a  Creator,  as  that  there  should  be  a  Creator:  and  as  wonderful 
that  the  Creator  should  act  without  any  rule  or  scheme,  as  that  he  should 
act  with  one ;  or  that  he  should  act  by  a  bad  rule,  rather  than  a  right-eous 
one. 

3,  Our  very  nature  compels  us  to  believe  that  the  will  and  character  of  the 

Author  of  nature,  is  just  and  good. 

4.  Whatever  be  his  character,  he  formed  the  world  as  it  is,  and  controls  it  as 

he  does,  and  has  assigned  us  our  part  and  lot. 
5*  Irrational  creatures  act  their  part,  and  receive  their  lot,  without  reflection?, 
but  creatures  endued  with  reason,  can  hardly  avoid  reflecting  whittier  v/o 
go,  and  what  is  the  scheme,  in  the  midst  of  which  we  find  ourselvef?. 
[Here  follows  a  recapitulation  of  the  book.] 


CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY.  45 


PART  n. 

CHAPTER   I. 

IMPORTANCE    OP    CHRISTIANITY. 

Every  one  must  admit  that  we  need  a  revelation.  Few,  if  any,  could  reason 
out  a  system,  even  of  natural  religion.  If  they  could,  there  is  no  probability 
that  they  would.  Such  as  might,  would  still  feel  the  want  of  revelation.  To 
say  that  Christianity  is  superfluous,  is  as  wild  as  to  say  all  are  happy. 

No  exactness  in  attending  to  natural  religion  can  make  Christianity  of  small 
importance. 

If  Christianity  be  from  God,  we  must  obey,  unless  we  know  all  his  reasons 
for  giving  it;  and  also  that  those  reasons  no  longer  exist;  at  least  in  our  case. 
This  we  cannot  know. 

The  importance  of  Christianity  appears  if  we  regard  it 

I.  As  a  republication  of  natural  religion. 

1.  It  gives  the  moral  system  of  the  universe. 
1.)  Free  from  corruptions;  teaching  that 
— Jehovah  created  all  things. 
—  governs  all  things. 

— Virtue  is  his  law. 

— Mankind  will  be  judged  according  to  character. 
2.)  It  publishes  its  facts  authoritatively. 
3.)  With  vastly  more  clearness ;  e.g.  the  doctrines  of  a  future  state :  danger 

of  sin  :  efficacy  of  repentance. 
4.)  With  the  advantage  of  a  visible  church,  distinguished  from  the  world  by 
peculiar  institutions. 
Ohjec.  The  perversions  of  Christianity,  and  the  little  good  it  has  done. 
Ana.  1.  Natural  religion  is  no  less  perverted,  and  has  done  less  good. 

2.  The  benefits  of  Christianity  are  not  small. 

3.  The  evils  ascribed  to  it,  are  not  its  effects.     Things  are  to  be  judged 

by  their  genuine  tendencies. 

4.  The  light  of  reason,  no  more  than  revelation  forces  acquiescence. 

5.)  With  the  additional  advantage  that  every  Christian,  is  bound  to  instruct 
and  persuade  others. 

II.  As  containing  truths  not  discoverable  by  natural  reason. 

1,  A  mode  of  salvation  for  the  ruined. 

*Z»  I'uties  unknown  before. 

3.  Our  relations  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Ghost. 

1.)  Hence  the  form  of  baptism. 

2.)  Pious  regards  to  Christ,  and  the  Holy  Ghost,  based  on  our  relation*  to 
them. 
1.  The  manner  of  external  worship. 


46  CONSPECTUS  or  the  analogy. 

III.   The  fearful  hazard  of  neglecting  Christianity. 

!•  Those  who  think  natural  religion  sufficient,  must  admit  that  Christianity  id 
highly  important. 

2.  Our  relations  to  Christ  being  made  known,  our  religious  regard  to  him  is 

an  evident  obligation. 

3.  These  relations  being  real,  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  our  neglect  of 

behaving  suitably  to  them,  will  not  be  attended  with  the  same  kind  of 
consequences  as  follow  the  neglect  of  duties  made  known  by  reason. 

4.  If  we  are  corrupt  and  depraved,  and  so  unfit  for  heaven,  and  if  we  need 

God's  Holy  Spirit  to  renew  our  nature,  how  can  it  be   a  slight  thing 
whether  we  make  use  of  the  means  for  obtaining  such  assistance? 

5.  Thus,  if  Christianity  be  either  true,  or  merely  credible,  it  is  most  rash  and 

presumptuous  to  treat  it  lightly. 

REMARKS. 

1.  The  distinction  between  positive  and  moral  obligations. 

1.)  For  moral  precepts  we  can  see  the  reason:  for  positive  we  cannot. 

2.)  Moral  duties  are  such  prior  to  command  j  positive  duties  tvie  such  because 

commanded. 
3.)  The  manner  in  which  a  duty  is  made  known,  d«es  not  make  it  moral  or 

positive. 

2.  The  ground  of  regarding  moral  duties  as  superior  to  positive. 
1.)  Both  have  the  nature  of  moral  commands. 

2.)  If  the  two  conflict,  we  must  obey  the  moral. 
— Positive  institutions  are  means  to  moral  ends. 
— Ends  are  more  excellent  than  means. 

— Obedience  to  positive  institutions,  has  no  value  but  as  proceeding  from 
moral  principle. 
3.)  Both  moral  and  positive  duties  are  revealed,  and  so  are  on  a  level;  but 
the  moral  law   is  also  interwoven  with  our  very  nature,  and  so  its 
precepts  must  prevail  when  the  two  interfere. 

3.  There  is  less  necessity  for  determining  their  relative  authority,  than  some 

suppose. 
1.)  Though  man  is  disposed  to  outward  and  ritual  religion,  nothing  can  give 

us  acceptance  with  God,  without  moral  virtue. 
2 )  Scripture  always  lays  stress  on  moral  duties. 

3.)  It  is  a  great  weakness,  though  very  common,  to  make  light  of  positive 
institutions,  because  less  important  than  moral. 
— We  are  bound  to  obey  all  God's  commands. 

— A  precept,  merely  positive,  admitted  to  be  from  God,  creates  moral 
obligation,  in  the  strictest  sense. 

COXCLUSION. 

This   account    of    Christianity    shows    our    great    obligation   to   study  the 
Scriptures. 


CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY.  4T 

CHAPTER  11. 

PRESUMPTIONS    AGAINST   A   REVELATION,    CONSIDERED    AS    MIRACULOUS. 

Having  shown  the  need  of  revelation,  we  now  examine  the  presumptions 
against  it. 

The  analogy  of  nature  is  generally  supposed  to  afford  presumptions  against 
miracles. 

They  are  deemed  to  require  stronger  evidence  than  other  events. 

I.  Analogy  furnishes  no  presumptions  against  the  general  scheme  of 

Christianity, 

1.  It  is  no  presumption  against  Christianity,  that  it  is  not  the  discovery  of, 

reason,  or  of  experience. 

2.  Nor  is  it  a  presumption  against  Christianity,  that  it  contains  things  unlike 

the  apparent  course  of  nature. 
1.)  We  cannot  suppose  every  thing,  in  the  vast  universe,  to  be  just  like  what 

is  the  course  of  nature  in  this  little  world. 
2.)  Even  within  the  present  compass  of  our  knowledge,  we  see  many  things 
greatly  unlike. 
3*  If  we  choose  to  call  what  is  unlike  our  known  course  of  things,  miraculoua, 
still  that  does  not  make  it  improbable. 

II.  There  is  no  presumption  against  such  a  revelation,  as  we  should 

now   call  miraculous,    being   made,    at   the   begiiining   of  the 

world, 
1.  There  was  then  no  course  of  nature,  as  to  this  world. 

2*  Whether  man  then  received  a  revelation  involves  a  question  not  of  miracles, 
but  of  fact. 

3.  Creation  was  a  very  different  exertion  of  power  from  that  which  rules  the 

world,  now  it  is  made. 
4r.  Whether  the  power  of  forming  stopped  when  man  was  made;  or  went  on, 

and  formed  a  religion  for  him,  is  merely  a  question  as  to  the  degree  or 

extent,  to  which  a  power  was  exerted. 
5*  There  is  then  no  presumption  from  analogy  against  supposing  man  had  a 

revelation  when  created. 
6.  All  tradition  and  history  teaches  that  he  had,  which  amounts  to  a  real  and 

material  proof. 

III.  There  is  no  presumption  against  miracles,  or  a  miracidous  revelu' 

tion,  after  the  course  of  nature  was  settled, 
1.  Such  a  presumption,  requires  the  adduction  of  some  parallel  case. 
*Z,  This  would  require  us  to  know  the  history  of  some  other  world. 
3*  Even  then,  if  drawn  from  only  one  other  world,  the  presumption  would 
be  very  precarious. 
To  be  more  jinrticular, 
!•  There  is  a  strong  presumption  against  any  truth  till  it  is  proved — which  yel 
is  overcome  by  almost  any  proof. 


48  CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

* 

— Hence  the  question  of  a  presumption  against  miracles,  involves  only 
the  degree  of  presumption,  (not  whether  the  presumption  is  peculiar 
to  miracles,)  and  whether  that  degree  is  such  as  to  render  them 
incredible. 

2.  If  we  leave  out  religion,  we  are  in  total  darkness  as  to  the  cause  or  circum- 

stances on  which  the  course  of  nature  depends. 

^Five  or  six  thousand  years  may  have  given  occasion  and  reasons  for 
miraculous  interpositions  of  Providence. 

3.  Taking  in   religion,   there   are   distinct   reasons    for  miracles;    to    afford 

additional  instruction ;  to  attest  the  truth  of  instruction. 
It,  Miracles  must  not  be  compared  with  common  events,  but  with  uncommon; 
earthquakes,  pestilence,  &c. 

CONCLUSION. 

1.  There  are  no  analogies  to  render  miracles  incredible. 

2.  On  the  contrary,  we  see  good  reasons  for  them. 

3.  There  are  no  presumptions  against  them,  ^ecu^^ar  to  them,  as  distinguished 

from  other  unusual  phenomena. 


CHAPTER  III. 


ODR   INCAPACITY    OF   JUDGING   WHAT    SHOULD   BE    EXPECTED    IN   A   REVELATION 
FROM   GOD. 

Beside  the  objectors  to  the  evidences  of  Christianity,  there  are  many  who 
object  to  its  nature.  They  say  it  is  not  full  enough  :  has  in  it  foolish  things  : 
gives  rise  to  superstition:  subserves  tyranny:  is  not  universally  known :  not 
Well  arranged  :  figurative  language,  &c. 

It  is  granted  that  if  it  contained  immoralities  or  contradictions  they  would 
show  it  to  be  false.  But  other  objections  against  religion,  aside  from  objections 
against  its  evidences,  are  frivolous :  as  will  now  be  shown. 

Let  the  student  look  to  the  force  of  the  proofs,  rather  than  any  consequences 
which  may  be  drawn  from  them. 

I.  The  Scripture  informs  us  of  a  scheme  of  government,  in  addition 
to  the  material  laws  of  the  world. 

1.  If  both  these  schemes,  the  physical  and  the  moral,  coincide  and  form  one 
whole,  then  our  inability  to  criticise  the  system  of  nature,  renders  it 
credible  that  we  are  incompetent  to  criticise  the  system  of  grace. 

'Z»  Nature  shows  many  things  we  should  not  have  expected,  prior  to  expe- 
rience. 

3.  Hence  it  is  altogether  likely  it  would  be  so  in  religion. 

4,  If  a  citizen  is  incompetent  to  judge  of  the  propriety  of  the  general  laws  of 

his  government,  he  is  equally  incompetent  to  judge  when  and  how  far 
those  laws  should  be  suspended,  or  deviated  from. 


CONSPECTUS    OF    THE    ANALOGY.  49 

II.  We  are  no  better  judges  of  how  revelation  should  be  imparted. 

Whether  to  every  man,  or  to  some  for  others ;  or  what  mode 
or  degree  of  proof  should  be  given ;  or  whether  the  know- 
ledge should  be  given  gradually  or  suddenly. 

1.  We  are  not  able  to  judge  how  much  new  knowledge  ought  to  be   given 

by  revelation. 

2.  Nor  how  far,  nor  in  what  way,  Ood  should  qualify  men  to  transmit  any 

revelation  he  might  make. 
3*  Nor  whether  the  evidence  should  be  certain,  probable,  or  doubtful. 
4r,  Nor  whether  all  should  have  the  same  benefit  from  it. 

5.  Nor  whether  it  should  be  in  writing,  or  verbal.     If  it  be  said  that  if  not  in 

writing  it  would  not  have  answered  its  purpose:  I  ask,  what  purpose? 
Who  knows  what  purposes  would  best  suit  God's  general  government? 

6,  All  which  shows  it  to  be  absurd  to  object  to  particular  things  in  revelation 

as  unsuitable. 

III.  Hence  the  oj^ly  question,  concerning  the  truth  of  revelation  is, 

whether  it  is  a  revelation. 

1.  No  obscurities,  &c.  could  overthrow  the  authority  of  a  revelation. 

2.  It  can  only  be  overthrown  by  nullifying  the  proofs. 

3.  Though  the  proofs  could  be  shown  to  be  less  strong  than  is  affirmed,  it  still 

should  control  our  conduct, 

IV.  Modes  of  arguing,  lohich  are  perfectly  just,  in  relation  to  other 

books,  are  not  so  as  to  the  Bible. 

1.  We  are  competent  judges  of  common  books,  but  not  of  Scripture. 
2*  Our  only  inquiry  should  be  to  find  out  the  sense. 

3.  In   other  books,   internal  improbabilities  weaken   external  proof;    but  in 
regard  to  revelation,  we  scarcely  know  what  are  improbabilities. 
1.)  Those  who  judge  the  Scripture  by  preconceived  expectations,  will  imagine 

they  find  improbabilities. 
2.)  And  so  they  would  by  thus  judging  in  natural  things. 

— It  would  seem  very  improbable,  prior  to  experience,  that  man  should 
be  better  able  to  determine  the  magnitudes  and  motions  of  heavenly 
bodies,  than  he  is  to  determine  the  causes  and  cures  of  disease,  which 
much  more  nearly  concerns  him. 
— Or  that  we  should  sometimes  hit  upon  a  thing  in  an  instant,  even  when 
thinking  of  something  else,  which  we  had  been  vainly  trying  to 
discover  for  years. 
— Or  that  language  should  be  so  liable  to  abuse,  that  every  man  may  be 

a  deceiver. 
—Or  that  brute  instinct  should  ever  bo  superior  to  reason. 

V.  Such  observations  apply  to  almost  all  objections  to  Christianity, 

as  distinguished  from  objections  against  its  evidence. 

For  instance,  the  disorderly  manner  in  which  some,  in  the  apostolic  ag«i 
ttsed  their  miraculous  gifts. 
1.  This  does  not  prove  the  acts  not  miraculous, 
D  5 


50  CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

2.  The  person  having  any  such  gift,  -would  have  the  same  power  over  it  which 

he  would  have  over  any  other  ability,  and  might  pervert  it. 
3*  To  say  why  was  he  not  also  endued  with  prudence,  to  restrain  its  use, 
is  but  saying  why   did  not    God    give  a  higher   degree   of    miraculoua 
endowment?     As  to  which  we  are  not  competent  judges. 

4.  God  does  not  confer  his  natural  gifts,  (memory,  eloquence,  knowledge,  <fec.) 

only  on  those  who  are  prudent  and  make  the  best  use  of  them. 

5.  Nor  is  worldly  instruction,  by  educators,  commonly  given  in  the  happiest 

manner. 
YI.   There  is  a  resemblance  behveen  religion  and  nature  in  several 
other  respects. 
1.  In  both,  common  and  necessary  things,  are  plain ;  but  to  "  go  on  to  perfec- 
tion" in  either,  requires  exact  and  laborious  study. 
2*  The  hinderances  to  both  religious  and  physical  knowledge,  are  the  same 
in  kind.     A  more  perfect  knowledge  may  be  brought  about, 
1.)  By  the  progress  of  learning  and  liberty. 
2.)  By  students  attending  to  intimations  overlooked  by  the  generality. 

3.  It  is  not  wonderful  that  our  knowledge  of  Bible  truth  should  be  small;  for 

the  natural  world  has  laid  open  to  inspection,  for  thousands  of  years,  and 
yet  onl}'  lately  are  any  great  discoveries  made. 

4.  Perhaps  these  scientific  discoveries,  are  to  be  the  means  of  opening  and 

ascertaining  Bible  truth. 
Ohjec.  The  cases  are  not  parallel ;  for  natural  knowledge  is  of  no  consequen<;e, 

compared  to  spiritual. 
.Ahs.  1.  The    cases   are   parallel;    for  natural   knowledge    is    as   important  to 
our   natural   well-being,   as  spiritual   knowledge   is   to  our  spiritual 
well-being. 
Ans.  2.  If  the  cases  were   not   parallel,  there   are  plenty  of  other  analogies, 
which  show  that  God   does  not  dispense  his  ^ifts  according  to  our 
notions  of  their  value. 
Ohjec.  2.  If  Christianity  be  intended  for  the  recovery  of  men,  why  not  sooner 

introduced,  and  more  widely  diffused  ? 

Ans.  The  objection  is  just  as  strong  against  the  natural  sciences.     Nay,  if  the 

light  of  nature  and  of  revelation  are  both  from  the  same  source,  we 

might  expect  that  revelation  would  have  been  introduced  and  diffused 

just  as  it  is. 

1.)  Remedies  for  disease  are  known  but  to  a  few,  or  not  known  at  all,  nor  to 

any  without  care  and  study. 
2.)  When  proposed  by  discoverers,  they  have  been  treated  with  derision,  and 

the  use  rejected  by  thousands  whom  they  might  have  cured. 
3.)  The  best  remedies  have  been  used  unskilfully,  and  so  made  to  produce 

more  disease. 
4.)  Their  benefit  may  come  very  slowly. 
6.)  In  some  cases  they  may  be  wholly  ineffectual. 
(&.)  They  may  be  so  disagreeable  that  many  will  not  submit  to  use  them,  even 

with  the  prospect  of  a  cure. 
7.)  Sometimes  the  remedy  may  be  entirely  out  of  reach  if  wo  were  re^dy 
to  take  it. 

All  this  reasoning  may  bo  applied  to  Christianity. 


CONSPECTUS    OP   THE   ANALOGY.  51 

VII.  Having  obviated  all  objections  to  Christianity,  from  its  con- 
taining things  we  should  not  have  expected,  we  will  now 
consider  the  objections  against  its  morality. 

1.  Reason  may  judge,  as  to  whether  revelation  contains  things  contrary  to 

justice,  and  wisdom,  &c.  as  those  attributes  are  taught  by  natural  religion. 
But  no  such  objections  are  advanced,  except  such  as  would  equally 
condemn  the  constitution  of  nature. 

2.  There  are  indeed  particular  precepts,  to  particular  persons,  which  would  be 

immoral,  but  for  the  precept.     The  precept  changes  the  nature  of  the 
action. 
3*  None  are  contrary  to  immutable  morality.     We  are  never  commanded  to 
cultivate  the  principles  of  ingratitude,  treachery,  <fec. 

4.  God  may  command  the  taking  of  life  or  property  because  these  are  At*. 

5.  The  only  real  difficulty  is,  that  such  commands  are  liable  to  be  perverted  by 

the  wicked  to  their  own  horrid  purposes ;  and  to  mislead  the  weak.  But 
such  objections  do  not  lie  against  revelation,  as  such,  but  against  the  very 
notion  of  relifjion  aa  a  trial. 

6.  The  sum  of  the   whole  is,  objections  against  the  scheme  of  Christianity 

do  not  affect  its  truth ;  since  there  are  no  objections  against  its  morality. 
Hence  objections  against  it,  aside  from  its  evidences,  are  frivolous.  Objec- 
tions against  the  eoidence,  will  be  considered  in  a  subsequent  chapter, 
[i.e.  ch.  viL] 


CHAPTER  rV.* 

CHRISTIANITY    A    SCHEME    IMPERFECTLY   UNDETISTOOD. 

In  the  last  chapter  it  was  shown  that  we  might  expect,  beforehand,  that  a 
revelation  would  contain  strange  things,  and  things  liable  to  great  objections. 

This  abates  the  force  of  such  objections,  or  rather  precludes  them. 

But  it  may  be  said  this  does  not  show  such  objectionable  things  to  be  good, 
or  credible. 

It  was  a  suflBcient  answer  [ch.  vii.  part  i.]  to  objections  against  the  course 
of  nature,  that  it  was  a  scheme,  imperfectly  comprehended. 

If  Christianity  be  a  scheme,  the  like  objections  admit  of  a  like  answer. 

I.    Christianity  is  a  scheme,  beyond  our  comprehension. 

!•  Ood's  general  plan  is  to  conductr'things  gradually,  so  that,  finally,  every  one 

shall  receive  what  he  deserves. 
3,  Christianity  is  a  partieidar  arrangement,  under  this  general  plan  :  is  a  part 

of  it,  and  conduces  to  its  completion. 
3.  It  is  itself  a  complicated  and  mysterious  economy. 
1.)  Its  arrangements  began  from  the  fall  of  man. 

2  )  Various  dispensations,  patriarchal,  prophetic,  &c.  were  preparatory  to  it, 
3.)  At  a  certain  juncture  in  the  condition  of  the  world  Jesus  Christ  came. 

*  [In  studying  this  cnapter,  let  chap.  vii.  part  i.  be  kept  in  view.] 


52  CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

4.)  The  mission  of  the  Holy  Ghost  was  part  of  this  economy. 
b.)  Christ   now  presides  over  it,  and  will  establish  the  church,  judge  tha 
world,  give  up  the  kingdom,  &c.  &c. 
4:.  Of  course,  we  can  comprehend  but  little  of  such  a  scheme. 

5.  We  plainly  see,  from  what  is  revealed,  that  there  is  very  much  unrevealed. 

6.  Thus  it  is  evident  that  we  are  as  little  capable  of  judging  as  to  the  whole 

system  of  religion,  as  we  are  as  to  the  whole  system  of  nature. 

II.  In    both    material    and    spiritual    things,    means    are  used  to 

accomplish  ends. 

1.  Hence  a  thing  may  seem  foolish  to  us,  because  we  do  not  know  its  object 

and  end. 

2.  Its  seeming  foolish  to  us,  is  no  proof  that  it  is  so. 

III.  Christianity  is  carried  on  hy  general  laivs,  no  less  than  nature. 

1«  Why  do  we  say  there  are  laios  of  nature? 

1.)  We  indeed  know  some  such.    But  nothing  of  the  laws  of  many  things,  e.g. 
•  Pestilence.  •  Storms.         •  Earthquakes.         •  Diversities  of 

human  powers.         •  Association  of  ideas. 
2.)  Hence  we  call  many  things  accidental,  which  we  know  are  not  matters 

of  chance,  but  are  subject  to  general  laws. 
3.)  It  is  a  very  little  way  that  we  can  trace  things  to  their  general  laws. 
4.)  We  attribute  many  things  to  such  laws,  only  by  analogy. 

2.  Just  for  the  same  reasons,  we  say  that  miracles  comport  with  God's  general 

laws  of  tvisdom.  These  laws  may  be  unknown  to  us ;  but  no  more  so  than 
those  by  which  some  die  as  soon  as  born,  or  live  to  old  age,  or  have 
superior  understandings,  &c. 

3.  We  see  no  more  reason  to  regard  the  frame  and  course  of  nature  as  a 

scheme,  than  we  have  to  regard  Christianity  as  such. 
1.)  If  the  first  is  a  scheme,  then  Christianity,  if  true,  would  be  liJcelg  to  be 

a  scheme. 
2.)  As    Christianity  is  revealed   but   in   part,   and   is   an    arrangement   to 

accomplish  ends,  there  would  of  course  seem  to  us,  in  it,  irregularities; 

just  as  we  see  in  nature. 
3.)  Therefore  objections  against  the  one,  are  answered  in  the  same  manner 

as  objections  against  the  other. 


Having,  in  a  previous  chapter,  [ch.  iii.,]  answered  objections  to  Christianity 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  and  in  this,  as  a  general  question  of  loisdom  and  goodness, 
the  next  thing  is  to  discuss  objections  in  particular. 

As  one  of  these  is  directed  against  the  scheme,  as  just  now  described,  it  will 
be  considered  here. 

Objec.  Christianity  is  a  roundabout,  and  perplexed  contrivance;  just  such  as 
men,  for  want  of  understanding  or  power,  are  obliged  to  adopt,  in 
their  designs. 
Ans.  ].)  God  uses  just  such  complex  arrangements  in  the  natural  world.     The 
mystery  is  quite  as  great  in  nature  as  in  grace. 


CONSPECTUS   OP   THE    ANALOGY.  53 

2.)  We  do  not  know  what  are  means,  and  what  are  ends. 
3.)  The  natural  world,  and  its  government,  are  not  fixed,  but  progressive. 
4.)  Great  length  of  time  is  required  in  some  changes;  e.g.  animals,  vege- 
tables, geological  periods,  &g. 
6.)  One  state  of  life  is  a  preparation  and  means  for  attaining  another. 
6.)  Man  is  impatient,  but  Jehovah  deliberate. 


CHAPTER  V. 

OF   A   MEDIATOR,    AND    REDEMPTION   BY   HIM. 

Nothing  in  Christianity  is  so  much  objected  to  as  the  position  assigned  to 
Christ;  yet  nothing  is  more  unjust.     The  whole  world  exhibits  mediation. 

I.  Our  existence,  and  all  its  satisfactions,  are  by  the  medium  of  others. 
1.  If  60  in  the  natural  world,  why  not  in  the  spiritual? 

2*  The  objection    therefore  is  not  only  against   Christ's  mediation,  but  all 
adediation. 

II.  We  cannot  know  all  the  ends  for  which  God  punishes,  nor  by 

whom  he  should  punish. 

!•  Future  punishment  may  be  as  natural  a  sequence  of  sin,  as  a  broken  limb 

is  of  falling  from  a  precipice. 
S*  This  is  not  taking  punishment  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  and  giving  it  to 

nature ;  ^it  is  only  distinguishing  ordinary  events  from  miraculous. 

III.  In  natural  providence,    God  has  made  provision  that  the  bad 

consequences  of  actions  do  not  always  folloio. 

1.  "We  may  say  God  could  have  prevented  all  evil.     But  we  see  he  permits  it, 

and  has  provided  relief,  and  even  sometimes  perfect  remedies  for  it. 
1.)  Thus  the  bad  consequences  of  trifling  on  a  precipice  may  be  prevented 

by  a  friend,  if  we  do  not  reject  his  assistance. 
2.)  We  may  ourselves  do  much  towards  preventing  the  bad  consequences  of 

our  misdeeds. 
S.)  Still  moi-e  if  assisted. 

2.  It  might  have  been  perfectly  just  if  it  were  not  so;  but  that  it  is  so,  shows 

compassion,  as  distinguished  from  goodness. 

3.  The  course  of  nature  affords  many  instances  of  such  compassion. 

4.  Thus  analogy  sanctions  an  arrangement,  by  which  the  ruinous  consequences 

of  vice  or  folly  may  be  averted,  at  least  in  some  cases. 

5.  If  the  consequences  of  rash  and  inconsiderate  acts,  which  we  scarcely  call 

vicious,  are  often  so  serious,  we  may  apprehend  that  the  bad  consequences 
will  be  greater,  in  proportion  as  the  irregularity  is  greater. 

6.  A  dissolute  disregard  to  all  religion,  if  there  be  a  religion,  is  incomparably 

more  reprehensible  than  the  mere  neglects,  imprudencies,  &c.  of  this  life. 
T..  As  the  eS"ects  of  worldly  imprudence  and  vice  are  often  misery,  ruin,  and 
even  death,  no  one  can  say  what  may  be  the  consequences  of  blasphemy, 
contempt  of  God,  and  final  impenitence. 
5* 


54  CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

8.  Nor  can  any  one  tell,  how  far  the  consequences  of  such  great  wickedness 

can  possibly  be  prevented,  consistently  with  the  eternal  rule  of  right. 

9.  Still  there  would,  from  analogy,  be  some  hope  of  room  for  pardon. 

IV.  There  is  no  prohahility  that  any  thing  we  could  do  alone,  would 
entirely  preve7it  the  effects  of  our  irregularities. 

1.  We  do  not  know  all  the  reasons  for  punishment,  nor  why  it  should  be  fit 

to  remit  punishment. 
"i.  Nor  do  we  know  all  the  consequences  of  vice,  and  so  should  not  know  how 

to  prevent  them. 
3.  Vice  impairs  men's  abilities  for  helping  themselves. 
4r.  Misconduct  makes  assistance  necessary,  which  otherwise  would  not  have 

been.     Why  should  not  the  same  things  be  so,  as  to  our  future  interests? 
5*  In  temporal  things,  behaving  well  in  time  to  come,  does  not  repair  old  errors, 

why  should  it  as  to  future  things  ? 

6.  Were  it  so  in  all  cases  it  would  be  contrary  to  all  our  notions  of  government. 

7.  It  could  not  be  determined  in  what  degree,  or  in  what  cases,  it  would  be 

so,  even  if  we  knew  it  might  in  some  cases. 

8.  The  efficacy  of  repentance,  as  urged  in  opposition  to  atonement,  is  contrary 

to  the  general  sense  of  mankind;  as  shown  by  the  prevalence  of  pro- 
pitiatory sacrifices. 

V.  In  this  state  of  apprehensioji,  awakened  by  the  light  of  nature, 
revelation  comes  in,  and  teaches  positively,  the  possibility  of 
pardon  and  safety. 

1.  Confirms  our  fears  as  to  the  unprevented  consequences  of  sin. 

2.  Declares  the  world  to  be  in  a  state  of  ruin. 

3.  That  repentance  alone  will  not  secure  pardon. 

4.  That  there  is  a  mode  of  pardon,  by  interposition. 

5.  That  God's   moral  government  is  compassionate,   as  well  as  his  natural 

government. 

6.  That  he  has  provided,  by  the  interposition  of  a  mediator,  to  save  men. 

7.  All  this  seems  to  put  man  in  a  strange  state  of  helpless  degradation.     But 

it  is  not  Christianity  which  puts  him  so.     All  philosophy  and  history 
show  man  to  be  degraded  and  corrupt. 

VI.  Scripture,  in  addition  to  confirming  the  dim,  testimony  of  the 
light  of  nature,  reveals  a  Christ,  as  mediator  and  propitiatory 
sacrifice. 

1.    He   is    "that  prophet." 

1.)  Declared   the   will   of    God. 

2.)  Published   anew   the   law   of  nature. 

2.)  Taught    with    authority. 

4.)  Revealed   the  right   manner   of  worship, 

5.)  Revealed    the    exact   use    of   repentance. 

6.)  Revealed   future   rewards   and   punishments. 

7.)  Set  us  a  perfect  example. 


CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY.  56 

2*  He  has  a  kingdom  -R-hicli  is  not  of  this  world. 
1.)  Founded  a  church. 
2.)  Governs  it. 

3.)  Of  it,  all  who  obey  him  are  members. 
4.)  Each  of  these  shall  live  and  reign  with  him  forever. 
3.  He  is  a  propitiatory  sacrifice. 

1.)  How  his  sacrifice  becomes  efficacious,  we  are  not  exactly  told. 

2.)  Conjectures  may  be  absurd;  at  least  cannot  be  certain. 

3.)  If  any  complain  for  want  of  further  instruction,  let  him  produce  his 

claim  to  it. 
4.)  Some,   because   they  cannot  explain,  leave  it  out  of  their  creed;   and 

regard  Christ  only  as  a  teacher. 
6.)  We  had  better  accept  the  benefit,  without  disputing  about  how  it  was 
procured. 

VII.  We  are  not  judges,  antecedent  to  revelation,  lohether  a  mediator 

was  necessary,  nor  what  should  be  the  whole  nature  of  his 
office. 

1.  We  know  not  how  future  punishment  would  have  been  inflicted. 
2<  Nor  all  the  reasons  why  it  would  be  necessary. 

3.  The  satisfaction  by  Christ,  does  not  represent  God  as  indifferent  whether 

he  punishes  the  innocent  or  guilty. 
1.)  We   see,  in  this  world,  the  innocent  forced  to  suffer  for  the  faults  of 

the  guilty. 
2.)  But  Christ  suffered  voluntarily. 

4.  Though,  finally,   every   one   shall   receive  according  to  his  own  deserts; 

yet,  during  the  progress  of  God's  scheme,  vicarious  sufferings  may  be 
necessary. 
1.)  God  commands  us  to  assist  others,  though  in  many  cases  it  costs  ua 

suffering  and  toil. 
2.)  One  person's  sufferings  often  tend  to  relieve  another. 
5*  Vicarious  atonement  for  sinners,  serves  to  vindicate  the  authority  of  God's 

laws,  and  to  deter  men  from  sin. 
6.  Objections  to  vicarious  suffering  are  obviously  not  objections  to  Christianity, 

but  to  the  whole  course  of  nature. 
T.  The   objection,  therefore,   amounts  to  nothing  more  than  saying  that  a 
divine  arrangement  is  not  necessary,  or  fit,  because  the  objector  does 
not  see  it  to  be  so ;  though  he  must  own  he  is  no  judge,  and  could  not 
understand  why  it  should  be  necessary,  if  it  were  so  ! 

VIII.  We  have  no  reason   to  expect  the  same  information  touching 

God's  conduct,  as  we  have  in  relation  to  our  oivn  duty. 

1.  God  instructs  us  by  experience. 

IS.  This  experience,  though  sufficient  for  our  purposes,  is  an  infinitely  small 
part  of  his  providence. 

3.  The  things  not  understood  involve  God's  appointment,  and  Christ's  exe- 
cution ;  but  what  is  required  of  us,  we  are  clearly  informed. 

4:.  Even  the  reasons  for  Christian  precepts  are  made  obvious. 


5(5  CONSPECTUS  or  the  analogy. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

STJPrOSED    LACK    OP   PROOF    OF    REVELATION-,  AND    ITS    WANT    OF   rNIVERSALITT. 

It  has  been  thought  to  be  a  positive  argument  against  revelation,  that  ita 
evidences  are  not  adequate,  and  that  it  is  not  universally  known  and  believed. 

But  the  argument  amounts  to  just  this,  that  God  would  not  bestow  on  us  any 
favor,  except  in  such  a  mode  and  degree  as  we  thought  best,  and  did  exactly 
the  same  for  everybody  else. 

Such  a  notion,  all  analogy  contradicts. 

I.  Hen  act  in  their  most  important  concerns  on  doubtful  evidence. 

1.  It  is  often  absolutely  impossible  to  say  which  of  two  modes  of  acting  will 

give  most  pleasure  or  profit. 

2.  If  it  were   possible,  we    cannot   know  what   changes    temper,  satiety,  ill 

health,  kc.  might  produce,  so  as  to  destroy  our  pleasure. 

3.  We  cannot  foresee   what  accidents  may  cut  it  all  off". 

4.  Strong  objections  and  difficulties  may  attach  to  the  course  of  action  we 

adopt,  which  yet  all  would  admit  ought  not  to  deter  us. 

5.  We  may,  after  all,  be  deceived  by  appearances,  or  by  our  passions,  &,c. 

6.  Men  think  it  reasonable  to  engage  in  pursuit  of  advantage,  even  when  the 

probabilities  of  success  are  against  them. 

II.  As  to  the  light  of  Christianity  not  being  universal. 

1,  Temporal  good  is  enjoyed  in  very  different  degrees  even  among  creatures 

of  the  same  species. 
2*  Yet  it  is  certain  that  God  governs. 

3.  We  may  prudently  or  imprudently  use  our  good  things. 

4.  The  Jewish  religion  was  not  universal. 

5.  If  it  be  intended  that  Christianity  should  be  a  small  light,  shining  in  a 

great  and  wide-spread  darkness,  it  would  be  perfectly  uniform  with 
other  parts  of  God's  providence. 

6.  If  some  have    Christianity  so  corrupted,   and   interpolated,  as  to  cause 

thoughtful  persons  to  doubt  it,  as  is  the  case  in  some  countries;  and  if, 
where  it  is  the  purest,  some  learn  much  less  from  it  than  they  might,  there 
are  manifest  parallels  in  God's  natural  dispensations. 

7.  No  more  is  expected  of  any  one,  than  is  equitable  under  his  circumstances. 

8.  Every  one  is  bound  to  get  rid  of  his  ignorance,  as  far  as  he  can,  and  to 

instruct  his  neighbor. 
9»  If  revelation  uere  universal,  in  extent  and  degree,  different  understandings, 
educations,  tempers,  length  of  lives,  and  outward  advantages,  would  soon 
make  the  knowledge  of  it  as  different  as  it  is  at  present. 

III.  Practical  reflections. 

First.  That  the  evidence  of  religion  is  not  such  as  unavoidably  to  convince  all, 

may  be  part  of  our  probation. 
1*  It  gives  scope  for  a  wise  or  vicious  use  of  our  understanding.     Juat  as  ii 
the  case  in  coir'Tion  affairs. 


CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY.  57 

2.  Intellectual  inaf.tention  to  so  serious  a  matter,  is  as  immoral,  as  disoLe* 

dience  after  conviction  of  the  truth. 
Secondly.  If  the  evidence  is  really  doubtful,  it  puts  us  on  probation. 
1.  If  a  man  were  in  doubt  whether  a  certain  person  had  done  him  the  greatest 

favor,  or  whether  his  whole  temporal  interest  depended  on  him,  he  oughv 

not  to  regard  that  person  as  he  would  if  there  were  no  reason  to  think  so. 
2*  So  if  there  is  only  reason  to  apprehend  that  Christianity  may  te  true,  we 

are  as  much  bound  to  examine,  &c.  as  we  would  be  bound  to  obey,  if  we 

knew  it  was  true. 
3*  Considering  the  infinite  importance  of  religion,  there  is  not  much  diflfer- 

ence  as  to  what  ought  to  be  the  mode  of  life  of  those  who  are  convinced 

and  those  who  doubt  its  truth.     Their  hopes  and  fears  are  the  same  in 

kind,  though  not  in  degree;  and  so  their  obligations  are  much  the  same. 
4r»  Doubts  presuppose   some  evidence,  belief  more,  and   certainty  more  still. 

Each  state  should  influence  our  conduct,  and  does  so,  in  common  things. 
5.  It  shows  a  mental  defect  not  to  see  evidence  unless  it  is  glaring;  and  a 

corrupt  heart  not  to  be  influenced  by  it  unless  overpowering. 
Thirdly.  Difficulties  as  to  believing  religion,  are  no  more  a  ground  of  complaint, 
than  difficulties  in  practising  it. 

1.  They  constitute  a  wholesome  discipline. 

1.)  In  allowing  an  unfair  mind  to  deceive  itself. 

2.)  In  requiring  belief  and  the  practice  of  virtue  under  some  uncertainties. 

2.  In  the  case  of  some  minds,  speculative  difficulties  as  to  the  evidence  of 

religion  is  the  princij^al  trial.      A  full  conviction  of  its  truth  would 

constrain  some  to  obedience. 
Fourthly.  The  difficulties  may  be  in  the  objector  rather  than  in  the  religion. 
1.  Not  sufficiently  in  earnest  to  be  informed. 
2     Secretly  wishes  religion  not  to  be  true. 
3»  Looks  at  objections  rather  than  replies. 
4.  Treats  the  subject  ludicrously. 
Fifthly.  The  proof  of  Christianity  is  level  to  common  men. 

1.  They  are  capable  of  being  convinced  of  the  existence  of  God,  and  of  their 

moral  accountability. 

2.  And  they  can  understand  the  evidence  of  miracles,  and  the  fulfilment  of 

prophecy. 
3*  If  they  are  capable  of  seeing  the  difficulty,  they  are  capable  of  understand- 
ing the  proof. 
4,  If  they  pick  up  objections  from  hearsay,  and  will  not  or  cannot  examine 
them  thoroughly,  they  must  remain  ignorant,  just  as  they  do  as  to  the 
sciences. 
Objec.  Our  directions  should  be  too  plain  to  admit  of  doubt;  like  those  of  an 

earthly  master. 
Ans.  The  earthly  master  only  wants  his  work  done,  and  is  careless  as  to  the 
state  of  the  heart;  but  as  the  whole  of  morality  consists  in  the  state  of 
the  heart,  the  cases  are  not  parallel. 
Finally.  The  credibility  of  our  being  in  a  state  of  probation  is  just  as  great 
as  the  credibility  of  there  being  any  religion.     Our  probation  may 
be  whether  we  choose  to  inform  ourselves  as  to  our  duty,  and  then 
•whether  we  choose  to  do  it. 


58  CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

Such  is  exactly  the  case  as  to  temporal  matters.  To  discern  what  is 
best  often  requires  difficult  consideration,  and  yet  leaves  doubts: 
and  not  reflecting  carefully,  or  not  acting  even  when  there  may 
be  doubt,  is  often  fatal. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

POSITIVE    EVIDENCES    OP    CHRISTIANITY. 

Having  considered  the  objections  both  to  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity, 
and  to  particular  doctrines  in  it,  it  only  remains  to  consider  the  positive  evi- 
dence of  its  truth ;  i.e.  what  analogy  teaches  with  regard  to  that  evidence. 

There  are  many  evidences  of  Christianity,  beside  those  from  miracles  or 
prophecy,  which  are  the  principal;  embracing  a  great  variety  of  proofs,  direct 
and  collateral,  and  reaching  through  all  past  time.  We  shall  now  consider 
the  proofs  from  miracles  and  prophecy.  ^ 

I.  Miracles. 

1.  Bible  history  gives  the  same  evidence  for  the  miracles  described,  as  for 

common  events. 
1.)  The  miracles  are  evidently  not  put  in  for  ornament,  as  speeches  are  by 

historians  and  poets  put  into  the  mouths  of  heroes. 
2.)  The  accounts  of  them  have  been  quoted  as  genuine,  by  various  writers, 

from  that  day  to  this. 
3.)  These  accounts  are  confirmed  by  subsequent  events ;  and  the  miracles 

alone,  can  account  for  those  events. 
4.)  The  only  fair  way  of  accounting  for  these  statements,  and  their  reception 

in  the  world,  is  that  the  things  really  happened. 
5.)  The  statements  should  be  admitted  till  disproved,  even  if  doubtful. 

2.  Paul's  Epistles  have  evidences  of  genuineness,  beyond  what  can  attach  to 

mere  history. 
1.)  Additional.     His  evidence  is  quite  detached.     He  received  the  gospel  not 

in  common  with  the  other  apostles,   but  separately,  and  direct  from 

Christ,  after  his  ascension. 
2.)  Peculiar.  He  speaks  of  Christ's  miracles  and  those  of  others  incidentally, 

as  familiar  facts,  fully  believed  by  those  to  whom  he  wrote. 

3.  Christianity  demands  credence  on  the  ground  of  its  miracles,  and  was  so 

received  by  great  numbers,  at  the  time  and  on  the  spot;  which  is  the 
case  with  no  other  religion. 
1.)  Its  first  converts  embraced  it  on  this  ground. 
2.)  It  is  not  conceivable  that  they  would  have   done  so,  at  such  fearful 

sacrifice,  unless  fully  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  these  miracles. 
3.)  Such  a  profession  and  sacrifices  furnish  the  same  kind  of  evidence  as 

if  they  had  testified  to  the  truth  of  the  miracles  in  writing. 
4.)  It  is  real  evidence,  for  they  had  full  opportunity  to  inform  themselves. 
5.)  It  is  a  sort  of  evidence  distinct  from  direct  history,  though  of  ^bo  sam» 
nature. 


CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY.  59 

6.)  Men  are  suspicious  as  well  as  credulous,  and  slow  to  believe  against  xhtii 
interests,  as  these  did. 
4.  It  lies  upon  unbelievers  to  show  why  all  this  array   of  proof  is  to  be 
rejected;  but  in  such  an  important  concern  we  shall  proceed  to  notice 
some  possible  objections. 
Objec.  1.  Enthusiasts  make  similar  sacrifices  for  idle  follies. 
Ana.  1.  This    ol>jection  ignores   the    distinction   between   opinions  and  facts. 
Suffering  for  an  opinion  is  no  proof  of  its  truth ;  but  in  attestation 
of  observed  facts,  it  is  proof. 

2.  Enthusiasm  weakens  testimony,  it  is  true,  even  as  to  facts  ,■  and  so  does 

disease,  t«  particular  instances.  But  when  great  numbers, -not  weak, 
nor  negligent,  afiirm  that  thei/  saw  and  heard  certain  things,  it  is  the 
fullest  evidence. 

3.  To  reject  testimony  on  the  ground  of  enthusiasm,  requires  that  the 

things  testified  be  incredible;  which  has  not  been  shown,  as  to 
religion,  but  the  contrary. 

4.  Religion  is  not  the  only  thing  in  regard  to  which  witnesses  are  liable 

to  enthusiasm.     In  common  matters,  we  get  at  the  truth  through 
witnesses,    though    influenced    by    party    spirit,    custom,    humor, 
romance,  &g.  &g. 
Objec.  2.  Enthusiasm  and  knavery  may  have  been  combined  in  the  apostles 

and  first  Christians. 
Ans.  Such  a  mixture  is  often  seen,  and  is  often  reproved  in  Scripture;  but  not 
more  in  religious  than  in  common  affairs.     Men  in  all  matters  deceive 
themselves  and  others,  in  every  degree,  yet  human  testimony  is  good 
ground  of  belief. 
Objec.  3.  Men  have  been  deluded  by  false  miracles. 
Ans.  Not  oftener  than  by  other  pretences. 
Objec.  4.  Fabulous  miracles  have  historical  evidence. 

Alls.  1.  If  this  were  equal  to  that  for  Scripture  miracles,  the  evidence  for  the 
latter  would  not  be  imjjaired.  The  objection  really  amounts  to  this, 
that  evidence  proved  not  to  be  good,  destroys  evidence  which  is  good 
and  unconfuted !  Or  to  this,  that  if  two  men,  of  equal  reputation, 
testify,  in  cases  not  related  to  each  other,  and  one  is  proved  false,  the 
other  must  not  be  believed  ! 

2.  Nothing  can  rebut  testimony,  but  proof  that  the  witness  is  incompetent, 

or  misled. 

3.  Against  all  such  objections  must  be  set  the  fact  that  Christianity  was 

too  serious  a  matter  to  allow  the  first  converts  to  be  careless  as  to  its 
evidence ;  and  also  that  their  religion  forbid  them  to  deceive  others. 

II    ^5  to  the  evidence  from  prophecy. 

1.  Obscurity  as  to  part  of  a  prophecy  does  not  invalidate  it,  but  is,  as  to  us,  as 
if  that  part  were  not  written,  or  were  lost.  We  may  not  see  the  whole 
prophecy  fulfilled,  and  yet  see  enough  fulfilled  to  perceive  in  it  more 
than  human  foresight. 

7.  A  long  series  of  prophecies,  all  applicable  to  certain  events,  is  proof  that 
such  events  were  intended.  This  answers  the  objection  that  particular 
prophecies  were  not  intended  to  be  applied  as  Christians  apply  them. 


60  CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

Mythological  and  satirical  -writings  greatly  resemble  proi^liecy.     Now  "^we 
apply  a  parablOj  or  fable,  or  satire,  merely  from  seeing  it  capable  of  such 
application. 
So  if  a  long  series  of  prophecies  be  U2)2^licahle  to  the  present  state  of  the 

world,  or  to  the  coming  of  Christ,  it  is  proof  that  they  were  so  intended. 
Besides,  the  ancient  Jews,  lefore  Christ,  applied  the  prophecies  to  him,  just 
as  Christians  do  now. 
3.  If  it  could  be  shown  that  the  prophets  did  not  understand  their  own  pre- 
dictions, or  that  their  prophecies  are  capable  of  being  applied  to  other 
events  than  those  to  which  Christians  apply  them,  it  would  not  abate  the 
force  of  the  argument  from  prophecy,  even  with  regard  to  those  instances. 
For, 
1.)  To  know  the   whole  meaning  of  an  author  we  must  know  the  whole 
meaning  of  his  book,  but  knowing  the  meaning  of  a   book  is   not 
knowing  the  whole  mind  of  the  author. 
2.)  If  the  book  is  a  compilation,  the  authors  may  have  meanings  deeper 
than  the  compiler  saw.     If  the  prophets  spoke  by  inspiration,  they  are 
not  the  authors,  but  the  writers  of  prophecy,  and  may  not  have  known 
all  that  the  Divine  Spirit  intended.     But  the  fulfilment  of  the  prophecy 
shows  a  foresight  more  than  human. 


This  whole  argument  is  just  and  real;  but  it  is  not  expected  that  those  will 
be  satisfied  who  will  not  submit  to  the  perplexity  and  labor  of  understanding 
it;  or  who  have  not  modesty  and  fairness  enough  to  allow  an  argument  its  due 
weight;  or  who  wilfully  discard  the  whole  investigation. 


We  now  proceed  to  the  general  argument  embracing  both  direct  and  cir- 
cumstantial evidence.  A  full  discussion  would  require  a  volume,  and  cannot 
be  expected  here ;  but  something  should  be  said,  especially  as  most  questions 
of  difiiculty,  in  practical  afiiiirs,  are  settled  by  evidence  arising  from  circum- 
stances which  confirm  each  other. 

The  thing  asserted  is  that  God  has  given  us  a  revelation  declaring  himself 
to  be  a  moral  governor;  stating  his  system  of  government;  and  disclosing  a 
plan  for  the  recovery  of  mankind  out  of  sin,  and  raising  them  to  perfect  and 
final  happiness. 

I.    Consider  this  revelation  as  a  historr/. 

1.  It  furnishes  an  account  of  the  world,  as  God's  world. 

1.)   God's  providence,  commands,  promises,  and  threatenings. 

2.)  Distinguishes  God  from  idols. 

3.)  Describes   the   condition  of    religion  and  of  its  professors,  in  a  world 

considered  as  apostate  and  wicked. 
4.)  Political   events    are   related   as   affecting   religion,  and   not   for   their 

importance  as  mere  political  events. 
5.)  The  history  is  continued  by  prophecy,  to  the  end  of  the  world. 
'Z,  It  eo-braces  a  vast  variety  of  other  topics;  natural  and  moral. 


CONSPECTUS    OF   THE    ANALOG    .  61 

1.)   Thus  furnishing  the  largest  scope  for  criticism. 

2.)   So  that  douhts  of  its  truth  confirm  that  truth,  for  io  this  enlightened  age 

the  claims  of  a  book  of  such  a  nature  could  bo  easily  and  finally  shown 

to  be  false,  if  they  were  so. 
3.)  None  who  believe  in  natural  religion,  hold  that  Christianity  has  been 

thus  confuted. 

3.  It  contains  a  minute  account  of  God's  selecting  one  nation  for  his  peculiar 

people,  and  of  his  dealings  with  them. 
1.)  Interpositions  in  their  behalf. 
2.)  Threats  of  dispersion,  &c.  if  they  rebelled. 
3.)  Promises  of  a  Messiah  as  their  prince ;  so  clearly  as  to  raise  a  general 

expectation,  &g. 
4.)  Foretelling  his  rejection  by  them,  and  that  he  should  be  the  Savior  of 

the  Gentiles. 

4.  Describes  minutely  the  arrival  of  the  Messiah,  and  his  life  and  labors ;  and 

the  result,  in  the  establishment  of  a  new  religion. 

II.  As  to  the  authenticity  of  this  history. 

Suppose  a  person  ignorant  of  all  history  but  the  Bible,  and  not  knowing 
even  that  to  be  true,  were  to  inquire  into  its  evidence  of  authenticity,  he 
would  find, 

1.  That  natural  religion  owes  its  establishment  to  the  truths  contained  in  this 

book.  This  no  more  disproves  natural  religion,  than  our  learning  a 
proposition  from  Euclid,  shows  that  the  proposition  was  not  true  before 
Euclid. 

2.  The  great  antiquity  of  revelation. 

3.  That  its  chronology  is  not  contradicted  but  confirmed  by  known  facts. 

4.  That  there  is  nothing  in  the  history  itself  to   awaken  suspicion  of   its 

fidelity, 
1.)  Every  thing  said  to  be  done  in  any  age  or  country,  is  conformable  to  the 

manners  of  that  age  and  country. 
2.)  The  characters  are  all  perfectly  natural. 
3.)  All  the  domestic  and  political  incidents  are  credible.     Some  of  these, 

taken  alone,  seem  strange  to  some,  in  this  day;  but  not  more  so  than 

things  now  occurring. 
4.)  Transcribers  may  have  made  errors,  but  these  are  not  more  numerous 

than  in  other  ancient  books;  and  none  of  them  impair  the  narrative. 

5.  That  profane  authors  confirm  Scripture  accounts. 

6.  That  the  credibility  of  the  general  history,  confirms  the  accounts  of  the 

miracles,  for  they  are  all  interwoven,  and  make  but  one  statement. 

7.  That  there  certainly  was  and  is  such  a  people  as  the  Jews ;  whose  form  of 

government  was  founded  on  these  very  books  of  Moses;  and  whose 
acknowledgment  of  the  God  of  the  Bible,  kept  them  a  distinct  race. 

8.  That  one  Jesus,  of  Jewish  extraction,  arose  at  the  time  when  the  Jews 

expected  a  Messiah,  was  rejected  by  them,  as  was  prophesied,  and  was 
received  by  the  Gentiles,  as  was  prophesied. 
5).  That  the  religion  of  this  Jesus  spread  till  it  became  the  religion  of  the 
world,  notwithstanding  every  sort  of  resistance;  and  has  ontinuea  uU 
now. 

6 


()2r  CONSPECTUS    OF    THE    ANALOGY. 

10.  That  the  Jewis'n  government  was  destroyed,  and  the  people  dispersed  into 
all  lands;  and  still  for  many  centuries,  continue  to  be  a  distinct  race, 
professing  the  law  of  Moses.  If  this  separateness  be  accounted  for,  in 
any  way,  it  does  not  destroy  the  fact  that  it  was  predicted. 

CONCLUSION. 

1.  Recapitulation  of  the  preceding  ten  observations. 

2.  Add  the  fact  that  there  are  obvious  appearances  in  the  world,  aside  from 

the  Jews,  which  correspond  to  prophetic  history. 

3.  These  appearances,  compared  with  Bible  history,  and  with  each  other,  in 

a  joint  view,  will  appear  to  be  of  great  weight,  and  would  impress  one 
who  regarded  them  for  the  first  time,  more  than  they  do  us  who  have 
been  familiar  with  them. 

4.  The  preceding  discussion,  though  not  thorough,  amounts  to  proof  of  some- 

thing more  than  human  in  this  matter. 
1.)  The  sufficiency  of  these  proofs  may  be  denied,  but  the  existence  of  them 

cannot  be. 
2.)  The  conformity  of  prophecies  to  events  may  be  said  to  be  accidental,  but 

the  conformity  itself  cannot  be  denied. 
3.)  These  collateral  proofs  may  be  pronounced  fanciful,  but  it  cannot  be  said 

they  are  nothing.     Probabilities  may  not  amount  to  demonstration,  but 

they  remain  probabilities. 

5.  Those  who  will  set  down  all  seeming  completions  of  prophecy,  and  judge 

of  them  by  the  common  rules  of  evidence,  will  find  that  toe/ether  they 
amount  to  strong  proof.  Because  probable  proofs,  added  together,  not 
only  increase  evidence,  but  multiply  it. 

6.  It  is  very  well  to  observe  objections;  but  it  should  be  remembered  that  a 

mistake  on  one  side  is  far  more  dangerous  than  a  mistake  on  the  other  j 
and  the  safest  conclusion  is  the  best. 

7.  Religion,   like   other  things,  is   to  be  judged  by  all   the  evidence  taken 

together.  Unless  all  its  proofs  be  overthrown,  it  remains  proved.  If 
no  proof  singly  were  sufficient,  the  whole  taken  together  might  be. 

8.  It  is  much  easier  to  start  an  objection,  than  to  comprehend  the  united  force 

of  a  whole  argument. 

9.  Thus  it  appears  that  the  positive  evidence  of  revelation  cannot  be  destroyed, 

though  it  should  be  lessened. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

OBJECTIONS    AGAINST   THE   ANALOGICAL   ARGUMENT. 

If  all  made  up  their  minds  with  proper  care  and  candor,  there  would  be  no 
need  of  this  chapter.  But  some  do  not  try  to  understand  what  they  condemn  • 
and  our  mode  of  argument  is  open  to  objections,  especially  in  the  luinds  ot 
those -who  judge  without  thinking.  The  chief  objections  will  therefore  be  con- 
sidered. They  are  these : — it  does  not  solve  difficulties  in  revelation  to  say 
that  there  are  as  great  in  natural  religion : — it  will  not  make  men  religious  to 


CONSPECTUS    OF    THE    ANALOGY.  63 

show  them  that  it  is  as  important  as  worldly  prudence,  for  showing  that,  docs 
not  make  them  prudent: — the  justice  of  God  in  the  system  of  religion,  is  not 
proved  by  showing  it  is  as  apparent  as  in  his  natural  providence: — no  rea^uu- 
ing  from  analogy  can  carry  full  conviction : — mankind  will  not  renounce  pre- 
sent pleasures,  for  a  religion  which  is  not  free  from  doubt.  To  each  of  which 
a  reply  will  now  be  given. 

I.  As  to  requiring  a  solution  of  all  difficulties. 

1*  This  is  but  resolving  to  comprehend  the  nature  of  God,  and  the  whole  plan 

of  his  government  throughout  eternity. 
3.  It  is  always  right  to  argue  from  what  is  known,  to  what  is  disputed.     We 

are  constantly  so  doing.    The  most  eminent  physician  does  not  understand 

all  diseases,  yet  we  do  not  despise  what  he  does  know. 
3*  It  is  very  important  to  find  that  objections  against  revelation  are  just  as 

strong,  not  only  against  natural  religion,  but  against  the  course  of  nature. 

II.  As  to  men's  having  as  little  reason  for  worldly  pursuits,  as  they 

have  for  being  religious. 

1.  If  men  can  be  convinced  that  they  have  as  much  reason  to  be  religious  as 

they  have  to  practise  worldly  prudence,  then  there  is  a  reason  for  being 
religious. 

2.  If  religion  proposes  greater  than  worldly  interests,  and  has  the  same  reasons 

for  belief,  then  it  has  proportionally  a  greater  claim. 

3.  If  religion  being  left  doubtful,  proves  it  to  be  false,  then  doubts  as  to  the 

success  of  any  worldly  pursuit  show  it  to  be  wrong.  Yet  we  constantly 
act,  even  in  the  most  important  affairs,  without  certainty  of  being  right. 

III.  As  to  the  Justice  and  goodness  of  God  in  religion. 

1,  Our  business  is  not  to  vindicate  God,  but  to  learn  our  duty,  governed  as  we 

are ;  which  is  a  very  different  thing.  It  has  been  shown  that  if  we  knew 
all  things,  present,  past,  and  future,  and  the  relations  of  each  thing  to  all 
other  things,  we  might  see  to  be  just  and  good  what  now  do  not  seem  so : 
and  it  is  probable  we  should. 

2.  We  do  not  say  that  objections   against  God's  justice    and  goodness  are 

removed  by  showing  the  like  objections  against  natural  providence,  but 

that  they  are  not  conclusive,  because  they  apply  equally  to  what  we  know 

to  be  facts. 
?.  The  existence  of  objections  does  not  destroy  the  evidence  of  facts.     The 

fact  for  instance  that  God  rewards  and  punishes,  though  men  may  think 

it  unjust.    Even  necessity,  plead  for  human  acts,  does  no  more  to  abolish 

justice  than  it  does  injustice. 
1.  Though  the  reasonableness  of  Christianity  cannot  be  shown  from  analogy, 

the  truth  of  it  may.     The  truth  of  a  fact  may  be  proved  without  regard 

ic   its  quality.      The  reasonableness  of  obeying  Christianity  is  proved.^ 

if  we  barely  prove  Christianity  itself  to  be  possible. 
H,  Though   analogy  may  not  show  Christian  precepts  to  be  good,  it  proves 

them  to  be  credible. 


64  CONSPECTUS   OF   THE   ANALOGY. 

IV.  The  analogical  argument  does  not  remove  doubt. 

1.  What  opinion  does  any  man  hold,  about  which  there  can  be  no  doubt? 

Even  the  best  way  of  preserving  and  enjoying  this  life,  is  not  agreed 
upon.  Whether  our  measures  will  accomplish  our  objects,  is  always 
uncertain;  and  still  more  whether  the  objects,  if  accomplished,  will 
give  us  happiness.  Yet  men  do  not  on  this  account  refuse  to  make 
exertion. 

2.  This  objection  overlooks  the  very  nature  of  religion.     The  embracing  of  it 

presupposes  a  certain  degree  of  candor  and  integrity,  to  try  which,  and 
exercise,  and  improve  it,  is  its  intention.  Just  as  warning  a  man  of 
danger,  presupposes  a  disposition  to  avoid  danger. 

3.  Keligion  is  a  probation,  and  has  evidence  enough  as  such;  and  would  not 

be  such,  if  it  compelled  assent. 

4.  We  never  mean   by  suflBcient  evidence,   such  an   amount  as  necessarily 

determines  a  man  to  act,  but  ouly  such  as  will  show  an  action  to  be 
prudent. 

V.  ^45  to  the  small  influence  of  the  analogical  argument. 

1.  As  just  observed,  religion  is  a  test,  and  an  exercise,  of  character;  and  that 

some  reject  it  is  nothing  to  our  purpose.  We  are  inquiring  not  what  sort 
of  creature  man  is,  but  what  he  should  be.  This  is  each  man's  own 
concern. 

2.  Religion,  as  a  probation,  accomplishes  its  end,  whether  individuals  believe 

or  not. 
3*  Even  this  objection  admits  that  religion  has  some  weight,  and  of  course 
it  should  have   some   influence;    and  if  so,  there  is  the  same  reason, 
though  not  so  strong,  for  publishing  it,  that  there  would  be,  if  it  were 
likely  to  have  greater  influence. 

Further.  It  must  be  considered  that  the  reasoning  in  this  treatise  is  on  the 
principles  of  other  men,  and  arguments  of  the  utmost  importance  are  omitted, 
because  not  universally  admitted.  Thus  as  to  Fatalism,  and  the  abstract  fitness 
or  unfitness  of  actions.  The  general  argument  is  just  a  question  of  fact,  and 
is  here  so  treated.  Abstract  truths  are  usually  advanced  as  proof;  but  in  this 
work,  only  facts  are  adduced.  That  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to 
two  right  angles,  is  an  abstract  truth  :  but  that  they  so  appear  to  us,  is  only 
a  matter  of  fact.  That  there  is  such  a  thing  as  abstract  right  and  wrong,  which 
determines  the  will  of  God  in  rewarding  and  punishing,  is  an  assertion  of  an 
abstract  truth,  as  well  as  a  fact.  Suppose  God  in  this  world  rewarded  and 
punished  every  man  exactly  as  he  obeyed  or  disobeyed  his  conscience,  this 
would  not  be  an  abstract  truth,  but  a  fact.  And  if  all  acknowledged  this  as  a 
fact,  all  would  not  see  it  to  be  right.  If,  instead  of  his  doing  it  now,  we  say 
he  will  do  it  hereafter,  this  too  is  not  an  abstract  truth,  but  a  question  of  fact. 
This  fact  could  be  fully  proved  on  the  abstract  principles  of  moral  fitness;  but 
without  them,  there  has  now  been  given  a  conclusive  practical  proof;  which 
though  it  may  be  cavilled  at,  and  shown  not  to  amount  to  demonstration,  caunol 
be  answered. 


CONSPECTUS    OF   THE   ANALOGY.  65 

Hence  it  may  Le  said  as  to  the  force  of  this  treatise, 

1,  To   sucli   as  are   convinced  of  the  truth  of  revelation,   as  proved  on  the 

principles  of  liberty  and  moral  fitness,  it  will  furnish  a  full  confirmation. 
To  such  as  do  not  admit  those  principles  it  is  an  original  proof. 

2,  Those  who  believe  will  find  objections  removed,  and  those  who  disbelieve 

will  find  they  have  no  grounds  for  their  scepticism;  and  a  good  deal 
beside. 

3,  Thus  though  some  may  think  too  much  is  here  made  of  analogy,  yet  there 

can  be  no  denying  that  the  argument  is  real.  It  confirms  all  facts  to 
which  it  can  be  applied;  and  of  many  is  the  only  proof.  It  is  strong 
on  the  side  of  religion,  and  ought  to  be  regarded  by  such  as  prefer  facts 
to  abstract  reasonings. 

CONCLUSION. 

Recapitulates  the  general  structure  and  design  of  the  argument,  the  classes 
af  persons  for  whose  benefit  it  is  particularly  adopted,  and  declares  these  who 
reject  Christianity  to  be  wholly  without  excuse. 


^toalisenunt  ^rdeJr  t0  l^t  |irst  €^xim. 


If  the  reader  should  here  meet  with  any  thing  which  he  had  not 
before  attended  to,  it  will  not  be  in  the  observations  upon  the  consti- 
tution and  course  of  nature,  these  being  all  obvious,  but  in  the  appli- 
cation of  them ;  in  which,  though  there  is  nothing  but  what  appears 
to  me  of  some  real  weight,  and  therefore  of  great  importance,  yet  he 
will  observe  several  things,  which  will  appear  to  him  of  very  little, 
if  he  can  think  things  to  be  of  little  importance,  which  are  of  any 
real  weight  at  all,  upon  such  a  subject  of  religion.  However,  the 
proper  force  of  the  following  treatise  lies  in  the  whole  general  analogy 
considered  together. 

It  is  come,  I  know  not  how  io  be  taken  for  granted,  by  many 
persons,  that  Christianity  is  not  st.  much  as  a  subject  of  inquiry; 
but  that  it  is,  now  at  length,  discovered  to  be  fictitious.  Accordingly 
they  treat  it,  as  if,  in  the  present  age,  this  were  an  agreed  point 
among  all  people  of  discernment ;  and  nothing  remained,  but  to  set 
it  up  as  a  principal  subject  of  mirth  and  ridicule,  as  it  were  by  way 
of  reprisals,  for  its  having  so  long  interrupted  the  pleasures  of  the 
world.  On  the  contrary,  thus  much  at  least,  will  be  here  found,  not 
taken  for  granted  but  proved,  that  any  reasonable  man,  who  will 
thoroughly  consider  the  matter,  may  be  as  much  assured,  as  he  is 
of  his  own  being,  that  it  is  not  so  clear  a  case,  that  there  is  nothing 
in  it.  There  is,  I  think,  strong  evidence  of  its  truth  ;  but  it  is  certain 
no  one  can,  upon  principles  of  reason,  be  satisfied  of  the  contrary. 
The  practical  consequence  to  be  drawn  from  this,  is  not  attended  to 
by  every  one  who  is  concerned  in  it. 

Mar/,  1736, 


INTRODUCTION. 


Probable  evidence  is  essentially  distinguished  from  demon- 
strative by  this,  that  it  admits  of  degrees ;  and  of  all  variety  of 
them,  from  the  highest  moral  certainty,  to  the  very  lowest  pre- 
sumption. We  cannot  indeed  say  a  thing  is  probably  true  upon 
one  very  slight  presumption  for  it;  because,  as  there  may  be  pro- 
babilities on  both  sides  of  a  question,  there  may  be  some  against 
it;  and  though  there  be  not,  yet  a  slight  presumption  does  not 
beget  that  degree  of  conviction,  which  is  implied  in  saying  a 
thing  is  probably  true.  But  that  the  slightest  possible  presump- 
tion is  of  the  nature  of  a  probability,  appears  from  hence ;  that 
such  low  presumption,  often  repeated,  will  amount  even  to  moral 
certainty.  Thus  a  man's  having  observed  the  ebb  and  flow  of 
the  tide  to-day,  affords  some  sort  of  presumption,  though  the 
lowest  imaginable,  that  it  may  happen  again  to-morrow :  but  the 
observation  of  this  event  for  so  many  days,  and  months,  and  ages 
together,  as  it  has  been  observed  by  mankind,  gives  us  a  full 
assurance  that  it  will. 

That  which  chiefly  constitutes  prohahilttT/  is  expressed  in  the 
word  likely,  i.e.  like  some  truth,*  or  true  event ;  like  it,  in  itself, 
in  its  evidence,  in  some  (more  or  fewer)  of  its  circumstances.*  For 
when  we  determine  a  thing  to  be  probably  true,  suppose  that  an 
event  has  or  will  come  to  pass,  it  is  from  the  mind's  remarking 
in  it  a  likeness  to  some  other  event,  which  we  have  observed  has 
come  to  pass.  This  observation  forms,  in  numberless  daily  in- 
stances, a  presumption,  opinion,  or  full  conviction,  that  such 
event  has  or  will  come  to  pass ;  according  as  the  observation  is, 
that  the  like  event  has  sometimes,  most  commonly,  or  always,  so 

*  Verisimile. 

*  [These  three  ways  of  being  *'  like,"  are  very  distinct  from  each  other.  The 
first  is  equivalent  to  a  logical  induction.  The  second  produces  belief,  because 
the  same  evidence  made  us  believe  in  a  similar  case.  The  third  is  just  an 
analogy,  in  the  popular  sense  of  the  term.] 

67 


68  INTRODUCTION 

far  as  our  observation  readies,  come  to  pass  at  like  distances  of 
time,  or  place,  or  upon  like  occasions.  Hence  arises  the  belief, 
tbat  a  child,  if  it  lives  twenty  years,  will  grow  up  to  the  stature 
and  strength  of  a  man ;  that  food  will  contribute  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  its  life,  and  the  want  of  it  for  such  a  number  of  days,  be 
its  certain  destruction.  So  likewise  the  rule  and  measure  of  our 
hopes  and  fears  concerning  the  success  of  our  pursuits;  our  ex- 
pectations that  others  will  act  so  and  so  in  such  circumstances ; 
and  our  judgment  that  such  actions  proceed  from  such  principles; 
all  these  rely  upon  our  having  observed  the  like  to  what  we  hope, 
fear,  expect,  judge ;  I  say,  upon  our  having  observed  the  like, 
either  with  respect  to  others  or  ourselves.  Thus,  the  prince* 
who  had  always  lived  in  a  warm  climate,  naturally  concluded  in 
the  way  of  analogy,  that  there  was  no  such  thing  as  water's  be- 
coming hard,  because  he  had  always  observed  it  to  be  fluid  and 
yielding.  We,  on  the  contrary,  from  analogy  conclude,  that  there 
is  no  presumption  at  all  against  this  :  that  it  is  supposable  there 
may  be  frost  in  England  any  given  day  in  January  next;  pro- 
bable that  there  will  on  some  day  of  the  month ;  and  that  there 
is  a  moral  certainty,  i.e.  ground  for  an  expectation  without  any 
doubt  of  it,  in  some  part  or  other  of  the  winter. 

Probable  evidence,  in  its  very  nature,  affords  but  an  imperfect 
kind  of  information ;  and  is  to  be  considered  as  relative  only  to 
beings  of  limited  capacities.  For  nothing  which  is  the  possible 
object  of  knowledge,  whether  past,  present,  or  future,  can  be  pro- 
bable to  an  infinite  intelligence;  since  it  cannot  but  be  discerned 
absolutely  as  it  is  in  itself,  certainly  true,  or  certainly  false.  But 
to  us,  probability  is  the  very  guide  of  life. 

From  these  things  it  follows,  that  in  questions  of  difficulty,  or 
such  as  are  thought  so,  where  more  satisfactory  evidence  cannot 
be  had,  or  is  not  seen ;  if  the  result  of  examination  be,  that  there 
appears  upon  the  whole,  any  even  the  lowest  presumption  on  one 
side,  and  none  on  the  other,  or  a  greater  presumption  on  one  side, 
though  in  the  lowest  degree  greater;  this  determines  the  ques- 
tion, even  im  matters  of  speculation.  In  matters  of  practice,  it 
will  lay  us  under  an  absolute  and  formal  obligation,  in  point  of 
prudence  and  of  interest,  to  act  upon  that  presumption  or  low 
probabilit}^,  though  it  be  so  low  as  to  leave  the  mind  in  very  great 
*  The  story  is  told  by  Mr.  Locke  in  the  Chapter  of  Probability. 


BY   THE   AUTHOR.  6^ 

doubt  whicli  is  the  trutli.  For  surely  a  man  is  as  really  bound 
in  prudence  to  do  what  upon  the  whole,  according  to  the  best  of 
his  judgment,  appears  to  be  for  his  happiness,''  as  what  he  cer- 
tainly knows  to  be  so. 

Further,  in  questions  of  great  consequence,  a  reasonable  man 
will  think  it  concerns  him  to  remark  lower  probabilities  and  pre- 
sumptions than  these ;  such  as  amount  to  no  more  than  showing 
one  side  of  a  question  to  be  as  supposable  and  credible  as  the 
other :  nay,  such  even  as  but  amount  to  much  less  than  this. 
For  numberless  instances  might  be  mentioned  respecting  the  com- 
mon pursuits  of  life,  where  a  man  would  be  thought,  in  a  literal 
sense,  distracted,  who  would  not  act,  and  with  great  application 
too,  not  only  upon  an  even  chance,  but  upon  much  less,  and 
where  the  probability  or  chance  was  greatly  against  his  suc- 
ceeding.* 

It  is  not  my  design  to  inquire  further  into  the  nature,  the 
foundation,  and  measure  of  probability;  or  whence  it  proceeds 
that  likeness,  should  beget  that  presumption,  opinion,  and  full 
conviction,  which  the  human  mind  is  formed  to  receive  from  it, 
and  which  it  does  necessarily  produce  in  every  one ;  or  to  guard 
against  the  errors,  to  which  reasoning  from  analogy  is  liable. 
This  belongs  to  the  subject  of  Logic;  and  is  a  part  of  that  sub- 
ject which  has  not  yet  been  thoroughly  considered.  Indeed  I, 
shall  not  take  upon  me  to  say,  how  far  the  extent,  compass,  and 
force,  of  analogical  reasoning,  can  be  reduced  to  general  heads 
and  rules ;  and  the  whole  be  formed  into  a  system.  But  though 
so  little  in  this  way  has  been  attempted  by  those  who  have  treated 
of  our  intellectual  powers,  and  the  exercise  of  them ;  this  does 
not  hinder  but  that  we  may  be,  as  we  unquestionably  are,  assured, 
that  analogy  is  of  weight,  in  various  degrees,  towards  determin- 
ing our  judgment  and  our  practice.  Nor  does  it  in  any  wise 
cease  to  be  of  weight  in  those  cases,  because  persons,  either  given 
to  dispute,  or  who  require  things  to  be  stated  with  greater  exact- 

^  [This  is  good  common  sense,  and  men  always  act  thus  if  prudent.  But  it 
's  not  enough  thus  to  act  in  the  matter  of  salvation.  "  He  that  believeth  not 
shall  be  damned  :"  Mark  xvi.  16.  "He  that  believeth  hath  everlasting  life:" 
John  iii.  36.  "With  the  heart  man  believeth  unto  righteousness:"  Rom.  x.  10. 
Belief  is  part  of  the  sinner's  dufT/  in  submitting  himself  to  God ;  and  not  merely 
a  ijuestiou  of  prudence.] 

*  See  Part  II.  chap.  vi. 


70  INTRODUCTION 

ness  than  our  faculties  appear  to  admit  of  in  practical  matters, 
may  find  other  cases  in  which  it  is  not  easy  to  say,  whether  it  be, 
or  be  not,  of  any  weight;  or  instances  of  seeming  analogies, 
which  are  really  of  none.  It  is  enough  to  the  present  purpose  to 
observe,  that  this  general  way  of  arguing  is  evidently  natural, 
just,  and  conclusive.  For  there  is  no  man  can  make  a  question 
but  that  the  sun  will  rise  to-morrow,  and  be  seen,  where  it  is  seen 
at  all,  in  the  figure  of  a  circle,  and  not  in  that  of  a  square. 

Hence,  namely  from  analogical  reasoning,  Origen*  has  with 
singular  sagacity  observed,  that  "  lie  icho  believes  the  ScrfjHure 
to  hade  proceeded  from  him  who  is  the  Author  of  nature,  may 
tcell  expect  to  find  the  same  sort  of  dijjicidties  in  it^  as  are  found 
in  the  const itution  of  nature."  And  in  a  like  way  of  reflection 
it  may  be  added,  that  he  who  denies  the  Scripture  to  have  been 
from  God  upon  account  of  these  difiiculties,  may,  for  the  very 
same  reason,  deny  the  world  to  have  been  formed  by  him.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  there  be  an  analogy  or  likeness  between  that 
system  of  things  and  dispensation  of  Providence,  which  revela- 
tion informs  us  of,  and  that  system  of  things  and  dispensation  of 
Providence,  which  experience  together  with  reason  informs  us 
of,  i.e.  the  known  course  of  nature;  this  is  a  presumption,  that 
they  have  both  the  same  author  and  cause ;  at  least  so  far  as  to 
^  answer  objections  against  the  former's  being  from  God,  drawn 
from  any  thing  which  is  analogical  or  similar  to  what  is  in  the 
latter,  which  is  acknowledged  to  be  from  him;  for  an  Author  of 
nature  is  here  supposed. 

Forming  our  notions  of  the  constitution  and  government  of 
the  world  upon  reasoning,  without  foundation  for  the  principles 
which  we  assume,  whether  from  the  attributes  of  God,  or  any 
thing  else,  is  building  a  world  upon  hypothesis,  like  Des  Cartes. 
Forming  our  notions  upon  reasoning  from  principles  which  are 
certain,  but  applied  to  cases  to  which  we  have  no  ground  to 
apply  them,  (like  those  who  explain  the  structure  of  the  human 
body,  and  the  nature  of  diseases  and  medicines,  from  mere  mathe- 
matics,) is  an  error  much  akin  to  the  former:  since  what  is  as- 
sumed in  order  to  make  the  reasoning  applicable,  is  Hypothesis. 
But  it  must  be  allowed  just,  to  join  abstract  reasonings  with  the 
observation  of  facts,  and  argue,  from  such  facts  as  are  known,  to 
*  Pliilocal.  p.  23,  Ed.  Cant. 


BY   THE   AUTHOR.  71 

otliers  that  are  like  them ;  from  that  part  of  the  divine  govern- 
ment over  intelligent  creatures  which  comes  under  our  view,  to 
that  larger  and  more  general  government  over  them  which  is 
beyond  it  3  and  from  what  is  present,  to  collect  what  is  likely, 
credible,  or  not  incredible,  will  be  hereafter. 

This  method  then  of  concluding  and  determining  being  prac- 
tical, and  what,  if  we  will  act  at  all,  we  cannot  but  act  upon  in  the 
common  pursuits  of  life;  being  evidently  conclusive,  in  various 
degrees,  proportionable  to  the  degree  and  exactness  of  the  whole 
analogy  or  likeness ;  and  having  so  great  authority  for  its  intro- 
duction into  the  subject  of  religion,  even  revealed  religion;  my 
design  is  to  apply  it  to  that  subject  in  general,  both  natural  and 
revealed  :  taking  for  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author 
of  nature,  and  natural  Governor  of  the  world.  For  as  there  is  no 
presumption  against  this  prior  to  the  proof  of  it :  so  it  has  been 
often  proved  with  accumulated  evidence;  from  this  argument  of 
analogy  and  final  causes;  from  abstract  reasouiogs;  from  the 
most  ancient  tradition  and  testimony ;  and  from  the  general  con- 
sent of  mankind.  Nor  does  it  appear,  so  far  as  I  can  find,  to  be 
denied  by  the  generality  of  those  who  profess  themselves  dis- 
satisfied with  the  evidence  of  religion. 

As  there  are  some,  who,  instead  of  thus  attending  to  what  is 
in  fact  the  constitution  of  nature,  form  their  notions  of  God's 
government  upon  hypothesis  :  so  there  are  others,  who  indulge 
themselves  in  vain  and  idle  speculations,  how  the  world  might 
possibly  have  been  framed  otherwise  than  it  is ;  and  upon  sup- 
position that  things  might,  in  imagining  that  they  should,  have 
been  disposed  and  carried  on  after  a  better  model,  than  what  ap- 
pears in  the  present  disposition  and  conduct  of  them.*=  Suppose 
now  a  person  of  such  a  turn  of  mind,  to  go  on  with  his  reveries, 
till  he  had  at  length  fixed  upon  some  particular  plan  of  nature, 
as  appearing  to  him  the  best. — One  shall  scarce  be  thought  guilty 
of  detraction  against  human  understanding,  if  one  should  say, 
even  beforehand,  that  the  plan  which  this  speculative  person 
would  fix  upon,  though  he  were  the  wisest  of  the  sons  of  men, 
probably  would  not  be  the  very  best,  even  according  to  his  own 

"-  [Some  of  these  speculations,  carried  to  the  full  measure  of  absurdity  and 
iiiipiety,  may  be  fouud  in  Lajle's  great  "Historical  and  Critical  Dictionai-y." 
bee  a&  iniitiinces,  the  articlcvi  Origen,  Manioh^eus,  Paulicians.] 


72  INTRODUCTION 

notions  of  hest;  whetlier  lie  thought  that  to  be  so,  which  afforded 
occasions  and  motives  for  the  exercise  of  the  greatest  virtue,  or 
which  was  productive  of  the  greatest  happiness,  or  that  these  two 
were  necessarily  connected,  and  run  up  into  one  and  the  same 
plan. 

It  may  not  be  amiss,  once  for  all,  to  see  what  would  be  the 
amount  of  these  emendations  and  imaginary  improvements  upon 
the  system  of  nature,  or  how  far  they  would  mislead  us.  It 
seems  there  could  be  no  stopping,  till  we  came  to  some  such  con- 
clusions as  these :  that  all  creatures  should  at  first  be  made  as 
perfect  and  as  happy  as  they  were  capable  of  ever  being :  that 
nothing,  surely,  of  hazard  or  danger  should  be  put  upon  them  to 
do;  some  indolent  persons  would  perhaps  think  nothing  at  all : 
or  certainly,  that  effectual  care  should  be  taken,  that  they  should, 
whether  necessarily  or  not,  yet  eventually  and  in  fact,  always  do 
what  was  right  and  most  conducive  to  happiness ;  which  would 
be  thought  easy  for  infinite  power  to  effect,  either  by  not  giving 
them  any  principles  which  would  endanger  their  going  wrong,  or 
by  laying  the  right  motive  of  action  in  every  instance  before  their 
minds  in  so  strong  a  manner,  as  would  never  fail  of  inducing 
them  to  act  conformably  to  it :  and  that  the  whole  method  of  go- 
vernment by  punishments  should  be  rejected  as  absurd;  as  an 
awkward  roundabout  method  of  carrying  things  on ;  nay,  as  con- 
trary to  a  principal  purpose,  for  which  it  would  be  supposed 
creatures  were  made,  namely,  happiness. 

Now,  without  considering  what  is  to  be  said  in  particular  to 
the  several  parts  of  this  train  of  folly  and  extravagance,  what  has 
been  above  intimated,  is  a  full  direct  general  answer  to  it ;  namely, 
that  we  may  see  beforehand  that  we  have  not  faculties  for  this 
kind  of  speculation.  For  though  it  be  admitted  that,  from  the 
first  principles  of  our  nature,  we  unavoidably  judge  or  determine 
some  ends  to  be  absolutely  in  themselves  preferable  to  others,  and 
that  the  ends  now  mentioned,  or  if  they  run  up  into  one,  that 
this  one  is  absolutely  the  best ;  and  consequently  that  we  must 
conclude  the  ultimate  end  designed,  in  the  constitution  of  nature 
and  conduct  of  Providence,  is  the  most  virtue  and  happiness  pos- 
sible ;  yet  we  are  far  from  being  able  to  judge  what  particular 
disposition  of  things  would  be  most  friendly  and  assistant  to  vir- 
tue ;  or  what  means  might  be  absolutely  necessary  to  produce  the 


BY   THE   AUTHOR.  73 

must  happiness  in  a  system  of  sucli  extent  as  our  own  world  may 
be,  taking  in  all  that  is  past  and  to  come,  though  we  should  sup- 
pose it  detached  from  the  whole  things.  Indeed  we  are  so  far 
from  being  able  to  judge  of  this,  that  we  are  not  judges  what- 
may  be  the  necessary  means  of  raising  and  conducting  one  per 
son  to  the  highest  perfection  and  happiness  of  his  nature.  Nay, 
even  in  the  little  affairs  of  tlio  present  life,  we  find  men  of  differ- 
ent educations  and  ranks  are  not  competent  judges  of  the  con- 
duct of  each  other.  Our  whole  nature  leads  us  to  ascribe  all 
moral  perfection  to  God,  and  to  deny  all  imperfection  of  him. 
And  this  will  forever  be  a  practical  proof  of  his  moral  character, 
to  such  as  will  consider  what  a  practical  prOof  is ;  because  it  is 
the  voice  of  God  speaking  in  us.  Hence  we  conclude,  that  virtue 
must  be  the  happiness,  and  vice  the  misery,  of  every  creature ; 
and  that  regularity  and  order  and  right  cannot  but  prevail  finally 
in  a  universe  under  his  government.  But  we  are  in  no  sort 
judges,  what  are  the  necessary  means  of  accomplishing  this  end. 

Let  us  then,  instead  of  that  idle  and  not  very  innocent  em- 
ployment of  forming  imaginary  models  of  a  world,  and  schemes 
of  governing  it,  turn  our  thoughts  to  what  we  experience  to  be 
the  conduct  of  nature  with  respect  to  intelligent  creatures ;  which 
may  be  resolved  into  general  laws  or  rules  of  administration,  in 
the  same  way  as  many  of  the  laws  of  nature  respecting  inanimate 
matter  may  be  collected  from  experiments.  Let  us  compare  the 
known  constitution  and  course  of  things  with  what  is  said  to  be 
the  moral  system  of  nature;  the  acknowledged  dispensations  of 
Providence,  or  that  government  which  we  find  ourselves  under, 
with  what  religion  teaches  us  to  believe  and  expect;  and  see 
whether  they  are  not  analogous  and  of  a  piece.  Upon  such  a 
comparison  it  will,  I  think,  be  found  that  they  are  very  much 
so  :  that  both  may  be  traced  up  to  the  same  general  laws,  and 
resolved  into  the  same  principles  of  divine  conduct. 

The  analogy  here  proposed  to  be  considered  is  of  pretty  large 
extent,  and  consists  of  several  parts ;  in  some  more,  in  others  less 
exact.  In  some  few  instances  perhaps,  it  may  amount  to  a  real 
practical  proof;  in  others  not  so.  Yet  in  these  it  is  a  confirma 
tion  of  what  is  proved  otherwise.  It  will  undeniably  show,  what 
too  many  need  to  have  shown  them,  that  the  system  of  religion, 
both  natural  and  revealed,  considered  only  as  a  system,  and  prior 

7 


74  INTRODUCTION 

to  the  proof  of  it,  is  not  a  subject  of  ridicule,  unless  tbat  oi  iia- 
ture  be  so  too.  And  it  will  aiford  an  answer  to  almost  all  objec' 
tions  against  the  system  both  of  natural  and  revealed  religion  j 
though  not  perhaps  an  answer  in  so  great  a  degree,  yet  in  a  very 
considerable  degree  an  answer  to  the  objections  against  the  evi- 
dence of  it :  for  objections  against  a  proof,  and  objections  against 
what  is  said  to  be  proved,  the  reader  will  observe  are  different 
things. 

The  divine  government  of  the  world,  implied  in  the  notion  of 
religion  in  general  and  of  Christianity,  contains  in  it :  that  man- 
kind is  appointed  to  live  in  a  future  state  3*  that  there  every  one 
shall  be  rewarded  or  punished  }'f  rewarded  or  punished  respect- 
ively for  all  that  behaviour  here,  which  we  comprehend  under  the 
words,  virtuous  or  vicious,  morally  good  or  evil  :J  that  our  pre- 
sent life  is  a  probation,  a  state  of  trial, §  and  of  discipline, ||  for 
that  future  one;  notwithstanding  the  objections,  which  men  may 
fancy  they  have,  from  notions  of  necessity,  against  there  being 
any  such  moral  plan  as  this  at  all;^  and  whatever  objections  may 
appear  to  lie  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  as  it  stands  so 
imperfectly  made  known  to  us  at  present  :**  that  this  world  being 
in  a  state  of  apostasy  and  wickedness,  and  consequently  of  ruin, 
and  the  sense  both  of  their  condition  and  duty  being  greatly  cor- 
rupted amongst  men,  this  gave  occasion  for  an  additional  dispensa- 
tion of  Providence ;  of  the  utmost  importance  ;ff  proved  by  mira- 
cles ;JJ  but  containing  in  it  many  things  appearing  to  us  strange, 
and  not  to  have  been  expected  ;§§  a  dispensation  of  Providence, 
which  is  a  scheme  or  system  of  things  ;||||  carried  on  by  the  media- 
tion of  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah,  in  order  to  the  recovery  of 
the  world  ;^^  yet  not  revealed  to  all  men,  nor  proved  with  the 
strongest  possible  evidence  to  all  those  to  whom  it  is  revealed; 
but  only  to  such  a  part  of  mankind,  and  with  such  particular 
evidence,  as  the  wisdom  of  God  thought  fit.**''' 

The  design  then  of  the  following  treatise  will  be  to  show,  that 
the  several  parts  principally  objected  against  in  this  moral  and 
Christian  dispensation,  including  its  scheme,  its  publication,  and 
the  proof  which  God  has  afforded  us  of  its  truth;  that  the  pa/- 


*  Ch.  i. 

t  Ch.  ii.         X  Ch.  iii. 

g  Ch.  iv.            II  Cb.  V. 

IT  Ch.  vi. 

•»  Ch.  vii. 

ft  Part  II.  Ch.  i. 

XX  Cb.  ii.          ^^  Ch.  iii. 

I!!l  Ch.  iv. 

•T^  Ch.  V. 

***  Ch.  vi.  vii. 

BY   THE   AUTHOR.  75 

ticular  parts  principally  objected  against  in  this  wliole  dispensa- 
tion, are  analogous  to  wliat  is  experienced  in  the  constitution  and 
course  of  nature  or  Providence;  that  the  chief  objections  them- 
selves which  are  alleged  against  the  former,  are  no  other  than 
what  may  be  alleged  with  like  justness  against  the  latter,  where 
they  are  found  in  fact  to  be  inconclusive ;  and  that  this  argu- 
ment from  analogy  is  in  general  unanswerable,  and  undoubtedly 
of  weight  on  the  side  of  religion,*  notwithstanding  the  objections 
which  may  seem  to  lie  against  it,  and  the  real  ground  which  there 
may  be  for  difference  of  opinion,  as  to  the  particular  degree  of 
weight  which  is  to  be  laid  upon  it.  This  is  a  general  account  of 
what  may  be  looked  for  in  the  following  treatise.  I  shall  begin 
it  with  that  which  is  the  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and  of  all 
our  fears ;  all  our  hopes  and  fears,  which  are  of  any  conside- 
ration 3  I  mean  a  future  life. 

*  Ch.  viii. 


THE 


ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION 


PART  I. 


CHAPTER  I. 

A     FUTURE     LIFE.* 

Strange  difficulties  have  been  raised  by  some  concerning  per- 
Bonal  identity,  or  the  sameness  of  living  agents,  implied  in  the 
notion  of  our  existing  now  and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two  succes 

*  [This  chapter  Dr.  Chalmers  regards  as  the  least  satisfactory  in  the  book: 
not  because  lacking  in  just  analogies,  but  because  infected  with  the  obscure 
metaphysics  of  that  age.  His  reasoning,  however,  only  serves  to  show  that  B. 
has  perhaps  made  too  much  of  the  argument  from  the  indivisibility  of  con- 
sciousness; and  by  no  means  that  he  does  not  fairly  use  it. 

We  certainly  cannot  object  that  the  subject  of  identity  is  not  made  plain. 
"Who  has  explained  identity,  or  motion-,  or  cohesion,  or  crystallization,  or  any 
thing  ?  Locke  goes  squarely  at  the  subject  of  personal  identity,  (see  Essay, 
ch.  27,)  but  has  rendered  us  small  aid.  His  definition  is,  "Existence  itself, 
which  determines  a  being  of  any  sort,  to  a  particular  time  and  place,  incom- 
municable to  two  beings  of  the  same  kind."  I  had  rather  define  it  "the  un- 
interrupted continuance  of  being."  What  ceases  to  exist,  cannot  again  exist: 
for  then  it  would  exist  after  it  had  ceased  to  exist,  and  would  have  existed  be- 
fore it  existed.  Locke  makes  consciousness  to  constitute  identity,  and  argues 
that  a  man  and  a  person  are  not  the  same ;  and  that  hence  if  I  kill  a  man,  but 
was  not  conscious  of  what  I  did,  or  have  utterly  forgotten,  I  am  not  the  same 
person.     Watts  shows  up  this  notion  of  Locke  very  ludicrously. 

Butler,  in  his  "Dissertation,"  urges  that  consciousness  j9re8i/^/)ose«  identity, 
as  knowledge  presupposes  truth.  On  Locke's  theory,  no  person  would  have 
Existed  any  earlier  than  the  period  to  which  his  memory  extends.  We  cannot 
suppose  the  soul  made  up  of  many  consciousnesses,  nor  could  memory,  if  ma- 
<ejial,  spread  itself  over  successive  years  of  life.] 

7-»  77 


78  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  part  i. 

give  moments;  which,  whoever  thinks  it  worth  while,  may  see 
considered  in  the  first  dissertation  at  the  end  of  this  treatise. 
But  without  regard  to  any  of  them  here,  let  us  consider  what  the 
analogy  of  nature,  and  the  several  changes  which  we  have  under- 
gone, and  those  which  we  know  we  may  undergo  without  being 
destroyed,  suggest,  as  to  the  effect  which  death  may,  or  may  not, 
have  upon  us ;  and  whether  it  be  not  from  thence  probable,  that 
we  may  survive  this  change,  and  exist  in  a  future  state  of  life 
and  perception. 

I.  From  our  being  born  into  the  present  world  in  the  helpless 
imperfect  state  of  infancy,  and  having  arrived  from  thence  to 
mature  age,  we  find  it  to  be  a  general  law  of  nature  in  our  own 
species,  that  the  same  creatures,  the  sa77ie  individuals,  should 
exist  in  degrees  of  life  and  perception,  with  capacities  of  action, 
of  enjoyment  and  suffering,  in  one  period  of  their  being,  greatly 
different  from  those  appointed  them  in  another  period  of  it.  In 
other  creatures  the  same  law  holds.  For  the  difference  of  their 
capacities  and  states  of  life  at  their  birth  (to  go  no  higher)  and 
in  maturity;  the  change  of  worms  into  flies,  and  the  vast  enlarge-" 
ment  of  their  locomotive  powers  by  such  change :  and  birds  and 
insects  bursting  the  shell  of  their  habitation,  and  by  this  means 
entering  into  a  new  world,  furnished  with  new  accommodations 
for  them,  and  finding  a  new  sphere  of  action  assigned  them; 
these  are  instances  of  this  general  law  of  nature.  Thus  all  the 
various  and  wonderful  transformations  of  animals  are  to  be  taken 
into  consideration  here.  The  states  of  life  in  which  we  ourselves 
existed  formerly,  in  the  womb  and  in  our  infancy,  are  almost  as 
different  from  our  present  in  mature  age,  as  it  is  possible  to  con- 
ceive any  two  states  or  degrees  of  life  can  be.  Therefore  that  we 
are  to  exist  hereafter,  in  a  state  as  different  (suppose)  from  our 
present,  as  this  is  from  our  former,  is  but  according  to  the  analogy 
of  nature ;  according  to  a  natural  order  or  appointment  of  the  very 
game  kind,  with  what  we  have  already  experienced. 

II.  We  know  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  action,  of  hap- 
piness and  misery:  for  we  are  conscious  of  acting,  of  enjoying 
pleasure  and  suffering  pain.  Now  that  we  have  these  powers  and 
capacities  before  death,  is  a  presumption  that  we  shall  retain 
them  through  and  after  death ;  indeed  a  probability  of  it  aban- 
dantly  sufficient  to  act  upon,  unless  there  be  some  positive  reason 


CHAP  I.  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  79 

to  thiDk  that  deatli  is  tlie  destruction  of  tliose  living  powers  •  be- 
cause there  is  in  every  case  a  probability,  that  all  things  will  con- 
tinue as  we  experience  they  are,  in  all  respects,  except  those  in 
which  we  have  some  reason  to  think  they  will  be  altered.  This 
is  that  hind^  of  presumption  or  probability  from  analogy,  ex- 
pressed in  the  very  word  continuance,  which  seems  our  only  na- 
tural reason  for  believing  the  course  of  the  world  will  continue 
to-morrow,  as  it  has  done  so  far  as  our  experience  or  knowledge 
of  history  can  carry  us  back.  Nay,  it  seems  our  only  reason  for 
believing,  that  any  one  substance  now  existing  will  continue  to 
exist  a  moment  longer ;  the  self-existent  substance  only  excepted. 
Thus  if  men  were  assured  that  the  unknown  event,  death,  was 
not  the  destruction  of  our  faculties  of  perception  and  of  action, 
there  would  be  no  apprehension  that  any  other  power  or  event, 
unconnected  with  this  of  death,  would  destroy  these  faculties  just 
at  the  instant  of  each  creature's  death ;  and  therefore  no  doubt 
but  that  they  would  remain  after  it ;  which  shows  the  high  pro- 
bability that  our  living  powers  will  continue  after  death,  unless 
there  be  some  ground  to  think  that  death  is  their  destruction. "j* 
For,  if  it  would  be  in  a  manner  certain  that  we  should  survive 
death,^  provided  it  were  certain  that  death  would  not  be 
our   destruction,  it  must  be  highly  probable   we  shall  survive 

*  I  say  Idnd  of  presumption  or  probability;  for  I  do  not  mean  to  afiirm  that 
there  is  the  same  degree  of  conviction,  that  our  living  powers  will  continue  after 
death,  as  there  is,  that  our  substances  will. 

f  Destruction  of  living  2^oicer8,  is  a  manner  of  expression  unavoidably  ambi- 
guous ;  and  may  signify  either  the  deatruction  of  a  living  being,  so  as  that  the  same 
living  being  shall  be  incapable  of  ever  perceiving  or  acting  again  at  all;  or  the 
de>itruction  of  those  means  and  instruments  by  which  it  is  cai)able  of  its  present 
life,  of  its  present  state  of  j^erception  and  of  action.  It  is  here  used  in  the 
former  sense.  When  it  is  used  in  the  latter,  the  epithet  prese»J  is  added.  The 
loss  of  a  man's  eye  is  a  destruction  of  living  powers  in  the  latter  sense.  But 
we  have  no  reason  to  think  the  destruction  of  living  powers,  in  the  former 
sense,  to  be  possible.  We  have  no  more  reason  to  think  a  being  endued  with 
living  powers,  ever  loses  them  during  its  whole  existence,  than  to  believe  that 
a  stone  ever  acquires  them. 

b  [The  next  paragraph  indicates  that  Butler  does  not,  as  Chalmers  tLinks, 
consider  this  argument  as  "  handing  us  over  to  an  absolute  demonstration."  It 
just  places  all  arguments  for  and  against  the  soul's  future  life,  in  that  balanced 
condition,  which  leaves  us  to  learn  the  fact  from  revelation,  free  from  presump- 
tions against  its  truth.  This  view  of  the  case  entirely  relieves  the  objection  aa 
to  the  future  life  of  brutes;  and  shows  how  entirely  we  must  rely  on  revela- 
tion, as  to  the  futm-e,  both  of  man  and  beast.] 


80  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  part  i. 

it,  if  tliere.  be  no  ground  to  think  cleatli  will  be  our  destruc- 
tion. 

Though  I  think  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  prior  to  the 
natural  and  moral  proofs  of  a  future  life  commonly  insisted  upon, 
there  would  arise  a  general  confused  suspicion,  that  in  the  great 
shock  and  alteration  which  we  shall  undergo  by  death,  we,  i.e. 
our  Hying  powers,  might  be  wholly  destroyed ;  yet  even  prior  to 
those  proofs,  there  is  really  no  particular  distinct  ground  or  reason 
for  this  apprehension  at  all,  so  far  as  I  can  find.  If  there  be,  it 
must  arise  either  from  the  reason  of  the  thing ,  or  from  the  analogy 
of  nature. 

But  we  cannot  argue  from  the  reason  of  the  tiling,  that  death 
is  the  destruction  of  living  agents,  because  we  know  not  at  all 
what  death  is  in  itself;  but  only  some  of  its  effects,  such  as  the 
dissolution  of  flesh,  skin,  and  bones.  These  effects  do  in  no  wise 
appear  to  imply  the  destruction  of  a  living  agent.  Besides,  as 
we  are  greatly  in  the  dark,  upon  what  the  exercise  of  our  living 
powers  depends,  so  we  are  wholly  ignorant  what  the  powers  them- 
selves depend  upon ;  the  powers  themselves  as  distinguished,  not 
only  from  their  actual  exercise,  but  also  from  the  present  capa- 
city of  exercising  them ;  and  as  opposed  to  their  destruction  :  for 
sleep,  or  certainly  a  swoon,  shows  us,  not  only  that  these  powers 
exist  when  they  are  not  exercised,  as  the  passive  power  of  motion 
does  in  inanimate  matter;  but  shows  also  that  they  exist,  when 
there  is  no  present  capacity  of  exercising  them  :  or  that  the  capa- 
cities of  exercising  them  for  the  present,  as  well  as  the  actual 
exercise  of  them,  may  be  suspended,  and  yet  the  powers  them- 
selves remain  undestroyed.  Since  then  we  know  not  at  all  upon 
what  the  existence  of  our  living  powers  depends,  this  shows  fur- 
ther, there  can  no  probability  be  collected  from  the  reason  of  the 
thing,  that  death  will  be  their  destruction  :  because  their  exist- 
ence may  depend  upon  somewhat  in  no  degree  affected  by  death; 
upon  somewhat  quite  out  of  the  reach  of  this  king  of  terrors. 
So  that  there  is  nothing  more  certain,  than  that  the  reason  of  the 
thing  shows  us  no  connection  between  death  and  the  destruction 
of  livino;  ao-ents. 

Nor  can  we  find  any  thing  throughout  the  whole  analogy  of 
nature  to  afford  us  even  the  slightest  presumption,  that  animals 
ever  lose  their  living  powers ;  much  less  if  it  were  possible,  that 


CHAP  I.  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  g] 

they  lose  them  by  death  :  for  we  have  no  faculties  wherewith  tc 
trace  any  beyond  or  through  it,  so  as  to  see  what  becomes  of 
them.  This  event  removes  them  from  our  view.  It  destroys 
the  sensible  proof,  which  we  had  before  their  death,  of  their  being 
possessed  of  living  powers,  but  does  not  appear  to  afford  the  least 
reason  to  believe  that  they  are,  then,  or  by  that  event,  deprived 
of  them. 

Our  knowing  that  they  were  possessed  of  these  powers,  up  to 
the  very  period  to  which  we  have  faculties  capable  of  tracing 
them,  is  itself  a  probability  of  their  retaining  them  beyond  it. 
This  is  confirmed,  and  a  sensible  credibility  is  given  to  it,  by  ob- 
serving the  very  great  and  astonishing  changes  which  we  have 
experienced ;  so  great,  that  our  existence  in  another  state  of  life, 
of  perception  and  of  action,  will  be  but  according  to  a  method  of 
providential  conduct,  the  like  to  which  has  been  already  exer- 
cised even  with  regard  to  ourselves;  according  to  a  coui«e  of 
nature,  the  like  to  which  we  have  already  gone  through. 

However,  as  one  cannot  but  be  greatly  sensible,  how  difficult 
it  is  to  silence  imagination  enough  to  make  the  voice  of  reason 
even  distinctly  heard  in  this  case ;  as  we  are  accustomed,  from 
our  youth  up,  to  indulge  that  forward,  delusive  faculty,  ever  ob- 
truding beyond  its  sphere;  (of  some  assistance  indeed  to  appre- 
hension, but  the  author  of  all  error,)  as  we  plainly  lose  ourselves 
in  gross  and  crude  conceptions  of  things,  taking  for  granted  that 
we  are  acquainted  with  what  indeed  we  are  wholly  ignorant  of: 
it  may  be  proper  to  consider  the  imaginary  presumptions,  that 
death  will  be  our  destruction,  arising  from  these  kinds  of  early 
and  lasting  prejudices ;  and  to  show  how  little  they  really  amount 
to,  even  though  we  cannot  wholly  divest  ourselves  of  them. 
And, 

I.  All  presumption  of  death's  being  the  destruction  of  living 
beings,  must  go  upon  supposition  that  they  are  compounded;"  and 

c  [Dodwell  had  published  a  book,  in  which  he  argues  that  human  souls  are 
not  nnturnlhj  immortal,  but  become  so,  by  the  power  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  in  re- 
generation. Dr.  Clarke  replied.  The  controversy  was  continued  by  Collins. 
Dr.  C.  wrote  four  tracts  on  the  subject. 

These  "presumptions"  form  the  base  of  materialism,  and  hence  tht  denial 
of  a  future  state.  Surely,  thoughts  and  feelings,  if  material,  have  extension. 
But  can  any  one  conceive  of  love  a  foot  long,  or  anger  an  inch  thick  ?.  How 
superior  to  the  gloomy  mists  of  modern  infidels  have  even  pagans  been  !   Cicero 


82  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  part  i. 

SO,  di;bcerptibie.  But  since  consciousness  is  a  single  and  indi- 
visible power,  it.  should  seem  that  the  subject  in  which  it  resides 
must  be  so  too.  For  were  the  motion  of  any  particle  of  matter 
absolutely  one  and  indivisible,  so  as  that  it  should  imply  a  con- 
tradiction to  suppose  part  of  this  motion  to  exist,  and  part  not 
to  exist,  i.e.  part  of  this  matter  to  move,  and  part  to  be  at  rest, 
then  its  power  of  motion  would  be  indivisible ;  and  so  also  would 
the  subject  in  which  the  power  inheres,  namely,  the  particle  of 
matter :  for  it  this  could  be  divided  into  two,  one  part  might 
be  moved  and  the  other  at  rest,  which  is  contrary  to  the  sup- 
position. 

In  like  manner  it  has  been  argued,*  and,  for  any  thing  ap- 
pearing to  the  contrary,  justly,  that  since  the  perception  or  con- 
sciousness, which  we  have  of  our  own  existence,  is  indivisible,  so 
as  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to  suppose  one  part  of  it  should  be 
here  and  the  other  there ;  the  perceptive  power,  or  the  power  of 
consciousness,  is  indivisible  too  :  and  consequently  the  subject  in 
which  it  resides,  i.e.  the  conscious  being.  Now,  upon  supposi- 
tion that  the  living  agent  each  man  calls  himself,  is  thus  a  single 
being,  which  there  is  at  least  no  more  difficulty  in  conceiving 
than  in  conceiving  it  to  be  a  compound,  and  of  which  there  is  the 
proof  now  mencioned;  it  follows,  that  our  organized  bodies  are  no 
more  ourselves  or  part  of  ourselves,  than  any  other  matter  around 
us.  And  it  is  as  easy  to  conceive,  how  matter,  which  is  no  part 
of  ourselves,  may  be  appropriated  to  us  in  the  manner  which  our 
present  bodies  are ;  as  how  we  can  receive  impressions  from,  and 
have  power  over,  any  matter.  It  is  as  easy  to  conceive,  that  we  may 
exist  out  of  bodies,  as  in  them  -,  and  that  we  might  have  animated 
bodies  of  any  other  organs  and  senses  wholly  different  from  these 
now  given  us;  and  that  we  may  hereafter  animate  these  same  or 
new  bodies,  variously  modified  and  organized;  as  to  conceive  how 

makes  Cato  say,  "  The  soul  is  a  simple,  uncompounded  substance,  wi'^hout  parts 
or  mixture :  it  cannot  be  divided,  and  so  cannot  perish."  And  iu  another  place, 
"  I  never  could  believe  that  the  soul  lost  its  senses  by  escaping  from  senseless 
matter;  or  that  such  a  release  will  not  enlarge  and  improve  its  powers;"  and 
agiiin,  "  I  am  persuaded  that  I  shall  only  begin  truly  to  live,  when  I  cease  to 
live  iu  this  world."  Xonophou  reports  Cyrus  as  saying,  in  his  last  moments, 
"  0  my  sons !  do  not  imagine  that  when  death  has  taker  me  from  you,  I  shall 
cease  to  exist."] 

*  See  Pr.  Clarke's  Letter  to  Mr.  Dodwell,  and  the  defence.''  of  it 


CHAP  I.  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  gg 

•we  can  animate  sucli  bodies  as  our  present.  And  lastly,  tlie  dis- 
solution of  all  these  several  organized  bodies,  supposing  ourselves 
to  have  successively  animated  them,  would  have  no  more  con- 
ceivable tendency  to  destroy  the  living  beings  ourselves,  or  de- 
prive us  of  living  faculties,  the  faculties  of  perception  and  of 
action,  than  the  dissolution  of  any  foreign  matter,  which  we  are 
capable  of  receiving  impressions  from^  and  making  use  of,  for  the 
common  occasions  of  life. 

II.  The  simplicity  and  absolute  oneness  of  a  living  agent  can- 
not, from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  properly  proved  by  experi- 
mental observations.  But  as  these  fall  in  with  the  supposition 
of  its  unity,  so  they  plainly  lead  us  to  conclude  certainly,  tbat  our 
gross  organized  bodies,  with  which  we  perceive  objects  of  sense, 
and  with  which  we  act,  are  no  part  of  ourselves ;  and  therefore 
show  us,  that  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  their  destruction  to  be 
ours  :  even  without  determining  whether  our  living  substance  be 
material  or  immaterial.  For  we  see  by  experience,  that  men  may 
lose  their  limbs,  their  organs  of  sense,  and  even  the  greatest  part 
of  these  bodies,  and  yet  remain  the  same  living  agents.  Persons 
can  trace  up  the  existence  of  themselves  to  a  time,  when  the  bulk 
of  their  bodies  was  extremely  small,  in  comparison  of  what  it  is 
in  mature  age  :  and  we  cannot  but  think,  that  they  might  then 
have  lost  a  considerable  part  of  that  small  body,  and  y£t  have  re- 
mained the  same  living  agents;  as  they  may  now  lose  great  part 
of  their  present  body,  and  remain  so.  And  it  is  certain,  that  the 
bodies  of  all  animals  are  in  a  constant  flux,*^  from  that  never- 
ceasing  attrition,  which  there  is  in  every  part  of  them.  Now, 
things  of  this  kind  unavoidably  teach  us  to  distinguish,  between 
these  living  agents  ourselves,  and  large  quantities  of  matter,  in 
which  we  are  very  nearly  interested;  since  these  may  be  alien- 
ated, and  actually  are  in  a  daily  course  of  succession,  and  changing 
their  owners;  whilst  we  are  assured,  that  each  living  agent  re- 

^i  [As  every  particle  of  our  bodies  is  changed  within  seven  years,  an  ave- 
rage life  would  take  us  through  many  such  changes.  If  the  mind  changes 
with  the  body,  it  would  be  unjust  for  an  old  man  to  be  made  to  suffer  for  the 
sins  of  his  youth.  To  escape  this,  the  materialist  is  driven  to  aflfirm  that  the 
whole  is  not  altered,  though  every  particle  be  changed. 

This  argument  from  the  constant  flux  is  irresistible.  It  proves  our  identity, 
and  that  matter  and  mind  are  not  the  same.  Does  it  not  also  destroy  all  pre- 
gumption  that  the  Ego  cannot  exist  without  this  particular  body?] 


S4  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  part  i. 

mains  one  and  the  same  permanent  being.*  And  this  general 
observation  leads  us  on  to  the  following  ones. 

First,  That  we  have  no  way  of  determining  by  experience, 
what  is  the  certain  bulk  of  the  living  being  each  man  calls  him- 
self: and  yet,  till  it  be  determined  that  it  is  larger  in  bulk  than 
the  solid  elementary  particles  of  matter,  which  there  is  no  ground 
to  think  any  natural  power  can  dissolve,  there  is  no  sort  of  reason 
to  think  death  to  be  the  dissolution  of  it,  of  the  living  being, 
even  though  it  should  not  be  absolutely  indiscerptible. 

Secondhj,  From  our  being  so  nearly  related  to  and  interested 
in  certain  systems  of  matter,  (suppose  our  flesh  and  bones,)  and 
afterwards  ceasing  to  be  at  all  related  to  them,  the  living  agents, 
ourselves,  remaining  all  this  while  undestroyed  notwithstanding 
such  alienation ;  and  consequently  these  systems  of  matter  not 
being  ourselves,  it  follows  further  that  we  have  no  ground  to 
conclude  any  other  (suppose  internal^  systems  of  matter,  to  be 
the  living  agents  ourselves;  because  we  can  have  no  ground  to 
conclude  this,  but  from  our  relation  to  and  interest  in  such  other 
systems  of  matter :  and  therefore  we  can  have  no  reason  to  con- 
clude what  befalls  those  sj^stems  of  matter  at  death,  to  be  the 
destruction  of  the  living  agents.  We  have  already  several  times 
over,  lost  a  great  part  or  perhaps  the  whole  of  our  body,  accord- 
ing to  certain  common  established  laws  of' nature,  yet  we  remain 
the  same  living  agents.  When  we  shall  lose  as  great  a  part,  or  the 
whole,  by  another  common  established  law  of  nature,  death,  why 
may  we  not  also  remain  the  same  ?  That  the  alienation  has  been 
gradual  in  one  case,  and  in  the  other  will  be  more  at  once,  does 
not  prove  any  thing  to  the  contrary.  We  have  passed  undestroyed 
through  those  many  and  great  revolutions  of  matter,  so  peculiarly 
appropriated  to  us  oui'selves ;  why  should  we  imagine  death  will 
be  so  fatal  to  us?  Nor  can  it  be  objected,  that  what  is  thus 
alienated  or  lost,  is  no  part  of  our  original  solid  body,  but  only 
adventitious  matter.  Because  we  may  lose  entire  limbs,  which 
must  have  -contained  many  solid  parts  and  vessels  of  the  original 
body;  or  if  this  be  not  admitted,  we  have  no  proof,  that  any  of 
these  solid  parts  are  dissolved  or  alienated  by  death.  Though  we 
are  very  nearly  related  to  that  extraneous  or  adventitious  maiter, 
whilst  it  continues  united  to  and  distending  the  several  parts  o^ 
-•■   Sec  Disserlatiou  I. 


CHAP.  I.  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  gg 

our  solid  bod}^  yet  after  all,  the  relation  a  person  bear»  to  those 
parts  of  his  body,  to  which  he  is  most  nearly  related,  amounts  but 
to  this,  that  the  living  agent,  and  those  parts  of  the  body,  mutu- 
ally affect  each  other.®  The  same  thing,  the  same  thing  in  kind 
though  not  in  degree,  may  be  said  of  all  foreign  matter,  which 
gives  us  ideas,  and  over  which  we  have  any  power.  From  these 
observations  the  whole  ground  of  the  imagination  is  removed, 
that  the  dissolution  of  any  matter,  is  the  destruction  of  a  living 
agent,  from  the  interest  he  once  had  in  such  matter. 

Thirdli/,  If  we  consider  our  body  somewhat  more  distinctly, 
as  made  up  of  organs  and  instruments  of  perception  and  of  mo- 
tion, it  will  brinsf  us  to  the  same  conclusion.  Thus  the  common 
optical  experiments  show,  and  even  the  observation  how  sight  is 
assisted  by  glasses  shows,  that  we  see  with  our  eyes  in  the  same 
sense  as  we  see  with  glasses.  Nor  is  there  any  reason  to  believe, 
that  we  see  with  them  in  any  other  sense ;  any  other,  I  mean, 
which  would  lead  us  to  think  the  eye  itself  a  percipient.  The  like 
is  to-  be  said  of  hearing;  and  our  feeling  distant  solid  matter  by 
means  of  something  in  our  hand,  seems  an  instance  of  the  like 
kind,  as  to  the  subject  we  are  considering.  All  these  are  in- 
stances of  foreign  matter,  or  such  as  is  no  part  of  our  body, 
being  instrumental  in  preparing  objects  for,  and  conveying  them 
to,  the  perceiving  power,  in  a  manner  similar  to  the  manner  in 
which  our  organs  of  sense  prepare  and  convey  them.  Both  are 
in  a  like  way  instruments  of  our  receiving  such  ideas  from  ex- 
ternal objects,  as  the  Author  of  nature  appointed  those  external 
objects  to  be  the  occasions  of  exciting  in  us.  Glasses  are  evident 
instances  of  this;  namely  of  matter  which  is  no  part  cf  our 
body,  preparing  objects  for  and  conveying  them  towards  the  per- 
ceiving power,  in  like  manner  as  our  bodily  organs  do.  And  if 
we  see  with  our  eyes  only  in  the  same  manner  as  we  do  with 
glasses,  the  like  may  justly  be  concluded,  from  analogy,  of  all 
our  other  senses.  It  is  not  intended,  by  any  thing  here  said,  to 
affirm,  that  the  whole  apparatus  of  vision,  or  of  perception  by 

e  [The  mind  affects  the  body,  as  much  as  the  body  does  the  mind.  Love, 
anger,  &c.  quicken  the  circulation;  fear  checks  it;  terror  may  stop  it  alto- 
gether. Mania  is  as  often  produced  by  moral,  as  by  physical  causes,  and 
hence  of  late  moral  means  are  resorted  to  for  cure.  The  brain  of  a  maniac, 
seldom  shows,  on  dissection,  any  derangement.  But  this  does  not  prove  that 
there  was  no  functional  derangement] 

8 


80  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  part  x. 

any  otbor  sense,  can  be  traced  through  all  its  steps,  quite  up  to 
the  living  power  of  seeing,  or  perceiving :  but  that  so  far  as  it 
can  be  traced  by  experimental  observations,  so  far  it  appears,  that 
our  organs  of  sense  prepare  and  convey  objects,  in  order  to  their 
l^eiug  perceived,  in  like  manner  as  foreign  matter  does,  without 
affording  any  shadow  of  appearance,  that  they  themselves  per- 
ceive. And  that  we  have  no  reason  to  think  our  organs  of  sense 
percipients,  is  confirmed  by  instances  of  persons  losing  some  of 
them,  the  living  beings  themselves,  their  former  occupiers,  re- 
maining unimpaired.  It  is  confirmed  also  by  the  experience  of 
dreams  ;  by  which  we  find  we  are  at  present  possessed  of  a  latent, 
and  what  would  be  otherwise  an  unimagined  unknown  power  of 
perceiving  sensible  objects,  in  as  strong  and  lively  a  manner  with- 
out our  external  organs  of  sense,  as  with  them. 

So  also  with  regard  to  our  power  of  moving,  or  directing 
motion  by  will  and  choice  ]  upon  the  destruction  of  a  limb,  this 
active  power  evidently  remains,  unlessened;  so  that  the  living 
being,  who  has  suffered  this  loss,  would  be  capable  of  moving  as 
before,  if  it  had  another  limb  to  move  with.  It  can  walk  by  the 
help  of  an  artificial  leg.  It  can  make  use  of  a  pole  or  a  lever, 
to  reach  towards  itself  and  to  move  things,  beyond  the  length 
and  the  power  of  its  arm ;  and  this  it  does  in  the  same  manner 
as  it  reaches  and  moves,  with  its  natural  arm,  things  nearer  and 
of  less  weight.  Nor  is  there  so  much  as  any  appearance  of  our 
limbs  being  endued  with  a  power  of  moving  or  directing  them- 
selves; though  they  are  adapted,  like  the  several  parts  of  a 
machine,  to  be  the  instruments  of  motion  to  each  other;  and 
some  parts  of  the  same  limb,  to  be  instruments  of  motion  to  the 
other  parts. 

Thus  a  man  determines  that  he  will  look  at  an  object  through 
a  microscope ;  or  being '  lame,  that  he  will  walk  to  such  a 
place  with  a  staff,  a  week  hence.  His  eyes  and  his  feet  no 
more  determine  in  these  cases,  than  the  microscope  and  the  staff. 
Nor  is  there  any  ground  to  think  they  any  more  put  the  determi- 
nation in  practice ;  or  that  his  eyes  are  the  seers,  or  his  feet  the 
movers,  in  any  other  sense  than  as  the  microscope  and  the  staff 
are.  Upon  the  whole,  then,  our  organs  of  sense,  and  our  limbs, 
are  certainly  instruments,'^  which  the  living  persons  ourseH'es 
^  ["S.  What  shall  we  say,  then,  of  the  shoemaker?     That  he  cuts  mth  lis 


j.HAP.  I.  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  87 

make  use  of  to  perceive  and  move  with  :  there  is  not  any  proba- 
bility, that  tbey  are  any  more;  nor  consequently,  that  we  have 
any  other  kind  of  relation  to  them,  than  what  we  have  to  any 
other  foreign  matter  formed  into  instruments  of  perception  ana 
motion,  suppose  into  a  microscope  or  a  staff;  (I  say  any  other  kind 
of  relation,  for  I  am  not  speaking  of  the  degree  of  it)  nor  con- 
sequently is  there  any  probability,  that  the  alienation  or  disso- 
lution of  these  instruments,  is  the  destruction  of  the  perceiving 
and  moving  agent. 

And  thus  our  finding  that  the  dissolution  of  matter,  in  which 
living  beings  were  most  nearly  interested,  is  not  their  dissolution; 
and  that  the  destruction  of  several  of  the  organs  and  instruments 
of  perception  and  of  motion  belonging  to  them,  is  not  their 
destruction ;  shows  demonstratively,  that  there  is  no  ground  to 
think  that  the  dissolution  of  any  other  matter,  or  destruction  of 
any  other  organs  and  instruments,  will  be  the  dissolution  or 
destruction  of  living  agents,  from  the  like  kind  of  relation.  And 
we  have  no  reason  to  think  we  stand  in  any  other  kind  of  relation 
to  any  thing  which  we  find  dissolved  by  death. 

But  it  is  said,  these  observations  are  ec[ually  applicable  to 
brutes  :^  and  it  is  thought  an  insuperable  difficulty,  that  they 

instrument  only,  or  with  his  hands  also?  A.  With  his  hands  also.  S.  Does 
he  use  his  eyes  also,  in  making  shoes  ?  A.  Yes.  S.  But  are  we  agreed  that  he 
who  uses,  and  what  he  uses,  are  different?  A.  Yes.  S.  The  shoemaker,  then, 
and  harper,  are  different  from  the  hands  and  eyes  they  use?  A.  It  appears  so. 
S.  Does  a  man  then  use  his  whole  body?  A.  Certainly.  S.  But  he  who  uses, 
and  that  which  he  uses  are  different.  A.  Yes.  S.  A  man  then  is  something 
different  from  his  own  body."     Plat.  Alcibi.  Prim.  p.  129,  D.  Stallb.  Ed. 

"  It  may  easily  be  perceived  that  the  mind  both  sees  and  hears,  and  not  those 
parts  which  are,  so  to  speak,  windows  of  the  mind."  "Neither  are  we  bodies; 
nor  do  I,  while  speaking  this  to  thee,  speak  to  thy  body."  "  Whatever  is  done 
by  thy  mind,  is  done  by  thee."     Cicero,  Tusc.  Disput.  I.  20,  46  and  22,  62, 

"The  mind  of  each  man  is  the  man;  not  that  figure  which  may  be  pointed 
out  with  the  finger."     Cic,  de  Rep.  b.  6,  s.  24.] 

s  [Butler's  argument,  if  advanced  ior  proof  would  prove  too  much,  not  only 
as  to  brutes  but  as  to  man;  for  it  would  prove  preexistence.  And  this  is  really 
the  tenet,  {i.e.  transmigration,)  of  those  who  arrive  at  the  doctrine  of  immor- 
tality only  by  philosophy.  Philosophy  cannot  establish  the  doctrine  of  a 
future  state,  nor  can  it  afford  any  presumptions  against  either  a  future  or  a 
oreexistent  state. 

Nothing  is  gained  by  insisting  that  reason  teaches  the  true  doctrine  of  the 
Boul;  any  more  than  there  would  be  by  insisting  that  by  it  we  learned  the 
doctrine  of  a  trinity,  or  atonement.     Philosophy  does  teach  that  He  who  can 


88  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  part  i. 

should  be  immortal,  and  by  consequence  capable  of  everlasting 
happiness.  Now  this  manner  of  expression  is  both  invidious  and 
weak  :  but  the  thing  intended  by  it,  is  really  no  difl&culty  at  all, 
either  in  the  way  of  natural  or  moral  consideration.  For  1,  Sup- 
pose the  invidious  thing,  designed  in  such  a  manner  of  expres- 
sion, were  really  implied,  as  it  is  not  in  the  least,  in  the  natural 
immortality  of  brutes,  namely,  that  they  must  arrive  at  great 
attainments,  and  become  rational  and  moral  agents;  even  this 
would  be  no  difficulty,  since  we  know  not  what  latent  powers  and 
capacities  they  may  be  endued  with.  There  was  once,  prior  to 
experience,  as  great  presumption  against  human  creatures,  as 
there  is  against  the  brute  creatures,  arriving  at  that  degree  of 
understanding,  which  we  have  in  mature  age.  For  we  can  trace 
up  our  own  existence  to  the  same  original  with  theirs.  We  find 
it  to  be  a  general  law  of  nature,  that  creatures  endued  with 
capacities  of  virtue  and  religion  should  be  placed  in  a  condition 
of  being,  in  which  they  are  altogether  without  the  use  of  them, 
for  a  considerable  length  of  their  duration*  as  in  infancy  and 
childhood.  And  great  part  of  the  human  species  go  out  of  the 
present  world,  before  they  come  to  the  exercise  of  these  capacities 
in  any  degree. 

2.  The  natural  immortality  of  brutes  does  not  in  the  least 
imply,  that  they  are  endued  with  any  latent  capacities  of  a 
rational  or  rtioral  nature.  The  economy  of  the  universe  might  re- 
quire, that  there  should  be  living  creatures  without  any  capacities 
of  this  kind.  And  all  difficulties  as  to  the  manner  how  they  are 
to  be  disposed  of,  are  so  apparently  and  wholly  founded  in  our 
ignorance,  that  it  is  wonderful  they  should  be  insisted  upon  by 
any,  but  such  as  are  weak  enough  to  think  they  are  acquainted 
with  the  whole    system  of   things.      There  is  then  absolutely 

create,  under  infinite  diversity  of  forms,  can  sustain  existence,  in  any  mode  he 
pleases. 

The  reader  who  chooses  to  look  further  into  the  discussion  as  to  the  immor- 
tality of  brutes,  will  find  it  spread  out  in  Polignac's  Anti-Lucretius,  and  still 
w  ve  in  Bayle's  Dicticnary,  under  the  articles  Perkira,  and  Rorarius. 
The  topic  Is  also  discussed  in  Des  Cartes  on  the  Passions:  Baxter  on  The 
Nature  of  the  Soul:  Hume's  Essays,  Essay  9:  Search's  Light  of  Nature: 
Cjieyne's  Philosophical  Principles :  Wagstaff  on  the  Immortality  of  Brutes 
Edwards'  Critical  and  Philosophical  Exercitations :  Watt's  Essays,  Essay  9* 
Coj.ljber's  Enquiry:  Locke  on  the  Understanding,  b.  2,  ch.  ix.  •  Dittoh  ou 
<iie  Resurrection :  Willis  De  Anima  BrutiC.J 


;hap.  I.  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  89 

nothing  at  Q.V  in  this  objection,  which  is  so  rhetorically  urged, 
against  the  greatest  part  of  the  natural  proofs  or  presumptions  of 
the  immortality  of  human  minds ;  I  say  the  greatest  part,  for  it 
is  less  applicable  to  the  following  observation,  which  is  more 
peculiar  to  mankind. 

III.  As  it  is  evident  our  present  powers  and  capacities  of 
reason,  memory,  and  affection,  do  not  depend  upon  our  gross 
body  in  the  manner  in  which  perception  by  our  organs  of  sense 
does ;  so  they  do  not  appear  to  depend  upon  it  at  all,  in  any  such 
manner  as  to  give  ground  to  think,  that  the  dissolution  of  this 
body  will  be  the  destruction  of  these  our  present  powers  of  reflec- 
tion, as  it  will  of  our  powers  of  sensation;  or  to  give  ground 
to  conclude,  even  that  it  will  be  so  much  as  a  suspension  of  the 
former. 

Human  creatures  exist  at  present  in  two  states  of  life  and  per- 
ception, greatly  different  from  each  other ;  each  of  which  has  its 
own  peculiar  laws,  and  its  own  peculiar  enjoyments  and  suffer- 
ings. When  any  of  our  senses  are  affected,  or  appetites  gratified 
with  the  objects  of  them,  we  may  be  said  to  exist  or  live  in  a 
state  of  sensation.  When  none  of  our  senses  are  affected  or 
appetites  gratified,  and  yet  we  perceive,  and  reason,  and  act,  we 
may  be  said  to  exist  or  live  in  a  state  of  reflection.  Now  it  is 
by  no  means  certain,  that  any  thing  which  is  dissolved  by  death, 
is  in  any  way  necessary  to  the  living  being,  in  this  its  state  of 
reflection,  after  ideas  are  gained.  For,  though,  from  our  present 
constitution  and  condition  of  being,  our  external  organs  of  sense 
are  necessary  for  conveying  in  ideas  to  our  reflecting  powers,  as 
carriages,  and  levers,  and  scaffolds  are  in  architecture  -y^  yet  when 
these  ideas  are  brought  in,  we  are  capable  of  reflecting  in  the 
most  intense  degree,  and  of  enjoying  the  greatest  pleasure,  and 
feeling  the  greatest  pain,  by  means  of  that  reflection,  without 

^  [It  is  as  absurd  to  suppose  that  a  brain  thinks,  as  that  an  eye  sees,  or  a  finger 
feels.  The  eye  no  more  sees,  than  the  telescope  or  spectacles.  If  the  nerve  be 
paralyzed,  there  is  no  vision,  though  the  eye  be  perfect.  A  few  words  spoken 
or  read,  may  at  once  deprive  of  sight,  or  knock  a  person  down. 

The  mind  sometimes  survives  the  body.  Swift,  utterly  helpless  from  palsy, 
retained  his  faculties.  In  some,  th^  body  survives  the  mind.  Morgagni, 
Haller,  Bonnet,  and  others,  have  proved  that  there  is  no  part  of  the  brain, 
rfot  even  the  pineal  gland,  which  has  not  been  found  destroyed  by  disease, 
ivhei<t  there  had  been  no  hallucination  of  mind,  nor  any  suspicion  of  such 
(iisease,  during  life.] 

8» 


90  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  part  i. 

any  assistance  from  our  senses;  and  without  any  at  all,  whicli  we 
know  of,  from  that  body  which  will  be  dissolved  by  death.  It 
does  not  appear  then,  that  the  relation  of  this  gross  body  to  the 
reflecting  being  is,  in  any  degree,  necessary  to  thinking ;  to  in- 
tellectual enjoyments  or  sufferings  :  nor,  consequently,  that  the 
dissolution  or  alienation  of  the  former  by  death,  will  be  the 
destruction  of  those  present  powers,  which  render  us  capable  of 
this  state  of  reflection. 

Further,  there  are  instances  of  mortal  diseases,  which  do  not 
at  all  affect  our  present  intellectual  powers ;  and  this  affords  a 
presumption,  that  those  diseases  will  not  destroy  these  present 
powers.  Indeed,  from  the  observations  made  above,*  it  appears, 
that  there  is  no  presumption,  from  their  mutually  affecting  each 
other,  that  the  dissolution  of  the  body  is  the  destruction  of  the 
living  agent.  By  the  same  reasoning,  it  must  appear  too,  that 
there  is  no  presumption,  from  their  mutually  affecting  each  other, 
that  the  dissolution  of  the  body  is  the  destruction  of  our  present 
reflecting  powers  :  indeed  instances  of  their  not  affecting  each 
other,  afibrd  a  presumption  of  the  contrary.  Instances  of  mortal 
diseases  not  impairing  our  present  reflecting  ^powers,  evidently 
turn  our  thoughts  even  from  imagining  such  diseases  to  be  the 
destruction  of  them.  Several  things  indeed  greatly  affect  all  our 
living  powers,  and  at  length  suspend  the  exercise  of  them ;  as 
for  instance  drowsiness,  increasing  till  it  ends  in  sound  sleep  : 
and  hence  we  might  have  imagined  it  would  destroy  them,  till 
we  found  by  experience  the  weakness  of  this  way  of  judging. 
But  in  the  diseases  now  mentioned,  there  is  not  so  much  as  this 
shadow  of  probability,  to  lead  us  to  any  such  conclusion,  as  to 
the  reflecting  powers  which  we  have  at  present.  For  in  those 
diseases,  persons  the  moment  before  death  appear  to  be  in  the 
highest  vigor  of  life.  They  discover  apprehension,  memory, 
reason,  all  entire ;  the  utmost  force  of  affection ;  a  sense  of  cha- 
racter, of  shame  and  honor;  and  the  highest  mental  enjoyments 
and  sufferings,  even  to  the  last  gasp.  These  surely  prove  even 
greater  vigor  of  life  than  bodily  strength  does.  Now  what  pre- 
tence is  there  for  thinking,  that  a  progressive  disease  when 
arrived  to  such  a  degree,  I  mean  that  degree  which  is  mortal, 
will  destroy  those  powers,  which  were  not  impaired,  which  wvra 
*  Pp.  84,  85. 


CHAP.  I.  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  91 

not  affected  by  it,  during  its  whole  progress  quite  up  to  t"hat 
degree  ?  And  if  death  by  diseases  of  this  kind,  is  not  the 
destruction  of  our  present  reflecting  powers,  it  will  scarce  be 
thought  that  death  by  any  other  means  is. 

It  is  obyious  that  this  general  observation  may  be  carried 
further.  There  appears  to  be  so  little  connection  between  our 
bodily  powers  of  sensation,  and  our  present  powers  of  reflection, 
that  there  is  no  reason  to  conclude,  that  death,  which  destroys 
the  former,  does  so  much  as  suspend  the  exercise  of  the  latter,  or 
interrupt  our  continuing  to  exist  in  the  like  state  of  reflection 
which  we  do  now.^  For  suspension  of  reason,  memory,  and  the 
affections  which  they  excite,  is  no  part  of  the  idea  of  death,  nor 
implied  in  our  notion  of  it.  Our  daily  experiencing  these  powers 
to  be  exercised,  without  any  assistance,  that  we  know  of,  from 
those  bodies  which  will  be  dissolved  by  death ;  and  our  finding 
often,  that  the  exercise  of  them  is  so  lively  to  the  last;  afford  a 
sensible  apprehension,  that  death  may  not  perhaps  be  so  much  as 
a  discontinuance  of  the  exercise  of  these  powers,  nor  of  the 
enjoyments  and  sufferings  which  it  implies.*  So  that  our  post- 
humous life,  whatever  there  may  be  in  it  additional  to  our  present, 
may  yet  not  be  beginning  entirely  anew;  but  going  on.  Death 
may,  in  some  sort  and  in  some  respects,  answer  to  our  birth; 
which  is  not  a  suspension  of  the  faculties  which  we  had  before 
it,  or  a  total  change  of  the  state  of  life  in  which  we  existed  when 
in  the  womb ;  but  a  continuation  of  both,  with  such  and  such 
great  alterations. 

Nay,  for  aught  we  know  of  ourselves,  of  our  present  life  and 
of   death,    death    may  immediately,   in    the    natural    course   of 

i  [We  are  told  by  sceptics  that  "mind  is  the  result  of  a  curious  and  compli- 
cated organization."  A  mere  jumble  of  words!  But  were  the  mind  material, 
there  is  no  evidence  that  death  would  destroy  it:  for  we  do  not  see  that  death 
has  any  power  over  matter.  The  body  remains  the  very  same  as  it  does  in  a 
swoon,  till  chemical  changes  begin.] 

*  There  are  three  distinct  questions,  relating  to  a  future  life,  here  considered : 
Whether  death  be  the  destruction  of  living  agents;  if  not.  Whether  it  be  the 
destruction  of  their  present  powers  of  reflection,  as  it  certainly  is  the  destruc- 
tion of  their  present  powers  of  sensation  ;  and  if  not,  Whether  it  be  the  sus- 
pension, or  discontinuance  of  the  exercise  of  these  present  reflecting  powers. 
Now.  if  there  be  no  reason  to  believe  the  last,  there  will  be,  if  that  wer« 
possible,  Jsss  for  me  nest,  and  less  still  for  the  first. 


92  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  part  i. 

tilings,  put  us  into  a  higher  and  more  enlarged  state  of  life,  as 
our  birth  does;*  a  state  in  which  our  capacities,  and  sphere  of 
perception  and  of  action,  may  be  much  greater  than  at  present. 
For  as  our  relation  to  our  external  organs  of  sense,  renders  us 
capable  of  existing  in  our  present  state  of  sensation ;  so  it  may 
be  the  only  natural  hinderance  to  our  existing,  immediately,  and 
of  course,  in  a  higher  state  of  reflection.  The  truth  is,  reason 
does  not  at  all  show  us,  in  what  state  death  naturally  leaves  us. 
But  were  we  sure,  that  it  would  suspend  all  our  perceptive  and 
active  powers ;  yet  the  suspension  of  a  power  and  the  destruction 
of  it,  are  effects  so  totally  different  in  kind,  as  we  experience 
from  sleep  and  a  swoon,  that  we  cannot  in  any  wise  argue  from 
one  to  the  other;  or  conclude  even  to  the  lowest  degree  of  pro- 
bability, that  the  same  kind  of  force  which  is  sufl&cient  to  sus- 
pend our  faculties,  though  it  be  increased  ever  so  much,  will  be 
sufficient  to  destroy  them.-" 

These  observations  together  may  be  sufficient  to  show,  how 
little  presumption  there  is,  that  death  is  the  destruction  of 
human  creatures.  However,  there  is  the  shadow  of  an  analogy, 
which  may  lead  us  to  imagine  it, — viz. :  the  supposed  likeness 
which  is  observed  between  the  decay  of  vegetables,  and  of  living 
creatures.  This  likeness  is  indeed  sufficient  to  afford  the  poets 
very  apt  allusions  to  the  flowers  of  the  field,  in  their  pictures  of 
the  frailty  of  our  present  life.  But  in  reason,  the  analogy  is  so 
far  from  holding,  that  there  appears  no  ground  for  the  com- 
parison, as  to  the  present  question ;  because  one  of  the  two  sub- 
jects compared  is  wholly  void  of  that,  which  is  the  principal  and 
chief  thing  in  the  other,  the  power  of  perception  and  of  action; 
which  is  the   only  thing  we  are  inquiring  about  the   continU' 

*■  This,  according  to  Strabo,  was  the  opinion  of  the  Brachmans,  voyii^uv  fiiv 
yap  Sn  Tov  jjiiv  h'daSe  (iiov,  wj  av  aKiviv  Kvojiivcov  eivai'  rov  6t  ^dvaTov,  yivsmv  dg  rov  Svtcjs 
(Slov,  Koi  TOV  cvSaijiOva  roXg  (piXoaocpftaaai'  Lib.  XV.  p.  1039,  Ed.  Amst.  1707.  ["For 
they  think  that  the  present  life  is  like  that  of  those  who  are  just  ready  to  be 
born  ,•  and  that  death  is  a  birth  into  the  real  life,  and  a  happy  one  to  those 
who  have  practised  philosophy."]  To  which  opinion  perhaps  Antoninus  may 
allude  in  these  words,  wj  vvv  Trtpijxki/tig,  -kotc  euPpvov  ck  rng  yacrrpos  rng  ywaiKOg  o-ou 
clekOi),  ourwj  eK(:kxeaBai,  t))v  uipav  tv  ji  to  ipvXciptov  aov  tov  sXvTpov  tovtov  EKTrtae'iTai.  Lib. 
ix.  c.  3.  [As  this  last  passage  may,  by  some,  be  thought  indelicate,  it  is  left 
untranslated.] 

J  [The  increase  of  a  force  in  any  direction,  cannot  of  itself  change  thlt  direc- 
tion. An  arrow  shot  from  a  bow,  towards  an  object,  does  not  aim  at  some 
othe'  object,  by  being  shot  with  more  force.] 


CHAP.  I.  A  FUTURE  LIFE.  9^ 

ance  of.  So  that  the  destruction  of  a  vegetable,  is  an  eveni  not 
similar  or  analogous  to  the  destruction  of  a  living  agent. 

If,  as  was  above  intimated,  leaving  off  the  delusive  custom  of 
substituting  imagination  in  the  room  of  experience,  we  would 
confine  ourselves  to  what  we  do  know  and  understand;  if  we 
would  argue  only  from  that,  and  from  that  form  our  expectations, 
it  would  appear  at  first  sight,  that  as  no  probability  of  living 
beings  ever  ceasing  to  be  so,  can  be  concluded  from  the  reason 
of  the  thing,  so  none  can  be  collected  from  the  analogy  of 
nature ;  because  we  cannot  trace  any  living  beings  beyond  death. 
But  as  we  are  conscious  that  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of 
perception  and  of  action,  and  are  living  persons ;  what  we  are  to 
go  upon  is,  that  we  shall  continue  so,  till  we  foresee  some  acci- 
dent, or  event,  which  will  endanger  those  capacitities,  or  be  likely 
to  destroy  us :  which  death  does  in  no  wise  appear  to  be. 

Thus,  when  we  go  out  of  this  world,  we  may  pass  into  new 
scenes,  and  a  new  state  of  life  and  action,  just  as  naturally  as  we 
came  into  the  present.  And  this  new  state  may  naturally  be  a 
social  one.^  And  the  advantages  of  it,  advantages  of  every  kind, 
may  naturally  be  bestowed,  according  to  some  fixed  general  laws 
of  wisdom,  upon  every  one  in  proportion  to  the  degrees  of  his 
virtue.  And  though  the  advantages  of  that  future  natural  state 
should  not  be  bestowed,  as  these  of  the  present  in  some  measure 
are,  by  the  will  of  the  society;  but  entirely  by  his  more  imme- 
diate action,  upon  whom  the  whole  frame  of  nature  depends  :  yet 
this  distribution  may  be  just  as  natural,  as  their  being  distributed 
here  by  the  instrumentality  of  men.  Indeed,  though  one  should 
allow  any  confused  undetermined  sense,  which  people  please  to 
put  upon  the  word  natural,  it  would  be  a  shortness  of  thought 
scarce  credible,  to  imagine,  that  no  system  or  course  of  things 
can  be  so,  but  only  what  we  see  at  present  :*  especially  whilst  the 

*  [Our  nature  will  ahoays  he  ours,  or  we  should  cease  to  be  ourselves,  and 
become  something  else.  And  this  nature  is  social.  Every  one  feels,  at  least 
sometimes,  that  he  is  not  complete  in  himself  for  the  production  of  happiness; 
and  so  looks  round  for  that  which  may  fit  his  wants,  and  supply  what  he  can- 
not produce  from  within.  Hence  amusements,  of  a  thousand  kinds,  are  re- 
sorted to,  and  still  more,  society.  Society  is  a  want  of  the  mind;  as  food  ia 
of  the  body.  Society,  such  as  perfectly  suits  our  real  nature,  and  calls  out,  in 
a  right  manner,  its  every  attribute,  would  secure  our  perfect  happiness.  But 
such  society  must  include  God.] 

*  Sec  Part  II.  chap.  ii.  and  Part  II.  chap.  iv. 


94  A  FUTURE  LIFE  part  t, 

probiibilitj  of  a  future  life,  or  the  natural  immortality  of  the 
soul,  is  admitted  upon  the  evidence  of  reason  ;  because  this  ia 
really  both  admitting  and  denying  at  once,  a  state  of  being  differ- 
ent from  the  present  to  be  natural.  But  the  only  distinct  mean- 
ing of  that  word  is,  stated,  fixed ^  or  settled;  since  what  is  natural 
as  much  requires  and  presupposes  an  intelligent  agent  to  render 
it  so,  i.e.  to  effect  it  continually,  or  at  stated  times,  as  what  is 
supernatural  or  miraculous  does  to  effect  it  for  once. 

Hence  it  must  follow,  that  persons'  notion  of  what  is  natural, 
will  be  enlarged  in  proportion  to  their  greater  knowledge  of  the 
works  of  God,  and  the  dispensations  of  his  providence.  Nor  is 
there  any  absurdity  in  supposing,  that  there  may  be  beings  in  the 
universe,  whose  capacities,  and  knowledge,  and  views,  may  be  so 
extensive,  as  that  the  whole  Christian  dispensation  may  to  4ihem 
appear  natural,  i.e.  analogous  or  conformable  to  Grod's  dealings 
with  other  parts  of  his  creation ;  os  natural  as  the  visible  known 
course  of  things  appears  to  us.  For  there  seems  scarce  any  other 
possible  sense  to  be  put  upon  the  word,  but  that  only  in  which  it 
is  here  used ;  similar,  stated,  or  uniform. 

This  credibility  of  a  future  life,  which  has  been  here  insisted 
upon,  how  little  soever  it  may  satisfy  our  curiosity,  seems  to 
answer  all  the  purposes  of  religion,  in  like  manner  as  a  demon- 
strative proof  would.  Indeed  a  proof,  even  a  demonstrative  one,  of 
a  future  life,  would  not  be  a  proof  of  religion.  For,  that  we  are 
to  live  hereafter,  is  just  as  reconcilable  with  the  scheme  of 
atheism,  and  as  well  to  be  accounted  for  by  it,  as  that  we  are 
now  alive  is  :  and  therefore  nothing  can  be  more  absurd  than  to 
argue  from  that  scheme,  that  there  can  be  no  future  state. 
But  as  religion  implies  a  future  state,  any  presumption  against 
such  a  state,  is  a  presumption  against  religion.  The  foregoing 
observations  remove  all  presumptions  of  that  sort,  and  prove,  to 
a  very  considerable  degree  of  probability,  one  fundamental  doc- 
trine of  religion;  which,  if  believed,  would  greatly  open  and 
dispose  the  mind  seriously  to  attend  to  the  general  evidence 
of  the  whole. 


«HAP.  II.  GOVEKNMENT  OF  GOD.  95 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE    GOVERNMENT    OF    GOD   BY   REWARDS    AND    PUNISHMENTS. 

That  which  makes  the  question  concerning  a  future  life  to  be 
of  so  great  importance  to  us,  is  our  capacity  of  happiness  and 
misery.  And  that  which  makes  the  consideration  of  it  to  he  of 
so  great  importance  to  us,  is  the  supposition  of  our  happiness  and 
misery  hereafter  depending  upon  our  actions  here.  Indeed, 
without  this,  curiosity  could  not  but  sometimes  bring  a  subject, 
in  which  we  may  be  so  highly  interested,  to  our  thoughts ;  espe- 
cially upon  the  mortality  of  others,  or  the  near  prospect  of  our 
own.  But  reasonable  men  would  not  take  any  further  thought 
about  hereafter,  than  what  should  happen  thus  occasionally  to 
rise  in  their  minds,  if  it  were  certain  that  our  future  interest  no 
way  depended  upon  our  present  behavior;  whereas,  on  the  con- 
trary, if  there  be  ground,  either  from  analogy  or  any  thing  else, 
to  think  it  does,  then  there  is  reason  also  for  the  most  active 
thought  and  solicitude,  to  secure  that  interest;  to  behave  so  as 
that  we  may  escape  that  misery,  and  obtain  that  happiness,  in 
another  life,  which  we  not  only  suppose  ourselves  capable  of,  but 
which  we  apprehend  also  is  put  in  our  own  power.  And  whether 
there  be  ground  for  this  last  apprehension,  certainly  would  deserve 
to  be  most  seriously  considered,  were  there  no  other  proof  of  a 
future  life  and  interest,  than  that  presumptive  one,  which  the 
foregoing  observations  amount  to. 

In  the  present  state,  all  which  we  enjoy,  and  a  great  part  of 
what  we  suffer,  is  put  in  our  own  power.  Pleasure  and  pain  are 
the  consequences  of  our  actions;  and  we  are  endued  by  the 
Author  of  our  nature  with  capacities  of  foreseeing  these  conse- 
quences. We  find  by  experience  that  he  does  not  so  much  as 
preserve  our  lives,  exclusive  of  our  own  care  and  attention,  to 
provide  ourselves  with,  and  to  make  use  of,  that  sustenance,  by 
which  he  has  appointed  our  lives  shall  be  preserved ;  and  with- 
out which,  he  has  appointed,  they  shall  not  be  preserved.  In 
general  we  foresee,  that  the  external  things,  which  are  the  objects 
of  our  various  passions,  can  neither  be  obtained  nor  enjoyed, 
without  exerting  ourselves  in  such  and  such  manners :  but  by 


96  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  parti- 

thus  exerting  ourselves,  we  obtain  and  enjoy  these  objects,  in 
which  our  natural  good  consists;  or  by  this  meaDS  God  gives  u^ 
the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  them.  I  know  not,  that  we  have 
any  one  kind  or  degree  of  enjoyment,  but  by  the  means  of  our 
own  actions.  By  prudence  and  care,  we  may,  for  the  most  part, 
pass  our  days  in  tolerable  ease  and  quiet :  on  the  contrary,  we 
may,  by  rashness,  ungoverned  passion,  wilfulness,  or  even  by 
negligence,  make  ourselves  as  miserable  as  ever  we  please.  And 
many  do  please  to  make  themselves  extremely  miserable,  i.e.  to 
do  what  they  know  beforehand  will  render  them  so.  They  follow 
those  ways,  the  fruit  of  which  they  know,  by  instruction,  ex- 
ample, and  experience,  will  be  disgrace,  and  poverty,  and  sick- 
ness, and  untimely  death.  This  every  one  observes  to  be  the  gene- 
ral course  of  things ;  though  it  is  to  be  allowed,  we  cannot  find  by 
experience,  that  all  our  sufferings  are  owing  to  our  own  follies. 

Why  the  Author  of  nature  does  not  give  his  creatures  pro- 
miscuously such  and  such  perceptions,  without  regard  to  their 
behavior;  why  he  does  not  make  them  happy  without  the  instru- 
mentality of  their  own  actions,  and  prevent  their  bringing  any 
sufferings  upon  themselves,  is  another  matter.*  Perhaps  there 
may  be  some  impossibilities  in  the  nature  of  things,  which  we  are 
unacquainted  with.*  Or  less  happiness,  it  may  be,  would  upon 
the  whole  be  produced  by  such  a  method  of  conduct,  than  is  by 
the  present.  Or  perhaps  divine  goodness,  with  which,  if  I  mis- 
take not,  we  make  very  free  in  our  speculations,  may  not  be  a 
bare  single  disposition  to  produce  happiness ;  but  a  disposition  to 
make  the  good,  the  faithful,  the  honest,  happy.  Perhaps  an 
infinitely  perfect  mind  may  be  pleased  with  seeing  his  creatures 
behave  suitably  to  the  nature  which  he  has  given  them ;  to  the 
relations  which  he  has  placed  them  in  to  each  other;  and  to  that 
which  they  stand  in  to  himself:  that  relation  to  himself,  which, 
during  their  existence,  is  even  necessary,**  and  which  is  the  most 

»  [Objections  and  diflficulties  belong  to  all  subjects,  in  some  of  their  bearings. 
Ingenious  and  uncandid  men  may  start  others,  which  care  and  candor  may 
remove.  It  is  therefore  no  proof  of  weakness  in  a  doctrine,  that  it  is  attacked 
with  objections,  both  real  and  merely  plausible.  Error  has  been  spread  by  two 
opposite  means  : — a  dogmatic  insisting  on  doubtful  points,  and  an  unteachable 
cavilling  at  certain  truth.] 

*   Part  I.  cliap.  vii. 

*>  [Our  relation  to  God  is  "even  necessary,"  because  we  are  his  creatures;  to 


CHAP.  II.  BY  REWARDS  AXD  PUNISHMENTS.  97 

important  one  of  all :  perhaps,  I  say,  an  infinitely  perfect  mind 
may  be  pleased  with  this  moral  piety  of  moral  agents,  in  and  for 
itself;  as  well  as  upon  account  of  its  being  essentially  conducive 
to  the  happiness  of  his  creation.  Or  the  whole  end,  for  which 
God  made,  and  thus  governs  the  world,  may  be  utterly  beyond 
the  reach  of  our  faculties  :  there  may  be  somewhat  in  it  as  im- 
possible for  us  to  have  any  conception  of,  as  for  a  blind  man  to 
have  a  conception  of  colors.  However  this  be,  it  is  certain 
matter  of  universal  experience,  that  the  general  method  of  divine 
administration  is,  forewarning  us,  or  giving  us  capacities  to  fore- 
see, with  more  or  less  clearness,  that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  we  shall 
have  such  enjoyments,  if  so  and  so,  such  sufi'erings;  and  giving 
us  those  enjoyments,  and  making  us  feel  those  sufferings,  in 
consequence  of  our  actions. 

"But  all  this  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course  of  nature.'' 
True.  This  is  the  very  thing  which  I  am  observing.  It  is  to  be 
ascribed  to  the  general  course  of  nature :  i.e.  not  surely  to  the 
words  or  ideas,  course  of  nature;  but  to  Him  who  appointed  it, 
and  put  things  into  it;  or  to  a  course  of  operation,  from  its 
uniformity  or  constancy,  called  natural;*  and  which  necessarily 
implies  an  operating  agent.  For  when  men  find  themselves 
necessitated  to  confess  an  Author  of  nature,  or  that  God  is  the 
natural  governor  of  the  world,  they  must  not  deny  this  again, 
because  his  government  is  uniform.  They  must  not  deny  that 
he  does  things  at  all,  because  he  does  them  constantly,''  because 
the  effects  of  his  acting  are  permanent,  whether  his  acting  be  so 
or  not ;  though  there  is  no  reason  to  think  it  is  not.  In  short, 
every  man,  in  every  thing  he  does,  naturally  acts  upon  the  fore- 
thought and  apprehension  of  avoiding  evil  or  obtaining  good  : 
and  if  the  natural  course  of  things  be  the  appointment  of  God, 
and  our  natural  faculties  of  knowledge  and  experience  are  given 

that  the  relation  must  endure  so  lon^  as  we  endure.  But  our  relations  to  other 
creatures  are  contingent,  and  may  be  changed  or  abrogated.] 

*  Pp.  93,  94. 

«  ["The  terms  nature,  and  power  of  nature,  and  course  of  nature,  are  but 
e-Tipty  words,  and  merely  mean  that  a  thing  occurs  usually  or  frequently.  The 
raising  of  a  human  body  out  of  the  earth  we  call  a  miracle,  the  generation  of 
one  in  the  ordinary  way  we  call  natural,  for  no  other  reason  than  because  one 
is  usual  the  other  unusual.  Did  men  usually  rise  out  of  the  earth  like  corn  we 
should  call  that  natural."     Dr.  Claiuce,  Controv.  with  Leibnitz.] 


98  GOYERXMEXT  OF  GOD  parti. 

US  by  him,  then  the  good  and  bad  consequences  which  follow  our 
actions,  are  his  appointment,  and  our  foresight  of  those  conse- 
quences, is  a  warning  given  u^  by  him,  how  we  'are  to  act. 

"  Is  the  pleasure  then,  naturally  accompanying  every  particular 
gratification  of  passion,  intended  to  put  us  upon  gratifying  our- 
selves in  every  such  particular  instance,  and  as  a  reward  to  us  for 
so  doing  T'  No,  certainly.  Nor  is  it  to  be  said,  that  our  eyes 
were  naturally  intended  to  give  us  the  sight  of  each  particular 
object,  to  which  they  do  or  can  extend;  objects  which  are  de- 
structive of  them,  or  which,  for  any  other  reason,  it  may  become 
us  to  turn  our  eyes  from.  Yet  there  is  no  doubt,  but  that  our 
eyes  were  intended  for  us  to  see  with.*^  So  neither  is  there  any 
doubt,  but  that  the  foreseen  pleasures  and  pains  belonging  to  the 
passions,  were  intended,  in  general,  to  induce  mankind  to  act  in 
such  and  such  manners. 

From  this  general  observation,  obvious  to  every  one,  (that  God 
has  given  us  to  understand,  he  has  appointed  satisfaction  and 
delight  to  be  the  consequence  of  our  acting  in  one  manner,  and 
pain  and  uneasiness  of  our  acting  in  another,  and  of  our  not  act- 
ing at  all;  and  that  we  find  these  consequences,  which  we  were 
beforehand  informed  of,  uniformly  to  follow;)  we  may  learn,  that 
we  are  at  present  actually  under  his  government  in  the  strictest 
and  most  proper  sense;  in  such  a  sense,  as  that  he  rewards  and 
punishes  us  for  our  actions. 

An  Author  of  nature  being  supposed,  it  is  not  so  much  a 
deduction  of  reason,  as  a  matter  of  experience,  that  we  are 
thus  under  his  government ;  under  his  gov  ^rnment,  in  the  same 
sense,  as  we  are  under  the  government  of  civil  magistrates. 
Because  the  annexing  of  pleasure  to  some  actions,  and  pain  to 
others,  in  our  power  to  do  or  forbear,  and  giving  notice  of  this 

^  [That  man  consists  of  parts,  is  evident;  and  the  use  of  each  part,  and  of 
the  whole  man,  is  open  to  investigation.  In  examining  any  part  we  learn  what 
it  in,  and  what  it  is  to  do :  e.g.  the  eye,  the  hand,  the  heart.  So  of  mental 
faculties;  memory  is  to  preserve  ideas,  shame  to  deter  us  from  things  shameful, 
compassion  to  induce  us  to  relieve  distress.  Jn  observing  our  whole  make,  we 
may  see  an  ultimate  design, — viz. :  not  particular  animal  gratif  cations,  but  in- 
tellectual and  moral  improvement,  and  happiness  by  that  means.  If  this  be 
our  end,  it  is  our  duty.  To  disregard  it,  must  bring  punishment;  for  shame, 
anguish,  remorse,  are  by  the  laws  of  mind,  the  sequences  of  sin. 

Se©  Law's  Notes  on  King's  Origin  of  Evil.l 


CHAP.  u.  BY  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS.  99 

appointment  beforehand  to  those  whom  it  concerns,  is  the  proper 
formal  notion  of  government. 

Whether  the  pleasure  or  pain  which  thus  follows  upon  our 
behavior,  be  owing  to  the  Author  of  nature's  acting  upon  us 
every  moment  which  we  feel  it ;  or  to  his  having  at  once  con- 
trived and  executed  his  own  part  in  the  plan  of  the  world; 
makes  no  alteration  as  to  the  matter  before  us.  For  if  civil 
magistrates  could  make  the  sanctions  of  their  laws  take  place, 
without  interposing  at  all,  after  they  had  passed  them;  with- 
out a  trial,  and  the  formalities  of  an  execution  :  if  they  were 
able  to  make  their  laws  execute  themselves,  or  every  offender  to 
execute  them  upon  himself;  we  should  be  just  in  the  same  sense 
under  their  government  then,  as  we  are  now;  but  in  a  much 
higher  degree,  and  more  perfect  manner. 

Vain  is  the  ridicule,  with  which  one  foresees  some  persons 
will  divert  themselves,  upon  finding  lesser  pains  considered  as 
instances  of  divine  punishment.  There  is  no  possibility  of 
answering  or  evading  the  general  thing  here  intended,  without 
denying  all  final  causes.  For  final  causes  being  admitted,  the 
j)leasures  and  pains  now  mentioned  must  be  admitted  too  as  in- 
stances of  them.  And  if  they  are ;  if  God  annexes  delight  to 
some  actions,  and  uneasiness  to  others,  with  an  apparent  design 
to  induce  us  to  act  so  and  so ;  then  he  not  only  dispenses  happi- 
ness and  misery,  but  also  rewards  and  punishes  actions.  If,  for 
example,  the  pain  which  we  feel,  upon  doing  what  tends  to  the 
destruction  of  our  bodies,  suppose  upon  too  near  approaches  to 
fire,  or  upon  wounding  ourselves,  be  appointed  by  the  Author  of 
nature  to  prevent  our  doing  what  thus  tends  to  our  destruction ; 
this  is  altogether  as  much  an  instance  of  his  punishing  our 
actions,  and  consequently  of  our  being  under  his  government,^  as 
declaring  by  a  voice  from  heaven,  that  if  we  acted  so,  he  would 
inflict  such  pain  upon  us;  and  inflicting  it,  whether  it  be  greater 
or  less. 

Thus  we  find,  that  the  true  notion  or  conception  of  the  Author 

^  [It  is  almost  amazing  that  pbilosophy,  because  it  discovers  the  laws  of 
matter,  shculd  be  placed  in  antagonism  with  the  Bible  which  reveals  a  su2:)er- 
intending  Providence.  The  Bible  itself  teaches  this  ver3'  result  of  philosophy, 
— viz. :  that  the  world  is  governed  by  rjcncral  laics.  See  Prov.  viii.  29  :  Job. 
txxviii.  12,  24,  31,  ;^3 :  Ps.  exix.  90,  91  :  Jer.  xxxi.  35,  and  xxxiii.  26.] 


100  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  parti. 

of  nature,  is  ibat  of  a  master  or  governor,  prior  to  the  considera- 
tion of  liis  moral  attributes.  The  fact  of  our  case,  which  we 
find  by  experience,  is,  that  he  actually  exercises  dominion  or 
government  over  us  at  present,  by  rewarding  and  punishing  us 
for  our  actions,  in  as  strict  and  proper  a  sense  of  these  words, 
and  even  in  the  same  sense,  as  children,  servants,  subjects,  are 
rewarded  and  punished  by  those  who  govern  them. 

Thus  the  whole  analogy  of  nature,  the  whole  present  course 
of  things,  most  fully  shows,  that  there  is  nothing  incredible  in 
the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  that  God  will  reward  and  punish 
men  for  their  actions  hereafter :  nothing  incredible,  I  mean, 
arising  out  of  the  notion  of  rewarding  and  jDunishing.  For  the 
whole  course  of  nature  is  a  present  instance  of  his  exercising  that 
government  over  us,  which  implies  in  it  rewarding  and  punishing. 


As  divine  punishment  is  what  men  chiefly  object  against,  and 
are  most  unwilling  to  allow;  it  may  be  proper  to  mention  some 
circumstances  in  the  natural  course  of  punishments  at  present, 
which  are  analogous  to  what  religion  teaches  us  concerning  a 
future  state  of  punishment;  indeed  so  analogous,  that  as  they 
add  a  further  credibility  to  it,  so  they  cannot  but  raise  a  most 
serious  apprehension  of  it  in  those  who  will  attend  to  them. 

It  has  been  now  observed,  that  such  and  such  miseries  natu- 
rally follow  such  and  such  actions  of  imprudence  and  wilfulness, 
as  well  as  actions  more  commonly  and  more  distinctly  considered 
as  vicious ;  and  that  these  consequences,  when  they  may  be  fore- 
seen, are  properly  natural  punishments  annexed  to  such  actions. 
The  general  thing  here  insisted  upon,  is,  not  that  we  see  a  great 
deal  of  misery  in  the  world,  but  a  great  deal  which  men  bring 
upon  themselves  by  their  own  behavior,  which  they  might  have 
foreseen  and  avoided.  Now  the  circumstances  of  these  natural 
punishments,  particularly  deserving  our  attention,  are  such  as 
these.  Oftentimes  they  follow,  or  are  inflicted  in  consequence 
of,  actions  which  procure  many  present  advantages,  and  are  ac- 
companied with  much  present  pleasure ;  for  instance,  sickness 
and  untimely  death  are  the  consequence  of  intemperance,  though 
accompanied  with  the  highest  mirth  and  jollity.     These  punish* 


CHAP.  n.  BY  REWAEDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS.  101 

ments  are  often  much  greater,  than  the  advantages  or  pleasures 
obtained  by  the  actions,  of  which  they  are  the  punishments  or 
consequences.  Though  we  may  imagine  a  constitution  of  nature, 
in  which  these  natural  punishments,  which  are  in  fact  to  follow, 
would  follow,  immediately  upon  such  actions  being  done,  or  very 
soon  after ;  we  find  on  the  contrary  in  our  world,  that  they  are 
often  delayed  a  great  while,  sometimes  even  till  long  after  the 
actions  occasioning  them  are  forgot ;  so  that  the  constitution  of 
nature  is  such,  that  delay  of  punishment  is  no  sort  nor  degree 
of  presumption  of  final  impunity.  After  such  delay,  these 
natural  punishments  or  miseries  often  come,  not  by  degrees,  but 
suddenly,  with  violence,  and  at  once ;  however,  the  chief  misery 
often  does.  As  certainty  of  such  distant  misery  following  such 
actions,  is  never  afforded  persons,  so  perhaps  during  the  actions, 
they  have  seldom  a  distinct,  full  expectation  of  its  following  :* 
and  many  times  the  case  is  only  thus,  that  they  see  in  general,  or 
may  see,  the  credibility,  that  intemperance,  suppose,  will  bring 
after  it  diseases ;  civil  crimes,  civil  punishments ;  when  yet  the 
real  probability  often  is,  that  they  shall  escape ;  but  things  not- 
withstanding take  their  destined  course,  and  the  misery  inevi- 
tably follows  at  its  appointed  time,  in  very  many  of  these  cases. 
Thus  also  though  youth  may  be  alleged  as  an  excuse  for  rashness 
and  folly,  as  being  naturally  thoughtless,  and  not  clearly  foresee- 
ing all  the  consequences  of  being  untractable  and  profligate,  this 
does  not  hinder_,  but  that  these  consequences  follow;  and  are 
grievously  felt,  throughout  the  whole  course  of  mature  life. 
Habits  contracted  even  in  that  age,  are  often  utter  ruin  :  and 
men's  success  in  the  world,  not  only  in  the  common  sense  of 
worldly  success,  but  their  real  happiness  and  misery,  depends,  in 
a  great  degree,  and  in  various  ways,  upon  the  manner  in  which 
they  pass  their  youth;  which  consequences  they  for  the  most 
part  neglect  to  consider,  and  perhaps  seldom  can  properly  be  said 
to  believe,  beforehand.  In  numberless  cases,  the  natural  course 
of  things  affords  us  opportunities  for  procuring  advantages  to 
ourselves  at  certain  times,  which  we  cannot  procure  when  we 
will ;  nor  ever  recall  the  opportunities,  if  we  have  neglected 
them.  Indeed  the  general  course  of  nature  is  an  example  of 
this.     If.  during  the  opportunity  of  youth,  persons  are  indocile 

*  See  Part  11.  chap.  vi. 
9* 


102  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  parti, 

a.nd  self-willed,  they  inevitably  suffer  in  their  future  life,  for 
want  of  those  acquirements,  which  they  neglected  the  natural 
set(Son  of  jvttaining.  If  the  husbandman  lets  seedtime  pass 
without  sowing,  the  whole  year  is  lost  to  him  beyond  recovery. 
Though  after  men  have  been  guilty  of  folly  and  extravagance  vp 
to  a  certain  degree,  it  is  often  in  their  power,  to  retrieve  their 
affairs,  to  recover  their  health  and  character,  at  least  in  good 
measure ;  yet  real  reformation  is  in  many  cases,  of  no  avail  at  all 
towards  preventing  the  miseries,  poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  natu- 
rally annexed  to  folly  and  extravagance  exceeding  that  degree 
There  is  a  certain  bound  to  imprudence  and  misbehavior,  which 
being  transgressed,  there  remains  no  place  for  repentance  in  the 
natural  course  of  things.  It  is  further  very  much  to  be  re- 
marked, that  neglects  from  inconsiderateness,  want  of  attention,* 
not  looking  about  us  to  see  what  we  have  to  do,  are  often  at- 
tended with  consequences  altogether  as  dreadful,  as  any  active 
misbehavior,  from  the  most  extravagant  passion.  And  lastly, 
civil  government  being  natural,  the  punishments  of  it  are  so  too : 
and  some  of  these  punishments  are  capital ;  as  the  effects  of  a 
dissolute  course  of  pleasure  are  often  mortal.  So  that  many 
natural  punishments  are  finalf  to  him  who  incurs  them,  if  con- 
sidered only  in  his  temporal  capacity;    and  seem   inflicted  by 

■*  Part  11.  chap.  vi. 

f  The  general  consideration  of  a  future  state  of  punishment,  most  evidently 
belongs  to  the  subject  of  natural  religion.  But  if  any  of  these  reflections 
should  be  thought  to  relate  more  peculiarly  to  this  doctrine,  as  taught  in  Scrip- 
ture, the  reader  is  desired  to  observe,  that  Gentile  writers,  both  moralists  and 
poets,  speak  of  the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked,  both  as  to  the  duration 
and  degree  of  it,  in  a  like  manner  of  expression  and  of  description,  as  the 
Scripture  does.  So  that  all  which  can  positively  be  asserted  to  be  matter  of 
mere  revelation,  with  regard  to  this  doctrine,  seems  to  be,  that  the  great  dis- 
tinction between  the  righteous  and  the  wicked,  shall  be  made  at  the  end  of  this 
world;  that  each  shall  then  receive  according  to  his  deserts.  Reason  did,  as  it 
well  might,  conclude  that  it  should,  finallj'  and  upon  the  whole,  be  well  with 
the  righteous,  and  ill  with  the  wicked:  but  it  could  not  be  determined  upon 
any  principles  of  reason,  whether  human  creatures  might  not  have  been  ap- 
pointed to  pass  through  other  states  of  life  and  being,  before  that  distributive 
justice  should  finally  and  eflfectually  take  place.  Revelation  teaches  us,  that 
the  next  state  of  things  after  the  present  is  appointed  for  tLie  execution  of  this 
justice;  that  it  shall  be  no  longer  delayed;  but  the  mystery  of  God,  the  great 
mystery  of  his  suffering  vice  and  confusion  to  prevail,  shall  then  he  finished ; 
and  he  will  take  to  him  his  great  j^otcer  and  will  reign,  by  rendering  to  p.verv 
one  according  to  his  works. 


CHAP.  ir.  BY  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS.  103 

natural  appointment,  either  to  remove  the  offender  out  of  tho 
way  of  being  further  mischievous,  or  as  an  example,  thougti  fre- 
quently a  disregarded  one,  to  those  who  are  left  behind. 

These  things  are  not  what  we  call  accidental,  or  to  be  met  with 
only  now  and  then;  but  they  are  things  of  every  day's  expe- 
rience. They  proceed  from  general  laws,  very  general  ones,  by 
which  God  governs  the  world  in  the  natural  course  of  his 
providence.^ 

And  they  are  so  analogous,  to  what  religion  teaches  us  con- 
cerning the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked,  so  much  of  a  piece 
with  it,  that  both  would  naturally  be  expressed  in  the  very  same 
words,  and  manner  of  description.  In  the  book  of  Proverbs/''  for 
instance,  wisdom  is  introduced,  as  frequenting  the  most  public 
places  of  resort,  and  as  rejected  when  she  offers  herself  as  tho 
natural  appointed  guide  of  human  life.  How  long,  speaking  to 
those  who  are  passing  through  it,  liow  long,  ye  simple  ones,  will 
ye  love  folly,  and  the  scorners  delight  in  their  scorning,  and  fools 
hate  knowledge  ?  Turn  ye  at  my  reproof  Behold,  I  will  pour 
out  my  spirit  upon  you,  I  will  tnahe  known  my  tvords  unto  you. 
But  upon  being  neglected.  Because  I  have  called,  and  ye  refused, 
I  have  stretched  out  my  hand,  and  no  man  regarded;  hut  ye 
have  set  at  nought  all  my  counsel,  and  would  none  of  my  re- 
proof:  I  also  will  laugh  at  your  calamity,  I  will  mock  when 
your  fear  cometh ;  when  your  fear  cometh  as  desolation,  and 
your  destruction  cometh  as  a  whii'lwind ;  when  distress  and 
anguish  come  up>on  you.  Then  shall  they  call  vp)on  me,  hut  I 
will  not  answer ;  they  shall  seek  me  early,  hut  they  shall  not  find 
me.  This  passage,  every  one  sees,  is  poetical,  and  some  parts  of 
it  are  highly  figurative ;  but  the  meaning  is  obvious.  And  the 
thing  intended  is  expressed  more  literally  in  the  following  words; 
For  that  they  hated  knowledge,  and  did  not  choose  the  fear  of 

the  Lord therefore  shall  they  eat  of  the  fruit  of  their  own 

way,  and  he  filled  with  their  own  devices.     For  the  security  of 

^  [Our  language  furnishes  no  finer  specimens  of  the  argument  analogical. 
Eutler  here  seizes  the  very  points,  which  are  most  plausible  and  most  insisted 
on,  as  showing  the  harshness  and  unreasonableness  of  Christianity;  and  over- 
throws them  at  a  stroke  by  simply  directing  attention  to  the  same  things,  in  the 
universally  observed  course  of  nature.] 

*  Chap.  i. 


104  GOVERNMENT  OE  GOD.  parti 

the  simjjle  sJiall  day  tliem,  and  the  prospcrlti/  of  fools  shall  de- 
stroy them.  Tiie  whole  passage  is  so  equally  applicable  to  what 
we  experience  in  the  present  world,  concerning  the  consequences 
of  men's  actions,  and  to  what  religion  teaches  us  is  to  be  expected 
in  another,  that  it  may  be  questioned  which  of  the  two  was  prin- 
cipally intended. 

Indeed  when  one  has  been  recollecting  the  proper  proofs  of  a 
future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments,  nothing  methinks  can 
give  one  so  sensible  an  apprehension  of  the  latter,  or  representa- 
tion of  it  to  the  mind,  as  observing,  that  after  the  many  dis- 
regarded checks,  admonitions,  and  warnings,  which  people  meet 
with  in  the  ways  of  vice  and  folly  and  extravagance,  warnings 
from  their  very  nature,  from  the  examples  of  others,  from  the 
lesser  inconveniences  which  they  bring  upon  themselves,  from 
the  instructions  of  wise  and  virtuous  men  :  after  these  have  been 
long  despised,  scorned,  ridiculed :  after  the  chief  bad  conse- 
quences, temporal  consequences,  of  their  follies,  have  been  de- 
layed for  a  great  while,  at  length  they  break 'in  irresistibly,  like 
an  armed  force  :  repentance  is  too  late  to  relieve,  and  can  serve 
only  to  aggravate  their  distress,  the  case  is  become  desperate : 
and  poverty  and  sickness,  remorse  and  anguish,  infamy  and 
death,  the  efiects  of  their  own  doings,  overwhelm  them  beyond 
possibility  of  remedy  or  escape.  This  is  an  account  of  what  is, 
in  fact,  the  general  constitution  of  nature. 

It  is  not  in  any  sort  meant,  that,  according  to  what  appears  at 
present  of  the  natural  course  of  things,  men  are  always  uniformly 
punished  in  proportion  to  their  misbehavior.  But  that  there  are 
very  many  instances  of  misbehavior  punished  in  the  several  ways 
now  mentioned,  and  very  dreadful  instances  too;  sufficient  to 
show  what  the  laws  of  the  universe  may  admit,  and,  if  thoroughly 
considered,  sufficient  fully  to  answer  all  objections  against  the 
credibility  of  a  future  state  of  punishments,  from  any  imagina- 
tions, that  the  frailty  of  our  nature  and  external  temptations, 
almost  annihilate  the  guilt  of  human  vices  :  as  well  as  objections 
of  another  sort ;  from  necessity,  from  suppositions,  that  the  will 
of  an  infinite  Being  cannot  be  contradicted,  or  that  he  must  be 
incapable  of  offence  and  provocation.* 

Reflections  of  this  kind  are  not  without  their  terrors  to  .serious 
*  See  chaps,  iv.  and  vi. 


CHAP.  III.  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  j.05 

persons,  e^  en  the  most  free  from  enthusiasm,  and  of  the  greatest 
strength  of  mind ;  but  it  is  fit  that  things  be  stated  and  con- 
sidered as  they  reall^^  are.  There  is,  in  the  present  age,  a  certain 
fearlessness  with  regard  to  what  may  be  hereafter  under  the 
government  of  God,  which  nothing  but  a  universally  acknow- 
ledged demonstration  on  the  side  of  atheism  can  justify;  and 
which  makes  it  quite  necessary,  that  men  be  reminded,  and  if 
possible  made  to  feel,  that  there  is  no  sort  of  ground  for  being 
thus  presumptuous,  even  upon  the  most  sceptical  principles.  For, 
may  it  not  be  said  of  any  person  upon  his  being  born  into  the 
world,  he  may  behave  so  as  to  be  of  no  service  J:o  it,  but  by 
being  made  an  example  of  the  woeful  effects  of  vice  and  folly? 
That  he  may,  as  any  one  may,  if  he  will,  incur  an  infamous 
execution  from  the  hands  of  civil  justice,  or  in  some  other 
course  of  extravagance  shorten  his  days ;  or  bring  upon  himself 
infamy  and  diseases  worse  than  death  ?  So  that  it  had  been 
better  for  him,  even  with  regard  to  the  present  world,  that  he 
had  never  been  born.  And  is  there  any  pretence  of  reason  for 
people  to  think  themselves  secure,  and  talk  as  if  they  had  certain 
proof,  that,  let  them  act  as  licentiously  as  they  will,  there  can  be 
nothing  analogous  to  this,  with  regard  to  a  future  and  more  gene- 
ral interest,  under  the  providence  and  government  of  the  same 
God? 


CHAPTER  III.» 

THE    MORAL    GOVERNMENT    OE    GOD. 

As  the  manifold  appearances  of  design,  and  of  final  causes,  in 
the  constitution  of  the  world,  prove  it  to  be  the  work  of  an  in- 
telligent mind,  so  the  particular  final  causes  of  pleasure  and  pain 
distributed  amongst  his  creatures,  prove  that  they  are  under  his 

^  [This  chapter,  more  than  any  other,  carries  the  force  of  positive  argument. 
If  in  this  world,  we  have  proofs  that  God  is  a  moral  governor,  then  in  order  to 
evince  that  we  shall  be  under  moral  government  hcrco/ter,  we  have  only  to 
supply  an  intermediate  consideration. — viz. :  that  God,  as  such,  must  be  un- 
changeable. The  argument,  as  just  remarked,  assumes  a  substantive  form; 
because  admitted  facts,  as  to  this  world,  exhibiting  the  very  princijyles  on  which 
G'^d's  government  goes  at  present,  compel  us  not  only  to  supijose  that  the  priu- 
e^pi<>3  of  God  will  remain,  but  to  believe  so.] 


106  THE  MORAL  GOYERXMENT  OF  GOD.  parti. 

gjv'''irnment ;  wliat  may  be  called  his  natural  government  of 
creaturis  endued  witli  sense  and  reason.  This  implies  somewhat 
more  than  seems  usually  attended  to,  when  we  speak  of  God's 
natural  government  of  the  world.  It  implies  government  of 
the  very  same  kind  with  that  which  a  master  exercises  over 
his  servants,  or  a  civil  magistrate  over  his  subjects.  These  latter 
instances  of  final  causes,  as  really  prove  an  intelligent  Governor 
of  the  world,  in  the  sense  now  mentioned,  and  before"^  distinctly 
treated  of;  as  any  other  instances  of  final  causes  prove  an  intelli- 
gent Maker  of  it. 

But  this  alone  does  not  appear  at  first  sight  to  determine  any 
thing  certainly,  concerning  the  moral  character  of  the  Author  of 
nature,  considered  in  this  relation  of  governor;  does  not  ascer- 
tain his  government  to  be  moral,  or  prove  that  he  is  the  righteous 
Judge  of  the  world.  Moral  government  consists,  not  in  barely 
rewarding  and  punishing  men  for  their  actions,  which  the  most 
tyrannical  may  do,  but  in  rewarding  the  righteous,  and  punish- 
ing the  wicked  :  in  rendering  to  men  according  to  their  actions, 
considered  as  good  or  evil.  And  the  perfection  of  moral  govern- 
ment consists  in  doing  this,  with  regard  to  all  intelligent  creatures, 
in  an  exact  proportion  to  their  personal  merits  or  demerits. 

Some  men  seem  to  think  the  only  character  of  the  Author  of 
nature  to  be  that  of  simple  absolute  benevolence.  This,  con- 
sidered as  a  principle  of  action  and  infinite  in  degree,  is  a  disposi- 
tion to  produce  the  greatest  possible  happiness,  without  regard 
to  persons'  behavior,  otherwise  than  as  such  regard  would  pro- 
duce higher  degrees  of  it.  And  supposing  this  to  be  the  only 
character  of  God,  veracity  and  justice  in  him  would  be  nothing 
but  benevolence  conducted  by  wisdom.  Surely  this  ought  not  to 
be  asserted,  unless  it  can  be  proved ;  for  we  .should  speak  with 
cautious  reverence  upon  such  a  subject.  Whether  it  can  be 
proved  or  no,  is  not  the  thing  here  to  be  inquired  into ;  but 
whether  in  the  constitution  and  conduct  of  the  world,  a  righteous 
government  be  not  discernibly  planned  out :  which  necessarily 
implies  a  righteous  governor.  There  may  possibly  be  in  the 
creation  beings,  to  whom  the  Author  of  nature  manifests  himself 
under  this  most  amiable  of  all  characters,  this  of  infinite  abso- 
lute benevolence;  for  it  is  the  most  amiable,  supposing  it  not,  as 
*  Chap.  ii. 


CHAP.  III.  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  i07 

perhaps  it  is  not,  incompatible  with  justice;  but  he  manifests 
himself  to  us  under  the  character  of  a  righteous  governor.  Ha 
may,  consistently  with  this,  be  simply  and  absolutely  benevolent, 
in  the  sense  now  explained  :  but  he  is  (for  he  has  given  us  a 
proof  in  the  constitution  and  conduct  of  the  world  that  he  is)  a 
governor  over  servants,  as  he  rewards  and  punishes  us  for  our 
actions.  And  in  the  constitution  and  conduct  of  it,  he  may  also 
have  given,  besides  the  reason  of  the  thing,  and  the  natural  pre- 
sages of  conscience,  clear  and  distinct  intimations,  that  his  govern- 
ment is  righteous  or  moral :  clear  to  such  as  think  the  nature  ot 
it  deserving  their  attention,  and  yet  not  to  every  careless  person, 
who  casts  a  transient  reflection  upon  the  subject.* 

It  is  particularly  to  be  observed,  that  the  divine  government, 
which  we  experience  ourselves  under  in  the  present  state,  taken 
alone,  is  allowed  not  to  be  the  perfection  of  moral  government. 
Yet  this  by  no  means  hinders,  but  that  there  may  be  somewhat, 
be  it  more  or  less,  truly  moral  in  it.  A  righteous  government 
may  plainly  appear  to  be  carried  on  to  some  degree,  enough  to 
give  us  the  apprehension  that  it  shall  be  completed,  or  C'-^rried  on 
to  that  degree  of  perfection  which  religion  teaches  us  it  shall ; 
but  which  cannot  appear,  till  much  more  of  the  divine  adminis- 
tration be  seen,  than  can  be  seen  in  the  present  life.  The  design 
of  this  chapter  is  to  inquire  how  far  this  is  the  case  :  how  far, 
over  and  above  the  moral  naturef  which  God  has  given  us,  and 
our  natural  notion  of  him  as  righteous  governor  of  those  his 
creatures,  to  whom  he  has  given  this  nature  3 J  I  say  how  far  be- 
sides this,  the  principles  and  beginnings  of  a  moral  government 
over  the  world  may  be  discerned,  notwithstanding  and  amidst  all 
the  confusion  and  disorder  of  it. 

One  might  mention  here,  what  has  been  often  urged  with 

*  The  objections  against  religion,  from  the  evidence  of  it  not  being  universal, 
nor  so  strong  as  might  possibly  have  been,  may  be  urged  against  natural  reli- 
gion, as  well  as  against  revealed.  And  therefore  the  consideration  of  them 
belongs  to  the  first  part  of  this  treatise,  as  well  as  the  second.  But  as  these 
objections  are  chiefly  urged  against  revealed  religion,  I  choose  to  consider 
them  in  the  second  part.  And  the  answer  to  them  there,  ch.  vi.,  as  urged 
against  Christianity,  being  almost  equally  opplicable  to  them  as  urged  against 
the  religion  of  nature;  to  avoid  repetition,  the  reader  is  referred  to  that 
chapter. 

t  Dissertation  II.  t  Chap.  vi. 


108  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  parti. 

grejit  foi'ce,  tliat,  in  general,  less  uneasiness  and  more  satisfac- 
tion, are  the  natural  consequences*  of  a  virtuous  than  of  a  vicious 
course  of  life,  in  the  present  state,  as  an  instance  of  a  moral 
government  established  in  nature ;  an  instance  of  it  collected 
from  experience  and  present  matter  of  fact.^  But  it  must  be 
owned  a  thing  of  difficulty  to  weigh  and  balance  pleasures  and  un- 
easinesses, each  amongst  themselves,  and  also  against  each  other, 
BO  as  to  make  an  estimate  with  any  exactness,  of  the  overplus  of 
happiness  on  the  side  of  virtue.  And  it  is  not  impossible,  that, 
amidst  the  infinite  disorders  of  the  world,  there  may  be  excep- 
tions to  the  happiness  of  virtue ;  even  with  regard  to  persons, 
whose  course  of  life  from  their  youth  up  has  been  blameless :  and 
more  with  regard  to  those  who  have  gone  on  for  some  time  in  the 
ways  of  vice,  and  have  afterwards  reformed.  For  suppose  an  in- 
stance of  the  latter  case ;  a  person  with  his  passions  inflamed, 
his  natural  faculty  of  self-government  impaired  by  habits  of  in- 
dulgence, and  with  all  his  vices  about  him,  like  so  many  harpies, 
craving  their  accustomed  gratification ;  who  can  say  how  long  it 
might  be,  before  such  a  person  would  find  more  satisfaction  in 
the  reasonableness  and  present  good  consequences  of  virtue,  than 
difficulties  and  self-denial  in  the  restraints  of  it?  Experience 
also  shows,  that  men  can  to  a  great  degree,  get  over  their  sense 
of  shame,  so  as  that  by  professing  themselves  to  be  without  priu- 

*  See  Lord  Shaftesbury's  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue,  Part  11. 

^  [At  the  foundation  of  moral  improvement,  lies  the  conviction  that  what  is 
right,  is  our  happiness,  no  less  than  our  duty.  This  again  is  based  upon  a  con- 
viction that  God  governs  justly;  and  has  all  power  over  us  for  good  or  evil. 
As  creation  is  full  of  the  evidences  of  design,  so  is  Providence.  And  as  the 
human  mind  shows,  in  its  structure,  the  most  exquisite  marks  of  design,  so  the 
government  of  mind  shows  a  final  object  for  all  our  faculties.  Among  the 
attributes  of  mind  we  observe,  conspicuous,  a  disposition  to  seek  ends,  lay 
plans,  and  sacrifice  present  indulgence  to  future  and  greater  good :  and  a 
facility  in  learning  how  to  subordinate  one  thing  to  another,  so  as  to  secure 
success  iu  our  plana.  This,  with  conscience  to  approve  or  disapprove  our 
modes,  constitutes  an  evident  adaj)tedness  to  a  moral  government  on  the  part 
of  God;  and  would  be  worse  than  superfluous,  if  there  be  no  such  government. 
Every  rule  of  action,  deduced  by  reason  from  the  light  of  nature,  may  fairly  be 
regarded  as  God's  law;  and  the  inconveniences  resulting  from  wrong  actions, 
arc  God's  retributions.  These  retributions,  felt  or  observed,  are  divine  teach- 
ings, saying,  emphatically,  if  you  act  thus  you  shall  receive  thus.  We  do 
actually  so  judge,  in  relation  to  physics.  Every  rule  of  motfon,  distance, 
gravitation,  heat,  electricity,  <tc.  <fec.,  is  received  as  God's  law;  and  we  ;vould 
deem  it  insane  to  act  in  opposition.] 


CHAP.  III.  THE  MORAL  GOVER^^MENT  OF  GOD.  109 

ciple,  and  avowing  even  direct  villanj,  they  can  support  them- 
selves against  the  infamy  of  it.  But  as  the  ill  actions  of  an^ 
one  will  probably  be  more  talked  of,  and  oftener  thrown  in  his 
"way,  upon  his  reformation;  so  the  infiimy  of  them  will  be  much 
more  felt,  after  the  natural  sense  of  virtue  and  of  honor  is  re- 
covered. Uneasiness  of  this  kind  ought  indeed  to  be  put  to  the 
account  of  former  vices  :  yet  it  will  be  said  they  are  in  part  the 
consequences  of  reformation.  Still  I  am  far  from  allowing  it 
doubtful,  whether  virtue,  upon  the  whole,  be  happier  than  vice 
in  the  present  world.  If  it  were,  yet  the  beginnings  of  a 
righteous  administration  may,  beyond  all  question,  be  found  in 
nature,  if  we  will  attentively  inquire  after  them.° 

I.  In  whatever  manner  the  notion  of  God's  moral  government 
over  the  world  might  be  treated,  if  it  did  not  appear,  whether  he 
were  in  a  proper  sense  our  governor  at  all ;  yet  when  it  is  certain 
matter  of  experience,  that  he  does  manifest  himself  to  us  under 
the  character  of  a  governor  in  the  sense  explained,*  it  must 
deserve  to  be  considered,  whether  there  be  not  reason  to  appre- 
hend, that  he  may  be  a  righteous  or  moral  governor.  Since  it 
appears  to  be  fact,  that  God  does  govern  mankind  by  the  method 
of  rewards  and  punishments,  according  to  some  settled  rules  of 
distribution ;  it  is  surely  a  question  to  be  asked,  what  presump- 
tion is  there  against  his  finaJJi/  rewarding  and  punishing  them 
according  to  this  particular  rule,  namely,  as  they  act  reasonably, 
or  unreasonably,  virtuously  or  viciously?  Eendering  men  happy 
or  miserable  by  this  rule,  certainly  falls  in,  much  more  falls  in, 
with  our  natural  apprehensions  and  sense  of  things,  tban  doing 
so  by  any  other  rule  whatever;  since  rewarding  and  punishing 
actions  by  any  other  rule,  would  appear  much  harder  to  be  ac- 
counted for,  by  minds  formed  as  he  has  formed  ours.  Be  the 
evidence  of  religion  then  more  or  less  clear,  the  expectation 
which  it  raises  in  us,  that  the  righteous  shall,  upon  the  whole, 
be  happy,  and  the  wicked  miserable,    cannot  possibly  be  con- 

c  [Consult  Capp  on  the  Gov.  of  God  :  TwissE  Vindiciae  Prov.  Dei :  Wittichii 
Excrc.  Theol. :  Dwight's  Theol. :  Martinius  de  Gubernatione  Mundi  :  Lief- 
CHiLD  on  Providence :  Morton  on  do.  :  Sherlock  on  do. :  Rutherford  on 
do. :  and  the  Sermons  of  Thos.  Leland,  Porteus.  Topping,  Hunt,  Daviea, 
Horseley,  South    Wisheart,  Seed,  CoUings,  and  Doddridge.] 

*  Chap,  ii 

10 


no  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  parti. 

sideied  j»s  absurd  or  cliiuierical;  because  it  is  no  more  tlian  an 
expectation,  that  a  method  of  government  already  begun,  shall 
bo  carried  on,  the  method  of  rewardiDg  and  punishing  actions; 
and  shall  be  carried  on  by  a  particular  rule,  which  unavoidably 
appears  to  us  at  first  sight  more  natural  than  any  other,  the  rule 
which  we  call  distributive  justice.     Nor, 

II.  Ought  it  to  be  entirely  passed  over,  that  tranquillity,  satis- 
faction, and  external  advantages,  being  the  natural  consequences 
of  prudent  management  of  ourselves,  and  our  affairs ;  and  rash- 
ness, profligate  negligence,  and  wilful  folly,  bringing  after  them 
many  inconveniences  and  sufferings ;  these  afford  instances  of  a 
right  constitution  of  nature,  as  the  correction  of  children,  for 
their  own  sakes,  and  by  way  of  example,  when  they  run  into 
danger  or  hurt  themselves,  is  a  part  of  right  education.*  Thus, 
that  God  governs  the  world  by  general  fixed  laws,  that  he  has 
endued  us  with  capacities  of  reflecting  upon  this  constitution  of 
things,  and  foreseeing  the  good  and  bad  consequences  of  behavior, 
plainly  implies  some  sort  of  moral  government;  since  from  such 
a  constitution  of  things  it  cannot  but  follow,  that  prudence  and 
impnideuce,  which  are  of  the  nature  of  virtue  and  vice,*  must 
be,  as  they  are,  respectively  rewarded  and  punished. 

III.  From  the  natural  course  of  things,  vicious  actions  are,  to 
a  great  degree,  actually  punished  as  mischievous  to  society ;  and 
besides  punishment  actually  inflicted  upon  this  account,  there  is 
also  the  feai  and  apprehension  of  it  in  those  persons,  whose 
crimes  have  rendered  them  obnoxious  to  it,  in  case  of  a  discovery; 
this  state  of  fear  being  often  itself  a  very  considerable  punish- 
ment. The  natural  fear  and  apprehension  of  it  too,  which  re- 
strains from  such  crimes,  is  a  declaration  of  nature  against  them. 
It  is  necessary  to  the  very  being  of  society,  that  vices,  destruc- 
tive of  it,  should  be  punished  as  heiiig  so  ;  the  vices  of  falsehood, 
injustice,  cruelty:  which  punishment  therefore  is  as  natural  as 

^  [Tn  the  structure  of  man,  physical  and  mental,  we  find  no  contrivances  for 
disease  or  pain,  so  that  in  general  those  who  conform  to  the  laws  of  their  beinj;^, 
enjoy  happiness:  and  suffering  is  chiefly  the  result  of  our  own  conduct.  But, 
as  without  revelation  we  could  only  learn  the  evil  of  vice,  by  its  effects,  nud 
would  often  learn  it  too  late  to  retrieve  our  afl'airs,  or  our  souls'  peace,  God  tiap 
in  mercy  given  forth  his  teachings,  by  which,  beforehand,  we  may  &now  th^ 
effects  of  actions.] 

*  See  Dissertation  II. 


CHAP.  III.  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  HI 

societ}',  and  so  is  an  instance  of  a  kind  of  moral  government, 
naturally  established,  and  actually  taking  place.  And,  since  tho 
certain  natural  course  of  things  is  the  conduct  of  providence  or 
the  government  of  God,  though  carried  on  by  the  instrumentality 
of  men,  the  observation  here  made  amounts  to  this,  that  mankind 
find  themselves  placed  by  him  in  such  circumstances,  as  that  they 
are  unavoidably  accountable  for  their  behavior;  and  are  often 
punished,  and  sometimes  rewarded,  under  his  government,  in 
the  view  of  their  being  mischievous,  or  eminently  beneficial  to 
society. 

If  it  be  objected  that  good  actions  and  such  as  are  beneficial 
to  society,  are  often  punished,  as  in  the  case  of  persecution  and 
in  other  cases;  and  that  ill  and  mischievous  actions  are  often 
rewarded  f-  it  may  be  answered  distinctly,  first,  that  this  is  in  no 
sort  necessary,  and  consequently  not  natural  in  the  sense  in 
which  it  is  necessary,  and  therefore  natural,  that  ill  or  mis- 
chievous actions  should  be  punished  :  and  in  the  next  place,  that 
good  actions  are  never  punished,  considered  as  beneficial  to 
society,  nor  ill  actions  rewarded,  under  the  view  of  their  being 
hurtful  to  it.  So  that  it  stands  good,  without  any  thing  on  the 
side  of  vice  to  be  set  over  against  it,  that  the  Author  of  nature 
has  as  truly  directed,  that  vicious  actions,  considered  as  mis- 
chievous to  society,  should  be  punished,  and  put  mankind  under 
a  necessitT/  of  thus  punishing  them,  as  he  has  directed  and  neces- 
sitated us  to  preserve  our  lives  by  food. 

IV.  In  the  natural  course  of  things,  virtue  as  sucli  is  actually 
rewarded,  and  vice  as  such  punished :  which  seems  to  afford  an 
instance  or  exampl^,  not  only  of  government,  but  of  moral 
government,  begun  and  established ;  moral  in  the  strictest  sense, 
though  not  in  that  perfection  of  degree,  which  religion  teaches 
us  to  expect.  In  order  to  see  this  more  clearly,  we  must  distin- 
guish between  actions  themselves,  and  that  qualify  ascribed  to 
them,  which  we  call  virtuous  or  vicious.'     The  gratification  itself 

<*  [It  was  contended  by  Mandeville  in  his  "Fable  of  the  Bees"  that  private 
vices,  as  luxury  for  instance,  are  often  conducive  to  the  well-being  of  society. 
This  idea  is  fully  refuted  by  Warburton,  Divine  Legation  of  Moses,  b.  1 : 
<5f;nKEiEY,  Minute  Philosopher,  Dial.  2:  and  by  Browx,  Characteristics, 
Ess   2.] 

^  [A  strong  illustration  of  this  distinction  is  seen  in  the  "delivering  up"  of 
our  fcavior  to  be  crucified.     As  to  the  mere  act  of  delivering  up,  we  find  it 


113  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  part  i. 

of  every  cattiral  passion,  must  be  attended  with  deliglit  -,  and 
acquisitions  of  fortune,  however  made,  are  acquisitions  of  the 
means  or  materials  of  enjoyment.  An  action  then,  by  which 
any  natural  passion  is  gratified,  or  fortune  acquired,  procures 
delight  or  advantage;  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the 
morality  of  such  action.  Consequently,  the  pleasure  or  advan- 
tage in  this  case,  is  gained  by  the  action  itself,  not  by  the 
morality,  the  virtuousness  or  viciousness  of  it;  though  it  be  per- 
haps virtuous  or  vicious. 

To  say  that  such  an  action  or  course  of  behavior,  procured 
such  pleasure  or  advantage,  or  brought  on  such  inconvenience 
and  pain,  is  quite  a  different  thing  from  saying,  that  such  good 
or  bad  effect  was  owing  to  the  virtue  or  vice  of  such  action  or 
behavior.  In  one  case,  an  action  abstracted  from  all  moral  con- 
sideration, produced  its  effect :  in  the  other  case,  for  it  will  ap- 
pear that  there  are  such  cases,  the  morality  of  the  action  under 
a  moral  consideration,  i.e.  the  virtuousness  or  viciousness  of  it, 
produced  the  effect.  Now  I  say  virtue  as  such,  naturally  pro- 
cures considerable  advantages  to  the  virtuous,  and  vice  as  such, 
naturally  occasions  great  inconvenience  and  even  misery  to  the 
vicious,  in  very  many  instances.  The  immediate  effects  of  virtue 
and  vice  upon  the  mind  and  temper,  are  to  be  mentioned  as  in- 
stances of  it.  Vice  as  such-  is  naturally  attended  with  some  sort 
of  uneasiness,  and  not  uncommonly,  with  great  disturbance  and 
apprehension.  That  inward  feeling,  which,  respecting  lesser 
matters  and  in  familiar  speech  we  call  being  vexed  with  oneself, 
and  in  matters  of  importance  and  in  more  serious  language,  re- 
morse ;  is  an  uneasiness  naturally  arising  from  an  action  of  a 
man's  own,  reflected  upon  by  himself  as  wrong,  unreasonable, 
faulty,  i.e.  vicious  in  greater  or  less  degrees  :  and  this  manifestly 
is  a  different  feeling  from  that  uneasiness,  which  arises  from  a 
sense  of  mere  loss  or  harm.  What  is  more  common,  than  to 
hear  a  man  lamenting  an  accident  or  event,  and  adding — but 

referred,  1.  To  God  the  Father,  John  iii.  16  :  Acts  ii.  23  :  Rom.  viii.  32.  2.  To 
Christ  himself,  Eph.  v.  2,  and  v.  25,  &c.  In  this  last  passage  it  is  literally 
delivered  himself.  3.  To  the  Jewish  rulers,  Luke  xx.  20  :  Mark  xii.  12.  4,  To 
Pontius  Pilate,  Matt,  xxvii.  26  :  Mark  xv.  15  :  John  xix.  6.  5.  To  Judas.  Matt, 
xxvi.  15:  Zee.  xi.  12. 

As  to  the  mere  act,  Judis  and  Pilate  did  just  what  God  the  Father,  and  our 
Lord  Jesus  did.     But  how  intiuitely  unlike  the  qualities  of  the  actlj 


CHAP.  m.  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  HR 

however  he  has  the  satisfaction  that  he  cannot  blame  himself  for 
it ;  or  on  the  contrary,  that  he  has  the  uneasiness  of  being  sen- 
sible it  was  his  own  doing?  Thus  also  the  disturbance  and  fear, 
which  often  follow  upon  a  man's  having  done  an  injury,  arise 
from  a  sense  of  his  being  blameworthy;  otherwise  there  would, 
in  many  cases,  be  no  ground  of  disturbance,  nor  any  reason  to 
fear  resentment  or  shame.  On  the  other  hand,  inward  security 
and  peace,  and  a  mind  open  to  the  several  gratifications  of  life, 
are  the  natural  attendants  of  innocence  and  virtue.  To  which 
must  be  added  the  complacency,  satisfaction,  and  even  joy  of 
heart,  which  accompany  the  exercise,  the  real  exercise  of  grati- 
tude, friendship,  benevolence. 

And  here,  I  think,  ought  to  be  mentioned  the  fears  of  future 
punishment,  and  peaceful  hopes  of  a  better  life,  in  those  who 
fully  believe,  or  have  any  serious  apprehension  of  religion  :  be- 
cause these  hopes  and  fears  are  present  uneasiness  and  satisfac- 
tion to  the  mind,  and  cannot  be  got  rid  of  by  great  part  of  the 
world,  even  by  men  who  have  thought  most  thoroughly  upon  the 
subject  of  religion.  And  no  one  can  say,  how  considerable  this 
uneasiness  or  satisfaction  may  be,  or  what  upon  the  whole  it  may 
amount  to.^ 

In  the  next  place  comes  in  the  consideration,  that  all  honest 
and  good  men  are  disposed  to  befriend  honest  good  men  as  such, 
and  to  discountenance  the  vicious  as  such,  and  do  so  in  some 
degree ;  indeed  in  a  considerable  degree  :  from  which  favor  and 
discouragement  cannot  but  arise  considerable  advantage  and  in- 
convenience. Though  the  generality  of  the  world  have  little 
regard  to  the  morality  of  their  own  actions,  and  may  be  supposed 
to  have  less  to  that  of  others,  when  they  themselves  are  not  con- 
cerned ;  yet  let  any  one  be  known  to  be  a  man  of  virtue,  some- 
how or  other  he  will  be  favored  and  good  offices  will  be  done  him, 
from  regard  to  his  character,  without  remote  views,  occasionally, 
and  in  some  low  degree,  I  think,  by  the  generalit}^  of  the  world, 

g  ["When  one  supposes  be  is  about  to  die,  there  comes  over  him  a  fear  and 
anxiety  about  things  in  regard  to  which  he  felt  none  before.  For  the  stories 
which  are  told  about  Hades,  that  sucli  as  have  practised  wrong,  must  there 
Buffer  punishment,  although  made  light  of  for  a  while,  these  torment  the  soul 
iest  they  should  be  true.  But  he  who  is  conscious  of  innocence,  has  a  pleasant 
4nd  good  1  ^pe,  which  will  support  old  age."     Plato,  Respub.  i.  s.  6.] 

10* 


114  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  part  i. 

as  it  happens  to  come  in  their  way.  Public  honors  too  and  ad- 
vantages are  the  natural  consequences,  and  sometimes  at  least, 
the  consf.quevices  in  fact,  of  virtuous  actions ;  of  eminent  justice, 
fidelity,  charity,  love  to  our  country,  considered  in  the  view  of 
being  virtuous.  And  sometimes  even  death  itself,  often  infamy 
and  external  inconveniences,  are  the  public  consequences  of  vice 
as  vice.  For  instance,  the  sense  which  mankind  have  of  tyranny, 
injustice,  oppression,  additional  to  the  mere  feeling  or  fear  of 
misery,  has  doubtless  been  instrumental  in  bringing  about  revo- 
lutions, which  make  a  figure  even  in  the  history  of  the  world. 
For  it  is  plain,  that  men  resent  injuries  as  implying  faultiness, 
and  retaliate,  not  merely  under  the  notion  of  having  received 
harm,  but  of  having  received  wrong ;  and  they  have  this  resent- 
ment in  behalf  of  others,  as  well  as  of  themselves.  So  likewise 
even  the  generality  are,  in  some  degree,  grateful  and  disposed  to 
return  good  ofiices,  not  merely  because  such  a  one  has  been  the 
occasion  of  good  to  them,  but  under  the  view,  that  such  good 
ofiices  implied  kind  intention  and  good  desert  in  the  doer. 

To  all  this  may  be  added  two  or  three  particular  things,  which 
many  persons  will  think  frivolous;  but  to  me  nothing  appears  so, 
which  at  all  comes  in  towards  determining  a  question  of  such  im- 
portance, as,  whether  there  be  or  be  not,  a  moral  institution  of 
government,  in  the  strictest  sense  moral,  visihly  established  and 
begun  in  nature.  The  particular  things  are  these :  That  in 
domestic  government,  which  is  doubtless  natural,  children  and 
others  also  are  very  generally  punished  for  falsehood,  injustice, 
and  ill-behavior,  as  such,  and  rewarded  for  the  contrary:  which 
are  instances  of  veracity  and  justice  and  right  behavior,  as  such, 
naturally  enforced  by  rewards  and  punishments,  more  or  less  con- 
siderable. That,  though  civil  government  be  supposed  to  take 
cognizance  of  actions  in  no  other  view  than  as  prejudicial  to 
society,  without  respect  to  the  immorality  of  them,  yet  as  such 
actions  are  immoral,  so  the  sense  which  men  have  of  the  im- 
morality of  them,  very  greatly  contributes,  in  different  ways,  to 
bring  ofi'enders  to  justice.  And  that  entire  absence  of  all  crime 
and  guilt  in  the  moral  sense,  when  plainly  appearing,  will  almost 
of  course  procure,  and  circumstances  of  aggravated  guilt  ^r.svent, 
a  remission  of  the  penalties  annexed  to  civil  crimes,  in  many 
cases,  though  by  no  means  in  all. 


CHAP.  III.  THE  MOEAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  115 

Upon  the  whole  then,  besides  the  good  and  bad  effects  of 
virtue  and  vice  upon  men's  own  minds,  the  course  or  tbe  world 
does,  in  some  measure,  turn  upon  the  approbation  and  disappro- 
bation of  them  as  such,  in  others.  The  sense  of  well  and  ilJ 
doiDg,  the  presages  of  conscience,  the  love  of  good  characters 
and  dislike  of  bad  ones,  honor,  shame,  resentment,  gratitude,  all 
these,  considered  in  themselves,  and  in  their  effects,  do  afford 
manifest  real  instances,  of  virtue  as  such  naturally  favored,  and 
of  vice  as  such  discountenanced,  more  or  less,  in  the  daily  course 
of  human  life;  in  every  age,  in  every  relation,  in  every  general 
circumstance  of  it.  That  God  has  given  us  a  moral  nature,*  may 
most  justly  be  urged  as  a  proof  of  our  being  under  his  moral 
government :  but  that  he  has  placed  us  in  a  condition,  which 
gives  this  nature,  as  one  may  speak,  scope  to  operate,  and  in 
which  it  does  unavoidably  operate  ;  i.e.  influence  mankind  to  act, 
so  as  thus  to  favor  and  reward  virtue,  and  discountenance  and 
punish  vice,  this  is  not  the  same,  but  a  further  additional  proof 
of  his  moral  government;  for  it  is  an  instance  of  it.  The  first 
is  a  proof,  that  he  will  finally  favor  and  support  virtue  effectually: 
the  second  is  an  example  of  his  favoring  and  supporting  it  at 
present,  in  some  degree. 

If  a  more  distinct  inquiry  be  made,  whence  it  arises,  that 
virtue  as  such  is  often  rewarded,  and  vice  as  such  is  punished, 
aod  this  rule  never  inverted,  it  will  be  found  to  proceed,  in  part, 
immediately  from  the  moral  nature  itself,  which  God  has  given 
us  f-  and  also  in  part,  from  his  having  given  us,  together  with 

*  See  Dissertation  II. 

^  [Aside  from  revelation,  our  ideas  of  the  divine  attributes  must  be  derived 
from  a  knowledge  of  our  own.  Among  these  is  our  m%ral  sense,  which  con- 
strains us  to  consider  right  and  wrong  as  an  immutable  distinction,  and  moral 
worth  as  our  highest  excellence.  Hence  we  ascribe  perfect  virtue  to  God.  It 
does  not  follow  from  such  reasoning,  that  we  form  a  Deity  after  our  own  con- 
ceptions, for  it  is  but  the  argument  a  fortiori,  "  He  that  formed  the  eye,  shall 
he  not  see?  He  that  teacheth  man  knowledge,  shall  he  not  know?"  Ps.  xciv. 
9.  We  do  not  conceive  of  a  Deity  who  sees  just  as  we  do ;  but  that  he  svex,  for 
he  makes  sight.  So  we  infer  that  he  has  moral  attributes,  because  we  have 
Jiem,  from  him. 

This  point  is  not  sufficiently  pressed  upon  infidels.  They  readily  acknow- 
ledge God's  physical  attributes,  because  the  argument  is  addressed  to  their 
understanding,  but  deny  his  moral  ones,  because  their  hearts  are  hardened 
through  the  deceitfulness  of  sin.] 


116  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OE  GOD.  part  t. 

this  nature,  so  great  a  power  over  eacli  other's  happiness  and 
misery.  For,  first,  it  is  certain,  that  peace  and  delight,  in  some 
degree  and  upon  some  occasions,  is  the  necessary  and  present 
effect  of  virtuous  practice;  an  effect  arising  immediately  from 
that  constitution  of  our  nature.  We  are  so  made,  that  well-doing 
as  such,  gives  us  satisfaction,  at  least  in  some  instances ;  ill-doing 
as  such,  in  none.  And,  secondly,  from  our  moral  nature,  joined 
with  God's  having  put  our  happiness  and  misery  in  many  respects 
in  each  other's  power,  it  cannot  but  be,  that  vice  as  such,  some 
kinds  and  instances  of  it  at  least,  will  be  infamous,  and  men  will 
be  disposed  to  punish  it  as  in  itself  detestable )  and  the  villain 
will  by  no  means  be  able  always  to  avoid  feeling  that  infamy,  any 
more  than  he  will  be  able  to  escape  this  further  punishment, 
which  mankind  will  be  disposed  to  inflict  upon  him,  under  the 
notion  of  his  deserving  it.  But  there  can  be  nothing  on  the  side 
of  vice,  to  answer  this;  because  there  is  nothing  in  the  human 
mind  contradictory,  as  the  logicians  speak,  to  virtue.  For  virtue 
consists  in  a  regard  to  what  is  right  and  reasonable,  as  being  so ; 
in  a  regard  to  veracity,  justice,  charity,  in  themselves  :  and  there 
is  surely  no  such  thing,  as  a  like  natural  regard  to  falsehood, 
injustice,  cruelty.  If  it  be  thought,  that  there  are  instances  of 
an  approbation  of  vice,  as  such,  in  itself,  and  for  \\jBr  own  sake, 
(though  it  does  not  appear  to  me,  that  there  is  any  such  thing  at 
all  3)  it  is  evidently  monstrous  :  as  much  so,  as  the  most  acknow- 
ledged perversion  of  any  passion  whatever.  Such  instances  of 
perversion  then  being  left  out,  as  merely  imaginary,  or  at  least 
unnatural;  it  must  follow,  from  the  frame  of  our  nature,  and 
from  our  condition,  in  the  respects  now  described,  that  vice  can- 
not at  all  be,  and  vh'tue  cannot  but  be,  favored  as  such  by  others, 
upon  some  occasions,  and  happy  in  itself,  in  some  degree.  For 
what  is  here  insisted  upon,  is  not  the  degree  in  which  virtue  and 
vice  are  thus  distinguished,  but  only  the  thing  itself,  that  they 
are  so  in  some  degree ;  though  the  whole  good  and  bad  effect  of 
virtue  and  vice  as  such,  is  not  inconsiderable  in  degree.  But 
that  they  must  be  thus  distinguished  in  some  degree,  is  in  a 
manner  necessary:  it  is  matter  of  fact  of  daily  experience,  even 
in  the  greatest  confusion  of  human  affairs. 

It  is  not  pretended  but  that,  in  the  natural  course  of  things, 
happiness  and  misery  appear  to  be  distributed  by  other  rules, 


CHAP.  III.  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  II7 

than  only  the  personal  merit  and  demerit  of  characters.  Thej 
may  sometimes  be  distributed  by  way  of  mere  discipline.  There 
may  be  the  wisest  and  best  reasons,  why  the  world  should  be 
governed  by  general  laws,  from  whence  such  promiscuous  distri- 
bution perhaps  must  follow;  and  also  why  our  happiness  and 
misery  should  be  put  in  each  other's  power,  in  the  degree  which 
they  are.  And  these  things,  as,  in  general,  they  contribute  to 
the  rewarding  virtue  and  punishing  vice,  as  such,  so  they  often 
contribute  also,  not  to  the  inversion  of  this,  which  is  impossible, 
but  to  the  rendering  persons  prosperous,  though  wicked  ;  afflicted, 
though  righteous ;  and,  which  is  worse,  to  the  rewarding  some 
actions,  though  vicious,  and  punishing  other  actions,  though 
virtuous.*  But  all  this  cannot  drown  the  voice  of  nature  in  the 
conduct  of  Providence,  plainly  declaring  itself  for  virtue,  by  way 
of  distinction  from  vice,  and  preference  to  it.  For  our  being  so 
constituted  as  that  virtue  and  vice  are  thus  naturally  favored  and 
discountenanced,  rewarded  and  punished,  respectively  as  such,  is 
an  intuitive  proof  of  the  intent  of  nature,  that  it  should  be  so; 
otherwise  the  constitution  of  our  mind,  from  which  it  thus  im- 
mediately and  directly  proceeds,  would  be  absurd.  But  it  cannot 
be  said,  because  virtuous  actions  are  sometimes  punished,  and 
vicious  actions  rewarded,  that  nature  intended  it.  For,  though 
this  great  disorder  is  brought  about,  as  all  actions  are,  by  means 
of  some  natural  passion ;  yet  this  mai/  be,  as  it  undoubtedly  is, 
brought  about  by  the  perversion  of  such  passion,  implanted  in  us 
for  other,  and  those  very  good  purposes.  And  indeed  these  other 
and  good  purposes,  even  of  every  passion,  may  be  clearly  seen. 

We  have  then  a  declaration,  in  some  degree  of  present  effect, 
from  Him  who  is  supreme  in  nature,  which  side  he  is  of,  or 
what  part  he  takes ;  a  declaration  for  virtue,  and  against  vice. 
So  far  therefore  as  a  man  is  true  to  virtue,  to  veracity  and  justice, 
to  equity  and  charity,  and  the  right  of  the  case,  in  whatever  he 
is  concerned ;  so  far  he  is  on  the  side  of  the  divine  administra- 
tion, and  co-operates  with  it :  and  from  hence,  to  such  a  man, 

*  [It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  occasional  disadvantages  of  virtue,  are  no  less 
conducive  to  moral  excellence,  than  its  being  generally  advantageous.  In  view 
of  its  general  advantages,  we  are  virtuous  with  a  proper  and  commanded  view 
to  our  instinctive  desire  for  happiness.  In  face  of  its  disadvantages,  we  culti- 
vate virtue  for  its  own  sake.] 


118  THE  MORAL  GOYERXMENT  OF  GOD.  part  i. 

arises  naturally  a  secret  satisfaction  and  sense  of  security,  and 
iinpliuit  hope  of  somewhat  further. 

V.  This  hope  is  confirmed  by  the  necessary  tendencies  of 
virtue,  which,  though  not  of  present  effect,  yet  are  at  present 
discernible  in  nature;  and  so  afford  an  instance  of  somewhat 
moral  in  the  essential  constitution  of  it.  There  is,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  a  tendency  in  virtue  and  vice  to  produce  the  good  and 
bad  effects  now  mentioned,  in  a  greater  degree  than  they  do  in 
fact  produce  them.  For  instance;  good  and  bad  men  would  be 
much  more  rewarded  and  punished  as  such,  were  it  not,  that 
justice  is  often  artificially  eluded,''  that  characters  are  not  known, 
and  many,  who  would  thus  favor  virtue  and  discourage  vice,  are 
hindered  from  doing  so,  by  accidental  causes.  These  tendencies 
of  virtue  and  vice  are  obvious  with  regard  to  individuals.  But 
it  may  require  more  particularly  to  be  considered,  that  power  in 
a  societi/,  by  being  under  the  direction  of  virtue,  naturally  in- 
creases, and  has  a  necessary  tendency  to  prevail  over  opposite 
power,  not  under  the  direction  of  it;  in  like  manner,  as  power, 
by  being  under  the  direction  of  reason,  increases,  and  has  a 
tendency  to  prevail  over  brute  force.     There  are  several  brute 

J  [The  common  remark,  "virtue  brings  its  own  reward,"  is  true  only  with 
qualifications.  The  apostles,  as  to  this  life,  were  the  most  miserable  of  men: 
(1  Cor.  XV.  9.)  Virtue  does  not  always  bring  earthly  rewards.  The  grand 
support  of  the  good  is  drawn  from  considerations  of  that  future  state  which 
the  infidel  denies.  Observe,  1.  We  cannot  suppose  that  God  would  so  construct 
man,  as  that  his  principal  comfort  and  reward  for  virtue,  is  a  delusion.  2.  Very 
good  persons  are  often  beset  with  painful  doubts  and  fears,  as  to  their  future 
safety.  Would  God  allow  such  doubts,  if  the  expectation  of  future  happiness 
were  the  only  reward  of  virtue?  3.  This  reward,  at  best,  is  private;  but  fur 
the  encouragement  of  virtue,  it  must  have  obvious  triumphs. 
,  On  the  other  hand,  bad  men  grow  callous  to  the  rebukes  of  conscience,  so 
that  great  sinners  suffer  less  from  remorse  than  small  ones,  and  what  is  worse, 
owe  their  tranquillity  to  their  guilt.  Again,  he  who  kills  a  good  man,  wholly 
deprives  him  of  his  only  reward,  if  this  life  alone  gives  it.  And  the  villain 
who  kills  himself,  escapes  his  only  punishment. 

Virtuous  persons,  in  the  strong  language  of  Robert  Hall,*  would  be  "  tho 
only  persons  who  are  wholly  disappointed  of  their  object;  the  only  persons 
who  (by  a  ft  tal  and  irreparable  mistake),  expecting  an  imaginary  happiness 
in  iui  imaginary  world,  lose  their  only  opportunity  of  enjoying  those  present 
pleasures,  of  Avhicb  others  avail  themselves;  dooming  themselves  to  grasp  at 
shadows,  while  they  neglect  the  substance,  and  harassed  with  a  perpetual 
struggle  against  their  natural  propensities  and  passiuns,  and  all  in  vain  !"'] 


Sermon  on  the  Vauitv  of  Man 


CHAP.  in.  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  119 

creatures  of  equal,  and  several  of  superior  strength,  to  that  of 
men ;  and  possibly  the  sum  of  the  whole  strength  of  brutes  may 
be  greater  than  that  of  mankind;  but  reason  gives  us  the  advan- 
tage and  superiority  over  them;  and  thus  man  is  the  acknow- 
ledged governing  animal  upon  the  earth.  Nor  is  this  superiority 
considered  by  any  as  accidental ;  but  as  what  reason  has  a  ten- 
dency, in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  to  obtain.  And  yet  perhaps 
difficulties  may  be  raised  about  the  meaning,  as  well  as  the  truth, 
of  the  assertion,  that  virtue  has  the  like  tendency. 

To  obviate  these  difficulties,  let  us  see  more  distinctly,  how  the 
case  stands  with  regard  to  reason  ;  which  is  so  readily  acknow- 
ledged to  have  this  advantageous  tendency.  Suppose  then  two  or 
three  men,  of  the  best  and  most  improved  understanding,  in  a  deso- 
late open  plain,  attacked  by  ten  times  the  number  of  beasts  of 
prey :  would  their  reason  secure  them  the  victory  in  this  unequal 
combat?  Power  then,  though  joined  with  reason,  and  under  its 
direction,  cannot  be  expected  to  prevail  over  opposite  power, 
though  merely  brutal,  unless  the  one  bears  some  proportion  to 
the  other.  Again :  put  the  imaginary  case,  that  rational  and 
irrational  creatures  were  of  like  external  shape  and  manner  :  it 
is  certain,  before  there  were  opportunities  for  the  first  to  distin- 
guish each  other,  to  separate  from  their  adversaries,  and  to  form 
a  union  among  themselves,  they  might  be  upon  a  level,  or  in 
several  respects  upon  great  disadvantage;  though  united  they 
might  be  vastly  superior  :  since  union  is  of  such  efficacy,  that 
ten  men  united,  might  be  able  to  accomplish,  what  ten  thousand 
of  the  same  natural  strength  and  understanding  wholly  ununited, 
could  not.  In  this  case,  brute  force  might  more  than  maintain 
its  ground  against  reason,  for  want  of  union  among  the  rational 
creatures.  Or  suppose  a  number  of  men  to  land  upon  an  island 
inhabited  only  by  wild  beasts;  men  who,  by  the  regulations  of 
civil  government,  the  inventions  of  art,  and  the  experience  of 
some  years,  could  they  be  preserved  so  long,  would  be  really  suffi- 
cient to  subdue  the  wild  beasts,  and  to  preserve  themselves  in 
security  from  them :  yet  a  conjuncture  of  accidents  might  give 
«uch  advantage  to  the  irrational  animals  as  they  might  at  once 
overpower,  and  even  extirpate,  the  rational  ones.  Length  of 
time  tuen,  proper  scope,   and  opportunities  for  reason  to  exert 


120  THE  MOEAL  GOVERXMEXT  OF  GOD.  part  t. 

xtself,  may  be  absolutely  necessary  to  its  prevailing  over  brute 
force. 

Furtlier :  there  are  many  instances  of  brutes  succeeding  in 
attempts,  wbich  they  could  not  have  undertaken,  bad  not  their 
irrational  nature  rendered  them  incapable  of  foreseeing  the  danger 
of  such  attempt,  or  the  fury  of  passion  hindered  their  attending 
to  it :  and  there  are  instances  of  reason  and  real  prudence  pre- 
venting men's  undertaking  what,  it  has  appeared  afterwards, 
they  might  have  succeeded  in  by  a  lucky  rashness.  In  certain 
conjunctures,  ignorance  and  folly,  weakness  and  discord,  may  have 
their  advantages.  So  that  rational  animals  have  not  necessarily 
the  superiority  over  irrational  ones;  but,  how  improbable  soever 
it  may  be,  it  is  evidently  possible,  that  in  some  globes  the  latter 
may  be  superior.  And  were  the  former  wholly  at  variance  and  dis- 
united, by  false  self-interest  and  envy,  by  treachery  and  injustice, 
and  consequent  rage  and  malice  against  each  other,  whilst  the 
latter  were  firmly  united  among  themselves  by  instinct,  this  might 
greatly  contribute  to  the  introducing  such  an  inverted  order  of 
things.  For  every  one  would  consider  it  as  inverted :  since 
reason  has,  in  the  nature  of  it,  a  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute 
force  ;  notwithstanding  the  possibility  it  may  not  prevail,  and  the 
necessity,  which  there  is,  of  many  concurring  circumstances  to 
render  it  prevalent. 

Now  I  say,  virtue  in  a  society  has  a  like  tendency  to  procure 
superiority  and  additional  power  :  whether  this  power  be  con- 
sidered as  the  means  of  security  from  opposite  power,  or  of  ob- 
taining other  advantages.  It  has  this  tendency,  by  rendering 
public  good,  an  object  and  end,  to  every  member  of  the  society; 
by  putting  every  one  upon  consideration  and  diligence,  recollec- 
tion and  self-government,  both  in  order  to  see  what  is  the  most 
eifectual  method,  and  also  in  order  to  perform  their  proper  part, 
for  obtaining  and  preserving  it;  by  uniting  a  society  within  itself, 
and  so  increasing  its  strength ;  and,  which  is  particularly  to  be 
mentioned,  uniting  it  by  means  of  veracity  and  justice.  For  as 
these  last  are  principal  bonds  of  union,  so  benevolence  or  public 
spirit,  undirected,  unrestrained  by  them,  is,  nobody  knows  what. 

And  suppose  the  invisible  world,  and  the  invisible  dispensa 
tions  of  Providence,  to  be,  in  any  sort,  analogous  to  what  appears : 
or  that  both  together  make  up  one  uniform  scheme,  the  two  parra 


CHAP.  m.  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  121 

of  which,  the  part  which  we  see,  and  that  which  is  beyond  our 
observation,  are  analogous  to  each  other :  then,  there  must  be  a 
like  natural  tendency  in  the  derived  power,  throughout  the  uni- 
verse, under  the  direction  of  virtue,  to  prevail  in  general  over 
that  which  is  not  under  its  direction ;  as  there  is  in  reason, 
derived  reason  in  the  universe,  to  prevail  over  brute  force. 

But  then,  in  order  to  the  prevalence  of  virtue,  or  that  it  may 
actually  produce,  what  it  has  a  tendency  to  produce ;  the  like 
concurrences  are  necessary,  as  are,  to  the  prevalence  of  reason. 
There  must  be  some  proportion,  between  the  natural  power  or 
force  which  is,  and  that  which  is  not,  under  the  direction  of 
virtue  :  there  must  be  sufficient  length  of  time ;  for  the  complete 
success  of  virtue,  as  of  reason,  cannot,  from  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  be  otherwise  than  gradual  :  there  must  be,  as  one  may 
speak,  a  fair  field  of  trial,  a  stage  large  and  extensive  enough, 
proper  occasions  and  opportunities,  for  the  virtuous  to  join  to- 
gether, to  exert  themselves  against  lawless  force,  and  to  reap  the 
fruit  of  their  united  labors.  Now  indeed  it  is  to  be  hoped,  that 
the  disproportion  between  the  good  and  bad,  even  here  on  earth, 
is  not  so  great,  but  that  the  former  have  natural  power  sufficient 
to  their  prevailing  to  a  considerable  degree,  if  circumstances 
would  permit  this  power  to  be  united.  For,  much  less,  very 
much  less,  power  under  the  direction  of  virtue,  would  prevail 
over  much  greater  not  under  the  direction  of  it.^  However, 
good  men  over  the  face  of  the  earth  cannot  unite;  because, 
(among  other  reasons,)  they  cannot  be  sufficiently  ascertained  of 
each  other's  characters.  And  the  known  course  of  human  things, 
the  scene  we  are  now  passing  through,  particularly  the  shortness 
of  life,  denies  to  virtue  its  full  scope  in  several  other  respects. 

The  natural  tendency  which  we  have  been  considering,  though 
real,  is  hindered  from  being  carried  into  effect  in  the  present 
state  :  but  these  hinderances  may  be  removed  in  a  future  one. 
Virtue,  to  borrow  the  Christian  allusion,  is  militant  here;  and 
various  untoward  accidents  contribute  to  its  being  often  over- 

*,[Becanse,  so  soon  as  any  community,  or  collection  of  persons,  conclude  a  man 
to  be  wholly  vicious  in  his  course,  and  without  any  restraint  of  conscience,  he 
is  at  once  shorn  of  his  influence,  and  will  soon  be  stripped  of  all  power  of  mis- 
chief. On  the  other  hand,  we  see  the  might  of  virtue  unarmed  with  power,  in 
Lcther,  in  Roger  Williams,  in  Wm.  Penn,  and  innumerable  other  instances.] 

11 


122  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  parti. 

borne  :  but  it  may  combat  with  greater  adyantage  hereafter,  and 
prevail  completely,  and  enjoy  its  consequent  rewards,  in  some 
future  states.  Neglected  as  it  is,  perhaps  unknown,  perhaps 
despised  and  oppressed  here;  there  maybe  scenes  in  eternity, 
lasting  enough,  and  in  every  other  way  adapted,  to  afford  it  a 
sufficient  sphere  of  action;  and  a  sufficient  sphere  for  the  natural 
consequences  of  it  to  follow  in  fact.  If  the  soul  be  naturally 
immortal,  and  this  state  be  a  progress  towards  a  future  one,  as 
childhood  is  towards  mature  age,  good  men  may  naturally  unite, 
not  only  among  themselves,  but  also  with  other  orders  of  vir- 
tuous creatures,  in  that  future  state.  For  virtue,  from  the  very 
nature  of  it,  is  a  principle  and  bond  of  union,  in  some  degree, 
among  all  who  are  endued  with  it,  and  known  to  each  other;  so 
as  that  by  it,  a  good  man  cannot  but  recommend  himself  to  the 
favor  and  protection  of  all  virtuous  beings,  throughout  the  whole 
universe,  who  can  be  acquainted  with  his  character,  and  can 
any  way  interpose  in  his  behalf  in  any  part  of  his  duration. 

One  might  add,  that  suppose  all  this  advantageous  tendency  of 
virtue  to  become  effect,  among  one  or  more  orders  of  creatures, 
in  any  distant  scenes  and  periods,  and  to  be  seen  by  any  orders 
of  vicious  creatures,  throughout  the  universal  kingdom  of  God ; 
this  happy  effect  of  virtue  would  have  a  tendency,  by  way  of  ex- 
ample, and  possibly  in  other  ways,  to  amend  those  of  them  who 
are  capable  of  amendment,  and  of  being  recovered  to  a  just  sense 
of  virtue.  If  our  notions  of  the  plan  of  Providence  were 
enlarged  in  any  sort  proportionable  to  what  late  discoveries  have 
enlarged  our  views  with  respect  to  the  material  world,  representa- 
tions of  this  kind  would  not  appear  absurd  or  extravagant.  They 
are  not  to  be  taken  as  intended  for  a  literal  delineation  of  what 
is  in  fact  the  particular  scheme  of  the  universe,  which  cannot  be 
known  without  revelation  :  for  suppositions  are  not  to  be  looked 
on  as  true,  because  not  incredible  :  but  they  are  mentioned  to 
show,  that  our  finding  virtue  to  be  hindered  from  procuring  to 
itself  such  superiority  and  advantages,  is  no  objection  against  its 
having,  in  the  essential  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to  pro- 
cure them.  And  the  suppositions  noAv  mentioned  do  plainly  show 
this  :  for  they  show,  that  these  hinderances  are  so  far  from  being 
necessary,  that  we  ourselves  can  easily  conceive,  how  they  may 
be  removed  in  future  states,  and  full  scope  be  granted  to  virtue 


CHAP.  III.  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  123 

And  all  these  advantageous  tendencies  of  it  are  to  be  considered 
as  declarations  of  God  in  its  favor.  This  however  is  taking  a 
pretty  large  compass  :  though  it  is  certain,  that,  as  the  material 
world  appears  to  be,  in  a  manner,  boundless  and  immense,  there 
must  be  some  scheme  of  Providence  vast  in  proportion  to  it. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  earth  our  habitation ;  and  we  shall  see 
this  happy  tendency  of  virtue,  by  imagining  an  instance  not  so 
vast  and  remote  :  by  supposing  a  kingdom  or  society  of  men  upon 
it,  perfectly  virtuous,  for  a  succession  of  many  ages ;  to  which, 
if  3'ou  please,  may  be  given  a  situation  advantageous  for  universal 
monarchy.  In  such  a  state,  there  would  be  no  such  thing  as 
faction  :  but  men  of  the  greatest  capacity  would  of  course,  all 
alongj  have  the  chief  direction  of  affairs  willingly  yielded  to 
them;  and  they  would  share  it  among  themselves  without  envy. 
Each  of  these  would  have  the  part  assigned  him,  to  which  his 
genius  was  peculiarly  adapted ',  and  others,  who  had  not  any  dis- 
tinguished genius,  would  be  safe,  and  think  themselves  very 
happy,  by  being  under  the  protection  and  guidance  of  those  who 
had.  Public  determinations  would  really  be  the  result  of  the 
united  wisdom  of  the  community:  and  they  would  faithfully  be 
executed,  by  the  united  strength  of  it.  Some  would  contribute 
in  a  higher  way,  but  all  in  some  way,  to  the  public  prosperity : 
and  in  it,  each  would  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  own  virtue.  And 
as  injustice,  whether  by  fraud  or  force,  would  be  unknown  among 
themselves,  so  they  would  be  sufficiently  secured  from  it  in  their 
neighbors.  For  cunning  and  false  self-interest,  confederacies  in 
injustice,  ever  slight,  and  accompanied  with  faction  and  intestine 
treachery;  these  on  one  hand  would  be  found  mere  childish  folly 
and  weakness,  when  set  in  opposition  against  wisdom,  public 
spirit,  union  inviolable,  and  fidelity  on  the  other:  allowing  both 
a  sufficient  length  of  years  to  try  their  force.  Add  the  general 
influence,  which  such  a  kingdom  would  have  over  the  face  of  the 
earth,  by  way  of  example  particularly,  and  the  reverence  which 
would  be  paid  it.  It  would  plainly  be  superior  to  all  others,  and 
the  world  must  gradually  come  under  its  empire;  not  by  means 
of  lawless  violence ;  but  partly  by  what  must  be  allowed  to  be  just 
conquest;  and  partly  by  other  kingdoms  submitting  themselves 
voluntarily  to  it,  throughout  a  course  of  ages,  and  claiming  its 
protection,  one  after  another,  in  successive  exigencies.    The  head 


124  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  pari  w 

of  it  would  be  a  universal  monarch,  in  another  sense  than  any 
mortal  has  yet  been ;  and  the  Eastern  style  would  be  literally 
applicable  to  him,  that  all peoj^le,  nations,  and  languages  should 
serve  him.  And  though  indeed  our  knowledge  of  human  nature, 
and  the  whole  history  of  mankind,  show  the  impossibility,  with- 
out some  miraculous  interposition,  that  a  number  of  men,  here 
on  earth,  should  unite  in  one  society  or  government,  in  the  fear 
of  God  and  universal  practice  of  virtue ;  and  that  such  a  govern- 
ment should  continue  so  united  for  a  succession  of  ages :  yet  ad- 
mitting or  supposing  this,  the  effect  would  be  as  now  drawn  out. 
Thus  for  instance,  the  wonderful  power  and  prosperity  promised 
to  the  Jewish  nation  in  the  Scripture,  would  be,  in  a  great  mea- 
sure, the  consequence  of  what  is  predicted  of  them ;  that  the 
people  should  he  all  righteous,  and  inherit  the  land  forever y^ 
were  we  to  understand  the  latter  phrase  of  a  long  continuance  only, 
sufficient  to  give  things  time  to  work.  The  predictions  of  this 
kind,  for  there  are  many  of  them,  cannot  come  to  pass,  in  the 
present  known  course  of  nature;  but  suppose  them  come  to  pass, 
and  then,  the  dominion  and  preeminence  promised  must  naturally 
follow,  to  a  very  considerable  degree. 

Consider  now  the  general  system  of  religion ;  that  the  govern- 
ment of  the  world  is  uniform,  and  one,  and  moral ;  that  virtue 
and  right  shall  finally  have  the  advantage,  and  prevail  over  fraud 
and  lawless  force,  over  the  deceits  as  well  as  the  violence  of 
wickedness,  under  4he  conduct  of  one  supreme  governor :  and 
from  the  observations  above  made,  it  will  appear  that  Grod  has, 
by  our  reason,  given  us  to  see  a  peculiar  connection  in  the 
several  parts  of  this  scheme,  and  a  tendency  towards  the  com- 
pletion of  it,  arising  out  of  the  very  nature  of  virtue  :  which 
tendency  is  to  be  considered  as  something  moral  in  the  essential 
constitution  of  things.  If  any  one  should  think  all  this  to  be  of 
little  importance,  I  desire  him  to  consider,  what  he  would  think, 
if  vice  had,  essentially  and  in  its  nature,  these  advantageous 
tendencies )  or  if  virtue  had  essentially  the  contrary  ones. 

It  may  be  objected,  that  notwithstanding  all  these  natural 
effects  and  natural  tendencies  of  virtue,  yet  things  may  be  now 
going  on  throughout  the  universe,  and  may  go  on  hereafter,  in 
the  same  mixed  way  as  here  at  present  upon  earth  :  virtue  some- 

*  Isa.  Ix.  21. 


CHAP.  III.  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  125 

times  prosperous,  sometimes  depressed ;  vice  sometimes  punished, 
sometimes  successful. 

The  answer  to  which  is,  that  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  this 
chapter,  nor  of  this  treatise,  properly  to  prove  God's  perfect 
moral  government  over  the  world,  or  the  truth  of  religion ;  but 
to  observe  what  there  is  in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature, 
to  confirm  the  proper  proof  of  it,  supposed  to  be  known :  and 
that  the  weight  of  the  foregoing  observations  to  this  purpose  may 
be  thus  distinctly  proved.  Pleasure  and  pain  are,  to  a  certain 
degree,  say  to  a  very  high  degree,  distributed  among  us  without 
any  apparent  regard  to  the  merit  or  demerit  of  characters.  And 
were  there  nothing  else  concerning  this  matter  discernible  in  the 
constitution  and  course  of  nature,  there  would  be  no  ground 
from  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  to  hope  or  to  fear 
that  men  would  be  rewarded  or  punished  hereafter  according  to 
their  deserts  :  which,  however,  it  is  to  be  remarked,  implies,  that 
even  then  there  would  be  no  ground  from  appearances  to  think, 
that  vice  upon  the  whole  would  have  the  advantage,  rather  than 
that  virtue  would.  Thus  the  proof  of  a  future  state  of  retribution 
would  rest  upon  the  usual  known  arguments  for  it ;  which  are 
[  think  plainly  unanswerable;  and  would  be  so,  though  there 
were  no  additional  confirmation  of  them  from  the  things  above 
insisted  on.  But  these  things  are  a  very  strong  confirmation 
of  them.     For, 

First,  They  show  that  the  Author  of  nature  is  not  indifferent 
to  virtue  and  vice.  They  amount  to  a  declaration,  from  him, 
determinate  and  not  to  be  evaded,  in  favor  of  one,  and  against 
the  other;  such  a  declaration,  as  there  is  nothing  to  be  set  over 
against  or  answer,  on  the  part  of  vice.  So  that  were  a  man, 
laying  aside  the  proper  proof  of  religion,  to  determine  from  the 
course  of  nature  only,  whether  it  were  most  probable,  that  the 
righteous  or  the  wicked  would  have  the  advantage  in  a  future 
life ;  there  can  be  no  doubt,  but  that  he  would  determine  the 
pwbability  j;o  be,  that  the  former  would.  The  course  of  nature 
then,  in  the  view  of  it  now  given,  furnishes  us  with  a  real  prac- 
tical proof  of  the  obligations  of  religion. 

BeconcUy,  When,  conformably  to  what  religion  teaches  us,  God 
shall  reward  and  punish  virtue  and  vice  as  such,  so  as  that  every 
«.2ie  shall,  upon  the  whole,  have  his  deserts;  this  distributivo 

11* 


126  THE  MOllAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  part  r 

justice  w^'ll  not  be  a  thing  different  in  hind,  but  only  in  degree, 
from  what  we  experience  in  his  present  government.  It  will  be 
that  in  effect,  towards  which  we  now  see  a  tendency.  It  will  be 
no  more  than  the  completion  of  that  moral  government,  the  prin- 
ciples and,  beginning  of  which  have  been  shown,  beyond  all 
dispute,  discernible  in  the  present  constitution  and  course  of 
nature. 

Thirdly,  As  under  the  natural  government  of  God,  our  expe- 
rience of  those  kinds  and  degrees  of  happiness  and  misery,  which 
we  do  experience  at  present,  gives  just  ground  to  hope  for,  and 
to  fear,  higher  degrees  and  other  kinds  of  both  in  a  future  state, 
supposing  a  future  state  admitted  :  so  under  his  moral  govern- 
ment our  experience,  that  virtue  and  vice  are,  in  the  manners 
above  mentioned,  actually  rewarded  and  punished  at  present,  in 
a  certain  degree,  gives  just  ground  to  hope  and  to  fear,  that  they 
way  he  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  higher  degree  hereafter.  It 
is  acknowledged  indeed  that  this  alone  is  not  sufficient  ground  to 
think,  that  they  actually  will  he  rewarded  and  punished  in  a 
higher  degree,  rather  than  in  a  lower  :  but  then, 

Lastly,  There  is  sufficient  ground  to  think  so,  from  the  good 
and  bad  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice.  For  these  tendencies  are 
essential,  and  founded  in  the  nature  of  things :  whereas  the 
hinderances  to  their  becoming  effect  are,  in  numberless  cases,  not 
necessary,  but  artificial  only.  Now  it  may  be  much  more  strongly 
argued,  that  these  tendencies,  as  well  as  the  actual  rewards  and 
punishments,  of  virtue  and  vice,  which  arise  directly  out  of  the 
nature  of  things,  will  remain  hereafter,  than  that  the  accidental 
hinderances  of  them  will.  And  if  these  hinderances  do  not 
remain;  those  rewards  and  punishments  cannot  but  be  carried 
on  much  farther  towards  the  perfection  of  moral  government: 
i.e.  the  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  will  become  effect;  but 
when,  or  where,  or  in  what  particular  way,  cannot  be  known  at 
all,  but  by  revelation. 

Upon  the  whole:  there  is  a  kind  of  moral  governn^ent  implied 
in  God's  natural  government:*  virtue  and  vice  are  natundly  re- 
warded and  punished  as  beneficial  and  mischievous  to  society ;'(' 
and  rewarded  and  punished  directly  as  virtue  and  vice.|  The 
notion  of  a  moral  scheme  of  government  is  not  fictitious,  but 
*  P.  109.  t  P-  110^  *c.  X  P- 111>  **J 


CHAP.  HI.  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  [2*^ 

natural ;  for  it  is  suggested  to  our  thoughts  by  the  constitution 
and  course  of  nature  :  and  the  execution  of  this  scheme  12 
actually  begun,  in  the  instances  here  mentioned.  Ana  these 
things  are  to  be  considered  as  a  declaration  of  the  Author  of 
nature,  for  virtue,  and  against  vice  :  they  give  a  credibility  to 
the  supposition  of  their  being  rewarded  and  punished  hereafter; 
and  also  ground  to  hope  and  to  fear,  that  they  may  be  rewarded 
and  punished  in  higher  degrees  than  they  are  here.  All  this  is 
confirmed,  and  the  argument  for  religion,  from  the  constitution 
and  course  of  nature,  is  carried  on  farther,  by  observing,  that 
there  are  natural  tendencies,  and,  in  innumerable  cases,  only  arti- 
ficial hinderances,  to  this  moral  scheme's  being  carried  on  much 
farther  towards  perfection,  than  it  is  at  present.* 

The  notion  then  of  a  moral  scheme  of  government,  much  more 
perfect  than  what  is  seen,  is  not  a  fictitious,  but  a  natural  notion  ', 
for  it  is  suggested  to  our  thoughts,  by  the  essential  tendencies  of 
virtue  and  vice.  These  teodencies  are  to  be  considered  as  in- 
timations, as  implicit  promises  and  threatenings,  from  the  Author 
of  nature,  of  much  greater  rewards  and  punishments  to  follow 
virtue  and  vice,  than  do  at  present.  Indeed,  every  natural  ten- 
dency, which  is  to  continue,  but  which  is  hindered  from  becom- 
ing effect  by  only  accidental  causes,  affords  a  presumption,  that 
such  tendency  will,  some  time  or  other,  become  effect :  a  pre- 
sumption proportionable  in  degree  to  the  length  of  the  duration, 
through  which  such  tendency  will  continue.  From  these  things 
together,  arises  a  real  prCvSumption,  that  the  moral  scheme  of 
government  established  in  nature,  shall  be  carried  on  much 
farther  towards  perfection  hereafter ;  and,  I  think,  a  presumption 
that  it  will  be  absolutely  completed.  From  these  things,  joined 
with  the  moral  nature  which  God  has  given  us,  considered"  as 
given  us  by  him,  arises  a  practical  prooff  that  it  icill  be  com- 
pleted :  a  proof  from  fact ;  and  therefore  a  distinct  one  from 
that  which  is  deduced  from  the  eternal  and  unalterable  relations, 
the  fitness  and  unfitness  of  actions. 

*  P.  118,  &c.  f  See  this  proof  drawn  out  briefly,  ch.  vi. 


I   8  PROBATION,  AS  IMPLYING  TRIAL,  pabti 


CHAPTEE  IV. 

PROBATION;    AS    IMPLYING    TRIAL,    DIFFICULTIES,    AND 
DANGER.* 

The  general  doctrine  of  religion,  that  our  present  life  is  a 
:tate  of  probation  for  a  future  one,  comprehends  under  it  several 
particular  things,  distinct  from  each  other.  The  first  and  most 
common  meaning  of  it  seems  to  be,  that  our  future  interest  is 
now  depending,  and  depending  upon  ourselves;  that  we  have 
scope  and  opportunities  here,  for  that  good  and  bad  behavior, 
which  God  will  reward  and  punish  hereafter;  together  with 
temptations  to  one,  as  well  as  inducements  of  reason  to  the  other. 
And  this,  in  a  great  measure,  is  the  same  as  saying,  that  we  are 
under  the  moral  government  of  God,  and  to  give  an  account  of 
our  actions  to  him.  For  the  notion  of  a  future  account  and 
general  righteous  judgment,  implies  some  sort  of  temptations  to 
what  is  wrong :  otherwise  there  would  be  no  moral  possibility  of 
doing  wrong,  nor  ground  for  judgment,  or  discrimination.  But 
there  is  this  difference,  that  the  word  probation  is  more  dis- 
tinctly and  particularly  expressive  of  allurements  to  wrong,  or 
difficulties  in  adhering  uniformly  to  what  is  right,  and  of  the 
danger  of  miscarrying  by  such  temptations,  than  the  words  moral 
government.  A  state  of  probation  then,  as  thus  particularly  im- 
plying in  it  trial,  difficulties,  and  danger,  may  require  to  be 
considered  distinctly  by  itself.'' 

As  the  moral  government  of  God,  which  religion  teaches  us, 

*  [This  chapter  is  one  of  many  attempts  to  account  for  the  mixture  of  suflfer- 
ing  and  enjoyment  in  this  world;  and  demands  close  examination  both  of  its 
theory  and  its  arguments.  The  student  may  consult,  as  he  has  opportunity, 
Mus^i  Disput. :  Holtzsfusii  Disp.  de  Lapsu  Prim.  Hominum  :  Selden  de  Laps. 
Augelorum  :  Stapferi  Inst. :  Witsii  Econom.  Feed. :  Bate's  Harmony  of  the 
Divine  Attrib. :  Calcott  on  the  Fall:  Shuckford  on  the  Creation  of  Man  : 
Manton's  Sermons:  South's  do.:  Toplady's  do.:  Pearson  on  the  Creed: 
Le  Clerc's  Diss.:  Henly's  Dissert.:  Kennicott  on  the  Tree  of  Life:  and 
Fabricius  de  Primo  Peccato  Angelorum  Lapsorum.] 

b  [The  evils  of  life,  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  entering,  necessarjly,  into 
God's  plan  of  probation;  and  they  are  not  here  so  presented.  The  Scripturea 
ehow  that  all  suffering  is  either  punitive,  or  castigatory.  Man  at  first  wa.s  to 
be  tried  by  temptations,  not  by  sufferings.] 


CHAP.  IV.  DIFFICULTIES,  AND  DANGER.  229 

implies  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  trial  witti  regard  to  x  future 
world,  so  also  his  natural  government  over  us  implies  that  wo 
are  in  a  state  of  trial,  in  the  like  sense,  with  regard  to  the  pre- 
sent world.  Natural  government  by  rewards  and  punishments, 
as  mucli  implies  natural  trial,  as  moral  government  does  moral 
trial.  The  natural  government  of  God  here  meant,*  consists  in 
his  annexing  pleasure  to  some  actions,  and  pain  to  others,  which 
are  in  our  power  to  do  or  forbear,  and  giving  us  notice  of  such 
appointment,  beforehand.  This  necessarily  implies,  that  he  has 
made  our  happiness  and  misery,  or  our  interest,  to  depend  in  part 
upon  ourselves.  So  far  as  men  have  temptations  to  any  course  of 
action,  which  will  probably  occasion  them  greater  temporal  incon- 
venience and  uneasiness,  than  satisfaction,  so  far  their  temporal 
interest  is  in  danger  from  themselves;  or  they  are  in  a  state  of 
trial  with  respect  to  it.  Now  people  often  blame  others,  and  even 
themselves,  for  their  misconduct  in  their  temporal  concerns.  And 
we  find  many  are  greatly  wanting  to  themselves,  and  miss  that 
natural  happiness,  which  they  might  have  obtained  in  the  present 
life  :  perhaps  every  one  does  in  some  degree.  But  many  run 
themselves  into  great  inconvenience,  and  into  extreme  distress 
and  misery,  not  through  incapacity  of  knowing  better,  and  doing 
better,  for  themselves,  which  would  be  nothing  to  the  present 
purpose,  but  through  their  own  fault.  These  things  necessarily 
imply  temptation,  and  danger  of  miscarrying,  in  a  greater  or  less 
degree,  with  respect  to  our  worldly  interest  or  happiness.  Every 
one  too,  without  having  religion  in  his  thoughts,  speaks  of  the 
hazards  which  young  people  run,  upon  their  setting  out  in  the 
world  :  hazards  from  other  causes,  than  merely  their  ignorance, 
and  unavoidable  accidents.  And  some  courses  of  vice,  at  least, 
being  contrary  to  men's  worldly  interest  or  good ;  temptations  to 
these  must  at  the  same  time  be  temptations  to  forego  our  present 
and  our  future  interest. 

Thus  in  our  natural  or  temporal  capacity,  we  are  in  a  state  of 
trial,  i.e.  of  difficulty  and  danger,  analogous,  or  like  to  our  moral 
and  religious  trial.  This  will  more  distinctly  appear  to  any  one, 
who  thinks  it  worth  while,  more  distinctly,  to  consider,  what  it 
is  which  constitutes  our  trial  in  both  capacities,  and  to  observe^ 
how  oiankind  behave  under  it. 

*  Chap.  ii. 


130  PROBATION,  AS  IMPLYING  TRIAL,  part  i. 

That  wliieli  constitutes  this  trial,  in  both  these  capacities,  must 
be  something  either  in  our  external  circumstances,  or  in  our 
mature.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  persons  may  be  betrayed  into 
wrong  behavior  upon  surprise,  or  overcome  upon  any  other  very 
singular  and  extraordinary  external  occasions,  who  would,  other- 
wise, have  preserved  their  character  of  prudence  and  of  virtue  : 
in  which  cases,  every  one,  in  speaking  of  the  wrong  behavior  of 
these  persons,  would  impute  it  to  such  particular  external  circum- 
stances. On  the  other  hand,  men  who  have  contracted  habits  of 
vice  and  folly  of  any  kind,  or  have  some  particular  passions  in 
excess,  will  seek  opportunities,  and,  as  it  were,  go  out  of  their 
way,  to  gratify  themselves  in  these  respects,  at  the  expense  of 
their  wisdom  and  their  virtue ;  led  to  it,  as  every  one  would  say, 
not  by  external  temptations,  but  by  such  habits  and  passions. 
And  the  account  of  this  last  case  is,  that  particular  passions  are 
no  more  coincident  with  prudence,  or  that  reasonable  self-love, 
the  end  of  which  is  our  worldly  interest,  than  they  are  with  the 
principle  of  virtue  and  religion ;  but  often  draw  contrary  ways 
to  one,  as  well  as  to  the  other :  and  so  such  particular  passions 
aro  as  much  temptations,  to  act  imprudently  with  regard  to  our 
wo»-idly  interest,  as  to  act  viciously.*  When  we  say,  men  are 
mi&ied  by  external  circumstances  of  temptation ;  it  cannot  but  be 
upderstood,  that  there  is  somewhat  within  themselves,  to  render 
those  circumstances  temptations,  or  to  render  them  susceptible  of 
impressions  from  them.  So  when  we  say,  they  are  misled  by 
p^sions  J  it  is  always  supposed,  that  there  are  occasions,  circum- 
sUnces,  and  objects,  exciting  these  passions,  and  affording  means 
for .  gratifying  them.  Therefore,  temptations  from  within,  and 
from  without,  coincide,  and  mutually  imply  each  other.  The 
several  external  objects  of  the  appetites,  passions,  and  affections, 
being  present  to  the  senses,  or  offering  themselves  to  the  mind, 
and  so  exciting  emotions  suitable  to  their  nature ;  not  only  in 
cases  where  they  can  be  gratified  consistently  with  innocence  and 
prudence,  but  also  in  cases  where  they  cannot,  and  yet  can  be 
gratified  imprudently  and  viciously  :  this  as  really  puts  them  in 
danger  of  voluntarily  foregoing  their  present  interest  or  good,  as 
their  future  3  and  as  really  renders  self-denial  necessary  to  secure 

«-  See  Sermons  preached  at  the  Bolls,  1726,  2d  ed.  p.  205,  &c.  Pref.  p.  25,  &o. 
SBrin.  p.  21,  &c. 


CHAP.  IV.  DIFFICULTIES,  AND  DANGER.  131 

one,  as  the  other :  i.e.  we  are  iu  a  like  state  of  trial  with  respect 
to  both,  by  the  very  same  passions,  excited  by  the  very  same 
means. 

Thus  mankind  having  a  temporal  interest  depending  upoa 
themselves,  and  a  pi'udent  course  of  behavior  being  necessary  lo 
secure  it,  passions  inordinately  excited,  whether  by  means  of 
example,  or  by  any  other  external  circumstance,  towards  such 
objects,  at  such  times,  or  in  such  degrees,  as  that  they  cannot  be 
gratified  consistently  with  worldly  prudence,  are  temptations ; 
dangerous,  and  too  often  successful  temptations,  to  forego  a 
greater  temporal  good  for  a  less;  i.e.  to  forego  what  is,  upon  the 
whole,  our  temporal  interest,  for  the  sake  of  a  present  gratifica- 
tion. This  is  a  description  of  our  state  of  trial  in  our  temporal 
capacity.  Substitute  now  the  word  future  for  te^nj^oral,  and 
virtue  for  prudence;  and  it  will  be  just  as  proper  a  description 
of  our  state  of  trial  in  our  religious  capacity;  so  analogous  are 
they  to  each  other.° 

If,  from  consideration  of  this  our  like  state  of  trial  in  both  capa- 
cities, we  go  on  to  observe  farther,  how  mankind  behave  under  it ; 
we  shall  find  there  are  some,  who  have  so  little  sense  of  it,  that 
they  scarce  look  beyond  the  passing  day :  they  are  so  taken  up  with 
present  gratifications,  as  to  have,  in  a  manner,  no  feeling  of  con- 
sequences, no  regard  to  their  future  ease  or  fortune  in  this  life  • 
any  more  than  to  their  happiness  in  another.  Some  appear  to  b« 
blinded  and  deceived  by  inordinate  passion,  in  their  worldly  con- 
cerns, as  much  as  in  religion.  Others  are  not  deceived,  but  as  it 
were  forcibly  carried  away  by  the  like  passions,  against  their 
better  judgment,  and  feeble  resolutions  too  of  acting  better."*  And 
there  are  men,  and  truly  not  a  few,  who  shamelessly  avow,  not 
their  interest,  but  their  mere  will  and  pleasure,  to  be  their  law 
of  life  :   and  who,  in  open  defiance  of  every  thing  reasonable, 

"  ["If  we  persist  in  our  objection,  notwithstanding  these  analogies,  then 
should  we  conclude,  either  that  we  are  under  the  regimen  of  an  unrighteous 
Deity,  or  that  there  is  no  Deity  at  all." — Dr.  Chalmers.] 

^  [Shall  we  be  of  such  ?  Shall  we  forget  or  disregard  the  great  fact  that 
when  death  has  transferred  us  to  other  conditions,  we,  our  proper  selves,  will 
remain  ?  No  longer,  indeed,  united  with  flesh  and  blood,  surrounded  with 
nouses,  lands,  business,  or  enjoyments,  such  as  the  present,  hut  atill  oicrselven. 
Still  with  wants  to  be  supplied,  desires  to  be  gratified^  and  capacities  to  be 
employed  and  developed  !] 


132  PROBATIOX,  AS  IMPLYING  TRIAL,  part  i. 

will  go  on  in  a  course  of  vicious  extravagance,  foreseeing,  with 
no  remorse  and  little  fear,  that  it  will  be  their  temporal  ruin ; 
and  some  of  them,  under  the  apprehension  of  the  consequences 
of  wickedness  in  another  state.  To  speak  in  the  most  moderate 
way,  human  creatures  are  not  only  continually  liable  to  go  wrong 
voluntarily,  but  we  see  likewise  that  they  often  actually  do  so, 
with  respect  to  their  temporal  interests,  as  well  as  with  respect 
to  religion. 

Thus  our  difficulties  and  dangers,  or  our  trials  in  our  temporal 
and  our  religious  capacity,  as  they  proceed  from  the  same  causes, 
and  have  the  same  efiect  upon  men's  behavior,  are  evidently  ana- 
logous, and  of  the  same  kind. 

It  may  be  added,  that  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  miscarry- 
ing in  our  religious  state  of  trial,  are  greatly  increased,  and  one 
is  ready  to  think,  are  in  a  manner  wholly  made,  by  the  ill 
behavior  of  others;  by  a  wrong  education,  wrong  in  a  moral 
sense,  sometimes  positively  vicious )  by  general  bad  example ;  by 
the  dishonest  artifices  which  are  got  into  business  of  all  kinds; 
and,  in  very  many  parts  of  the  world,  by  religion's  being  cor- 
rupted into  superstitions,  which  indulge  men  in  their  vices.  In 
like  manner,  the  difficulties  of  conducting  ourselves  prudently 
in  respect  to  our  present  interest,  and  our  danger  of  being  led 
aside  from  pursuing  it,  are  greatly  increased,  by  a  foolish  educa- 
tion ;  and,  after  we  come  to  mature  age,  by  the  extravagance  and 
carelessness  of  others,  with  whom  we  have  intercourse  :  and  by 
mistaken  notions,  very  generally  prevalent,  and  taken  up  from 
common  opinion,  concerning  temporal  happiness,  and  wherein  it 
consists. 

Persons,  by  their  own  negligence  nnd/olli/  in  temporal  affairs,  no 
less  than  by  a  course  of  vice,  bring  themselves  into  new  difficulties, 
and,  by  habits  of  indulgence,  become  less  qualified  to  go  through 
them  :  and  one  irregularity  after  another,  embarrasses  things  to 
guch  a  degree,  that  they  know  not  whereabout  they  are;  and 
often  makes  the  path  of  conduct  so  intricate  and  perplexed,  that 
it  is  difficult  to  trace  it  out;  difficult  even  to  determine  what  is 
the  prudent  or  the  moral  part.  Thus,  for  instance,  wrong  be- 
havior in  one  stage  of  life,  youth ;  wrong,  I  mean  considering 
ourselves  only  in  our  temporal  capacity,  without  taking  in  reli- 
gion;   thiS;  in   several  ways,   increases  the  difficulties  of  right 


CHAP.  IV.  DIFFICULTIES,  AND  DANGER.  133 

behavior  in  mature  age;  i.e.  puts  us  into  a  more  disadvantageous 
state  of  trial  in  our  temporal  capacity. 

We-  are  an  inferior  part  of  the  creation  of  God.  There  are 
natural  appearances  of  our  being  in  a  state  of  degradation.*  We 
certainly  are  in  a  condition,  which  does  7iot  seem.;  by  any  means, 
the  most  advantageous  we  could  imagine  or  desire,  either  in  our 
natural  or  moral  capacity,  for  securing-  either  our  present  or 
future  interest.  However,  this  condition,  low,  and  careful,  and 
uncertain  as  it  is,  does  not  afford  any  just  ground  of  complaint. 
For,  as  men  may  manage  their  temporal  affairs  with  prudence, 
and  so  pass  their  days  here  on  earth  in  tolerable  ease  and  satis- 
faction, by  a  moderate  degree  of  care  :  so  likewise  with  regard  to 
religion,  there  is  no  more  required  than  what  they  are  well  able 
to  do,^  and  what  they  must  be  greatly  wanting  to  themselves,  if 
they  neglect.  And  for  persons  to  have  that  put  upon  them, 
which  they  are  well  able  to  go  through,  and  no  more,  we  natu- 
rally consider  as  an  equitable  thing ;  supposing  it  done  by  proper 
authority.  Nor  have  we  any  more  reason  to  complain  of  it,  with 
regard  to  the  Author  of  nature,  tban  of  his  not  having  given  us 
advantages  belonging  to  other  orders  of  creatures. 

[Remarks.]  The  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  the  state 
of  trial,  which  religion  teaches  us  we  are  in,  is  rendered  credible, 
by  its  being  throughout  uniform  and  of  a  piece  with  the  general 
conduct  of  Providence  towards  us,  in  all  other  respects  within 
the  compass  of  our  knowledge.  Indeed  if  mankind,  considered 
in  their  natural  capacity,  as  inhabitants  of  this  world  only,  found 
themselves,  from  their  birth  to  their  death,  in  a  settled  state  of 

*  Part  II.  chap.  v. 

«  [This  is  one  of  those  passages,  remarked  on  in  our  introduction,  as  a  state- 
ment not  properly  explained  or  guarded.  We  cannot  suppose  the  author,  to 
have  overlooked  the  great  fact  of  man's  fall  and  corruption.  That  the  argu- 
ment properly  considered,  stands  good,  is  the  verdict  of  such  a  man  as  Chal- 
mers. After  speaking  of  human  helplessness  in  matters  of  religion,  he  says, 
"There  is  nothing  in  this  [helplessness]  to  break  the  analogies  on  which  to 
found  the  negative  vindication  that  forms  the  great  and  undoubted  achieve- 
ment of  this  volume.  The  analogy  lies  here: — that  if  a  man  wills  to  obtain 
prosperity  in  this  life,  he  may,  if  observant  of  the  rules  which  experience  and 
wisdotu  prescribe,  in  general,  make  it  good.  And  if  he  wills  to  attain  blessed- 
cess  in  the  next  life,  he  shall,  if  observant  of  what  religion  prescribes,  most 
certJiinly  make  "*  good;  in  conformity  with  the  declaration,  *he  that  uCekelh 
findetb.'"] 

12 


1H4  PROBATION,  AS  IMPLYING  TRIAL,  part  i. 

J5rcurity  and  happiness,  without  any  solicitude  or  thought  of  their 
own  :  or  if  they  were  in  no  danger  of  being  brought  into  incon- 
veniences and  distress,  by  carelessness,  or  the  folly  of  passion, 
through  bad  example,  the  treachery  of  others,  or  the  deceitful 
appearances  of  things  :  were  this  our  natural  condition,  then  it 
might  seem  strange,  and  be  some  presumption  against  the  truth 
of  religion,  that  it  represents  our  future  and  more  general  in- 
terest, as  not  secure  of  course,  but  as  depending  upon  our  be- 
havior, and  requiring  recollection  and  self-government  to  obtain  it. 
It  then  might  be  alleged,  "What  you  say  is  our  condition,  in  one 
respect,  is  not  in  any  wise  of  a  sort  with  what  we  find,  by  expe- 
rience, is  our  condition  in  another.  Our  whole  present  interest 
is  secured  to  our  hands,  without  any  solicitude  of  ours ;  and  why 
should  not  our  future  interest,  if  we  have  any  such,  be  so  too?'^ 
But  since,  on  the  contrary,  thought  and  consideration,  the  volun- 
tary denying  ourselves  many  things  which  we  desire,  and  a  course 
of  behavior,  far  from  being  always  agreeable  to  us,  are  absolutely 
necessary  to  our  acting  even  a  common  decent,  and  common 
prudent  part,  so  as  to  pass  with  any  satisfaction  through  the 
present  world,  and  be  received  upon  any  tolerable  good  terms 
in  it :  since  this  is  the  case,  all  presumption  against  self-denial 
and  attention  being  necessary  to  secure  our  higher  interest,^  is 
removed. 

Had  we  not  experience,  it  might,  perhaps  speciously,  be  urged, 
that  it  is  improbable  any  thing  of  hazard  and  danger  should  be 
put  upon  us  by  an  infinite  being;  when  every  thing  which  has 
hazard  and  danger  in  our  manner  of  conception,  and  will  end  in 
error,  confusion,  and  misery,  is  already  certain  in  his  foreknow- 
ledge. Indeed,  why  any  thing  of  hazard  and  danger  should  be 
put  upon  such  frail  creatures  as  we  are,  may  well  be  thought  a 
difficulty  in  speculation ;  and  cannot  but  be  so,  till  we  know  the 
whole,  or  at  least  much  more  of  the  case.  But  still  the  consti- 
tution of  nature  is  as  it  is.  Our  happiness  and  misery  are  trusted 
to  our  conduct,  and  made  to  depend  upon  it.  Somewhat,  and, 
in  many  circumstances,  a  great  deal  too,  is  put  upon  us,  either  to 

^  [It  comes  to  this  : — good  things,  in  this  life,  are  not  forced  upon  us:  for  we 
may  refuse  them,  or  turn  any  of  them  into  evils.  Nor  are  they  offered  for  our 
mere  acceptance  :  but  only  as  the  results  of  self-control  and  painj-taking  So 
is  it,  as  to  heaven.] 


CHAP.  IV.  DIFFICULTIES,  AND  DANGER.  135- 

do,  or  to  sivffer,  as  we  choose.  All  t"he  various  miseries  of  life; 
which  people  bring  upon  themselves  by  neglfgeuce  and  folly, 
and  might  have  avoided  by  proper  care,  are  instances  of  this : 
which  miseries  are,  beforehand,  just  as  contingent  and  undeter- 
mined as  conduct,  and  left  to  be  determined  by  it. 

These  observations  are  an  answer^  to  the  objections  against  the 
credibility  of  a  state  of  trial,  as  implying  temptations,  and  real 
danger  of  miscarrying  with  regard  to  our  general  interest,  under 
the  moral  government  of  God.  And  they  show,  that,  if  we  are 
at  all  to  be  considered  in  such  a  capacity,  and  as  having  such  an 
interest,  the  general  analogy  of  Providence  must  lead  us  to  ap- 
prehend ourselves  in  danger  of  miscarrying,  in  different  degrees, 
as  to  this  interest,  by  our  neglecting  to  act  the  proper  part  be- 
longing to  us  in  that  capacity.  For  we  have  a  present  interest 
under  the  government  of  God,  which  we  experience  here  upon 
earth.  This  interest,  as  it  is  not  forced  upon  us,  so  neither  is  it 
offered  to  our  acceptance,  but  to  our  acquisition ;  and  in  such 
manner,  as  that  we  are  in  danger  of  missing  it,  by  means  of 
temptations  to  neglect,  or  act  contrary  to  it;  and  without  atten- 
tion and  self-denial,  we  must  and  do  miss  it.  It  is  then  perfectly 
credible,  that  this  may  be  our  case,  with  respect  to  that  chief  and 
final  good,  which  religion  proposes  to  us. 

e  [They  a^-e  an  answer,  but  a  cavil  remains, — viz. :  ''  the  difference  between 
temporal  and  eternal  things,  is  so  vast  that  the  cases  are  not  analogous." 
Faii-ly  considered,  the  cases  are  analogous,  differing  only  in  degree,  and  not  at 
all  in  principle.  What  would  be  wrong  on  a  great  scale,  is  wrong  on  a  small 
one. 

Perhaps  the  analogy  may  be  pressed  further.  As  the  happiness  and  life  of 
some  animals,  may  be  sacrificed  for  the  benefit  of  man,  why  may  not  the  hap- 
piness and  life  of  some  men,  be  sacrificed  for  the  good  of  innumerable  beings 
of  a  higher  order,  who  witness  the  afi'airs  of  this  earth?  It  would  but  bo 
securing  "the  greatest  good  of  the  greatest  number."  No  analogies  could 
teach  this,  for  analogies  of  course  teach  nothing.  But  if  the  Scriptures  con- 
tained this  doctrine,  immensely  more  repugnant  than  that  which  our  author  is 
here  defending,  would  analogy  offer  repellant  presumptions  ?] 


,3G  PROBATION  AS  A  DISCIPLINE.  parti 


CHAPTER  V. 

PROBATION,    AS   INTENDED    FOR    MORAL   DISCIPLINE 
AND   IMPROVEMENT. 

From  the  consideration  of  our  being  in  a  probation-state,  of 
so  much  difficulty  and  hazard,  naturally  arises  the  question,  how 
we  came  to  be  placed  in  it  ?  But  such  a  general  inquiry  as  this 
would  be  found  involved  in  insuperable  difficulties.  For,  though 
some  of  these  difficulties  would  be  lessened,  by  observing  that  all 
wickedness  is  voluntary,  as  is  implied  in  its  very  notion  j  and 
that  many  of  the  miseries  of  life  have  apparent  good  effects : 
yet,  when  we  consider  other  circumstances  belonging  to  both, 
and  what  must  be  the  consequence  of  the  former  in  a  life  to 
come,  it  cannot  but  be  acknowledged  plain  folly  and  presump- 
tion, to  pretend  to  give  an  account  of  the  wliole  7'easons  of  this 
matter;  the  whole  reasons  of  our  being  allotted  a  condition,  out 
of  which  so  much  wickedness  and  misery,  so  circumstanced, 
would  in  fact  arise.  Whether  it  be  not  beyond  our  faculties,  not 
only  to  find  out,  but  even  to  understand;  or,  though  we  should 
be  supposed  capable  of  understanding  it,  yet,  whether  it  would 
be  of  service  or  prejudice  to  us  to  be  informed  of  it,  is  impos- 
sible to  say.  But  as  our  present  condition  can  in  no  wise  be 
shown  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  perfect  moral  government  of 
God  :  so  religion  teaches  us  we  were  placed  in  it,  that  we  might 
qualify  ourselves,  by  the  practice  of  virtue,  for  another  state 
which  is  to  follow  it.  This,  though  but  a  partial  answer,  a  very 
partial  one  indeed,  to  the  inquiry  now  mentioned;  is  yet  a  more 
satisfactory  answer  to  another,  which  is  of  real,  and  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  us  to  have  answered, — viz. :  What  is  our  business 
here  ?  The  known  end  then,  why  we  are  placed  in  a  state  of  so 
much  affliction,  hazard,  and  difficulty,  is,  our  improvement  in 
virtue  and  piety,  as  the  requisite  qualification  for  a  future  state 
of  security  and  happiness. 

Tbe  beginning  of  life,  considered  as  an  education  for  mature 
age  in  the  present  world,  appears  plainly,  at  first  sight,  analogous 
to  this  our  trial  for  a  future  one  :  the  former  being  in  our  tern 
poral  capacity,  what  the  latter  is  in  our  religious  capacity.    8om«9 


OHAP.  V.  PROBATION  AS  A  DISCIPLINE.  13''' 

observations  common  to  both,  and  a  more  distinct  consideration 
of  each,  will  more  distinctly  show  tbe  extent  and  force  of  the 
analogy  between  them ;  and  the  credibility,  which  arises  from 
hence,  as  well  as  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  that  the  present 
life  was  intended  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  a  future  one. 

I.  Every  species  of  creatures  is,  we  see,  designed  for  a  par- 
ticular way  of  life ;  to  which,  the  nature,  the  capacities,  temper, 
and  qualifications,  of  each  species,  are  as  necessary  as  their  ex- 
ternal circumstances.  Both  come  into  the  notion  of  such  state, 
or  particular  way  of  life,  and  are  constituent  parts  of  it.  Change 
a  man's  capacities  or  character,  to  the  degree  in  which  it  is  con- 
ceivable they  may  be  changed,  and  he  would  be  altogether  in- 
capable of  a  human  course  of  life,  and  human  happiness;  as 
incapable,  as  if,  his  nature  continuing  unchanged,  he  were  placed 
in  a  world,  where  he  had  no  sphere  of  action,  nor  any  objects  to 
answer  his  appetites,  passions,  and  affections  of  any  sort.  One 
thing  is  set  over  against  another,  as  an  ancient  writer  expresses 
it.*  Our  nature  corresponds  to  our  external  condition.  With- 
out this  correspondence,  there  would  be  no  possibility  of  any  such 
thing  as  human  life  and  happiness  :  which  life  and  happiness  are, 
therefore,  a  result  from  our  nature  and  condition  jointly:  mean- 
ing by  human  life,  not  living  in  the  literal  sense,  but  the  whole 
complex  notion  commonly  understood  by  those  words.  So  that 
without  determining  what  will  be  the  employment  and  happiness, 
the  particular  life,  of  good  men  hereafter;  there  must  be  some 
determinate  capacities,  some  necessary  character  and  qualifica- 
tions, without  which  persons  cannot  but  be  utterly  incapable  of 
it :  in  like  manner,  as  there  must  be  some,  without  which  men 
would  be  incapable  of  their  present  state  of  life. 

II.  The  constitution  of  human  creatures,  and  indeed  of  all 
creatures  which  come  under  our  notice,  is  such,  as  that  they  are 
capable  of  naturally  becoming  Ciualified  for  states  of  life,  for 
which  they  were  once  wholly  unqualified.  In  imagination  we 
may  indeed  conceive  of  creatures,  incapable  of  having  any  of 
their  faculties  naturally  enlarged,  or  as  being  unable  naturally 
to  acquire  any  new  qualifications.     But  the  faculties  of  every 

a  [That  is,  the  son  of  Sirac,  who  says,  "All  things  are  double,  one  against 
ai^other;  ani  He  hath  made  nothing  imperfect:  one  thing  establisheth  the 
good  •!  another  :"  Ecclesiasticus  xlii.  24.] 

12* 


l38  PROBATION  AS   A   DISCIPLINE.  part  i 

species  known  to  us,  are  made  for  enlargement;  for  acquirements 
of  experience  and  habits.  We  find  ourselves,  in  particulai,  en- 
dued with  capacities,  not  only  of  perceiving  ideas,  and  of  know- 
ledge or  perceiving  truth,  but  also  of  storing  up  ideas  and  know- 
ledge by  memory.  AVe  are  capable,  not  only  of  acting,  and  of 
having  different  momentary  impressions  made  upon  us;  but  of 
getting  a  new  facility  in  any  kind  of  action,  and  of  settled  altera- 
tions in  our  temper  or  character.  The  power  of  the  two  last  is 
the  power  of  habits.  But  neither  the  perception  of  ideas,  nor 
knowledge  of  any  sort,  are  habits;  though  absolutely  necessary  to 
the  forming  of  them.  However,  apprehension,  reason,  memory, 
which  are  the  capacities  of  acquiring  knowledge,  are  greatly  im- 
proved by  exercise.  Whether  the  word  habit  is  applicable  to  all 
these  improvements,  and  in  particular  how  far  the  powers  of 
memory  and  of  habits  may  be  powers  of  the  same  nature,  I  shall 
not  inquire.  But  that  perceptions  come  into  our  minds  readily 
and  of  course,  by  means  of  their  having  been  there  before,  seems 
a  thing  of  the  same  sort,  as  readiness  in  any  particular  kind  of 
action,  proceeding  from  being  accustomed  to  it.  Aptness  to  re- 
collect practical  observations,  of  service  in  our  conduct,  is  plainly 
habit  in  many  cases.  There  are  habits  of  perception,  and  habits 
of  action.  An  instance  of  the  former,  is  our  constant  and  even 
involuntary  readiness,  in  correcting  the  impressions  of  our  sight 
concerning  magnitudes  and  distances,  so  as  to  substitute  judg- 
ment in  the  room  of  sensation,  imperceptibly  to  ourselves.  It 
seems  as  if  all  other  associations  of  ideas  not  naturally  connected, 
might  be  called  passive  habits;  as  properly  as  our  readiness  in 
understanding  languages  upon  sight,  or  hearing  of  words.  Our 
readiness  in  speaking  and  writing  them,  are  instances  of  active 
habits. 

For  distinctness,  we  may  consider  habits,  as  belonging  to  the 
body,  or  to  the  mind :  and  the  latter  will  be  explained  by  the 
former.  Under  the  former  are  comprehended  all  bodily  activities 
or  motions,  whether  graceful 'or  unbecoming,  which  are  owing  to 
use:  u^der  the  latter,  general  habits  of  life  and  conduct;  such  as 
those  of  obedience  and  submission  to  authority,  or  to  any  par- 
ticular person;  those  of  veracity,  justice,  and  charity;  those  of 
attention,  industry,  self-government,  envy,  revenge.  Habits  of 
this  latter  kind  seem  produced  by  repeated  acts,  as  well  as  Jhe 


CHAP.  V.  PROBATION  AS   A   DISCIPLINE.  139 

former.  And  as  habits  belonging  to  the  body  are  produced  by 
external  acts,  so  habits  of  the  mind  are  produced  by  the  exertion 
of  inward  practical  principles;  i.e.  by  carrying  them  into  act,  or 
acting  upon  them  ;  the  principles  of  obedience,  of  veracity,  justice, 
and  charity.  Nor  can  those  habits  be  formed  by  any  external 
course  of  action,  otherwise  than  as  it  proceeds  from  these  princi- 
ples: because  it  is  only  these  inward  principles  exerted,  which 
are  strictly  acts  of  obedience,  of  veracity,  of  justice,  and  of 
charity. 

So  likewise  habits  of  attention,  industry,  self-government,  are 
in  the  same  manner  acquired  by  exercise;  and  habits  of  envy  and 
revenge  by  indulgence,  whether  in  outward  act,  or  in  thought 
and  intention;  i.e.  inward  act:  for  such  intention  is  an  act. 
Resolutions  to  do  well,  are  also  properly  acts.  And  endeavoring 
to  enforce  upon  our  own  minds  a  practical  sense  of  virtue,  or  to 
beget  in  others  that  practical  sense  of  it,  which  a  man  really  has 
himself,  is  a  virtuous  act.  All  these,  therefore,  may  and  will 
contribute  towards  forming  good  habits.  But  going  over  the 
theory  of  virtue  in  one's  thoughts,  talking  well,  and  drawing  fine 
pictures,  of  it;  this  is  so  far  from  necessarily  or  certainly  con- 
ducing to  form  a  habit  of  it,  in  him  who  thus  employs  himself,  tliat 
it  may  harden  the  mind  in  a  contrary  course,  and  render  it  gradu- 
ally more  insensible;  i.e.  form  a  habit  of  insensibility  to  all  moral 
considerations.  For,  from  our  very  faculty  of  habits,  passive  im- 
pressions, by  being  repeated,  grow  weaker.  Thoughts,  by  often 
passing  through  the  mind,  are  felt  less  sensibly:  being  accus- 
tomed to  danger,  begets  intrepidity,  i.e.  lessens  fear;  to  distress, 
lessens  the  passion  of  pity;  to  instances  of  others'  mortality, 
lessens  the  sensible  apprehension  of  our  own. 

From  these  two  observations  together,  that  practical  habits  are 
formed  and  strengthened  by  repeated  acts,  and  that  passive  im- 
pressions grow  weaker  by  being  repeated  upon  us,  it  must  follow, 
that  active  habits  may  be  gradually  forming  and  strengthening, 
by  a  course  of  acting  upon  such  and  such  motives  and  excite- 
ments, while  these  motives  and  excitements  themselves  are,  by 
proportionable  degrees,  growing  less  sensible;  i.e.  are  continually 
less  and  less  sensibly  felt,  even  as  the  active  habits  strengthen. 
And  experience  confirms  this :  for  active  principles,  at  the  very 
lime  that  they  are  less  lively  in  perception  than  they  were,  are 


140  PROBATION   AS   A   DISCIPLINE.  part  i. 

found  to  be,  somehow,  wrought  more  thoroughly  into  the  temper 
and  character,  and  become  more  effectual  in  influencing  our  prac- 
tice. The  three  things  just  mentioned  may  afford  instances  of  it. 
Perception  of  danger  is  a  natural  excitement  of  passive  fear,  and 
active  caution:  and  by  being  inured  to  danger,  habits  of  the  latter 
are  gradually  wrought,  at  the  same  time  that  the  former  gradually 
lessens.  Perception  of  distress  in  others  is  a  natural  excitement, 
passively  to  pity,  and  actively  to  relieve  it:  but  let  a  man  set 
himself  to  attend  to,  inquire  out,  and  relieve  distressed  persons, 
and  he  cannot  but  grow  less  and  less  sensibly  affected  with  the 
various  miseries  of  life,  with  which  he  must  become  acquainted; 
when  yet,  at  the  same  time,  benevolence,  considered  not  as  a 
passion,  but  as  a  practical  principle  of  action,  will  strengthen : 
and  while  he  passively  compassionates  the  distressed  less,  he  will 
acquire  a  greater  aptitude  actively  to  assist  and  befriend  them. 
So  also  at  the  same  time  that  the  daily  instances  of  men's  dying 
around  us  give  us  daily  a  less  sensible  passive  feeling  or  appre- 
hension of  our  own  mortality,  such  instances  greatly  contribute  to 
the  strengthening  a  practical  regard  to  it  in  serious  men;  i.e.  to 
forming  a  habit  of  acting  with  a  constant  view  to  it. 

This  seems  further  to  show,  that  passive  impressions  made 
upon  our  minds  by  admonition,  experience,  or  example,  though 
they  may  have  a  remote  efficacy,  and  a  very  great  one,  towards 
forming  active  habits,  yet  can  have  this  efficacy  no  otherwise 
than  by  inducing  us  to  such  a  course  of  action :  and  that  it  is  not 
being  affected  so  and  so,  but  acting,  which  forms  those  habits : 
only  it  must  be  always  remembered,  that  real  endeavors  to  enforce 
good  impressions  upon  ourselves  are  a  species  of  virtuous  action. 
Nor  do  we  know  how  far  it  is  possible,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
that  effects  should  be  wrought  in  us  at  once,  equivalent  to  habits; 
i.e.  what  is  wrought  by  use  and  exercise.  The  thing  insisted  on 
is,  not  what  may  be  possible,  but  what  is  in  fact  the  appointment 
of  nature :  which  is,  that  active  habits  are  to  be  formed  by  exer- 
cise. Their  progress  may  be  so  gradual,  as  to  be  imperceptible 
in  its  steps :  it  may  be  hard  to  explain  the  fiiculty,  by  which  we 
are  capable  of  habits,  throughout  its  several  parts;  and  to  trace 
it  up  to  its  original,  so  as  to  distinguish  it  from  all  others  in  ou'' 
mind :  and  it  seems  as  if  contrary  effects  were  to  be  ascribed  to 
it.     But  the  thing  in  general,  that  our  nature  is  formed  to  yield 


CHAP.  V.  PROBATION   AS   A   DISCIPLINE.  141 

to  use  and  exercise,  in  some  such  manner  as  this,  is  matter  of 
certain  experience. 

Thus,  by  accustoming  ourselves  to  any  course  of  action,  we  get 
an  aptness  to  go  on,  a  facility,  readiness,  and  often  pleasure,  in 
it.  The  inclinations  which  rendered  us  averse  to  it,  grow  weaker; 
the  difficulties  in  it,  not  only  the  imaginary  but  the  real  ones, 
lessen;  the  reasons  for  it  offer  themselves  of  course  to  our  thoughts 
upon  all  occasions;  and  the  least  glimpse  of  them  is  sufficient  to 
make  us  go  on,  in  a  course  of  action,  to  which  we  have  been  ac- 
customed. Practical  principles  appear  to  grow  stronger,  abso- 
lutely in  themselves,  by  exercise;  as  well  as  relatively,  with 
regard  to  contrary  principles;  which,  by  being  accustomed  to 
submit,  do  so  habitually,  and  of  course.  Thus  a  new  character, 
in  several  respects,  may  be  formed;  and  many  habitudes  of  life, 
not  given  by  nature,  but  which  nature  directs  us  to  acquire. 

III.  Indeed  we  may  be  assured,  that  we  should  never  have  had 
these  capacities  of  improving  by  experience,  acquired  knowledge, 
and  habits,  had  they  not  been  necessary,  and  intended  to  be  made 
use  of.  And  accordingly  we  find  them  so  necessary,  and  so  much 
intended,  that  without  them  we  should  be  utterly  incapable  of 
that  which  was  the  end  for  which  we  were  made,  considered  in 
our  temporal  capacity  only  :  the  employments  and  satisfactions 
of  our  mature  state  of  life. 

Nature  does  in  no  wise  qualify  us  wholly,  much  less  at  once,  for 
this  mature  state  of  life.  Even  maturity  of  understanding,  and 
bodily  strength,  not  only  are  arrived  at  gradually,  but  are  also 
very  much  owing  to  the  continued  exercise  of  our  powers  of  body 
and  mind  from  infancy.  If  we  suppose  a  person  brought  into 
the  world  with  both  these  in  maturity,  as  far  as  this  is  conceivable, 
he  would  plainly  at  first  be  as  unqualified  for  the  human  life  of 
mature  age,  as  an  idiot.  He  would  be  in  a  manner  distracted, 
with  astonishment,  and  apprehension,  and  curiosity,  and  suspense: 
nor  can  one  guess,  how  long  it  would  be,  before  he  would  be 
familiarized  to  himself  and  the  objects  about  him,  enough  even  to 
set  himself  to  any  thing.  It  may  be  questioned  too,  whether  the 
natural  information  of  his  sight  and  hearing  would  be  of  any 
manner  of  use  to  him  in  acting,  before  experience.  And  it  seems, 
that  men  would  be  strangely  headstrong  and  self-willed,  and  dis- 
porvd  to  exert    themselves  with   an   impetuosity,   which  would 


142  PROBATION  AS  A  DISCIPLINE.  parti 

render  society  insupportable,  and  the  living  in  it  impracticable, 
were  it  not  for  some  acquired  moderation  and  self-government,  some 
aptitude  and  readiness  in  restraining  themselves,  and  concealing 
their  sense  of  things.  Want  of  every  thing  of  this  kind  which 
is  learnt  would  render  a  man  as  incapable  of  society,  as  want  of 
language  would;  or  as  his  natural  ignorance  of  any  of  the  par- 
ticular employments  of  life  would  render  him  incapable  of  pro- 
viding himself  with  the  common  conveniences,  or  supplying  the 
necessary  wants  of  it.  In  these  respects,  and  probably  in  many 
more  of  which  we  hivve  no  particular  notion,  mankind  is  left  by 
nature,  an  unformed,  unfinished  creature;  utterly  deficient  and 
unqualified,  before  the  acquirement  of  knowledge,  experience, 
and  habits,  for  that  mature  state  of  life,  which  was  the  end  of 
his  creation,  considering  him  as  related  only  to  this  world. 

But,  as  nature  has  endued  us  with  a  power  of  supplying. those 
deficiencies,  by  acquired  knowledge,  experience,  and  habits;  so 
likewise  we  are  placed  in  a  condition,  in  infancy,  childhood,  and 
youth,  fitted  for  it;  fitted  lor  our  acquiring  those  qualifications 
of  all  sorts,  which  we  stand  in  need  of  in  mature  age.  Hence 
children,  from  their  very  birth,  are  daily  growing  acquainted 
with  the  objects  about  them,  with  the  scene  in  which  they  are 
placed,  and  to  have  a  future  part ;  and  learning  something  or  other, 
necessary  to  the  performance  of  it.  The  subordinations,  to  which 
they  are  accustomed  in  domestic  life,  teach  them  self-government 
in  common  behavior  abroad,  and  prepare  them  for  subjection  and 
obedience  to  civil  authority.**  What  passes  before  their  eyes,  and 
daily  happens  to  them,  gives  them  experience,  caution  against 
treachery  and  deceit,  together  with  numberless  little  rules  of 
action  and  conduct,  which  we  could  not  live  without;  and  which 
are  learnt  so  insensibly  and  so  perfectly,  as  to  be  mistaken  per- 
haps for  instinct,  though  they  are  the  efiect  of  long  experience 
and  exercise;  as  much  so  as  language,  or  knowledge  in  particular 
business,  or  the  qualifications  and  behavior  belonging  to  the 
several  ranks  and  professions.  Thus  the  beginning  of  our  days 
is  adapted  to  be,  and  is,  a  state  of  education  in  the  theory  and 
practice  of  mature  life.  We  are  much  assisted  in  it  by  example, 
instruction,  and  the  care  of  others ;  but  a  great  deal  is  left  to 

*>  [Consult  jMillman's  Histi  of  Christ,  vol.  i. :  Priestley's  Institutes  of  Nat. 
and  Kev.  Rel.,  vol.  i.  ch.  i  •  and  WhatiiLy's  Pol.  Econ.j  sec.  5.1 


CHAP.  V.  PROBATION  AS  A  DISCIPLINE.  143 

ourselves  to  do.  And  of  this,  as  part  is  done  easily  and  of 
course;  so  part  requires  diligence  and  care,  the  voluntary  fore- 
going many  things  which  we  desire,  and  setting  ourselves  to  what 
we  should  have  no  inclination  to,  but  for  the  necessity  or  expe- 
dience of  it.  For  that  labor  and  industry,  which  the  station  of 
so  many  absolutely  requires,  they  would  be  greatly  unqualified 
for,  in  maturity,  as  those  in  other  stations  would  be  for  any  other 
sorts  of  application;  if  both  were  not  accustomed  to  them  in 
their  youth.  And,  according  as  persons  behave  themselves,  in 
the  general  education  which  all  go  through,  and  in  the  particular 
ones  adapted  to  particular  employments,  their  character  is 
formed,"  and  made  to  appear;  they  recommend  themselves  more 
or  less ;  and  are  capable  of,  and  placed  in,  different  stations  in 
society. 

The  former  part  of  life,  then,  is  to  be  considered  as  an  im- 
portant opportunity,  which  nature  puts  into  our  hands ;  and 
which,  when  lost  is  not  to  be  recovered.  And  our  being  placed 
in  a  state  of  discipline  throughout  this  life,  for  another  world,  is 
a  providential  disposition  of  things,  exactly  of  the  same  kind,  as 
our  being  placed  in  a  state  of  discipline  during  childhood,  for 
mature  age.  Our  condition  in  both  respects  is  uniform  and  of  a 
piece,  and  comprehended  under  one  and  the  same  general  law 
of  nature. 

If  we  were  not  able  at  all  to  discern,  how  or  in  what  way  the 
present  life  could  be  our  preparation  for  another ;  this  would  be 
DO  objection  against  the  credibility  of  its  being  so.  We  do  not 
discern,  how  food  and  sleep  contribute  to  the  growth  of  the 
body;  nor  could  have  any  thought  that  they  would,  before  we 

<=  [We  are  too  apt  to  overlook  the  effect  of  actions  on  the  actor;  (which  ia 
often  the  chief  effect)  in  improving  or  impairing  his  own  powers.  A  razor 
used  to  cut  wood  or  stone,  is  not  only  put  to  an  improper  use,  but  spoiled  for 
the  use  which  is  proper.  But  this  is  a  faint  illustration.  The  razor  may  be 
sharpened  again;  but  how  shall  we  restore  a  blunted  sensibility,  an  enfeebled 
judgment,  or  a  vitiated  appetite?  Our  wrong-doing  inflicts  worse  results  on 
ourselves  than  on  our  victims;  and  the  evil  may  spread  disaster  over  our  whole 
future.  Hence  the  young  make  a  fatal  blunder  when  they  suppose  that  an 
occasional  indulgence  in  impropriety  may  be  compatible  with  general  welfare, 
and  improvement.  Instead  of  balancing  the  pros  and  cons  of  a  particular 
act,  in  the  scale  of  utility  or  pleasure,  they  should  mark  well  its  effects  on 
themselves.  See  the  description  of  how  an  upright  being  may  fall;  in  a 
subsequent  part  of  this  chapter.] 


144  PIIOBATIOX  AS  A  DISCIPLINE.  part  i. 

had  experience.  Nor  do  children  at  all  thiuk,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  the  sports  and  exercises,  to  which  they  are  so  much  addicted, 
contribute  to  their  health  and  growth ;  nor,  on  the  other,  of  the 
necessity  which  there  is  for  their  being  restrained  in  them.  Nor 
are  they  capable  of  understanding  the  use  of  many  parts  of  dis- 
cipline, which  nevertheless  they  must  be  made  to  go  through,  in 
order  to  qualify  them  for  the  business  of  mature  age.  Were  we 
not  able  then  to  discover,  in  what  respects  the  present  life  could 
form  us  for  a  future  one ;  yet  nothing  would  be  more  supposable 
than  that  it  might,  in  some  respects  or  other,  from  the  general 
analogy  of  Providence.  And  this,  for  aught  I  see,  might  reason- 
ably be  said,  even  though  we  should  not  take  in  the  consideration 
of  God's  moral  government  over  the  world.     But, 

IV.  Take  in  this  consideration,  and  consequently,  that  the 
character  of  virtue  and  piety  is  a  necessary  qualification  for  the 
future  state,  and  then  we  may  distinctly  see,  how,  and  in  what 
respects,  the  present  life  may  be  a  preparation  for  it;  since  we 
want,  and  are  capable  of,  improvement  in  that  character,  hy 
moral  and  religious  habits;  and  the  present  life  is  Jit  to  be  a. 
state  of  discipline  for  such  improvement :  in  like  manner  as  we 
have  already  observed,  how,  and  in  what  respects,  infancy,  child- 
hood, and  youth,  are  a  necessary  preparation,  and  a  natural  state 
of  discipline,  for  mature  age. 

Nothing  which  we  at  present  see,  would  lead  us  to  the  thought 
of  a  solitary  inactive  state  hereafter.  If  we  judge  at  all  from 
the  analogy  of  nature,  we  must  suppose,  according  to  the  Scrip- 
ture account  of  it,  that  it  will  be  a  community.  And  there  is  no 
shadow  of  any  thing  unreasonable  in  conceiving,  though  there 
be  no  analogy  for  it,  that  this  community  will  be,  as  the  Scrip- 
ture represents  it,  under  the  more  immediate,  or,  if  such  an  ex- 
pression may  be  used,  the  more  sensible  government  of  God. 
Nor  is  our  ignorance,  what  will  be  the  employments  of  this 
happy  community,  nor  our  consequent  ignorance,  what  particular 
scope  or  occasion  there  will  be  for  the  exercise  of  veracity, 
justice,  and  charity,  among  the  members  of  it  with  regard  to 
each  other,  any  proof,  that  there  will  be  no  sphere  of  exercise 
for  those  virtues.  Much  less,  if  that  were  possible,  is  our  igno- 
rance any  proof,  that  there  will  be  no  occasion  for  that  frame  of 
mind,  or  character,  which  is  formed- by  the  daily  practice  of  those 


CHAP.  V.  PROBATION  AS  A  DISCIPLmE.  145 

particular  virtues  liere,  and  which  is  a  result  from  it.^  This  at 
least  must  be  owned  in  general,  that,  as  the  government  esta- 
blished in  the  universe  is  moral,  the  character  of  virtue  and 
piety  must,  in  some  way  or  other,  be  the  condition  of  our  happi- 
ness or  the  qualification  for  it. 

From  what  is  above  observed,  concerning  our  natural  power  of 
habits,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  we  are  capahle  of  moral  improve- 
ment by  discipline.  And  how  greatly  we  icant  it,  need  not  be 
proved  to  any  one  who  is  acquainted  with  the  great  wickedness 
of  mankind;  or  even  with  those  imperfections,  which  the  best 
are  conscious  of.  But  it  is  not  perhaps  distinctly  attended  to  by 
every  one,  that  the  occasion  which  human  creatures  have  for  dis- 
cipline, to  improve  in  them  this  character  of  virtue  and  piety,  is 
to  be  traced  up  higher  than  to  excess  in  the  passions,  by  indul- 
gence and  habits  of  vice.  Mankind,  and  perhaps  all  finite 
creatures,  from  the  very  constitution  of  their  nature,  before 
habits  of  virtue,  are  deficient,  and  in  danger  of  deviating  from 
what  is  right;  and  therefore  stand  in  need  of  virtuous  habits,  for 
a  security  against  this  danger.  For,  together  with  the  general 
principle  of  moral  understanding,  we  have  in  our  inward  frame 
various  afi"ections  towards  particular  external  objects.  These 
affections  are  naturally,  and  of  right,  subject  to  the  government 
of  the  moral  principle,  as  to  the  occasions  upon  which  they  may 
be  gratified ;  as  to  the  times,  degrees,  and  manner,  in  which  the 
objects  of  them,  may  be  pursued.  But  the  principle  of  virtue 
can  neither  excite  them,  nor  prevent  their  being  excited.  On  the 
contrary,  they  are  naturally  felt,  when  the  objects  of  them  are 
present  to  the  mind,  not  onl}^  before  all  consideration  whether 

^  [''It  might  seem,  at  first  sight,  that  if  our  state  hereafter  presented  no 
temptations  to  falsehood,  injustice,  &c.,  our  habit  of  indulging  these  vices  here 
■would  be  no  disqualification  for  such  a  state;  and  our  forming  the  contrary 
habits  no  qualification.  But  habits  of  veracity,  justice,  &c.  are  not  merely 
securities  against  temptations  to  the  contrary,  but  needful  for  conserving  the 
principles  of  love  of  truth,  justice,  &c.  As  our  happiness  depends  upon  the 
ratio  between  our  circumstances  and  our  dispositions,  our  happiness,  in  a  state 
where  things  are  ordered  so  as  to  give  no  scope  for  the  practice  of  falsehood, 
injustice,  &c.,  must  depend  on  our  having  formed  a  love  for  their  opjjosites. 

Besides,  the  circumstances  of  the  future  life  may  be  such  as  only  to  remove 
temptations  from  characters  formed  by  such  moral  discipline  as  we  undergo 
in  this  life,  and  not  all  things  that  could  be  temptations  to  any  one." — Prof. 
Fitzgerald.] 


K 


13 


X46  PROBATION  AS   A   DISCIPLINE.  part  i. 

they  can  be  obtaiDcd  bj  lawful  means,  but  after  it  is  .found  they 
cannot.  The  natural  objects  of  affection  continue  so;  the  neces- 
saries, conveniences,  and  pleasures  of  life,  remain  naturally  de- 
sirable, though  they  cannot  be  obtained  innocently :  nay,  though 
they  cannot  possibly  be  obtained  at  all.  And  when  the  objects 
of  any  affection  whatever  cannot  be  obtained  without  unlawful 
means;  but  may  be  obtained  by  them:  such  affection,  though  its 
being  excited,  and  its  continuing  some  time  in  the  mind,  be  as 
innocent  as  it  is  natural  and  necessary,  yet  cannot  but  be  con- 
ceived to  have  a  tendency  to  incline  persons  to  venture  upon  such 
unlawful  means  :  and  therefore  must  be  conceived  as  putting 
them  in  some  danger  of  it.  Now  what  is  the  general  security 
against  this  danger,  against  their  actually  deviating  from  right? 
As  the  danger  is,  so  also  must  the  security  be,  from  within :  from 
the  practical  principle  of  virtue.*  The  strengthening  or  improving 
this  principle,  considered  as  practical,  or  as  a  principle  of  action, 
will  lessen  the  danger,  or  increase  the  security  against  it.  And 
this  moral  principle  is  capable  of  improvement,  by  proper  dis- 
cipline and  exercise:  by  recollecting  the  practical  impressions 
which  example  and  experience  have  made  upon  us:  and,  instead 
of  following  humor  and  mere  inclination,  by  continually  attending 
to  the  equity  and  right  of  the  case,  in  whatever  we  are  engaged, 
be  it  in  greater  or  less  matters  ;  and  accustoniin-g  ourselves  always 
to  act  upon  it,  as  being  itself  the  just  and  natural  motive  of  action ; 
and  as  this  moral  course  of  behavior  must  necessarily,  under  the 
divine  government,  be  our  final  interest.      Thus  the  principle  of 

*  It  may  be  thought,  that  a  sense  of  interest  would  as  effectually  restrain 
creatures  from  doing  wrong.  But  if  by  a  sense  of  interest  is  meant  a  specula- 
tive conviction  or  belief,  that  such  and  such  indulgence  would  occasion  theai 
greater  uneasiness,  upon  the  whole,  than  satisfaction;  it  is  contrary  to  present 
experience  to  say,  that  this  sense  of  interest  is  sufficient  to  restrain  them  from 
thus  indulging  themselves.  And  if  by  a  sense  of  interest  is  meant  a  practical 
regard  to  what  is  upon  the  whole  our  happiness;  this  is  not  only  coincident 
with  the  principle  of  virtue  or  moral  rectitude,  but  is  a  part  of  the  idea  itself. 
And  it  is  evident  this  reasonable  self-love  wants  to  be  improved,  as  really  as 
any  principle  in  our  nature.  For  we  daily  see  it  overmatched,  not  onlj'^  by  the 
more  boisterous  passions,  but  by  curiosity,  shame,  love  of  imitation,  by  any 
thing,  even  indolence  :  especially  if  the  interest,  the  temporal  interest,  suppose, 
which  is  the  end  of  such  self-love,  be  at  a  distance.  So  greatly  are  profligate 
men  mistaken,  Avhen  they  affirm  they  are  wholly  governed  by  interestedness 
and  self-love;  and  so  little  cause  is  there  for  moralists  to  disclaim  th's  priu- 
ciple. — See  p.  131. 


CHAP.  V.  PROBATION  AS   A  DISCIPLmE.  147 

Virtue,  improved  into  a  liahit,  of  which  improvement  we  are  thus 
capable,  will  p)lainli/  he,  in  p>ro2Jortion  to  the  strength  of  it,  a 
security  against  the  danger  which  finite  creatures  are  in,  from 
the  very  nature  of  propension,  or  particidar  affections.  This 
way  of  putting  the  matter,  supposes  particular  affections  to  re- 
main in  a  future  state;  wliicli  it  is  scarce  possible  to  avoid  sup- 
posing. And  if  tliej  do;  we  clearly  see,  that  acquired  habits  of 
virtue  and  self-government  may  be  necessary  for  the  regulation 
of  them.  However,  though  we  were  not  distinctly  to  take  in 
this  supposition,  but  to  speak  only  in  general;  the  thing  really 
comes  to  the  same.  For  habits  of  virtue,  thus  acquired  by  dis- 
cipline, are  improvement  in  virtue:  and  improvement  in  virtue 
must  be  advancement  in  happiness,  if  the  government  of  the 
universe  be  moral. 

From  these  things  we  may  observe,  (and  it  will  further  show 
this  our  natural  and  original  need  of  being  improved  by  discipline,) 
how  it  comes  to  pass,  that  creatures  made  upright,  fall;  and  how 
those  who  preserve  their  uprightness,  raise  themselves  by  so 
doing,  to  a  more  secure  state  of  virtue.  To  say  that  the  former 
is  accounted  for  by  the  nature  of  liberty,  is  to  say  no  more,  than 
that  an  event's  actually  happening  is  accounted  for  by  a  mere 
possibility  of  its  happening.  But  it  seems  distinctly  conceivable 
from  the  very  nature  of  particular  affections  or  propensions.  For, 
suppose  creatures  intended  for  such  a  particular  state  of  life,  for 
which  such  propensions  were  necessary:  suppose  them  endued 
with  such  propensions,  together  with  moral  understanding,  as 
well  including  a  practical  sense  of  virtue  as  a  speculative  percep- 
tion of  it;  and  that  all  these  several  principles,  both  natural  and 
moral,  forming  an  inward  constitution  of  mind,  were  in  the  most 
exact  proportion  possible;  i.e.  in  a  proportion  the  most  exactly 
adapted  to  their  intended  state  of  life;  such  creatures  would  be 
made  upright,  or  finitely  perfect.  Now  particular  propensions, 
from  their  very  nature,  must  be  felt,  the  objects  of  them  being 
present;  though  they  cannot  be  gratified  at  all,  or  not  with  the 
allowance  of  the  moral  principle.  If  they  can  be  gratified  without 
its  allowance,  or  by  contradicting  it,  then  they  must  be  conceived 
to  have  some  tendency,  in  how  low  a  degree  soever,  yet  some 
tendency,  to  induce  persons  to  such  forbidden  gratification.  This 
tendency,  in  some  one  particular  propension,  may  be  increased, 


14»  PROBATION  AS   A   DISCIPLINE.  part  i. 

by  the  greater  frequency  of  occasions  naturally  exciting  it,  than 
of  occasions  exciting  others.  The  least  voluntary  indulgence  in 
forbidden  circumstances,^  though  but  in  thought,  will  increase 
this  wrong  tendency;  and  may  increase  it  further,  till,  peculiar 
conjunctures  perhaps  conspiring,  it  becomes  effect;  and  danger 
of  deviating  from  right,  ends  in  actual  deviation  from  it;  a  danger 
necessarily  arising  from  the  very  nature  of  propension,  and  which 
therefore  could  not  have  been  prevented,  though  it  might  have 
been  escaped,  or  got  innocently  through.  The  case  would  be,  as 
if  we  were  to  suppose  a  straight  path  marked  out  for  a  person,  in 
which  a  certain  degree  of  attention  would  keep  him  steady:  but 
if  he  would  not  attend,  in  this  degree,  any  one  of  a  thousand 
objects,  catching  his  eye,  might  lead  him  out  of  it. 

Now  it  is  impossible  to  say,  how  much  even  the  first  full  overt 
act  of  irregularity,  might  disorder  the  inward  constitution;  un- 
settle the  adjustments,  and  alter  the  proportions,  which  formed 
it,  and  in  which  the  uprightness  of  its  make  consisted:  but  repe- 
tition of  irregularities  would  produce  habits.  Thus  the  constitu- 
tion would  be  spoiled;  and  creatures  made  upright,  become 
corrupt  and  depraved  in  their  settled  character,  proportionably  to 
their  repeated  irregularities  in  occasional  acts.^     On  the  contrary, 

«  [Discipline  is  mainly  promoted  by  a  careful  regard  to  acts  of  small  indi- 
vidual moment.  The  subjecting  of  trivial  acts  to  moral  considerations,  is  the 
sure,  and  the  only  mode  of  self-culture.  These  acts  are  embryo  habits,  and  we 
may  often  see  clearly  the  moral  character  of  a  habit,  when  the  single  act  seems 
indifferent.  Thus  viewed,  the  importance  of  single  acts  will  seldom  seem  small. 
A  single  cigar,  one  glass  of  wine  for  convivial  purposes,  one  story  told  with 
exaggerations,  may  change  the  complexion  of  our  character,  and  of  our  whole 
destiny ! 

It  is  doing  or  refusing  to  do,  from  a  law-abiding  regard  to  consequences, 
that  constitutes  self-discipline.  Papists  wholly  err  in  teaching  the  repression 
of  bodily  desires  as  in  itself  virtuous.  Indulgence  maybe  either  an  obstacle  or 
an  aid  to  moral  progress,  according  to  our  reason  for  indulgence.  When  we 
can  repress  an  appetite  or  passion  whenever  indulgence  would  be  wrong,  its 
mastery  over  us  is  broken;  and  when  the  passions  and  appetites  act  rightly, 
from  force  of  virtuous  habit,  without  direct  volition,  discipline  is  complete. 
Ascetic  acts  are  only  useful  as  means,  and  so  long  as  they  are  ascetic  (askesis) 
are  proofs  of  imperfect  obedience.  Discipline  is  good  only  as  discipline j  and 
when  complete,  changes  from  a  struggle  between  principle  and  inclination,  to 
a  spontaneous  habit,  and  permanent  mental  peace.] 

'  [Chalmers  objects  to  this  hypothetical  fall  of  man,  that  it  wants  harmony 
•with  the  Sc-ipture  account.  But  I  do  not  see  the  force  of  the  objection.  Butler 
cf  course  does  nut  copy  the  Scripture  account,  for  he  would  then  depart  from  tie 


CHAP.  V.  PROBATION  AS   A   DISCIPLINE.  149 

these  creatures  might  have  improved  and  raised  themselves,  to  a 
higher  and  more  secure  state  of  virtue,  by  the  contrary  behavior : 
by  steadily  following  the  moral  principle,  supposed  to  be  one  part 
of  their  nature :  and  thus  iDitlistandliig  that  unavoidable  danger 
of  defection,  which  necessarily  arose  from  propension,  the  other 
part  of  it.  For,  by  thus  preserving  their  integrity  for  some  time, 
their  danger  would  lessen;  siuce  propensions,  by  being  inured  to 
submit,  would  do  it  more  easily  and  of  course :  and  their  security 
asainst  this  lessenino-  dansfer  would  increase:  since  the  moral 
principle  would  gain  additional  strength  by  exercise :  both  which 
things  are  implied  in  the  notion  of  virtuous  habits. 

Thus  vicious  indulgence  is  not  only  criminal  in  itself,  but  also 
depraves  the  inward  constitution  and  character.  And  virtuous 
self-government  is  not  only  right  in  itself,  but  also  improves  the 
inward  constitution  or  character :  and  may  improve  it  to  such  a 
degree,  that  though  we  should  suppose  it  impossible  for  particular 
affections  to  be  absolutely  coincident  with  the  moral  principle; 
and  consequently  should  allow,  that  such  creatures  as  have  been 
above  supposed,  would  forever  remain  defectible,  yet  their  danger 
of  actually  deviating  from  right  may  be  almost  infinitely  lessened, 
and  they  fully  fortified  against  what  remains  of  it;  if  that  may 
be  called  danger,  against  which  there  is  an  adequate,  effectual 
security.  Still,  this  their  higher  perfection  may  continue  to  con- 
sist in  habits  of  virtue  formed  in  a  state  of  discipline,  and  this 
their  more  complete  security  remain  to  proceed  from  them. 

Thus  it  is  plainly  conceivable,  that  creatures  without  blemish, 
as  they  came  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  may  be  in  danger  of  going 
wrong;  and  so  may  stand  in  need  of  the  security  of  virtuous 
habits,  additional  to  the  moral  principle  wrought  into  their  natures 
by  him.  That  which  is  the  ground  of  their  danger,  or  their 
want  of  security,  may  be  considered  as  a  deficiency  in  themselves, 

aim  and  nature  of  his  book.  The  Bible  says  man  fell  suddenly,  no  less  in  his 
state  than  in  his  character.  Butler  says  that  we  could  not  reason  out  how  much 
disorder  and  damage  would  ensue  from  the  first  sin  :  and  in  saying  this,  avoids 
any  incongruity  with  the  Mosaic  account,  which  tells  us  how  much.  What  B. 
Bays  of  the  formation  of  habit,  by  repeated  transgressions,  certainly  cannot  be 
gainsayed. 

Adam  "died,"  the  very  day  he  ate  the  forbidden  fruit.  The  sinner  "lives" 
the  very  day  he  believes  on  the  only-begotten  Son  of  God.  Increase  of  guilt, 
br  growth  in  grace  are  predicable  in  both  instances.  In  both  also  there  is  aa 
ioi^ant  transition  into  a  new  relationship  with  God.] 

13* 


150  PROBATION  AS  A  DISCIPLINE.  part  i. 

to  wliich  virtuous  liabits  are  the  natural  supply.  And  as  they 
are  naturally  capable  of  being  raised  and  improved  by  discipline, 
't  may  be  a  thing  fit  and  requisite,  that  they  should  be  placed 
in  circumstances  with  an  eye  to  it :  in  circumstances  peculiarly 
fitted  to  be  to  them  a  state  of  discipline  for  their  improvement  in 
virtue. 

But  how  much  more  strongly  nnist  this  hold  with  respect  to 
those  who  have  corrupted  their  natures,  are  fallen  from  their 
original  rectitude,  and  whose  passions  are  become  excessive  by 
repeated  violations  of  their  inward  constitution  !  Upright  crea- 
tures may  want  to  be  improved  :  depraved  creatures  want  to  be 
renewed.  Education  and  discipline,  which  may  be  in  all  degrees 
and  sorts  of  gentleness  and  of  severity,  are  expedient  for  those : 
but. must  be  absolutely  necessary  for  these.  For  these,  discipline 
of  the  severer  sort  too,  and  in  the  higher  degrees  of  it,  must  be 
necessary,  in  order  to  wear  out  vicious  habits ;  to  recover  their 
primitive  strength  of  self-government,  which  indulgence  must 
have  weakened ;  to  repair,  as  well  as  raise  into  a  habit,  the  mordl 
principle,  in  order  to  their  arriving  at  a  secure  state  of  virtuoxis 
happiness. 

Whoever  will  consider  the  thing,  may  clearly  see  that  tbe 
present  world  is  'peculiarly  jit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  this 
purpose,  to  such  as  will  set  themselves  to  mend  and  improve. 
For,  the  various  temptations  with  which  we  are  surrounded;  our 
experience  of  the  deceits  of  wickedness ;  having  been  in  many 
instances  led  wrong  ourselves;  the  great  vieiousness  of  the  world; 
the  infinite  disorders  eonsec|uent  upon  it;  our  being  made  ac- 
quainted with  pain  and  sorrow,  either  from  our  own  feeling  of  it, 
or  from  the  sight  of  it  in  others ;  these  things,  though  some  of 
them  may  indeed  produce  wrong  effects  upon  our  minds,  yet 
when  duly  reflected  upon,  have,  all  of  them,  a  direct  tendency 
to  bring  us  to  a  settled  moderation  and  reasonableness  of  temper* 
the  contrary  both  to  thoughtless  levity,  and  also  to  that  unre- 
strained self-will,  and  violent  bent  to  follow  present  inclination, 
which  may  be  observed  in  undisciplined  minds. 

Such  experience,  as  the  present  state  affords,  of  the  frailty 
of  our  nature ;  of  the  boundless  extravagance  of  ungoverned 
passion ;  of  the  power  which  an  infinite  being  has  over  us,  by 
the  various  capacities  of  misery  which  he  has  given  us ;  in  short, 


CHAP.  V.  PROBATIOX  AS  A  DISCIPLINE.  151 

tliat  kind  and  degree  of  experience,  wliicli  the  present  state 
affords  us,  that  the  constitution  of  nature  is  such  as  to  adraiu 
the  possibility,  the  danger,  and  the  actual  event,  or  creatures 
losing'  their  innocence  and  happiness,  and  becoming  vicious  and 
wretched;  has  a  tendency  to  give  us  a  practical  sense  of  things 
very  different  from  a  mere  speculative  knowledge,  that  we  are 
liable  to  vice,  and  capable  of  misery.  And  who  knows,  whether 
the  security  of  creatures  in  the  highest  and  most  settled  state  of 
perfection,  may  not  in  part  arise,  from  their  having  had  such  a 
sense  of  things  as  this,  formed,  and  habitually  fixed  within  them, 
in  some  state  of  probation.  And  passing  through  the  present 
world  with  that  moral  attention,  which  is  necessary  to  the  acting 
a  right  part  in  it,  may  leave  everlasting  impressions  of  this  sort 
upon  our  minds. 

To  be  a  little  more  distinct :  allurements  to  what  is  wroag, 
difl&culties  in  the  discharge  of  our  duty,  our  not  being  able  to  act 
a  uniform  right  part  without  some  thought  and  care,  and  the 
opportunities  which  we  have,  or  imagine  we  have,  of  avoiding 
what  we  dislike  or  obtaining  what  we  desire,  by  unlawful  means, 
when  we  either  cannot  do  it  at  all,  or  at  least  not  so  easily,  by 
lawful  ones,  these  things,  i.e.  the  snares  and  temptations  of  vice, 
are  what  render  the  present  world  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state  of 
discipline,  to  those  who  will  preserve  their  integrity:  because 
they  render  being  upon  our  guard,  resolution,  and  the  denial  of 
our  passions,  necessary  in  order  to  that  end.  The  exercise  of 
such  particular  recollection,  intention  of  mind,  and  self-govern- 
ment, in  the  practice  of  virtue,  has,  from  the  make  of  our  nature, 
a  peculiar  tendency  to  form  habits  of  virtue;  as  implying,  not 
only  a  real,  but  also  a  more  continued,  and  a  more  intense  exer- 
cise of  the  virtuous  principle,  or  a  more  constant  and  a  stronger 
effort  of  virtue  exerted  into  act.  Thus  suppose  a  person  to  know 
himself  to  be  in  particular  danger,  for  some  time,  of  doing  any 
thing  wrong,  which  yet  he  fully  resolves  not  to  do;  continued 
recollection  and  keeping  upon  his  guard,  in  order  to  make  good 
bis  resolution,  is  a  continued  exerting  of  that  act  of  virtue 
m  a  high  dcyree,  which  nec^d  have  been,  and  perhaps  would 
nave  been,  only  instantancons  and  iccqIl,  had  the  tcmptatioQ 
been  so. 

It  is  indeed  ridiculous  to  assert,  that  self-denial  is  essential  to 


352  PROBATION  AS  A  DISCIPLIXE.  pakt  i. 

virtue  and  piety  i^  but  it  would  have  been  nearer  the  truth, 
though  not  strictly  the  truth  itself,  to  have  said,  that  it  is  essen- 
tial to  discipline  and  improvement.  For  though  actions  ma- 
terially virtuous,  which  have  no  sort  of  difl&culty,  but  are  per- 
fectly agreeable  to  our  particular  inclinations,  may  possibly  be 
done  only  from  these  particular  inclinations,  and  so  may  not  be 
any  exercise  of  the  principle  of  virtue,  i.e.  not  be  virtuous  actions 
at  all;  yet,  on  the  contrary,  they  may  be  an  exercise  of  that 
principle  :  and  when  they  are,  they  have  a  tendency  to  form  and 
fix  the  habit  of  virtue.  But  when  the  exercise  of  the  virtuous 
principle  is  more  continued,  oftener  repeated,  and  more  intense; 
as  it  must  be  in  circumstances  of  danger,  temptation,  and  diffi- 
culty, of  any  kind  and  in  any  degree;  tbis  tendency  is  increased 
proportionably,  and  a  more  confirmed  habit  is  the  consequence. 

This  undoubtedly  holds  to  a  certain  length :  but  how  far  it 
may  hold,  I  know  not.  Neither  our  intellectual  powers,  nor  our 
bodily  strength  can  be  improved  beyond  a  certain  degree :  and 
both  may  be  overwrought.  Possibly  there  may  be  something 
analogous  to  this,  with  respect  to  the  moral  character;  which  is 
scarce  worth  considering.  I  mention  it  only,  lest  it  should  come 
into  some  persons'  thoughts,  not  as  an  exception  to  the  foregoing 
observations,  which  perhaps  it  is ;  but  as  a  confutation  of  them, 
which  it  is  not.  And  there  may  be  several  other  exceptions. 
Observations  of  this  kind  cannot  be  supposed  to  hold  minutely, 
and  in  every  case.  It  is  enough  that  they  hold  in  general.  And 
these  plainly  hold  so  far,  as  that  from  them  may  be  seen  dis- 
tinctly, (which  is  all  that  is  intended  by  them,)  that  the  ^present 
world  is  jpeculiarly  jit  to  he  a  state  of  discipline,  for  our  im- 
j^rovemcnt  in  virtue  and  piety:  in  the  same  sense  as  some 
sciences,  by  requiring  and  engaging  the  attention,  not  to  be  sure 
of  such  persons  as  will  not,  but  of  such  as  will,  set  themselves 
to  them,  are  fit  to  form  the  mind  to  habits  of  attention. 

e  [A  forced  or  reluctant  obedience  is  wholly  incompatible  with  earthly  hap- 
piness; but  may,  in  the  highest  degree  promote  our  future  happiness.  It  will 
Dot  lone/  mar  our  happiness,  even  here;  because  being  based  on  principle,  and 
establit^hed  b}^  habit,  it  will,  in  process  of  time,  be  superseded  by  prompt  and 
pleasurable  submission.  Thus  a  person  habitually  virtuous,  is  hardly  conscious 
of  self-denial ;  a  fact  noticed  fc^  Aristotle.  "  He  who  abstains  from  bodily 
pleasures  and  delights,  is  virtuous  in  this  very  abstinence;  but  he  who  ia 
troubled  by  it,  is  undisciplined."     Ethic.  Kic.  ii.  3.1 


«BAP.  V.  PROBATION  AS  A  DISCIPLINE.  153 

Indeed  the  present  state  is  so  far  from  proving,  in  event,  a  dis- 
cipliue  of  virtue  to  the  generality  of  men,  that  on  the  contrary 
they  seem  to  make  it  a  discipline  of  vice.  And  the  viciousness 
of  the  world  is,  in  different  ways,  the  great  temptation  which 
renders  it  a  state  of  virtuous  discipline,  in  the  degree  it  is,  to 
good  men.  The  whole  end,  and  the  whole  occasion,  of  man- 
kind's being  placed  in  such  a  state  as  the  present,  is  not  pre- 
tended to  be  accounted  for.  That  which  appears  amidst  the 
general  corruption,  is,  that  there  are  some  persons,  who,  having 
within  them  the  principle  of  amendment  and  recovery,  attend  to 
and  follow  the  notices  of  virtue  and  religion,  be  they  more  clear 
or  more  obscure,  which  are  afforded  them ;  and  that  the  present 
world  is  not  only  an  exercise  of  virtue  in  these  persons,  but  an 
exercise  of  it  in  ways  and  degrees,  peculiarly  apt  to  improve  it : 
apt  to  improve  it,  in  some  respects,  even  beyond  what  would  be, 
by  the  exercise  of  it,  required  in  a  perfectly  virtuous  society,  or 
in  a  society  of  equally  imperfect  virtue  with  themselves.  But 
that  the  present  world  does  not  actually  become  a  state  of  moral 
discipline  to  many,  even  to  the  generality,  i.e.  that  they  do  not 
improve  or  grow  better  in  it,  cannot  be  urged  as  a  proof,  that  it 
was  not  intended  for  moral  discipline,  by  any  who  at  all  observe 
the  analogy  of  nature.  For,  of  the  numerous  seeds  of  vegetables 
and  bodies  of  animals,  which  are  adapted  and  put  in  the  way  to 
improve  to  such  a  point  or  state  of  natural  maturity  and  perfec- 
tion, we  do  not  see  perhaps  that  one  in  a  million  actually  does. 
Far  the  greatest  part  of  them  decay  before  they  are  improved  to 
it;  and  appear  to  be  absolutely  destroyed.  -Yet  no  one,  who  does 
not  deny  all  final  causes,  will  deny,  that  those  seeds  and  bodies, 
which  do  attain  to  that  point  of  maturity  and  perfection,  answer 
the  end  for  which  they  were  really  designed  by  nature ;  and 
therefore  that  nature  designed  them  for  such  perfection.  I  can- 
not forbear  adding,  though  it  is  not  to  the  present  purpose,  that 
the  appeai'ance  of  such  an  amazing  luaste  in  nature,  with  respect 
to  these  seeds  and  bodies,  by  foreign  causes,  is  to  us  as  unaccount- 
able, as,  what  is  much  more  terrible,  the  present  and  future  ruin 
of  so  many  moral  agents  by  themselves,  i.e.  by  vice. 

Against  this  whole  notion  of  moral  discipline,  it  may  be  ob- 
jected, in  another  way;  that  so  far  as  a  course  of  behavior, 
materially  virtuous,  proceeds  from  hope  and  fear,  so  far  it  is  only 


;54  PEOBATIOX  AS  A  DISCIPLINE.  parti. 

ft  disbipline  and  strengtlieniiig  of  self-love.  But  doing  what  God 
commands,  because  he  commands  it,  is  obedience,  though  it  pro- 
ceeds from  hope  or  fear.  A  course  of  such  obedience  will  form 
habits  of  it.  And  a  constant  regard  to  veracity,  justice,  and 
charity,  may  form  distinct  habits  of  these  particular  virtues ;  and 
will  certainly  form  habits  of  self-government,  and  of  denying  our 
inclinations,  whenever  veracity,  justice,  or  charity  requires  it. 
Nor  is  there  any  foundation  for  this  great  nicety,  with  which 
some  affect  to  distinguish  in  this  case,  in  order  to  depreciate  all 
religion  proceeding  from  hope  or  fear.  For,  veracity,  justice, 
and  charity,  regard  to  Grod's  authority,  and  to  our  own  chief  in- 
terest, are  not  only  all  three  coincident;  but  each  of  them  is,  in 
itself,  a  just  and  natural  motive  or  principle  of  action.  He  who 
begins  a  good  life  from  any  one  of  them,  and  perseveres  in  it,  as 
he  is  already  in  some  degree,  so  he  cannot  fail  of  becoming  more 
and  more,  of  that  character  which  is  correspondent  to  the  con- 
stitution of  nature  as  moral ;  and  to  the  relation  which  God 
stands  in  to  us  as  moral  governor  of  it :  nor  consequently  can  he 
fail  of  obtaining  that  happiness,  which  this  constitution  and  rela- 
tion necessarily  suppose  connected  with  that  character. 

These  several  observations,  concerning  the  active  principle  of 
virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  commands,  are  applicable  to  pas- 
sive submission  or  resignation  to  his  will :  which  is  another  es- 
sential part  of  a  right  character,  connected  with  the  former,  and 
very  much  in  our  power  to  form  ourselves  to.  It  may  be  imagined, 
that  nothing  but  afBictions  can  give  occasion  for  or  require  this 
virtue;  that  it  can  have  no  respect  to,  nor  be  any  way  necessary 
to  qualify  for,  a  state  of  perfect  happiness :  but  it  is  not  expe- 
rience which  can  make  us  think  thus.  Prosperity  itself,  while 
any  thing  supposed  desirable  is  not  ours,  begets  extravagant  and 
unbounded  thoughts.     Imagination  is  alto2;ether  as  much  a  source 

O  CD  O 

of  discontent,  as  any  thing  in  our  external  condition.  It  is  in- 
deed true,  that  there  can  be  no  scope  for  patience,  when  sorrow 
shall  be  no  more;  but  there  may  be  need  of  a  temper  of  mind, 
which  shall  have  been  formed  by  patience.  For,  though  self- 
love,  considered  merely  as  an  active  principle  leading  us  to  pur- 
sue our  chief  interest,  cannot  but  be  uniforndy  coincident  with 
the  principle  of  obedience  to  God's  commands,  our  interest  being 
rightly  understood;  because  this  obedience,  and  the  pmvnii   of 


CHAP.  V.  PROBATION   AS   A   DISCIPLINE.  155 

our  own  chief  interest,  must  be  in  every  case  one  and  tlie  samo 
tiling:  yet  it  may  be  questioned,  whether  self-love,  considered 
merely  as  the  desire  of  our  own  interest  or  happiness,  can,  from 
its  nature,  be  thus  absolutely  and  uniformly  coincident  with  the 
will  of  Godj  any  more  than  particular  affections  can:*  coincident 
in  such  sort,  as  not  to  be  liable  to  be  excited  upon  occasions  and 
in  degrees,  impossible  to  be  gratified  consistently  with  the  consti- 
tution of  things,  or  the  divine  appointments.  So  that  habits  of 
resignation  may,  upon  this  account,  be  requisite  for  all  creatures : 
habits,  I  say;  which  signify  what  is  formed  by  use.  However, 
in  general  it  is  obvious  that  both  self-love  and  particular  affection 
in  human  creatures  considered  only  as  passive  feelings,  distort 
and  rend  the  mind;  and  therefore  stand  in  need  of  discipline. 
Now  denial  of  those  particular  affections,  in  a  course  of  active 
virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  will,  has  a  tendency  to  moderate 
them;  and  seems  also  to  have  a  tendency  to  habituate  the  mind, 
to  be  easy  and  satisfied  with  that  degree  of  happiness  which  is 
allotted  us,  i.e.  to  moderate  self-love.  But  the  proper  discipline 
for  resignation  is  affliction.  A  right  behavior  under  that  trial ; 
recollecting  ourselves  so  as  to  consider  it  in  the  view,  in  which 
religion  teaches  us  to  consider  it,  as  from  the  hand  of  God,  re- 
ceiving it  as  what  he  appoints,  or  thinks  proper  to  permit,  in  his 
world  and  under  his  government;  this  will  habituate  the  mind  to 
a  dutiful  submission.  Such  submission,  together  with  the  active 
principle  of  obedience,  make  up  the  temper  and  character  in  us, 
which  answers  to  bis  sovereignty;  and  which  absolutely  belongs 
to  the  condition  of  our  being,  as  dependent  creatures.  Nor  ean 
it  be  said,  that  this  is  only  breaking  the  mind  to  a  submission  to 
mere  power;  for  mere  power  may  be  accidental,  and  precarious, 
and  usurped:  but  it  is  forming  within  ourselves  the  temper  of 
resignation  to  His  rightful  authority,  who  is,  by  nature,  supreme 
over  all. 

Upon  the  whole:  such  a  character,  and  such  qualifications,  are 
necessary  for  a  mature  state  of  life  in  the  present  world,  as  nature 
alone  does  in  no  wise  bestow;  but  has  put  it  upon  us,  in  great 
part,  to  acquire,  in  our  progress  from  one  stage  of  life  to  another, 
horn  childhood  to  mature  age ;  put  it  upon  us  to  acquire  them, 
by  giving  us  capacities  of  doing  it,  and  by  placing  us,  in  the 

*  P.  U5. 


it(\  PROBATION  AS   A   DISCIPLINE.  part  l 

beglnnicig  of  life,  in  a  condition  fit  for  it.  And  this  is  a  general 
analogy  to  our  condition  in  the  present  world,  as  in  a  state  of 
moral  discipline  for  another. 

It  is  in  vain  to  object  against  the  credibility  of  the  present 
life's  being  intended  for  this  purpose,  that  all  the  trouble  and  the 
danger  unavoidably  accompanying  such  discipline,  might  have 
been  saved  us,  by  our  being  made  at  once  the  creatures  and  the 
characters,  which  we  icere  to  be.  For  we  experience,  that  what 
we  iccre  to  he,  was  to  be  the  effect  of  ichat  ice  icould  do:  and 
that  the  general  conduct  of  nature  is,  not  to  save  us  trouble  or 
danger,  but  to  make  us  capable  of  going  through  them,  and  to 
put  it  upon  us  to  do  so.  Acquirements  of  our  own,  experience 
and  habits,  are  the  natural  supply  to  our  deficiencies,  and  secu- 
rity against  our  dangers :  since  it  is  as  plainly  natural  to  set  our- 
selves to  acquire  the  qualifications,  as  the  external  things,  which 
we  stand  in  need  of.  In  particular,  it  is  as  plainly  a  general  law 
of  nature,  that  we  should  with  regard  to  our  temporal  interest, 
form  and  cultivate  practical  principles  within  us,  by  attention, 
use,  and  discipline,  as  any  thing  whatever  is  a  natural  law;  chiefly 
in  the  beginning  of  life,  but  also  throughout  the  whole  course  of 
it.  The  alternative  is  left  to  our  choice:  either  to  improve  our- 
selves, and  better  our  condition;  or,  in  default  of  such  improve- 
ment, to  remain  deficient  and  wretched.  It  is  therefore  perfectly 
credible,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  that  the  same  may  be  our 
case,  with  respect  to  the  happiness  of  a  future  state,  and  the 
qualifications  necessary  for  it. 

There  is  a  third  thing,  which  may  seem  implied  in  the  present 
world's  being  a  state  of  probation;  that  it  is  a  theatre  of  action^ 
for  the  manifestation  of  persons'  characters,  with  respect  to  a 
future  one  :  not,  to  be  sure,  to  an  all-knowing  Being,  but  to  his 
creation  or  part  of  it.  This  may,  perhaps,  be  only  a  consequence 
of  our  being  in  a  state  of  probation  in  the  other  senses.  How- 
ever, it  is  not  impossible,  that  men's  showing  and  making  mani- 
fest, what  is  in  their  heart,  what  their  real  character  is,  may  have 
respect  to  a  future  life,  in  ways  and  manners  with  which  we  are 
not  acquainted :  particularly  it  may  be  a  means,  (for  the  Author 
of  nature  does  not  appear  to  do  any  thing  without  means,)  of 
their  being  disposed  of  suitably  to  their  characters;  and  of  its 
being  known  to  the  creation,  by  way  of  example,  that  they  are 


CHAP.  VI.  THE    OPIXIOX    OF   NECESSITY.  157 

thus  disposed  of.  But  not  to  enter  upon  any  conjectural  account 
of  this;  one  may  just  mention,  that  the  manifestation  of  persons' 
characters  contributes  very  much,  in  various  ways,  to  the  carrying 
on  a  great  part  of  that  general  course  of  nature,  respecting  man- 
kind, which  comes  under  our  observation  at  present.  I  shah 
only  add,  that  probation,  in  both  these  senses,  as  well  as  in  that 
treated  of  in  the  foregoing  chapter,  is  implied  in  moral  govern- 
ment; since  by  persons'  behavior  under  it,  their  characters  can- 
not but  be  manifested,  and  if  they  behave  well,  improved. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE    OPINION    OF    NECESSITY,    CONSIDERED    AS    INFLUENCINa 
PRACTICE. 

Throughout  the  foregoing  treatise  it  appears,  that  the  con 
dition  of  mankind,  considered  as  inhabitants  of  this  world  only, 
and  under  the  government  of  God  which  we  experience,  is  greatly 
analogous  to  our  condition,  as  designed  for  another  world,  or  as 
under  that  farther  government,  which  religion  teaches  us.  If 
therefore  any  assert,  as  a  fatalist  must,  that  the  opinion  of  uni- 
versal necessity  is  reconcilable  with  the  former;  there  immediately 
arises  a  question  in  the  way  of  analogy,  whether  he  must  not  also 
own  it  to  be  reconcilable  with  the  latter,  i.e.  with  the  system  of 
religion  itself,  and  the  proof  of  it.  The  reader  then  will  observe, 
that  the  question  now  before  us  is  not  absolute,  i.e.  whether  the 
opinion  of  fate  be  reconcilable  with  religion ;  but  hypothetical, 
whether,  upon  supposition  of  its  being  reconcilable  with  the  con- 
stitution of  nature,  it  be  not  reconcilable  with  religion  also.  Or, 
what  pretence  a  fatalist,  not  other  persons,  but  a  fatalist,  has  to 
conclude  from  his  opinion,  that  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as 
religion.  And  as  the  puzzle  and  obscurity,  which  must  unavoid- 
ably arise  from  arguing  upon  so  absurd  a  supposition  as  that  of 
universal  necessity,  will,  I  fear,  easily  be  seen;  it  will,  I  hope,  as 
easily  be  excused.'* 

*  [The  student  sliould  learn  to  distinguish  between  the  hinds  of  necessity. 
There  is — 1.  "  Logical  necessity,"  which  requires  the  admission  of  a  consequent 
to  a  premise      2.   '  Moral  necessity,"  which  requires  means  in  order  to  ends. 

li 


158  THE  OPINIOX  OF  NECESSITY,  part  i. 

Since  it  li.'is  been  all  along  taken  for  granted,  as  a  thing  proved, 
that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  or  natural  Governor 
of  the  world;  and  since  an  objection  may  be  made  against  the 
proof  of  this,  from  the  opinion  of  universal  necessity,  as  it  may 
be  supposed,  that  such  necessity  will  itself  account  for  the  origin 
and  preservation  of  all  things;  it  is  requisite,  that  this  objection 
be  distinctly  answered ;  or  that  it  be  shown,  that  a  fatality  sup- 
posed consistent  with  what  we  certainly  experience,  does  not 
destroy  the  proof  of  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of 
nature ;  before  we  proceed  to  consider,  whether  it  destroys  the 
proof  of  a  moral  Governor  of  it,  or  of  our  being  in  a  state  of 
religion. 

When  it  is  said  by  a  fatalist,  that  the  whole  constitution  of 
nature,  the  actions  of  men,  every  thing,  and  every  mode  and 
circumstance  of  every  thing,  is  necessary,  and  could  not  possibly 
have  been  otherwise;  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  this  necessity  does 
not  exclude  deliberation,  choice,  preference,  and  acting  from  cer- 
tain principles,  and  to  certain  ends :  because  all  this  is  matter  of 
undoubted  experience,  acknowledged  by  all,  and  what  every  man 
may,  every  moment,  be  conscious  of.  Hence  it  follows,  that 
necessity,  alone  and  of  itself,  is  in  no  sort  an  account  of  the  con- 
stitution of  nature,  and  how  things  came  to  he  and  to  continue  as 
they  are;  but  only  an  account  of  this  circumstance  relating  to 
their  origin  and  continuance,  that  they  could  not  have  been  other- 
wise, than  they  are  and  have  been.  The  assertion,  that  every 
thing  is  by  necessity  of  nature,  is  not  an  answer  to  the  question ; 
Whether  the  world  came  into  being  as  it  is,  by  an  intelligent 
Agent  forming  it  thus,  or  not :  but  to  quite  another  question ; 
Whether  it  came  into  being  as  it  is,  in  that  way  and  manner 
which  we  call  necessarilt/,  or  in  that  way  and  manner  which  we  call 

3.  "Physical  necessity,"  which  is  the  compulsory  connection  of  sequences  to 
antecedents,  in  the  material  world.  4.  "Metaphysical  necessity,"  which  be- 
longs to  God  only,  as  existing  eternally  and  immutably.  All  these  exist  and 
operate,  and  by  them  we  govern  ourselves. 

But  there  are  various  other  kinds  of  necessity,  erroneous  and  pernicious, 
which  may  be  groujjed  unc''er  two  heads: — 1.  "Atheistic,"  sometimes  called 
the  Democritio,  which  ascribes  all  things  to  the  mechanical  laws  of  matter. 
2.  "  Theistic,"  which  admits  the  existence  of  God,  but  denies  to  him  moral 
character,  and  makes  him  the  arbitrary  and  only  agent  in  the  universe,  and 
creatures  not  responsible.  See  Colltngs  on  Providence,  Price's  Dissertations, 
RoTHERFOKD  cu  Providence,  Charnock's  Sermons,  and  Whately's  Logic  J 


CHAP.  VI.  AS  INFLUEXCIXa  PRACTICE.  159 

freely?  For  suppose  farther,  that  one  who  was  a  fatalist,  and 
one  who  kept  to  his  natural  sense  of  things,  and  believed  him- 
self a  free  agent,  were  disputing  together,  and  vindicating  their 
respective  opinions;  and  they  should  happen  to  instance  a 
house;  they  would  agree  that  it  was  built  by  an  architect.  Their 
difference  concerning  necessity  and  freedom  would  occasion  no 
difference  of  judgment  concerning  this;  but  only  concerning  an- 
other matter ;  whether  the  architect  built  it  necessarily  or  freely. 

Suppose  they  should  proceed  to  inquire  concerning  the  consti- 
tution of  nature.  In  a  lax  way  of  speaking,  one  of  them  might 
say,  it  was  by  necessity;  and  the  other,  by  freedom  :  but  if  they 
had  any  meaning  to  their  words,  as  the  latter  must  mean  a  free 
agent,  so  the  former  must  at  length  be  reduced  to  mean  an  agent, 
whether  he  would  say  one  or  more,  acting  by  necessity:  for  ab- 
stract notions  can  do  nothing.  "We  indeed  ascribe  to  God  a  neces- 
sary existence,  uncaused  by  any  agent.  For  we  find  within  our- 
selves the  idea  of  infinity,  i.e.  immensity  and  eternity,  impossible, 
even  in  imagination,  to  be  removed  out  of  being.  We  seem  to 
discern  intuitively,  that  there  must,  and  cannot  but  be,  some- 
thing, external  to  ourselves,  answering  this  idea,  or  the  archetype 
of  it.  Hence,  (for  tlih  ahstract,  as  much  as  any  other,  implies 
a  concrete^  we  conclude,  that  there  is,  and  cannot  but  be,  an  in- 
finite and  immense  eternal  being,  existing  prior  to  all  design  con- 
tributing to  his  existence,  and  exclusive  of  it.  From  the  scanti- 
ness of  language,  a  manner  of  speaking  has  been  introduced; 
that  necessity  is  the  foundation,  the  reason,  the  account  of  the 
existence  of  God.  But  it  is  not  alleged,  nor  can  it  be  at  all 
intended,  that  every  thing  exists  as  it  does,  by  this  kind  of  neces- 
sity :  a  necessity  antecedent  in  nature  to  design  :  it  cannot,  I 
say,  be  meant  that  every  thing  exists  as  it  does,  by  this  kind  of 
necessity,  upon  several  accounts;  and  particularly  because  it  is 
admitted,  that  design,  in  the  actions  of  men,  contributes  to  many 
alterations  in  nature.  If  any  deny  this,  I  shall  not  pretend  to 
reason  with  them. 

From  these  things  it  follows;  First,  That  when  a  fatalist 
asserts,  that  every  thing  is  hy  necessity,  he  must  mean,  hy  an 
{igcnt  acting  necessarily ;  he  must,  1  say,  mean  this,  for  I  am 
very  sensible  he  would  not  choose  to  mean  it.  Secondly,  That 
the  necessity,  by  which  such  an  agent  is  supposed  to  act,  does 


160  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  part  i. 

not  exclude  iDtelligence  and  design.  So  that,  were  the  system 
of  fatality  admitted,  it  would  just  as  much  account  for  the  for- 
mation of  the  world,  as  for  the  structure  of  a  house,  and  no 
more.  Necessity  as  much  requires  and  supposes  a  necessary 
agent,  as  freedom  requires  and  supposes  a  free  agent,  to  be  the 
former  of  the  world.  And  the  appearances  of  design  and  of  fnal 
causes  in  the  constitution  of  nature  as  really  prove  this  acting 
agent  to  be  an  intelligent  designer,  or  to  act  from  choice ;  upon 
the  scheme  of  necessity,  supposed  possible,  as  upon  that  of 
freedom. 

It  appearing  thus,  that  the  notion  of  necessity  does  not  destroy 
the  proof  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature  and 
natural  Governor  of  the  world ;  the  present  question,  which  the 
analogy  before  mentioned  suggests,*  and  which,  I  think,  it  will 
answer,  is  this  :  Whether  the  opinion  of  necessity,  supposed  con- 
sistent with  possibility,  with  the  constitution  of  the  world,  and 
the  natural  government  which  we  experience  exercised  over  it, 
destroys  all  reasonable  ground  of  belief,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of 
religion  :  or  whether  that  opinion  be  reconcilable  with  religion  ; 
with  the  system,  and  the  proof  of  it. 

Suppose  then  a  fatalist  to  educate  any  one,  from  his  youth  up, 
in  his  own  principles;  that  the  child  should  reason  upon  them, 
and  conclude,  that  since  he  cannot  possibly  behave  otherwise 
than  he  does,  he  is  not  a  subject  of  blame  or  commendation,  nor 
can  deserve  to  be  rewarded  or  punished.  Imagine  him  to  eradi- 
cate the  very  perceptions  of  blame  and  commendation  out  of  his 
mind,  by  means  of  this  system ;  to  form  his  temper,  and  cha- 
lacter,  and  behavior  to  it;  and  from  it  to  judge  of  the  treatment 
he  was  to  expect,  say,  from  reasonable  men,  upon  his  coming 
abroad  into  the  world:  as  the  fatalist  judges  from  this  system, 
what  he  is  to  expect  from  the  Author  of  nature,  and  with  regard 
to  a  future  state.  I  cannot  forbear  stopping  here  to  ask,  whether 
any  one  of  common  sense  would  think  fit,  that  a  child  should  be 
put  upon  these  speculations,  and  be  left  to  apply  them  to  prac- 
tice. And  a  man  has  little  pretence  to  reason,  who  is  not 
sensible,  that  we  are  all  children  in  speculations  of  this  kind. 
However,  the  child  would  doubtless  be  highly  delighted  to  find 
himself  freed  from  the  restraints  of  fear  and  shame,  wi*h  vvhicb 

*  P.  ir.7. 


CHAP.  VI.  AS  INFLUEXCING  PRACTICE.  IGl 

his  play-fellows  were  fettered  and  embarrassed ;  and  tiigbly  v3on- 
ceited  in  his  superior  knowledge,  so  ftir  beyond  his  years.  But 
conceit  and  vanity  would  be  the  least  bad  part  of  the  influence, 
which  these  principles  must  have,  when  thus  reasoned  and  acted 
upon,  during  the  course  of  his  education.  He  must  either  be 
allowed  to  go  on  and  be  the  plague  of  all  about  him,  and  himself 
too,  even  to  his  own  destruction,  or  else  correction  must  be  con- 
tinually made  use  of,  to  supply  the  want  of  those  natural  percep- 
tions of  blame  and  commendation,  which  we  have  supposed  to 
be  removed;  and  to  give  him  a  practical  impression,  of  what  he 
had  reasoned  himself  out  of  the  belief  of,  that  he  was  in  fact  an 
accountable  child,  and  to  be  punished  for  doing  what  he  was 
forbid.  It  is  therefore  in  reality  impossible,  but  that  the  correc 
tion  which  he  must  meet  with,  in  the  course  of  his  education, 
must  convince  him,  that  if  the  scheme  he  was  instructed  in  were 
not  false,  yet  that  he  reasoned  inconclusively  upon  it,  and  some- 
how or  other  misapplied  it  to  practice  and  common  life ;  as  what 
the  fatalist  experiences  of  the  conduct  of  Providence  at  present, 
ought  in  all  reason  to  convince  him,  that  this  scheme  is  mis- 
applied, when  applied  to  the  subject  of  religion."^  But  supposing 
the  child's  temper  could  remain  still  formed  to  the  system,  and 
his  expectation  of  the  treatment  he  was  to  have  in  the  world,  be 
regulated  by  it ;  so  as  to  expect  that  no  reasonable  man  would 
blame  or  punish  him,  for  any  thing  which  he  should  do,  because 
he  could  not  help  doing  it :  upon  this  supposition  it  is  manifest 
he  would,  upon  his  coming  abroad  into  the  world,  be  insupport- 
able to  society,  and  the  treatment  which  he  would  receive  from  it 
would  render  it  so  to  him ;  and  he  could  not  fail  of  doing  some- 
thing very  soon,  for  which  he  would  be  delivered  over  into  the 
hands  of  civil  justice.  And  thus,  in  the  end,  he  would  be  con- 
vinced of  the  obligations  he  was  under  to  his  wise  instructor. 

Suppose  this  scheme  of  fatality,  in  any  other  way,  applied  to 
practice,  such  practical  application  of  it  will  be  found  equally 
absurd;  equally  fallacious  in  a  practical  sense.  For  instance,  that 
if  a  man  be  destined  to  live  such  a  time,  he  shall  live  to  it, 
though  he  take  no  care  of  his  own  preservation ;  or  if  he  be 
destined  to  die  before  that  time,  no  care  can  prevent  it,  there- 
fore all  care  about  preserving  one's  life  is  to  be  neglected :  which 

*  P.  158. 
L  '  14* 


162  THE    OPIXIOX   OF  XECESSITY,  paiit  r. 

is  the  fallacy  instanced  in  by  the  ancients.  On  tlie  contrary, 
none  ot  tliese  practical  absurdities  can  be  drawn  from  reasoning, 
upon  the  supposition  that  we  are  free;  but  all  such  reasoning 
with  regard  to  the  common  affairs  of  life  is  justified  by  experience. 
Therefore,  though  it  were  admitted  that  this  opinion  of  necessity 
were  sjyccuJativcly  true;  yet,  with  regard  to  practice,  it  is  as  if  it 
were  false,  so  far  as  our  experience  reaches :  that  is,  to  the  whole 
of  our  present  life.  For,  the  constitution  of  the  present  world, 
and  the  condition  in  which  we  are  actually  placed,  is,  as  if  we 
were  free.  And  it  may  perhaps  justly  be  concluded,  that  since 
the  whole  process  of  action,  through  every  step  of  it,  suspense, 
deliberation,  inclining  one  way,  determining,  and  at  last  doing  as 
we  determine,  is  as  if  we  were  free,  therefore  we  are  so.^ 

The  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  under  the  present  natural 
government  of  the  world,  we  find  we  are  treated  and  dealt  with, 
as  if  we  were  free,  prior  to  all  consideration  whether  we  are  so  or 
not.  Were  this  opinion  therefore  of  necessity  admitted  to  be 
ever  so  true;  yet  such  is  in  fact  our  condition  and  the  natural 
course  of  things,  that  whenever  we  apply  it  to  life  and  practice, 
this  application  of  it  always  misleads  us,  and  cannot  but  mislead 
us,  in  a  most  dreadful  manner,  with  regard  to  our  present  interest. 
How  then  can  people  think  themselves  so  very  secure,  that  the 
same  application  of  the  same  opinion  may  not  mislead  them  also, 
in  some  analogous  manner,  with  respect  to  a  future,  a  more 
general,  and  more  important  interest?  For,  religion  being  a 
practical  subject;  and  the  analogy  of  nature  showing  us,  that  we 
have  not  faculties  to  apply  this  opinion,  were  it  a  true  one,  to 
practical  subjects;  whenever  we  do  apply  it  to  the  subject  of  re- 
ligion, and  thence  conclude,  that  we  are  free  from  its  obligations, 
it  is  plain  this  conclusion  cannot  be  depended  upon.  There  will 
still  remain  just  reason  to  think,  whatever  appearances  are,  that 
we  deceive  ourselves;  in  somewhat  of  a  like  manner,  as  when 
people  fancy  they  can  draw  contradictory  conclusions  from  the 
idea  of  infinity. 

^  [Hume  says,  "tliough  man,  in  truth,  is  a  necessary  agent,  having  all  hia 
actions  determined  by  fixed  and  immutable  laws,  yet,  this  being  concealed  from 
him,  he  acts  with  the  conviction  of  being  a  free  agent." 

Which  is  the  same  as  to  say  that  God  intended  to  conceal  from  men  ar* 
important  fact,  involving  the  whole  subject  of  right  and  wrong,  but  Mr.  Hume 
found  him  out !  ] 


CHAP.  VT.  AS  INFLUENCma   PRACTICE.  1G3 

From  these  thinfrs  togetlier,  the  attentive  reader  Till  see  it 
follows,  that  if  upon  supposition  of  freedom  the  evidence  of  reli- 
gion be  conclusive,  it  remains  so,  upon  supposition  of  necessity, 
because  the  notion  of  necessity  is  not  applicable  to  practical  sub- 
jects :  i.e.  with  respect  to  them,  is  as  if  it  were  not  true.  Nor 
does  this  contain  any  reflection  upon  reason,  but  only  upon  what 
is  unreasonable.  For  to  pretend  to  act  upon  reason,  in  opposition 
to  practical  principles,  which  the  Author  of  our  nature  gave  us  to 
act  upon;  and  to  pretend  to  apply  our  reason  to  subjects,  with 
regard  to  which,  our  own  short  views,  and  even  our  experience, 
will  show  us,  it  cannot  be  depended  upon;  and  such,  at  best,  the 
subject  of  necessity  must  be;  this  is  vanity,  conceit,  and  un- 
reasonableness. 

But  this  is  not  all.  "We  find  within  ourselves  a  will,  and  are 
conscious  of  a  character.  Now  if  this,  in  us,  be  reconcilable  with 
fate,  it  is  reconcilable  with  it  in  the  Author  of  nature.  Besides, 
natural  government  and  final  causes  imply  a  character  and  a  will 
in  the  Governor  and  Designer;"*^  a  will  concerning  the  creatures 
whom  he  governs.  The  Author  of  nature  then  being  certainly 
of  some  character  or  other,  notwithstanding  necessity;  it  is  evi- 
dent this  necessity  is  as  reconcilable  with  the  particular  character 
of  benevolence,  veracity,  and  justice,  in  him,  which  attributes 
are  the  foundation  of  religion,  as  with  any  other  character:  since 
we  find  this  necessity  no  more  hinders  men  from  being  benevo- 
lent, than  cruel;  true,  than  faithless;  just,  than  unjust;  or,  if 
the  fatalist  pleases,  what  we  call  unjust.  It  is  said  indeed,  that 
what,  upon  supposition  of  freedom,  would  be  just  punishment, 
upon  supposition  of  necessity,  becomes  manifestly  unjust :  because 
it  is  punishment  inflicted  for  doing  that  which  persons  could  not 
avoid  doing.  As  if  the  necessity,  which  is  supposed  to  destroy 
the  injustice  of  murder,  for  instance,  would  not  also  destroy  the 
injustice  of  punishing  it!  However,  as  little  to  the  purpose  as 
this  objection  is  in  itself,  it  is  very  much  to  the  purpose  to  ob- 
serve from  it,  how  the  notions  of  justice  and  injustice  remain, 
even  while  we  endeavor  to  suppose  them  removed;    how  they 

*  By  loill  and  character  is  meant  that  which,  in  speaking  of  men,  we  should 
express,  not  only  by  these  words,  but  also  by  the  words  temper,  taste,  dispo- 
tinons,  practica-.  principles :  that  whole  frame  of  mind,  from  ivhence  ice  act  iit 
one  manner  i  ather  than  another. 


164  THE   OPINION   OF   NECESSITY,  part  i. 

force  themselves  upon  the  mind,  even  while  we  are  making  suppo- 
sitions destructive  of  them :  for  there  is  not,  perhaps,  a  man  in 
the  world,  but  would  be  ready  to  make  this  objection  at  first 
thought. 

But  though  it  is  most  evident,  that  universal  necessity,  if  it  be 
reconcilable  with  any  thing,  is  reconcilable  with  that  character  in 
the  x\uthor  of  nature,  which  is  the  foundation  of  religion;  ''Yet, 
does  it  not  plainly  destroy  the  j97'<9o/  that  he  is  of  that  character, 
and  consequently  the  proof  of  religion  T'  By  no  means.  Foi 
we  find,  that  happiness  and  misery  are  not  our  Jate^  in  any  such 
sense  as  not  to  be  the  consequences  of  our  behavior;  but  that 
they  are  the  consequences  of  it.*  We  find  God  exercises  the 
same  kind  of  government  over  us,  which  a  father  exercises  over 
his  children,  and  a  civil  magistrate  over  his  subjects.  Now, 
whatever  becomes  of  abstract  questions  concerning  liberty  and 
necessity,  it  evidently  appears  to  us,  that  veracity  and  justice 
must  be  the  natural  rule  and  measure  of  exercising  this  authority 
or  government,  to  a  Being  who  can  have  no  competitions,  or  in- 
terfering of  interests,  with  his  creatures  and  his  subjects. 

But  as  the  doctrine  of  liberty,  though  we  experience  its  truth, 
may  be  perplexed  with  difiiculties,  which  run  up  into  the  most 
abstruse  of  all  speculations;  and  as  the  opinion  of  necessity  seems 
to  be  the  very  basis  upon  which  infidelity  grounds  itself;  it  may 
be  of  some  use  to  offer  a  more  particular  proof  of  the  obligations 
of  religion,  which  may  distinctly  be  shown  not  to  be  destroyed 
by  this  opinion. 

The  proof  from  final  causes  of  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature 
is  not  afiected  by  the  opinion  of  necessity;  supposing  necessity  a 
thing  possible  in  itself,  and  reconcilable  with  the  constitution  of 
things. "I*  It  is  a  matter  of  fact,  independent  on  this  or  any  other 
speculation,  that  he  governs  the  world  by  the  method  of  rewards 
and  punishments  :  J  and  also  that  he  hath  given  us  a  moral  faculty, 
by  which  we  distinguish  between  actions,  and  approve  some  as 
virtuous  and  of  good  desert,  and  disapprove  others  as  vicious  and 
of  ill  desert. §  This  moral  discernment  implies,  in  the  notion  of 
it,  a  rule  of  action,  and  a  rule  of  a  very  peculiar  kind  :  for  it 
carries  in  it  authority  and  a  right  of  direction;  authority  in  such 
a  sense,  as  that  we  cannot  depart  from  it  without  being  self-cou- 

*  Chap.  ii.  t  P.  157,  <tc.  %  Cliap.  ii.  I  Dissert.  11. 


CHAP.  VI.  AS   INFLUENCING   PRACTICE.  Ig^ 

demned.*  And  that  the  dictates  of  this  moral  faculty,  which  aro 
by  nature  a  rule  to  us,  are  moreover  the  laws  of  God,  laws  in  a 
sense  including  sanctions;  may  be  thus  proved.  Consciousness 
of  a  rule  or  guide  of  action,  in  creatures  who  are  capable  of  con- 
sidering it  as  given  them  by  their  Maker,  not  only  raises  imme- 
diately a  sense  of  duty,  but  also  a  sense  of  security  in  following 
it,  and  of  danger  in  deviating  from  it.  A  direction  of  the  Author 
of  nature,  given  to  creatures  capable  of  looking  upon  it  as  such, 
is  plainly  a  command  from  him  :  and  a  command  from  him  neces- 
sarily includes  in  it,  at  least,  an  implicit  promise  in  case  of  obe- 
dience, or  threatening  in  case  of  disobedience.  But  then  the 
sense  or  perception  of  good  and  ill  desert, f  which  is  contained  in 
the  moral  discernment,  renders  the  sanction  explicit,  and  makes 
It  appear,  as  one  may  say,  expressed.  For  since  his  method  of 
government  is  to  reward  and  punish  actions,  his  having  annexed 
to  some  actions  an  inseparable  sense  of  good  desert,  and  to  others 
of  ill,  this  surely  amounts  to  declaring,  upon  whom  his  punish- 
ments shall  be  inflicted,  and  his  rewards  be  bestowed.  He  must 
have  given  us  this  discernment  and  sense  of  things,  as  a  presenti- 
ment of  what  is  to  be  hereafter :  that  is,  by  way  of  information 
beforehand,  what  we  are  finally  to  expect  in  this  world.  There 
is  then  most  evident  ground  to  think,  that  the  government  of 
Grod,  upon  the  whole,  will  be  found  to  correspond  to  the  nature 
which  he  has  given  us  :  and  that,  in  the  upshot  and  issue  of 
things,  happiness  and  misery  shall,  in  fact  and  event,  be  made 
to  follow  virtue  and  vice  respectively ;  as  he  has  already,  in  so 
peculiar  a  manner,  associated  the  ideas  of  them  in  our  minds. 
And  hence  might  easily  be  deduced  the  obligations  of  religious 
worship,  were  it  only  to  be  considered  as  a  means  of  preserving 
upon  our  minds  a  sense  of  this  moral  government  of  God,  and 
securing  our  obedience  to  it :  which  yet  is  an  extremely  imper- 
fect view  of  that  most  important  duty. 

No  objection  from  necessity  can  lie  against  this  general  proof 
of  religion.  None  against  the  proposition  reasoned  upon,  that 
we  have  such  a  moral  faculty  and  discernment;  because  this  is  a 
mere  matter  of  fact,  a  thing  of  experience,  that  human  kind  is 
thus  constituted :  none  against  the  conclusion ;  because  it  is 
immediate  and  wholly  from  this  fact.     For  the  conclusion,  that 

*  Serm.  2,  at  the  Eolln.  f  Dissert.  II. 


166  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  pakt  i. 

God  will  finally  reward  the  righteous  and  punish,  the  wicked,  is 
not  here  drawn,  from  its  appearing  to  us  fit'*'  that  he  should ;  but 
from  its  appearing,  that  he  has  told  us,  he  will.  And  this  he 
hath  certainly  told  us,  in  the  promise  and  threatening,  which  it 
hath  been  observed  the  notion  of  a  command  implies,  and  the 
sense  of  good  and  ill  desert  which  he  has  given  us,  more  dis- 
tinctly expresses.  This  reasoning  from  fact  is  confirmed,  and  in 
some  degree  even  verified,  by  other  facts ;  by  the  natural  tenden- 
cies of  virtue  and  of  vice;j"  and  by  this,  that  God,  in  the  natural 
course  of  his  providence,  punishes  vicious  actions  as  mischievous 
to  society;  and  also  vicious  actions  as  such  in  the  strictest  sense. | 
So  that  the  general  proof  of  religion  is  unanswerably  real^  even 
upon  the  wild  supposition  which  we  are  arguing  upon. 

It  must  be  observed  further,  that  natural  religion  has,  besides 
this,  an  external  evidence;  which  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  if  it 
could  be  true,  would  not  affect.  For  suppose  a  person,  by  the 
observations  and  reasoning  above,  or  by  any  other,  convinced  of 
the  truth  of  religion ;  that  there  is  a  God,  who  made  the  world, 
who  is  the  moral  governor  and  judge  of  mankind,  and  will  upon 
the  whole  deal  with  every  one  according  to  his  works  :  I  say, 
suppose  a  person  convinced  of  this  by  reason,  but  to  know 
nothing  at  all  of  antiquity,  or  the  present  state  of  mankind  :  it 
would  be  natural  for  such  a  one  to  be  inquisitive,  what  was  the 
history  of  this  system  of  doctrine ;  at  what  time,  and  in  what 
manner,  it  came  first  into  the  world;  and  whether  it  were  be- 
lieved by  any  considerable  part  of  it.     Were  he  upon  inquiry  to 

"*  However,  I  am  far  from  intending  to  deny,  that  the  will  of  God  is  deter- 
mined, by  what  is  fit,  by  the  right  and  reason  of  the  case  ,•  though  one  chooses 
to  decline  matters  of  such  abstract  speculation,  and  to  speak  with  caution  when 
one  does  speak  of  them.  But  if  it  be  intelligible  to  sa}',  that  it  is  fit  and 
reasonable  for  every  one  to  consult  fit's  own  happiness,  then  fitness  of  action,  or 
the  riyht  and  reason  of  the  case,  is  an  intelligible  manner  of  speaking.  And 
it  seems  as  inconceivable,  to  suppose  God  to  approve  one  course  of  action,  or 
one  end,  preferably  to  another,  which  yet  his  acting  at  all  from  design  implies 
that  he  does,  without  supposing  somewhat  prior  in  that  end,  to  be  the  ground 
of  the  preference;  as  to  suppose  him  to  discern  an  abstract  proposition  to  be 
true,  without  supposing  somewhat  prior  in  it,  to  be  the  ground  of  the  discern- 
ment. It  doth  not  therefore  appear,  that  moral  right  is  any  more  relative  t( 
perception,  than  abstract  truth  is ;  or  that  it  is  any  more  improper  to  .«peak  of 
the  fitness  and  rightness  of  actions  and  ends,  as  fuiinded  in  the  nature  oi  thii  gs, 
than  to  speak  of  abstract  truth,  as  thus  founded. 

t  P.  118.  X  P.  110,  ^-c. 


CHAP.  VI.  AS  INFLUENCING  PRACTICE.  1G7 

find,  that  a  particular  person,  in  a  late  age,  first  of  an  proposed 
it,  as  a  deduction  of  reason,  and  that  mankind  were  before 
wholly  ignorant  of  it;  then,  though  its  evidence  from  reason 
would  remain,  there  would  be  no  additional  probability  of  its 
truth,  from  the  account  of  its  discovery. 

But  instead  of  this  being  the  fact,  he  would  find,  on  the  con- 
trary, what  could  not  but  afford  him  a  very  strong  confirmation 
of  its  truth  :  First,  That  somewhat  of  this  system,  with  more  or 
fewer  additions  and  alterations,  hath  been  professed  in  all  ages 
and  countries,  of  which  we  have  any  certain  information  relating 
to  this  matter.  Secondly,  That  it  is  certain  historical  fact,  so 
far  as  we  can  trace  things  up,  that  this  whole  system  of  belief, 
that  there  is  one  God,  the  creator  and  moral  governor  of  the 
world,  and  that  mankind  is  in  a  state  of  religion,  was  received 
in  the  first  ages.  And  Tliirdly,  That  as  there  is  no  hint  or  in- 
timation in  history,  that  this  system  was  first  reasoned  out;  so 
there  is  express  historical  or  traditional  evidence,  as  ancient  as 
history,  that  it  was  taught  first  by  revelation. 

Now  these  things  must  be  allowed  to  be  of  great  weight.  The 
first  of  them,  general  consent,  shows  this  system  to  be  conform- 
able to  the  common  sense  of  mankind.  The  second,  namely, 
that  religion  was  believed  in  the  first  ages  of  the  world,  especially 
as  it  does  not  appear  that  there  were  then  any  superstitious  or 
false  additions  to  it,  cannot  but  be  a  further  confirmation  of  its 
truth.  For  it  is  a  proof  of  this  alternative  :  either  that  it  came 
into  the  world  by  revelation ;  or  that  it  is  natural,  obvious,  and 
forces  itself  upon  the  mind.  The  former  of  these  is  the  conclu- 
sion of  learned  men.  And  whoever  will  consider,  how  unapt  for 
speculation  rude  and  uncultivated  minds  are,  will,  perhaps  from 
hence  aloue,  be  strongly  inclined  to  believe  it  the  truth.  And 
as  it  is  shown  in  the  second  part*  of  this  treatise,  that  there  is 
nothing  of  such  peculiar  presumption  against  a  revelation  in  the 
beginning  of  the  world,  as  there  is  supposed  to  be  against  subse- 
quent ones ;  a  sceptic  could  not,  I  think,  give  any  account,  which 
would  appear  more  probable  even  to  himself,  of  the  early  pre- 
tences to  revelation ;  than  by  supposing  some  real  original  one, 
from  whence  they  were  copied. 

And  the  third  thing  above  mentioned,  that  there  is  express 

*  Chap.  ii. 


16S  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY,  part  i. 

liistorical  or  traditional  evidence,  as  ancient  as  history,  of  the 
system  of  religion  being  taught  mankind  by  revelation,  this  must 
be  admitted  as  some  degree  of  real  proof,  that  it  was  so  taught. 
For  why  should  not  the  most  ancient  tradition  be  admitted  as 
some  additional  proof  of  a  fact,  against  which  there  is  no  pre- 
isumption  ?  This  proof  is  mentioned  here,  because  it  has  its 
weight  to  show,  that  religion  came  into  the  world  by  revelation, 
prior  to  all  consideration  of  the  proper  authority  of  any  book 
supposed  to  contain  it;  and  even  prior  to  all  consideration, 
whether  the  revelation  itself  be  uncorruptly  handed  down,  or 
mixed  and  darkened  with  fables.  Thus  the  historical  account, 
which  we  have  of  the  origin  of  religion,  taking  in  all  circum- 
etances,  is  a  real  confiriLation  of  its  truth,  no  way  affected  by 
the  opinion  of  necessity.  And  the  external  evidence,  even  of 
natural  religion,  is  by  no  means  inconsiderable. 

It  is  carefully  to  be  observed,  and  ought  to  be  recollected  after 
all  proofs  of  virtue  and  religion,  which  are  only  general,  that  as 
speculative  reason  may  be  neglected,  prejudiced,  and  deceived, 
so  also  may  our  moral  understanding  be  impaired  and  perverted, 
and  the  dictates  of  it  not  impartially  attended  to.  This  indeed 
proves  nothing  against  the  reality  of  our  speculative  or  practical 
faculties  of  perception ;  against  their  being  intended  by  nature, 
to  inform  us  in  the  theory  of  things,  and  instruct  us  how  we  are 
to  behave,  and  what  we  are  to  expect  in  consequence  of  our 
behavior.  Yet  our  liableness,  in  the  degree  we  are  liable,  to 
prejudice  and  perversion,  is  a  most  serious  admonition  to  us  to  bo 
upon  our  guard,  with  respect  to  what  is  of  such  consequence,  as 
our  determinations  concerning  virtue  and  religion  ]  and  par- 
ticularly not  to  take  custom,  and  fashion,  and  slight  notions  of 
honor,  or  imaginations  of  present  ease,  use,  and  convenience  to 
mankind,  for  the  only  moral  rule."^ 

The  foregoing  observations,  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  and  the  history  of  religion,  amount,  iclien  taken  together, 
to  a  real  practical  proof  of  it,  not  to  be  confuted :  such  a  proof 
as,  considering  the  infinite  importance  of  the  thing,  I  apprehend, 
would  be  admitted  fully  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  influence  tho 
actions  of  men,  who  act  upon  thought  and  reflection,  if  it  were  ad- 
mitted that  there  is  no  proof  of  the  contrary.    But  it  may  be  said; 

*  Dissertation  II. 


CHAP.  VI.  AS  IXFLUEXCIXG  PRACTICE.  169 

*•  There  are  many  probabilities,  whicb  cannot  indeed  be  confuted^ 
i.e.  shown  to  be  no  probabilities,  and  yet  may  be  overbalanced  by 
greater  probabilities,  on  the  other  side ;  muck  more  by  demon- 
stration. And  there  is  no  occasion  to  object  against  particular 
arguments  alleged  for  an  opinion,  when  the  opinion  itself  may  be 
clearly  shown  to  be  false,  without  meddling  with  such  arguments 
at  all,  but  leaving  them  just  as  they  are.*  Now  the  method  of 
government  by  rewards  and  punishments,  and  especially  reward- 
ing and  punishing  good  and  ill  desert  as  such  respectively,  must 
go  upon  supposition,  that  we  are  free  and  not  necessary  agents. 
And  it  is  incredible,  that  the  Author  of  nature  should  govern  us 
upon  a  supposition  as  true,  which  he  knows  to  be  false;  and 
therefore  absurd  to  think,  he  will  reward  or  punish  us  for  our 
actions  hereafter;  especially  that  he  will  do  it  under  the  notion, 
that  they  are  of  good  or  ill  desert."' 

Here  then  the  matter  is  brought  to  a  point.  And  the  answer 
is  full,  and  not  to  be  evaded, — viz. :  that  the  whole  constitution 
and  course  of  things,  the  whole  analogy  of  Providence,  shows 
beyond  possibility  of  doubt,  that  the  conclusion  from  this  reason- 
ing is  false ;  wherever  the  fallacy  lies.  The  doctrine  of  freedom 
indeed  clearly  shows  where:  in  supposing  ourselves  necessary, 
when  in  truth  we  are  free  agents.  But,  upon  the  supposition  of 
necessity,  the  fallacy  lies  in  taking  for  granted,  that  it  is  in- 
credible necessary  agents  should  be  rewarded  and  punished. 
That,  somehow  or  other,  the  conclusion  now  mentioned  is  false, 
is  most  certain.  For  it  is  fact,  that  God  does  govern  even  brute 
creatures  by  the  method  of  rewards  and  punishments,  in  the 
natural  course  of  things.  Men  are  rewarded  and  punished  for 
their  actions,  punished  for  actions  mischievous  to  society  as  being 
so,  punished  for  vicious  actions  as  such ;  by  the  natural  instru- 
mentality of  each  other,  under  the  present  conduct  of  Provi- 
dence. Nay,  even  the  affection  of  gratitude,  and  the  passion  of 
resentment,  and  the  rewards  and  punishments  following  from 
them,  which  in  general  are  to  be  considered  as  natural,  i.e.  from 
the  Author  of  nature;  these  rewards  and  punishments,  being 
naturally\  annexed  to  actions  considered  as  implying  good  inten- 
tion and  good  desert,  ill  intention  and  ill  desert;  these  natural 
rewards  and  punishments,  I  say,  are  as  much  a  contradiction  to 
«-  Pp.  68,  71.  t  Serm.  Stb,  at  the  BMs. 

15 


170  NECESSITY,  AS   INFLUENCING   PRACTICE.  paet  i. 

the  conclusion  above,  and  show  its  falsehood,  as  a  more  exact  and 
complete  rewarding  and  punishing  of  good  and  ill  desert  as  such. 
So  that  if  it  be  imcredible,  that  necessary  agents  should  be  thus 
rewarded  and  punished ;  then,  men  are  not  necessary  but  free ; 
since  it  is  matter  of  fact,  that  they  are  thus  rewarded  and 
punished.  If,  on  the  contrary,  which  is  the  supposition  we  have 
been  arguing  upon,  it  be  insisted  that  men  are  necessary  agents; 
then,  there  is  nothing  incredible  in  the  further  supposition  of 
necessary  agents  being  thus  rewarded  and  punished :  since  we 
ourselves  are  thus  dealt  with. 

From  the  whole  therefore  it  must  follow,  that  a  necessity  sup- 
posed possible,  and  reconcilable  with  the  constitution  of  things, 
does  in  no  sort  prove  that  the  Author  of  Nature  will  not,  nor 
destroy  the  proof  that  he  will,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  in  his 
eternal  government,  render  his  creatures  happy  or  miserable,  by 
some  means  or  other,  as  they  behave  well  or  ill.  Or,  to  express 
this  conclusion  in  words  conformable  to  the  title  of  the  chapter, 
the  analogy  of  nature  shows  us,  that  the  opinion  of  necessity,  con- 
sidered as  practical,  is  false.  And  if  necessity,  upon  the  suppo- 
sition above  mentioned,  doth  not  destroy  the  proof  of  natural 
religion,  it  evidently  makes  no  alteration  in  the  proof  of  revealed. 

From  these  things  likewise  we  may  learn,  in  what  sense  to 
understand  that  general  assertion,  that  the  opicion  of  necessity  is 
essentially  destructive  of  all  religion.  First,  in  a  practical  sense; 
that  by  this  notion,  atheistical  men  pretend  to  satisfy  and  encou- 
rage themselves  in  vice,  and  justify  to  others  their  disregard  to 
all  religion.  And  secondly,  in  the  strictest  sense ;  that  it  is  a 
contradiction  to  the  whole  constitution  of  nature,  and  to  what  we 
may  every  moment  experience  in  ourselves,  and  so  overturns 
e^ery  thing.  But  by  no  means  is  this  assertion  to  be  understood, 
as  if  necessity,  supposing  it  could  possibly  be  reconciled  with  the 
constitution  of  things,  and  with  what  we  experience,  were  not 
also  reconcilable  with  religion:  for  upon  this  supposition,  it 
demonstrably  is  so.° 

<=  [Consult,  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  atheistical  writers  gene- 
rally;  such  as  Fichte,  Hegel,  D'Holback,  Comte,  Crousse,  Martineau,  Leroux, 
and  Holyoake  —  also,  Belsham's  Essays,  Collins  on  Liberty,  Crombie  on 
Phil.  Necessity,  IIoebes'  Liberty  and  Necessity,  and  Leviathan,  Priestley  on 
Liberty,  Hartley  on  Man,  and  Edwards  on  the  Will. 

Against  the  doctrine,  see  Beattie's  Works,  Part  2 ;    Replies  to  Hobbes  by 


CHAP.  VII.    GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD,  INCOMPREHENSIBLE,  171 


CHAPTER  Yir. 

THE   GOVERNMENT    OF    GOD,    CONSIDERED    AS    A    SCHEME    OR 
CONSTITUTION,  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED. 

Though  it  be  acknowledged,  as  it  cannot  but  be,  that  the  ana- 
logy of  nature  gives  a  strong  credibility  to  the  general  doctrine  of 
religion,  and  to  the  several  particular  things  contained  in  it,  con- 
sidered as  so  many  matters  of  fact;  and  likewise  that  it  shows 
this  credibility  not  to  be  destroyed  by  any  notions  of  necessity : 
still,  objections  maybe  insisted  upon,  against  the  wisdom,  equity, 
and  goodness  of  the  divine  government  implied  in  the  notion  of 
religion,  and  against  the  method  by  which  this  government  is 
conducted;  to  which  objections  analogy  can  be  no  direct  answer. 
For  the  credibility,  or  the  certain  truth,  of  a  matter  of  fact,  does 
not  immediately  prove  any  thing  concerning  the  wisdom  or  good- 
ness of  it;  and  analogy  can  do  no  more,  immediately  or  directly, 
than  show  such  and  such  things  to  be  true  or  credible,  considered 
only  as  matters  of  fact.  But  if,  upon  supposition  of  a  moral  con- 
stitution of  nature  and  a  moral  government  over  it,  analogy  sug- 
gests and  makes  it  credible,  that  this  government  must  be  a 
scheme,  system,  or  constitution  of  government,  as  distinguished 
from  a  number  of  single  unconnected  acts  of  distributive  justice 
and  goodness;  and  likewise,  that  it  must  be  a  scheme,  so  imper- 
fectly comprehended,  and  of  such  a  sort  in  other  respects,  as  to 
afford  a  direct  general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice 
and  goodness  of  it :  then  analogy  is,  remotely,  of  great  service  in 
answering  those  objections;  both  by  suggesting  the  answer,  and 
showing  it  to  be  a  credible  one. 

Now  this,  upon  inquiry,  will  be  found  to  be  the  case.  For, 
First,  Upon  supposition  that  God  exercises  a  moral  government 
over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural  government  suggests 
and  makes  it  credible,  that  his  moral  government  tnust  be  a 
scheme,   quite  beyond  our  comprehension :    and  this  affords  a 


Bn.\Mn.\LT>  and  Latvson;  Replies  to  Priestley  by  Palaier  and  Bryant;  Grove 
on  Liberty;  Clarke's  Sermons  at  the  Boyle  Lectures;  Gibe's  Contemplations; 
Jvixg's  Origin  of  Evil;  Reib  on  the  Mind;  Watts  on  Liberty;  Harris' Boylo 
Lectures;  Jacksox's  Defence;  Butterworth  on  Moral  Government.] 


172  THE    GOVERNMENT  OF   GOD,  parti. 

general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and  goodness 
of  it.  Secondly,  A  more  distinct  observation  of  some  particular 
things  contained  in  God's  scheme  of  natural  government,  the  like 
things  being  supposed,  by  analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his  moral 
government,  will  further  show,  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid 
upon  these  objections. 

I.  Upon  supposition  that  Grod  exercises  a  moral  government 
over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural  government  suggests 
and  makes  it  credible,  that  his  moral  government  must  be  a 
scheme,  quite  beyond  our  comprehension;  and  this  affords  a 
general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and  goodness 
of  it.  It  is  most  obvious,  analogy  renders  it  highly  credible,  that, 
upon  supposition  of  a  moral  government,  it  must  be  a  scheme. 
For  the  world,  and  the  whole  natural  government  of  it,  appears 
to  be  so  :  to  be  a  scheme,  system,  or  constitution,  whose  parts 
correspond  to  each  other,  and  to  a  whole,  as  really  as  any  work  of 
art,  or  as  any  particular  model  of  a  civil  constitution  and  govern- 
ment. In  this  great  scheme  of  the  natural  world,  individuals 
have  various  peculiar  relations  to  other  individuals  of  their  own 
species.  Whole  species  are,  we  find,  variously  related  to  other 
species,  upon  this  earth.  Nor  do  we  know,  how  much  further 
these  kinds  of  relations  may  extend.  And,  as  there  is  not  any 
action  or  natural  event,  which  we  are  acquainted  with,  so  single 
and  unconnected,  as  not  to  have  a  respect  to  some  other  actions 
and  events;  so  possibly  each  of  them,  when  it  has  not  an  imme- 
diate, may  yet  have  a  remote,  natural  relation  to  other  actions 
and  events,  much  beyond  the  compass  of  this  present  world. 
There  seems  indeed  nothing,  from  whence  we  can  so  much  as 
make  a  conjecture,  whether  all  creatures,  actions,  and  events, 
throughout  the  whole  of  nature,  have  relations  to  each  other 
But,  as  it  is  obvious,  that  all  events  have  future  unknown  conse 
queuces;  so  if  we  trace  any  event,  as  far  as  we  can,  into  what  id 
connected  with  it,  we  shall  find,  that  if  it  were  not  connected 
with  something  further  in  nature,  unknown  to  us,  something 
both  past  and  present,  such  event  could  not  possibly  have  been 
at  all.  Nor  can  we  give,  the  whole  account  of  any  one  thing 
whatever;  of  all  its  causes,  ends,  and  necessary  adjuncts;  those 
adjuncts,  I  mean,  without  which  it  could  nut  have  been.  By 
this  most  astonishing  connection,  these  reciprocal  correspondences? 


CH4P.  vri.  A   SCHEME  INCOMPREHENSIBLE.  I73 

and  mutual  relations,  every  thing  which  we  see  in  the  course  0^ 
nature  is  actually  brought  about.  Things  seemingly  the  most 
insignificant  imaginable,  are  perpetually  observed  to  be  necessary 
conditions  to  other  things  of  the  greatest  importance;  so  that 
any  one  thing  whatever,  may  for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary, 
be  a  necessary  condition  to  any  other. 

The  natural  world  then,  and  natural  government  of  it,  being 
such  an  incomprehensible  scheme ;  so  incomprehensible,  that  a 
man  must,  really  in  the  literal  sense,  know  nothing  at  all,  who  is 
not  sensible  of  his  ignorance  in  it;  this  immediately  suggests, 
and  strongly  shows  the  credibility,  that  the  moral  world  and 
government  of  it  may  be  so  too.*  Indeed  the  natural  and  moral 
constitution  and  government  of  the  world  are  so  connected,  as  to 
make  up  together  but  one  scheme  :  and  it  is  highly  probable, 
that  the  first  is  formed  and  carried  on  merely  in  subserviency  to 
the  latter;  as  the  vegetable  world  is  for  the  animal,  and  organized 
bodies  for  minds.  But  the  thing  intended  here  is,  without  in- 
quiring how  far  the  administration  of  the  natural  world  is  bub- 
ordinate  to  that  of  the  moral,  only  to  observe  the  credibility,  that 
one  should  be  analogous  or  similar  to  the  other:  that  theiefore 
every  act  of  divine  justice  and  goodness  may  be  supposed  to  look 
much  beyond  itself,  and  its  immediate  object;  may  have  some 
reference  to  other  parts  of  God's  moral  administration,  and  to  a 
general  moral  plan  ;  and  that  every  circumstance  of  this  his  moral 
government  may  be  adjusted  beforehand  with  a  view  to  the  whole 
of  it.  For  example:  the  determined  length  of  time,  and  the 
degrees  and  ways,  in  which  virtue  is  to  remain  in  a  state  of  war- 
fare and  discipline,  and  in  which  wickedness  is  permitted  to  have 

*  [Maimonides  makes  use  of  the  following  similitude.  "  Suppose  one  of  good 
understanding,  whose  mother  had  died  soon  after  he  was  born  to  be  brought 
up  on  an  island,  where  he  saw  no  human  being  but  his  father  nor  the  female 
of  any  beast.  This  person  when  grown  up  inquires  how  men  are  produced. 
He  is  told  that  they  are  bred  in  the  womb  of  one  of  the  same  species  and  that 
while  in  the  womb  we  are  very  small  and  there  move  and  are  nourished.  Tho 
young  man  inquires  whether  when  thus  in  the  womb  we  did  not  eat,  and  drink, 
and  breathe,  as  we  do  now,  and  is  answered.  No.  Then  he  denies  it,  and  offers 
demonstration  that  it  could  not  be  so.  For  says  he,  if  either  of  us  cease  to 
breathe  our  life  is  gone;  and  how  could  we  have  lived  close  shut  up  in  a  womb 
for  months  ?  So  if  we  cease  to  eat  and  drink,  we  die,  and  how  could  the  child 
live  so  for  months  ?  and  thus  he  satisfies  himself  that  it  is  impossible  man 
anould  come  into  existence  in  such  a  manner."] 

15* 


174  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD,  part  i. 

it3progre&s;  the  times  appointed  for  the  execution  of  justice  j 
the  appointed  instruments  of  it;  the  kinds  of  rewards  and  punish- 
mentS;  and  the  manners  of  their  distribution;  all  particular  in- 
stances of  divine  justice  and  goodness,  and  every  circumstance  of 
them,  may  have  such  respects  to  each  other,  as  to  make  up  alto- 
gether a  whole,  connected  and  related  in  all  its  parts ;  a  scheme 
or  system,  which  is  as  properly  such,  as  the  natural  world  is,  and 
of  the  like  kind.  Supposing  this  to  be  the  case,  it  is  most  evi- 
dent, that  we  are  not  competent  judges  of  this  scheme,  from  the 
small  parts  of  it  which  come  within  our  view  in  the  present  life : 
therefore  no  objections  against  any  of  these  parts  can  be  insisted 
upon  by  reasonable  men.^ 

This  our  ignorance,  and  the  consequence  here  drawn  from  it, 
are  universally  acknowledged  upon  other  occasions;  and  though 
scarce  denied,  yet  are  universally  forgot,  when  persons  come  to 
argue  against  religion.  And  it  is  not  perhaps  easy,  even  for  the 
most  reasonable  men,  always  to  bear  in  mind  the  degree  of  our 
ignorance,  and  make  due  allowances  for  it.  Upon  these  accounts, 
it  may  not  be  useless  to  go  a  little  further,  in  order  to  show  more 
distinctly,  how  just  an  answer  our  ignorance  is,  to  objections 
against  the  scheme  of  Providence.  Suppose  then  a  person  boldly 
to  assert,*'  that  the  things  complained  of,  the  origin  and  continu- 
ance of  evil,  might  easily  have  been  prevented  by  repeated  inter- 
positions;* interpositions  so  guarded  and  circumstanced,  as  would 

^  [Let  us  imagine  a  person  to  be  taken  to  view  some  great  historical  painting, 
■before  which  hangs  a  thick  curtain.  The  attendant  raises  the  curtain  a  few 
inches.  Can  the  spectator,  from  the  unmeaning  strip  of  foreground,  derive 
any  conception  of  the  figures  yet  concealed  ?  Much  less  is  he  able  to  criticize 
their  proportions,  or  beauty,  or  perspective,  or  even  the  design  of  the  artist  ? 
The  small  fragment  of  a  tree,  or  flower,  or  animal,  or  building,  may  seem  quite 
unmeaning  and  even  ugly,  though  the  whole  would  present  beautj^,  fitness,  or 
grandeur.  Now  the  portion  of  God's  dominions  within  our  surve^^,  is  as  utterly 
insignificant,  compared  to  the  universe,  and  its  interminable  duration,  as  an 
atom  compared  to  a  planet  or  a  man's  age  to  eternity. 

The  concluding  observations  of  this  chapter,  abundantly  remove  every  diffi- 
culty as  to  such  ignorance  being  as  valid  against  the  proofs  of  religion,  as  it  is 
against  objections  to  it.] 

c  [No  truly  philosophical  mind  can  be  arrogant;  because  the  wider  the  range 
of  thought,  the  greater  are  the  discoveries  of  our  ignorance.  The  young  stu- 
dent may  well  hesitate  to  decide  points,  on  which  the  profoundest  thinkers 
take  opposite  sides,  and  when  conscious  of  inability  intrust  himsai^  to  the 
guidance  of  those  whose  lives  are  best. 

*  Pp.  177,  178. 


CHAP.  vii.  A   SCHEME   INCOMPREHENSIBLE.  J-J  9 

preclude  all  mischief  arising  from  tliem.  Or,  if  this  were  in.- 
practicable,  that  a  scheme  of  government  is  itself  an  imperfection, 
since  more  good  might  have  been  produced,  without  any  scheme, 
system,  or  constitution  at  all,  by  continued  single  unrelated  acts 
of  distributive  justice  and  goodness;  because  these  would  have 
occasioned  no  irregularities.  Farther  than  this,  it  is  presumed, 
the  objections  will  not  be  carried.  Yet  the  answer  is  obvious  : 
that  were  these  assertions  true,  still  the  observations  above,  con- 
cerning our  ignorance  in  the  scheme  of  divine  government  and 
the  consequence  drawn  from  it,  would  hold,  in  great  measure; 
enough  to  vindicate  religion,  against  all  objections  from  the  dis- 
orders of  the  present  state.  Were  these  assertions  true,  yet  the 
government  of  the  world  might  be  just  and  good  notwithstanding; 
for,  at  the  most,  they  would  infer  nothing  more  than  that  it 
might  have  been  better.  But  they  are  mere  arbitrary  assertions ; 
no  man  being  sufficiently  acquainted  with  the  possibilities  of 
things,  to  bring  any  proof  of  them  to  the  lowest  degree  of  proba- 
bility. For  however  possible  what  is  asserted  may  seem,  yet 
many  instances  may  be  alleged,  in  things  much  less  out  of  our 
reach,  of  suppositions  absolutely  impossible,  and  reducible  to  the 
most  palpable  self  contradictions,  which,  not  every  one  would  per- 
ceive to  be  such;  nor  perhaps  any  one,  at  first  sight  suspect. 

From  these  things,  it  is  easy  to  see  distinctly,  how  our  igno- 
rance, as  it  is  the  common,  so  it  is  really  a  satisfactory  answer, 
to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and  goodness  of  Providence. 
If  a  man,  contemplating  any  one  providential  dispensation,  which 
had  no  relation  to  any  others,  should  object,  that  he  discerned  in 
it  a  disregard  to  justice,  or  a  deficiency  of  goodness ;  nothing 
would  be  less  an  answer  to  such  objection,  than  our  ignorance  in 
other  parts  of  providence,  or  in  the  possibilities  of  things,  no  way 
related  to  what  he  was  contemplating.  But  when  we  know  not 
but  the  part  objected  against  may  be  relative  to  other  parts  un- 
known to  us;  and  when  we  are  unacquainted  with  what  is,  in 
the  nature  of  the  thing,  practicable  in  the  case  before  us;  then 
our  ignorance  is  a  satisfactory  answer;  because,  some  unknown 
relation,  or  some  unknown  impossibility,  may  render  what  is 
objected  against,  just  and  good;  nay  good  in  the  highest  practi- 
cable degree. 

II.  How  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  such  objections,  will 


176  THE   GOVERNMENT    OF   GOD,  part  i. 

further  appear,  by  a  more  disMnct  observation  of  some  particular 
things  contained  in  the  natural  government  of  God,  the  like  to 
which  may  be  supposed,  from  analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his 
moral  government. 

First,  As  in  the  scheme  of  the  natural  world,  no  ends  appear 
to  be  accomplished  without  means :  so  we  find  that  means  very 
undesirable,  often  conduce  to  bring  about  ends  in  such  a  measure 
desirable,  as  greatly  to  overbalance  the  disagreeableness  of  the 
means.  And  in  cases  where  such  means  are  conducive  to  such 
ends,  it  is  not  reason,  but  experience,  which  shows  us,  that  they 
are  thus  conducive.  Experience  also  shows  many  means  to  be 
conducive  and  necessary  to  accomplish  ends,  which  means,  before 
experience,  we  should  hav€  thought,  would  have  had  even  a  con- 
trary tendency.  From  these  observations  relating  to  the  natural 
scheme  of  the  world,  the  moral  being  supposed  analogous  to  it, , 
arises  a  great  credibility,  that  the  putting  our  misery  in  each 
other's  power  to  the  degree  it  is,  and  making  men  liable  to  vice 
to  the  degree  we  are;  and  in  general,  that  those  things  which 
are  objected  against  the  moral  scheme  of  Providence,  may  be, 
upon  the  whole,  friendly  and  assistant  to  virtue,  and  productive 
of  an  overbalance  of  happiness:  i.e.  the  things  objected  against 
may  be  means,  by  which  an  overbalance  of  good,  will  in  the  end, 
be  found  produced.  And  from  the  same  observations,  it  .appears 
to  be  no  presumption  against  tbis,  that  we  do  not,  if  indeed  we 
do  not,  see  those  means  to  have  any  such  tendency,  or  that  they 
seem  to  us  to  have  a  contrary  one.  Thus  those  things,  which  we 
call  irregularities,  may  not  be  so  at  all;  because  they  may  be 
means  of  accomplishing  wise  and  good  ends-  more  considerable. 
It  may  be  added,  as  above,  that  they  may  also  be  the  only  means, 
by  which  these  wise  and  good  ends  are  capable  of  being  accom- 
plished. 

It  may  be  proper  to  add,  in  order  to  obviate  an  absurd  and 
wicked  conclusion  from  any  of  these  observations,  that  though 
the  constitution  of  our  nature,  from  whence  we  are  capable  of 
vice  and  misery,  may,  as  it  undoubtedly  does,  contribute  to  the 
perfection  and  happiness  of  the  world;  and  though  the  actual 
permission  of  evil  may  be  beneficial  to  it :  {i.e.  it  would  have 
been  more  mischievous,  not  that  a  wicked  person  had  himself 
abstained  from  his  own  wickedness,  but  that  any  one  had  forcibly 


CHAP.  VII.  A   SCHEME   INCOMPREHENSIBLE..  1^7 

prevented  it,  than  that  it  was  permitted  :)  yet  notwithstanding, 
it  might  have  been  much  better  for  the  world,  if  this  very  evil 
had  never  been  done.  Nay  it  is  most  clearly  conceivable,  that 
the  very  commission  of  wickedness  may  be  beneficial  to  the  world, 
and  yet,  that  it  would  be  infinitely  more  beneficial  for  men  to  re- 
frain from  it.  For  thus,  in  the  wise  and  good  constitution  of  the 
natural  world,  there  are  disorders  which  bring  their  own  cures ; 
diseases,  which  are  themselves  remedies.  Many  a  man  would 
have  died,  had  it  not  been  for  the  gout  or  a  fever;  yet  it  would 
be  thought  madness  to  assert,  that  sickness  is  a  better  or  more 
perfect  state  than  health;  though  the  like,  with  regard  to  the 
moral  world,  has  been  asserted. 

Secondly,  The  natural  government  of  the  world  is  carried  on 
by  general  laws.  For  this  there  may  be  wise  and  good  reasons : 
the  wisest  and  best,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary.  And 
that  there  are  such  reasons,  is  suggested  to  our  thoughts  by  the 
analogy  of  nature ;  by  our  being  made  to  experience  good  ends 
to  be  accomplished,  as  indeed  all  the  good  which  we  enjoy  is 
accomplished,  by  this  means, — viz. :  that  the  laws,  by  which  the 
world  is  governed,  are  general.  We  have  scarce  any  kind  of 
enjoyments,  but  what  we  are,  in  some  way  or  other,  instrumental 
in  procuring  ourselves,  by  acting  in  a  manner  which  we  foresee 
likely  to  procure  them  :  now  this  foresight  could  not  be  at  all, 
were  not  the  government  of  the  world  carried  on  by  general  laws. 
And  though,  fur  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary,  every  single 
case  may  be,  at  length,  found  to  have  been  provided  for  even  by 
these  :  yet  to  prevent  all  irregularities,  or  remedy  them  as  they 
arise,  by  the  wisest  and  best  general  laws,  may  be  impossible  in 
the  nature  of  things ;  as  we  see  it  is  absolutely  impossible  in  civil 
government. 

But  then  we  are  ready  to  think,  that,  the  constitution  of  nature 
remaining  as  it  is,  and  the  course  of  things  being  permitted  to  go 
on,  in  other  respects,  as  it  does,  there  might  be  interpositions  to 
prevent  irregularities;  though  they  could  not  have  been  pre- 
vented, or  remedied  by  any  general  laws.  There  would  indeed 
be  reason  to  wish,  which,  by-lhe-way,  is  very  different  from  a 
\ight  to  claim,  that  all  irregularities  were  prevented  or  remedied 
by  present  interpositions,  if  these  interpositions  would  have  no 
other  effect  than  this.  But  it  is  plain  they  would  have  some 
M 


178  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD,  parti. 

visible  and  immediate  had  effects :  for  instance,  they  would 
encourage  idleness  and  negligence;  and  they  would  render 
doubtful  the  natural  rule  of  life^,  which  is  ascertained  by  this 
very  thing,  that  the  course  of  the  world  is  carried  on  by  general 
Jaws.  And  further,  it  is  certain  they  would  have  distant  effects, 
and  very  great  ones  too;  by  means  of  the  wonderful  connections 
before  mentioned.*  So  that  we  cannot  so  much  as  guess,  what 
would  be  the  whole  result  of  the  interpositions  desired.  It  may 
be  said,  any  bad  result  might  be  prevented  by  further  interposi- 
tions, whenever  there  was  occasion  for  them :  but  this  again  is 
talking  quite  at  random,  and  in  the  dark.^ 

Upon  the  whole  then,  we  see  wise  reasons,  why  the  course  of 
the  world  should  be  carried  on  by  general  laws,  and  good  ends 
accomplished  by  this  means :  and  for  aught  we  know,  there 
may  be  the  wisest  reasons  for  it,  and  the  best  ends  accomplished 
by  it.  We  have  no  ground  to  believe,  that  all  irregularities  could 
be  remedied  as  they  arise,  or  could  have  been  precluded,  by  gene- 
ral laws.  We  find  that  interpositions  would  produce  evil,  and 
prevent  good :  and,  for  aught  we  know,  they  would  produce 
greater  evil  than  they  would  prevent;  and  prevent  greater  good 
than  they  would  produce.  And  if  this  be  the  case,  then  the  not 
interposing  is  so  far  from  being  a  ground  of  complaint,  that  it  is 
an  instance  of  goodness.  This  is  intelligible  and  sufficient :  and 
going  further,  seems  beyond  the  utmost  reach  of  our  faculties. 

It  may  be  said,  that  ''after  all,  these  supposed  impossibilities 
and  relations  are  what  we  are  unacquainted  with ;  and  we  must 
judge  of  religion,  as  of  other  things,  by  what  we  do  know,  and 
look  upon  the  rest  as  nothing  :  or  however,  that  the  answers  here 
given  to  what  is  objected  against  religion,  may  equally  be  made 
use  of  to  invalidate  the  proof  of  it ;  since  their  stress  lies  so 
very  much  upon  our  ignorance.''     But, 

First,  Though  total  ignorance  in  any  matter  does  indeed 
equally  destroy,  or  rather  preclude,  all  proof  concerning  it,  and 
objections  against  it;  yet  partial  ignorance  does  not.  For  we 
may  in  any  degree  be  convinced,  that  a  person  is  of  such  a  cha- 
racter, and  consequently  will  pursue  such  ends ;  though  we  are 
greatly  ignorant,  what  is  the  proper  way  of  acting,  in  order  the 
most  effectually  to  obtain  those  ends  :  and  in  this  case,  objections 
*  P.  173,  &c.  t  V.  17S 


CHAP,  vit  A  SCHEME  INCOMPREHENSIBLE.  1.79 

against  bis  manner  of  acting,  as  seemingly  not  conducive  to  ob- 
tain tbem,  migbt  be  answered  by  our  ignorance ;  tdougti  the 
proof  that  sucb  ends  were  intended,  migbt  not  at  all  be  invali- 
dated by  it.  Thus,  the  proof  of  religion  is  a  proof  of  the  moral 
character  of  God,  and  consequently  that  his  government  is  moral, 
and  that  every  one  upon  the  whole  shall  receive  according  to  his 
deserts ;  a  proof  that  this  is  the  designed  end  of  his  government. 
But  we  are  not  competent  judges,  what  is  the  proper  way  of 
acting,  in  order  the  most  effectually  to  accomplish  this  end.* 
Therefore  our  ignorance  is  an  answer  to  objections  against  the 
conduct  of  Providence,  in  permitting  irregularities,  as  seeming 
contradictory  to  this  end.  Now,  since  it  is  so  obvious,  that  our 
ignorance  may  be  a  satisfactory  answer  to  objections  against  a 
thing,  and  yet  not  affect  the  proof  of  it ;  till  it  can  be  shown,  it 
is  frivolous  to  assert,  that  our  ignorance  invalidates  the  proof  of 
religion,  as  it  does  the  objections  against  it. 

Secondly,  Suppose  unknown  impossibilities,  and  unknown  rela- 
tions, might  justly  be  urged  to  invalidate  the  proof  of  religion, 
as  well  as  to  answer  objections  against  it;  and  that,  in  conse- 
quence of  this,  the  proof  of  it  were  doubtful.  Still,  let  the 
assertion  be  despised,  or  let  it  be  ridiculed,  it  is  undeniably  true, 
that  moral  obligations  would  remain  certain,  though  it  were  not 
certain  what  would,  upon  the'  whole,  be  the  consequences  of 
observing  or  violating  them.  For,  these  obligations  arise,  im- 
mediately and  necessarily,  from  the  judgment  of  our  own  mind, 
unless  perverted,  which  we  cannot  violate  without  being  self- 
condemned.  And  they  would  be  certain  too,  from  considerations 
of  interest.  For  though  it  were  doubtful,  what  will  be  the  future 
consequences  of  virtue  and  vice ;  yet  it  is,  however,  credible, 
that  they  may  have  those  consequences,  which  religion  teaches 
us  they  will :  and  this  credibility  is  a  certainf  obligation  in  point 
of  prudence,  to  abstain  from  all  wickedness,  and  to  live  in  the 
conscientious  practice  of  all  that  is  good. 

Tliirdly^  The  answers  above  given  to  the  objections  against 
religion  cannot  be  made  use  of  to  invalidate  the  proof  of  it. 
For,  upon  suspicion  that  God  exercises  a  moral  government  over 
ihe  world,  analogy  does  most  strongly  lead  us  to  conclude,  that 
this  moral  government  must  be  a  scheme,  or  constitution,  beyond 
*  Pp.  72,  73.  t  P.  68,  and  Part  II.  cbap.  vi. 


180  CONCLUSION.  PART  I. 

our  comprehension.  A  thousand  particular  analogies  show  us, 
that  parts  of  such  a  scheme,  from  their  relation  to  other  parts, 
may  conduce  to  accomplish  ends,  which  we  should  have  thought 
they  had  no  tendency  to  accomplish  :  nay  ends,  which  before  ex- 
perience, we  should  have  thought  such  parts  were  contradictory 
to,  and  had  a  tendency  to  prevent.  Therefore  all  these  analogies 
show,  that  the  way  of  arguing  made  use  of  in  objecting  against 
religion  is  delusive :  because  they  show  it  is  not  at  all  incredible, 
that,  could  we  comprehend  the  whole,  we  should  find  the  per- 
mission of  the  disorders  objected  against  to  be  consistent  with 
justice  and  goodness;  and  even  to  be  instances  of  them.  Now 
this  is  not  applicable  to  the  proof  of  religion,  as  it  is  to  the 
objections  against  it;*  and  therefore  cannot  invalidate  that  proof, 
as  it  does  these  objections. 

Lastly,  From  the  observation  now  made,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that 
the  answers  above  given  to  the  objections  against  Providence, 
though,  in  a  general  way  of  speaking,  they  may  be  said  to  be 
taken  from  our  ignorance ;  yet  are  by  no  means  taken  merely 
from  that,  but  from  something  which  analogy  shows  us  concern- 
ing it.  For  analogy  shows  us  positively,  that  our  ignorance  in 
the  possibilities  of  things,  and  the  various  relations  in  nature, 
renders  us  incompetent  judges,  and  leads  us  to  false  conclusions, 
in  cases  similar  to  this,  in  which  we  pretend  to  judge  and  to 
object.  So  that  the  things  above  insisted  upon  are  not  mere 
suppositions  of  unknown  impossibilities  and  relations :  but  they 
are  suggested  to  our  thoughts,  and  even  forced  upon  the  observa- 
tion of  serious  men,  and  rendered  credible  too,  by  the  analogy  of 
nature.  Therefore  to  take  these  things  into  the  account,  is  to 
judge  by  experience  and  what  we  do  know :  and  it  is  not  judg- 
ing so,  to  take  no  notice  of  them. 


CONCLUSION 

The  observations  of  the  last  chapter  lead  us  to  consider  this 
little  scene  of  human  life,  in  which  we  are  so  busily  engaged,  as 
having  a  reference,  of  some  sort  or  other,  to  a  much  larger  plan 
of  things.     Whether  we  are,  any  way,  related  to  the  more  dia-- 

*  germ,  at  the  Rolls,  p.  312,  2d  ed 


CHAP.  VII.  CONCLUSION.  Jgl 

tant  parts  of  the  boundless  universe,  into  wbicli  we  are  brought, 
is  altogether  uncertain.  But  it  is  evident,  that  the  course  of 
things,  which  comes  within  our  view,  is  connected  with  some 
things,  past,  present,  and  future,  beyond  it.*  So  that  we  are 
placed,  as  one  may  speak,  in  the  middle  of  a  scheme,  not  fixed 
but  progressive,  every  way  incomprehensible  :  incomprehensible, 
in  a  manner  equally,  with  respect  to  what  has  been,  what  now  is, 
and  what  shall  be.  This  scheme  cannot  but  contain  in  it  some 
things  as  wonderful,  atid  as  much  beyond  our  thought  and  con- 
ception,■}■  as  any  thing  in  that  of  religion.  For,  will  any  man  in 
his  senses  say,  that  it  is  less  difl&cult  to  conceive,  how  the  world 
came  to  be  and  to  continue  as  it  is,  without,  than  with,  an  intelli- 
gent Author  and  Governor  of  it '/  Or,  admitting  an  intelligent 
Governor  of  it,  that  there  is  some  other  rule  of  government  more 
natural,  and  of  easier  conception,  than  that  which  we  call  moral? 
Indeed,  without  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of  nature, 
no  account  at  all  can  be  given,  how  this  universe,  or  the  part  of 
it  particularly  in  which  we  are  concerned,  came  to  be,  and  the 
course  of  it  to  be  carried  on,  as  it  is :  nor  any,  of  its  general  end 
and  design,  without  a  moral  governor  of  it.  That  there  is  an 
intelligent  Author  of  nature,  and  natural  Governor  of  the  world, 
is  a  principle  gone  upon  in  the  foregoing  treatise ;  as  proved,  and 
generally  known,  and  confessed  to  be  proved.  And  the  very 
notion  of  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  proved  by  particular 
final  causes,  implies  a  will  and  a  character. | 

Now,  as  our  whole  nature,  the  nature  which  he  has  given  us, 
leads  us  to  conclude  his  will  and  character  to  be  moral,  just,  and 
good :  so  we  can  scarce  in  imagination  conceive,  what  it  can  be 
otherwise.  However,  in  consequence  of  this  his  will  and  cha- 
racter, whatever  it  be,  he  formed  the  universe  as  it  is,  and  carries 
on  the  course  of  it  as  he  does,  rather  than  in  any  other  manner ; 
and  has  assigned  to  us,  and  to  all  living  creatures,  a  part  and  a 
lot  in  it.  Irrational  creatures  act  this  their  part,  and  enjoy  and 
undergo  the  pleasures  and  the  pains  allotted  them,  without  any 
reflection.  But  one  would  think  it  impossible,  that  creatures 
endued  with  reason  could  ayoid  reflecting  sometimes  upon  all 
this ;  reflecting,  if  not  from  whence  we  came,  yet,  at  least, 
•whither  we  are  going-  and  what  the  mysterious  scheme,  in  the 

»  P.  172,  &c.  t  See  Part  11.  ch.  ii.  t  P.  173. 

IG 


182  CONCLUSION.  PART  I. 

midst  of  wticli  we  find  ourselves,  will,  at  lengtli,  come  out  and 
produce  :  a  scheme  in  wtiich  it  is  certain  we  are  highly  interested, 
and  in  which  we  may  be  interested  even  beyond  conception."* 

For  many  things  prove  it  palpably  absurd  to  conclude,  that 
we  shall  cease  to  be,  at  death.  Particular  analogies  do  most 
sensibly  show  us,  that  there  is  nothing  to  be  thought  strange,  in 
our  being  to  exist  in  another  state  of  life.  And  that  we  are  now 
living  beings,  affords  a  strong  probability  that  we  shall  continue 
so;  unless  there  be  some  positive  ground,  and  there  is  none  from 
reason  or  analogy,  to  think  death  will  destroy  us.  Were  a  per- 
suasion of  this  kind  ever  so  well  grounded,  there  would,  surely, 
be  little  reason  to  take  pleasure  in  it.  Indeed  it  can  have  no 
other  ground,  than  some  such  imagination,  as  that  of  our  gross 
bodies  being  ourselves;  which  is  contrary  to  experience.  Expe- 
rience too  most  clearly  shows  us  the  folly  of  concluding,  from  the 
body  and  the  living  agent  affecting  each  other  mutually,  that  the 
dissolution  of  the  former  is  the  destruction  of  the  latter.  And 
there  are  remarkable  instances  of  their  not  affecting  each  other, 
which  lead  us  to  a  contrary  conclusion.  The  supposition,  then, 
which  in  all  reason  we  are  to  go  upon,  is,  that  our  living  nature 
will  continue  after  death.  And  it  is  infinitely  unreasonable  to 
form  an  institution  of  life,  or  to  act,  upon  any  other  supposition. 

All  expectation  of  immortality,  whether  more  or  less  certain, 
opens  an  unbounded  prospect  to  our  hopes  and  our  fears :  since 
we  see  the  constitution  of  nature  is  such,  as  to  admit  of  misery, 
as  well  as  to  be  productive  of  happiness,  and  experience  ourselves 
to  partake  of  both  in  some  degree;  and  since  we  cannot  but  know, 
what  higher  degrees  of  both  we  are  capable  of.  And  there  is  no 
presumption  against  believing  further,  that  our  future  interest 
depends  upon  our  present  behavior :  for  we  see  our  present  in- 
terest doth;  and  that  the  happiness  and  misery,  which  are  natu- 
rally annexed  to  our  actions,  very  frequently  do  not  follow,  till 
long  after  the  actions  are  done,  to  which  they  are  respectively 
annexed.  So  that  were  speculation  to  leave  us  uncertain,  whether 
it  were  likely,  that  the  Author  of  nature,  in  giving  happiness 
and  misery  to  his  creatures,  hath  regard  to  their  actions  or  not: 
yet,  since  we  find  by  experience  that  he  hath  such  regard,  tho 

^  [The  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  a  recapitulation  of  the  whole  argur»em 
from  the  beginning;  and  should  be  carefully  conned.] 


CHAP.  vii.  CONCLUSION.  183 

whole  sense  of  things  whicli  he  has  o-iven  us,  plainly  leads  us,  at 
once  and  without  any  elaborate  inquiries,  to  think  that  it  may, 
indeed  must,  be  to  good  actions  chiefly  that  he  hath  annexed 
happiness,  and  to  bad  actions  misery;  or  that  he  will,  upon  the 
whole,  reward  those  who  do  well,  and  punish  those  who  do  evil. 

To  confirm  this  from  the  constitution  of  the  world,  it  has  been 
observed,  that  some  sort  of  moral  government  is  necessarily  im- 
plied in  that  natural  government  of  God,  which  we  experience 
ourselves  under;  that  good  and  bad  actions,  at  present,  are  natu- 
rally rewarded  and  punished,  not  only  as  beneficial  and  mischievous 
to  society,  but  also  as  virtuous  and  vicious  :  and  that  there  is,  in 
the  very  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to  their  being  rewarded 
and  punished  in  a  much  higher  degree  than  they  are  at  present. 
And  though  this  higher  degree  of  distributive  justice,  which 
nature  thus  points  out  and  leads  towards,  is  prevented  for  a  time 
from  taking  place;  it  is  by  obstacles,  which  the  state  of  this  world 
unhappily  throws  in  its  way,  and  which  therefore  are  in  their 
nature  temporary.  Now,  as  these  things  in  the  natural  conduct 
of  Providence  are  observable  on  the  side  of  virtue;  so  there  is 
nothing  to  be  set  against  them  on  the  side  of  vice.  A  moral 
scheme  of  government  then  is  visibly  established,  and,  in  some 
decree,  carried  into  execution :  and  this,  together  with  the  essen- 
tial  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  duly  considered,  naturally  raise 
in  us  an  apprehension,  that  it  will  be  carried  on  further  towards 
perfection  in  a  future  state,  and  that  every  one  shall  there  receive 
according  to  his  deserts. 

And  if  this  be  so,  then  our  future  and  general  interest,  under 
the  moral  government  of  God,  is  appointed  to  depend  upon  our 
behavior;  notwithstanding  the  difficulty,  which  this  may  occasion, 
of  securing  it,  and  the  danger  of  losing  it :  just  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  our  temporal  interest,  under  his  natural  government,  is 
appointed  to  depend  upon  our  behavior;  notwithstanding  the 
like  difficulty  and  danger.  For,  from  our  original  constitution, 
and  that  of  the  world  which  we  inhabit,  we  are  naturally  trusted 
with  ourselves;  with  our  own  conduct  and  our  own  interest. 
And  from  the  same  constitution  of  nature,  especially  joined  with 
that  course  of  things  which  is  owing  to  men,  we  have  temptations 
10  be  unfaithful  in  this  trust;  to  forfeit  this  interest,  to  neglect 
it,  and  run  ourselves  into  misery  and  ruin.     From  these  tempta- 


184  CONCLUSION.  PART  1 

tions  arise  tlie  difficulties  of  behaving  so  as  to  secure  our  temporal 
interest,  and  the  hazard  of  behaving  so  as  to  miscarry  in  it. 
There  is  therefore  nothing  incredible  in  supposing  there  may  be 
the  like  difficulty  and  hazard  with  regard  to  that  chief  and  final 
good,  which  religion  lays  before  us. 

The  whole  account,  how  it  came  to  pass  that  we  were  placed 
in  such  a  condition  as  this,  must  indeed  be  beyond  our  compre- 
hension. But  it  is  in  part  accounted  for  by  what  religion  teaches 
us,  that  the  character  of  virtue  and  piety  must  be  a  necessary 
qualification  for  a  future  state  of  security  and  happiness,  under 
the  moral  government  of  God;  in  like  manner,  as  some  certain 
qualifications  or  other  are  necessary  for  every  particular  condition 
of  life,  under  his  natural  government :  and  that  the  present  state 
was  intended  to  be  a  school  of  discipline,  for  improving  in  our- 
selves that  character.  Now  this  intention  of  nature  is  rendered 
highly  credible  by  observing;  that  we  are  plainly  made  for  im- 
provement of  all  kinds;  that  it  is  a  general  appointment  of  Provi- 
denpe,  that  we  cultivate  practical  principles,  and  form  within 
ourselves  habits  of  action,  in  order  to  become  fit  for  what  we  were 
wholly  unfit  for  before;  that  in  particular,  childhood  and  youth 
is  naturally  appointed  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  mature  age; 
and  that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  fitted  for  a  state  of  moral 
discipline.  And,  whereas  objections  are  urged  against  the  whole 
notion  of  moral  government  and  a  probationary  state,  from  the 
opinion  of  necessity;  it  has  been  shown,  that  God  has  given  us 
the  evidence,  as  it  were,  of  experience,  that  all  objections  against 
religion,  on  this  head,  are  vain  and  delusive.  He  has  also,  in 
his  natural  government,  suggested  an  answer  to  all  our  short- 
sighted objections,  against  the  equity  and  goodness  of  his  moral 
government;  and  in  general  he  has  exemplified  to  us  the  latter 
by  the  former. 

These  things,  which  it  is  to  be  remembered,  are  matters  of 
fact,  ought,  in  all  common  sense,  to  awaken  mankind;  to  induce 
them  to  consider  in  earnest  their  condition,  and  what  they  have 
to  do.  It  is  absurd,  absurd  to  the  decree  of  being  ridiculous,  if 
the  subject  were  not  of  so  serious  a  kind,  for  men  to  think  them- 
selves secure  in  a  vicious  life;  or  even  in  that  immoral  thought- 
lessness, into  which  far  the  greatest  part  of  them  are  fallen.  The 
credibility  of  religion,  arising  from  experience  and  faces  here  con- 


CHAP.  VII.  CONCLUSION.  185 

sidered,  is  fully  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  engage  them  to  live  in 
the  general  practice  of  all  virtue  and  piet}^;  under  the  serious 
apprehension,  though  it  should  be  mixed  with  some  doubt,*  of  a 
righteous  administration  established  in  nature,  and  a  future  judg- 
ment in  consequence  of  it:  especially  when  we  consider,  how 
very  questionable  it  is,  whether  any  thing  at  all  can  be  gained  by 
vice,")-  how  unquestionably  little  as  well  as  precarious,  the  pleasures 
and  profits  of  it  are  at  the  best,  and  how  soon  they  must  be  parted 
with  at  the  longest.  For,  in  the  deliberations  of  reason,  concern- 
ing what  we  are  to  pursue  and  what  to  avoid,  as  temptations  to 
any  thing  from  mere  passion  are  supposed  out  of  the  case,  so  in- 
ducements to  vice,  from  cool  expectations  of  pleasure  and  interest 
so  small  and  uncertain  and  short,  are  really  so  insignificant,  as,  ia 
the  view  of  reason  to  be  almost  nothing  in  themselves j  and  in 
comparison  with  the  importance  of  religion  they  quite  disappear 
and  are  lost. 

Mere  passion  may  indeed  be  alleged,  though  not  as  a  reason, 
yet  as  an  excuse,  for  a  vicious  course  of  life.  And  how  sorry  an 
excuse  it  is,  will  be  manifest  by  observing,  that  we  are  placed  in 
a  condition  in  which  we  are  unavoidably  inured  to  govern  our 
passions,  by  being  necessitated  to  govern  them :  and  to  lay  our- 
selves under  the  same  kind  of  restraints,  and  as  great  ones  too, 
from  temporal  regards,  as  virtue  and  piety,  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  things,  require.  The  plea  of  ungovernable  passion  then,  en 
the  side  of  vice,  is  the  poorest  of  all  things;  for  it  is  no  reason, 
and  a  poor  excuse.  The  proper  motives  to  religion  are  the  proper 
proofs  of  it,  from  our  moral  nature,  from  the  presages  of  con- 
science, and  our  natural  apprehension  of  God  under  the  character 
of  a  righteous  Governor  and  Judge:  a  nature,  and  conscience, 
and  apprehension,  given  us  by  him;  and  from  the  confirmation 
of  the  dictates  of  reason,  by  life  and  immortality  brought  to  light 
hy  the  Gospel;  and  the  wrath  of  God  revealed  from  heaven 
%gainst  all  ungodliness  and  unrighteousness  of  men. 

«•  Part  II.  cb.  vi.  f  P.  108. 


END    OF    THE    FIRST    PART. 


16* 


PART  11. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   IMPORTANCE    OF   CHRISTIANITY." 

Some  persons,  upon  pretence  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  liglit 
of  nature,  avowedly  reject  all  revelation,  as  in  its  very  notion  in- 
credible,  and  what  must  be  fictitious.  And  indeed  it  is  certain, 
no  revelation  would  have  been  given,  had  the  light  of  nature 
been  sufficient  in  such  a  sense,  as  to  render  one  not  wanted  and 
useless.  But  no  man,  in  seriousness  and  simplicity  of  mind,  can 
possibly  think  it  so,  who  considers  the  state  of  religion  in  the 
heathen  world  before  revelation,  and  its  present  state  in  those 
places  which  have  borrowed  no  light  from  it :  particularly  the 
doubtfulness  of  some  of  the  greatest  men,  concerning  things  of 
the  utmost  importance,  as  well  as  the  natural  inattention  and 
ignorance  of  mankind  in  general.  It  is  impossible  to  say,  who 
would  have  been  able  to  have  reasoned  out  that  whole  system, 
which  we  call  Natural  Religion,  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  clear 

^  [There  is  a  slight  indication  in  this  chapter  that  Butler  falls  into  the  old 
plan  of  settling  the  necessity  of  Christianity,  before  determining  its  truth. 
Paley  discards  this  order  of  arrangement,  in  his  very  first  sentence;  and  with 
good  reason.  The  necessity  of  revelation  is  an  abstraction ;  the  proofs  of  it 
are  patent  facts.  To  hold  in  abeyance  the  credentials  presented  by  Chria- 
tianit}',  till  we  first  satisfy  ourselves  that  God  could  or  would  make  any  such 
announcements,  is  uuphilosophical  and  irreverent.  This  chapter  discusses  the 
importance  rather  than  the  necessity  of  revelation;  and  so  is  a  fitting  com- 
mencement of  the  discussion.  Every  truth  disclosed  in  revelation,  over  and 
above  the  truths  which  natural  religion  furnishes,  proves  the  necessity  of 
revelation,  if  we  would  know  any  thing  of  such  truths.  And  it  is  such  truths 
■which  constitute  the  very  peculiarities  of  revelation,  and  teach  the  icay  r/ 
tahation,  for  the  sinful  and  helpless.] 
186 


CHAP.  I.  niPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  ]87 

of  superstition  :  but  there  is  certainly  no  ground  to  affirm  that 
the  generality  could.  If  they  could,  there  is  no  sort  of  pi'oba 
bility  that  they  would.  Admitting  there  were,  they  would  highly 
want  a  standing  admonition  to  remind  them  of  it,  and  inculcate 
it  upon  them. 

And  further,  were  they  as  much  disposed  to  attend  to  religion, 
as  the  better  sort  of  men  are  ',  yet  even  upon  this  supposition, 
there  would  be  various  occasions  for  supernatural  instruction  and 
assistance,  and  the  greatest  advantages  might  be  afforded  by 
them.^  So  that  to  say  revelation  is  a  thing  superfluous,  what 
there  was  no  need  of,  and  what  can  be  of  no  service,  is,  I  think,  to 
talk  quite  wildly  and  at  random.  Nor  would  it  be  more  extrava- 
gant to  affirm,  that  mankind  is  so  entirely  at  ease  in  the  present 
state,  and  life  so  completely  happy,  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to 
suppose  our  condition  capable  of  being,  in  any  respect,  better. 

There  are  other  persons,  not  to  be  ranked  with  these,  who 
seem  to  be  getting  into  a  way  of  neglecting,  and  as  it  were,  over- 
looking revelation,  as  of  small  importance  provided  natural  reli- 
gion be  kept  to.  With  little  regard  either  to  the  evidence  of 
the  former,  or  to  the  objections  against  it,  and  even  upon  sup- 
position of  its  truth;  "the  only  design  of  it,"  say  they,  "must 
be,  to  establish  a  belief  of  the  moral  system  of  natiu'c,  and  to 
enforce  the  practice  of  natural  piety  and  virtue.  The  belief  and 
practice  of  these  were,  perhaps,  much  promoted  by  the  first  pub- 
lication of  Christianity :  but  whether  they  are  believed  and  prac- 
tised, upon  the  evidence  and  motives  of  nature  or  of  revelation, 
is  no  great  matter."*    This  way  of  considering  revelation,  though 

^  [No  one  can  read  the  writings  of  tbe  great  sages  of  antiquity  witbcat  a 
full  and  sad  conviction  that  in  relation  to  the  character  of  God,  the  sioful- 
ness  of  man,  the  future  state,  and  the  rules  of  living,  those  prime  points  on 
which  we  need  knowledge,  they  were  almost  profoundly  ignorant.  See  on  ihis 
point,  Leland's  Adv.  and  Necess. :  Chalmers'  Nat.  Theol. :  McCosn's  Div. 
Gov. :  Pascal's  Thoughts :  Warburtox's  Div.  Legation.] 

*  Invents  multos propterea  nolle  fieri  Christianos,  quia  quasi  sufficnint 

sibi  de  bona  vita  sua.  Bene  vivere  opus  est,  ait.  Quid  mihi  praecepturus  est 
Cbristus?  Ut  bene  vivam?  Jam  bene  vivo.  Quid  mihi  necessarius  est 
Christus;  nullum  homicidium,  nullum  furtum,  nuUam  rapinam  facio,  res 
(jiienas  non  concupisco,  nuUo  adulterio  contaminor?  Nam  inveniatur  in  7  ita 
mea  aliquid  quod  reprehendatur,  et  qui  reprehenderit  faciat  Christianum.  /up 
in  Psp'  xxxi.'  [You  find  many  who  refuse  to  become  Christians,  becjfis* 
they  feel  sufiicient  of  themselves  to  lead  a  good  life.     "We  ought  to  live  wt«i. 


188  IMPOP  TANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  part  ii 

it  is  not  the  same  with  the  former,  yet  borders  nearly  upon  it, 
and  very  much,  at  length  runs  up  into  it :  and  requires  to  be 
particularly  considered,  with  regard  to  the  persons  who  seem  to 
be  getting  into  this  way.  The  consideration  of  it  will  likewise 
further  show  the  extravagance  of  the  former  opinion,  and  the 
truth  of  the  observations  in  answer  to  it,  just  mentioned.  And 
an  inquiry  into  the  importance  of  Christianity,  cannot  be  an 
improper  introduction  to  a  treatise  concerning  the  credibility 
of  it. 

Now,  if  God  has  given  a  revelation  to  mankind,  and-  com- 
manded those  things  which  are  commanded  in  Christianity;  it  is 
evident,  at  first  sight,  that  it  cannot  in  any  wise  be  an  indifferent 
matter,  whether  we  obey  or  disobey  those  commands :  unless  we 
are  certainly  assured,  that  we  know  all  the  reasons  for  them,  and 
that  all  those  reasons  are  now  ceased,  with  regard  to  mankind  in 
general,  or  to  ourselves  in  particular.  It  is  absolutely  impossible 
we  can  be  assured  of  this.°  For  our  ignorance  of  these  reasons 
proves  nothing  in  the  case:  since  the  whole  analogy  of  nature 
shows,  what  is  indeed  in  itself  evident,  that  there  may  be  infinite 
reasons  for  things,  with  which  we  are  not  acquainted. 

But  the  importance  of  Christianity  will  more  distinctly  appear, 
by  considering  it  more  distinctly :  First,  as  a  republication,  and 
external  institution,  of  natural  or  essential  religion,  adapted  to 
the  present  circumstances  of  mankind,  and  intended  to  promote 
natural  piety  and  virtue  :  Secondly,  as  containing  an  account  of 
a  dispensation  of  things,  not  discoverable  by  reason,  in  conse- 
quence of  which  several  distinct  precepts  are  enjoined  us.  For 
though  natural  religion  is  the  foundation  and  principal  part  of 
Christianity,  it  is  not  in  any  sense  the  whole  of  it. 

I.  Christianity  is  a  republication  of  Natural  religion.  It  in- 
structs mankind  in  the  moral  system  of  the  world :  that  it  is  the 
work  of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being,  and  under  his  government, 
that  virtue  is  his  law,  and  that  he  will  finally  judge  mankind  in 

fiays  one.  "AVhat  will  Christ  teach  me?  To  live  well?  I  do  live  well,  what 
need  then  have  I  of  Christ?  I  commit  no  murder,  no  theft,  no  robbery.  I 
eovet  no  man's  goods,  and  am  polluted  by  no  adultery.  Let  some  one  find  in 
me  any  thing  to  censure,  and  he  who  can  do  so,  may  make  me  a  Christian."] 

c  [The  true  mode  of  distinguishing  a  temporary,  local,  or  individual  com- 
mand from  such  as  are  of  universal  and  perpetual  ol  ligation,  is  well  iaid  ao«a 
by  Wayland,  Mor.  Sci.  ch.  ix.  sec.  2.] 


©HAP.  I.  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  Ig9 

righteousness,  and  render  to  all  according  to  their  works,  in  a 
future  state.  And,  which  is  very  material,  it  teaches  natural 
religion  in  its  genuine  simplicity;  free  from  those  superstitions, 
with  which  it  was  totally  corrupted,  and  under  which  it  was  in  a 
manner  lost. 

Revelation  is,  further,  an  autlioritative  publication  of  natural 
religion,  and  so  affords  the  evidence  of  testimony  for  the  truth 
of  it.  Indeed  the  miracles  and  prophecies  recorded  in  Scripture, 
were  intended  to  prove  a  particular  dispensation  of  Providence, 
i.e.  the  redemption  of  the  world  by  the  Messiah  :  but  this  does  not 
hinder,  but  that  they  may  also  prove  God's  general  providence 
over  the  world,  as  our  moral  governor  and  judge.  And  they 
evidently  do  prove  it;  because  this  character  of  the  Author  of 
nature,  is  necessarily  connected  with  and  implied  in  that  par- 
ticular revealed  dispensation  of  things :  it  is  likewise  continually 
taught  expressly,  and  insisted  upon,  by  those  persons  who 
wrought  the  miracles  and  delivered  the  prophecies.  So  that 
indeed  natural  religion  seems  as  much  proved  by  the  Scripture 
revelation,  as  it  would  have  been,  had  the  design  of  revelation 
been  nothing  else  than  to  prove  it. 

But  it  may  possibly  be  disputed,  how  far  miracles  can  prove 
natural  religion;  and  notable  objections  may  be  urged  against 
this  proof  of  it,  considered  as  a  matter  of  speculation  :  but 
considered  as  a  practical  thing,  there  can  be  none.  For 
suppose  a  person  to  teach  natural  religion  to  a  nation,  who 
had  lived  in  total  ignorance  or  forgetfulness  of  it;  and  to 
declare  that  he  was  commissioned  by  God  so  to  do ;  suppose  him, 
in  proof  of  his  commission,  to  foretell  things  future,  which  no 
human  foresight  could  have  guessed  at ;  to  divide  the  sea  with  a 
word ;  feed  great  multitudes  with  bread  from  heaven ;  cure  all 
manner  of  diseases;  and  raise  the  dead,  even  himself,  to  life; 
would  not  this  give  additional  credibility  to  his  teaching,  a  credi- 
bility beyond  what  that  of  a  common  man  would  have;  and  be 
an  authoritative  publication  of  the  law  of  nature,  i.e.  a  new 
proof  of  it  ?  It  would  be  a  practical  one,  of  the  strongest  kind, 
perhaps,  which  human  creatures  are  capable  of  having  given 
them.  The  Law  of  Moses  then,  and  the  Gospel  of  Christ,  are 
authoritative  publications  of  the  religion  of  nature;  they  afford 
a  proof  of  God's  general  providence,  as  moral  Governor  of  the 


laO  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  part  ii. 

world,  iM  well  as  of  his  particular  dispensations  of  providence 
towards  sinful  creatures,  revealed  in  the  Law  and  the  Gospel. 
As  they  are  the  only  evidence  of  the  latter,  so  they  are  an  addi- 
tional evidence  of  the  former. 

To  show  this  further,  let  us  suppose  a  man  of  the  greatest  and 
most  improved  capacity,  who  had  never  heard  of  revelation,  con- 
vinced upon  the  whole,  notwithstanding  the  disorders  of  the 
world,  that  it  was  under  the  direction  and  moral  government  of 
an  infinitely  perfect  Being;  hut  ready  to  question,  whether  he 
were  not  got  beyond  the  reach  of  his  faculties :  suppose  him 
brought,  by  this  suspicion,  into  great  danger  of  being  carried 
away  by  the  universal  bad  example  of  almost  every  one  around 
him,  who  appeared  to  have  no  sense,  no  practical  sense  at  least, 
of  these  things :  and  this,  perhaps,  would  be  as  advantageous  a 
situation  with  regard  to  religion,  as  nature  alone  ever  placed  any 
man  in.  What  a  confirmation  now  must  it  be  to  such  a  person, 
all  at  once,  to  find,  that  this  moral  system  of  things  was  revealed 
to  mankind,  in  the  name  of  that  infinite  Being,  whom  he  had 
from  principles  of  reason  believed  in :  and  that  the  publishers  of 
the  revelation  proved  their  commission  from  him,  by  making  it 
appear,  that  he  had  intrusted  them  with  a  power  of  suspending 
and  changing  the  general  laws  of  nature. 

Nor  must  it  by  any  means  be  omitted,  for  it  is  a  thing  of  the 
utmost  importance,  that  life  and  immortality  are  eminently 
brought  to  light  by  the  Gospel.  The  great  doctrines  of  a  future 
state,  the  danger  of  a  course  of  wickedness^  and  the  efiicacy  of 
repentance,  are  not  only  confirmed  in  the  Gospel,  but  are  taught, 
especially  the  last  is,  with  a  degree  of  light,  to  which  that  of 
nature  is  but  darkness. 

Further.  As  Christianity  served  these  ends  and  purposes, 
when  it  was  first  published,  by  the  miraculous  publication  itself, 
so  it  was  intended  to  serve  the  same  purposes  in  future  ages,  by 
means  of  the  settlement  of  a  visible  church  :^  of  a  society,  dis- 

^  [Natural  religion  shows  us  the  danger  of  sin;  but  not  the  infinite  danger 
of  eternal  retribution,  and  the  hopelessness  of  restoration  after  death.  And  as 
tu  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  it  rather  opposes  that  doctrine  than  teaches  it. 
At  least  it  does  not  teach  that  repentance  may  be  accepted,  so  as  not  only  to 
cancel  guilt,  but  restore  to  the  favor  of  God.] 

«  ["  Christianity  was  left  with  Christians,  to  be  transmitted,  in  like  mannef 
as  the  religion  of  nature  had  been  left,  with  mankind  in  general.     There  wai 


CHAP.  I.  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  191 

tinguished  from  common  ones,  and  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  oy 
peculiar  religious  institutions;  by  an  instituted  method  of  Instruc- 
tion, and  an  instituted  form  of  external  religion.  Miraculous 
powers  were  given  to  the  first  preachers  of  Christianity,  in  order 
to  their  introducing  it  into  the  world :  a  visible  church  was  esta- 
blished, in  order  to  continue  it,  and  carry  it  on  successively 
throughout  all  ages.  Had  only  Moses  and  the  prophets,  Christ 
and  his  apostles,  taught,  and  by  miracles  proved,  religion  to  their 
contemporaries;  the  benefits  of  their  instructions  would  have 
reached  but  a  small  part  of  mankind.  Christianity  must  have 
been,  in  a  great  degree,  sunk  and  forgot  in  a  very  few  ages.  To 
prevent  this,  appears  to  have  been  one  reason  why  a  visible 
church  was  instituted;  to  be  like  a  city  upon  a  hill,  a  standing 
memorial  to  the  world  of  the  duty  which  we  owe  our  Maker :  to 
call  men  continually,  both  by  example  and  instruction,  to  attend 
to  it,  and,  by  the  form  of  religion,  ever  before  their  eyes,  remind 
them  of  the  reality;  to  be  the  repository  of  the  oracles  of  God; 
to  hold  up  the  light  of  revelation  in  aid  to  that  of  nature,  and  to 
propagate  it,  throughout  all  generations,  to  the  end  of  the  world — 
the  light  of  revelation,  considered  here  in  no  other  view,  than  as 
designed  to  enforce  natural  religion.  And  in  proportion  as 
Christianity  is  professed  and  taught  in  the  world,  religion,  natural 
or  essential  religion,  is  thus  distinctly  and  advantageously  laid 
before  mankind,  and  brought  again  and  again  to  their  thoughts, 
as  a  matter  of  infinite  importance. 

A  visible  church  has  also  a  further  tendency  to  promote  natural 
religion,  as  being  an  instituted  method  of  education,  originally 
intended  to  be  of  peculiar  advantage  to  those  who  conform  to  it. 
For  one  end  of  the  institution  was,  that,  by  admonition  and  re- 
proof, as  well  as  instruction,  by  a  general  regular  discipline,  and 
public  exercises  of  religion,  the  body  of  Christ,  as  the  Scripture 
speaks,  should  be  edified;  i.e.  trained  up  in  piety  and  virtue  for 
a  higher  and  better  state.     This  settlement,  then,  appearing  thus 

ho-wever  this  difference  that  by  an  institution  of  external  religion  with  a  stand- 
ing ministry  for  instruction  and  discipline,  it  pleased  God  to  unite  Christians 
into  visible  churches,  and  all  along  to  preserve  them  over  a  great  part  of  the 
■world,  and  thus  perpetuate  a  general  publication  of  the  Gospel."  Butler's 
sermon  before  the  Soc.  for  Prop,  the  Gospel.  He  goes  on  to  show,  in  that  dis- 
course, that  these  churches,  however  corrupt  any  may  become,  are  repositories 
for  the  written  oracles  of  God,  and  so  carry  the  antidote  to  their  heresies.] 


192  rMPOETAXCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  part  n. 

beneficial,  tending  in  the  nature  of  tlie  thing  to  answer,  and,  in 
some  degree,  actually  answering,  those  ends,  it  is  to  be  remem- 
bered, that  the  very  notion  of  it  implies  positive  institutions;  for 
the  visibility  of  the  church  consists  in  them.  Take  away  every 
thing  of  this  kind,  and  you  lose  the  very  notion  itself.  So  that 
if  the  things  now  mentioned  are  advantages,  the  reason  and  im- 
portance of  positive  institutions  in  general  is  most  obvious;  since 
without  them  these  advantages  could  not  be  secured  to  the  world. 
And  it  is  mere  idle  wantonness,  to  insist  upon  knowing  the 
reasons,  vjliy  such  particular  ones  were  fixed  upon  rather  than 
others. 

The  benefit  arising  from  this  supernatural  assistance,  which 
Christianity  affords  to  natural  religion,  is  what  some  persons  are 
very  slow  in  apprehending.  And  yet  it  is  a  thing  distinct  in 
itself,  and  a  very  plain  obvious  one.  For  will  any  in  good  earnest 
really  say,  that  the  bulk  of  mankind  in  the  heathen  world  were 
in  as  advantageous  a  situation,  w^ith  regard  to  natural  religion,  as 
they  are  now  among  us :  that  it  was  laid  before  them,  and  en- 
forced upon  them,  in  a  manner  as  distinct,  and  as  much  tending 
to  influence  their  practice  '/ 

The  objections  against  all  this,  from  the  perversion  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  from  the  supposition  of  its  having  had  but  little  good 
influence,  however  innocently  they  may  be  proposed,  cannot  be 
insisted  upon  as  conclusive,  upon  any  principles,  but  such  as  lead 
to  downright  Atheism;  because  the  manifestation  of  the  law  of 
nature  by  reason,  which,  upon  all  principles  of  Theism,  must 
have  been  from  God,  has  been  perverted  and  rendered  iuefi'ectual 
in  the  same  manner.  It  may  indeed,  I  think,  truly  be  said,  that 
the  good  effects  of  Christianity  have  not  been  small;  nor  its  sup- 
posed ill  effects,  any  effects  at  all  of  it,  properly  speaking.  Per- 
haps, too,  the  things  done  have  been  aggravated;  and  if  not, 
Christianity  hath  been  often  only  a  pretence,  and  the  same  evils 
in  the  main  would  have  been  done  upon  some  other  pretence. 
However,  great  and  shocking  as  the  corruptions  and  abuses  of  it 
have  really  been,  they  cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  arguments 
against  it,  upon  principles  of  Theism.  For  one  cannot  proceed 
one  step  in  reasoning  upon  natural  religion,  any  more  than  upon 
Christianity,  without  laying  it  down  as  a  first  principle,  that  the 
dispensations  of  Providence  are  not  to  be  judged  of  by  their  per 


CHAP.  I.  IMPORTANCE  OF   CHRISTIANITY.  193 

versions,  but  bj  their  genuine  tendencies  :  not  by  wbat  they  do 
actually  seem  to  effect,  but  by  what  they  would  effect  if  mankind 
did  their  part;  that  part  which  is  justly  put  and  left  upon  them. 
It  is  altogether  as  much  the  language  of  one  as  of  the  other :  Hg 
that  is  unjust,  let  Mm  he  unjust  still :  and  he  that  is  holy,  let  him 
he  holy  still.^  The  light  of  reason  does  not,  any  more  than  that 
of  revelation,  force  men  to  submit  to  its  authority;  both  admonish 
them  of  what  they  ought  to  do  and  avoid,  together  with  the  con- 
eequences  of  each;  and  after  this,  leave  them  at  full  liberty  to 
act  just  as  they  please,  till  the  appointed  time  of  judgment. 
Every  moment's  experience  shows,  that  this  is  God's  general  ]  x\q 
of  government.' 

To  return  then :  Christianity  being  a  promulgation  of  the  law 
of  nature;  being  moreover  an  authoritative  promulgation  of, it; 
with  new  light,  and  other  circumstances  of  peculiar  advantage, 
adapted  to  the  wants  of  mankind;  these  things  fully  show  its 
importance. 

It  is  to  be  observed  further,  that  as  the  nature  of  the  case  re- 
quires, so  all  Christians  are  commanded  to  contribute,  by  their 
profession  of  Christianity,  to  preserve  it  in  the  world,  and  render 
it  such  a  promulgation  and  enforcement  of  religion.  For  it  is 
the  very  scheme  of  the  Gospel,  that  each  Christian  should,  in  his 
degree,  contribute  towards  continuing  and  carrying  it  on :  all  by 
uniting  in  the  public  profession  and  external  practice  of  Chris- 
tianity; some  by  instructing,  by  having  the  oversight  and  taking 
care  of  this  religious  community,  the  church  of  God.  Now  this 
further  shows  the  importance  of  Christianity;  and,  which  is  what 
I  chiefly  intend,  its  importance  in  a  practical  sense :  or  the  high 
obligations  we  are  under,  to  take  it  into  our  most  serious  considera- 
tion; and  the  danger  there  must  necessarily  be,  not  only  in  treating 

*  Rev.  xxii.  11. 

'  ["It  is  no  real  objection  to  this,  though  it  may  seem  so  at  first  sight,  to  say 
that  since  Christianity  is  a  remedial  system,  designed  to  obviate  those  very 
evils  which  have  been  produced  by  the  neglect  and  abuse  of  the  light  of  nature, 
it  ought  not  to  be  liable  to  the  same  perversions.  Because — 1.  Christianity  is 
not  designed  primarily  to  remedy  the  defects  of  nature,  but  of  an  unnatural 
state  of  ruin  into  which  men  were  brought  by  the  Fall.  And  2.  It  is  remedial 
of  the  defects  of  nature  in  a  great  decree,  by  its  giving  additional  advantages. 
3.  It  might  be  impossible  that  it  should  bo  remedial  in  a  greater  degree  than 
it  is,  without  destroying  man's  free  agency;  which  worad  be  to  destroy  its  own 
end,  the  practice  of  virtue." — Fitzgerald's  Xo^cs.] 
N  17 


194  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  part  u. 

it  despitefullj,  wliicli  I  am  not  now  speaking  of,  but  in  dis- 
regarding and  neglecting  it.  For  this  is  neglecting  to  do  what 
is  expressly  enjoined  us,  for  continuing  those  benefits  to  the 
world,  and  transmitting  them  down  to  future  times.  And  all 
this  holds,  even  though  the  only  thing  to  be  considered  in  Chris- 
tianity were  its  subserviency  to  natural  religion. 

II.  Christianity  is  to  be  considered  in  a  further  view ;  as  con- 
taining an  account  of  a  dispensation  of  things,  not  at  all  dis- 
coverable by  reason,  in  consequence  of  which  several  distinct 
precepts  are  enjoined  us.  Christianity  is  not  only  an  external 
institution  of  natural  religion,  and  a  new  promulgation  of  God's 
general  providence,  as  righteous  governor  and  judge  of  the  world; 
but  it  contains  also  a  revelation  of  a  particular  dispensation  of 
Providence,  carrying  on  by  his  Son  and  Spirit,  for  the  recovery 
and  salvation  of  mankind,  who  are  represented  in  Scripture  to 
be  in  a  state  of  ruin.  And  in  consequence  of  this  revelation 
being  made,  we  are  commanded  to  he  hcqjtized,  not  only  in  the 
name  of  the  Father,  but  also,  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy 
Ghost:  and  other  obligations  of  duty,  unknown  before,  to  the 
Son  and  the  Holy  Ghost,  are  revealed.  Now  the  importance  of 
these  duties  may  be  judged  of,  by  observing  that  they  arise,  not 
from  positive  command  merely,  but  also  from  the  offices  which 
appear,  from  Scripture,  to  belong  to  those  divine  persons  in  the 
Gospel  dispensation ;  or  from  the  relations,  which  we  are  there 
informed,  they  stand  in  to  us.  By  reason  is  revealed  the  rela- 
tion, which  God  the  Father  stands  in  to  us.  Hence  arises  the 
obligation  of  duty  which  we  are  under  to  him.  In  Scripture  are 
revealed  the  relations,  which  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  stand  in 
to  us.  Hence  arise  the  obligations  of  duty/  which  we  are  under 
to  them.  The  truth  of  the  case,  as  one  may  speak,  in  each  of 
these  three  respects  being  admitted :  that  God  is  the  governor 
of  the  world,  upon  the  evidence  of  reason;  that  Christ  is  the 
mediator  between  God  and  man,  and  the  Holy  Ghost  our  guide 
and  sanctifier,  upon  the  evidence  of  revelation :  the  truth  of  the 

8  [Chalmers  (Nat.  Theol.,  b.  v.  ch.  iv.)  makes  this  very  plain.  He  shows 
the  elides  of  natural  religion  to  be  one  thing  and  its  objects  another.  Natural 
religion  discloses  no  Redeemer  or  Sanctifier;  but  it  teaches  how  we  should 
regard  such  a  person,  if  there  be  one.  It  teaches  love  and  conformity  to  such 
a  being  by  the  relation  in  which  we  of  course  stand  to  him.  How  we  are  to 
express  that  love  and  obedience  it  cannot  teach.] 


CHAP.  I.  IMrORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  195 

case,  I  say,  in  eacli  of  ttese  respects  being  admitted,  it  is  no 
more  a  question,  why  it  should  be  commanded,  that  we  be  bap- 
tized in  the  name  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  than  that 
we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Father.  This  matter  seems 
to  require  to  be  more  fully  stated.* 

Let  it  be  remembered  then,  that  religion  comes  under  the 
twofold  consideration  of  internal  and  external :  for  the  latter  is 
as  real  a  part  of  religion,  of  true  religion,  as  the  former.  Now, 
when  religion  is  considered  under  the  first  notion,  as  an  inward 
principle,  to  be  exerted  in  such  and  such  inward  acts  of  the  mind 
and  heart,  the  essence  of  natural  religion  may  be  said  to  consist 
in  religious  regards  to  God  the  Father  Almiyhti/ :  and  the  essence 
of  revealed  religion,  as  distinguished  from  natural,  to  consist  in 
religious  regards  to  the  Son,  and  to  the  Holy  Ghost.  The  obliga- 
tion we  are  under,  of  paying  these  religious  regards  to  each  of 
these  divine  persons  respectively,  arises  from  the  respective  rela- 
tions which  they  each  stand  in  to  us.  How  tbese  relations  are 
made  known,  whether  by  reason  or  revelation,  makes  no  alteration 
in  the  case :  because  the  duties  arise  out  of  the  relations  them- 
selves, not  out  of  the  manner  in  which  we  are  informed  of  them. 
The  Son  and  Spirit  have  each  his  proper  office  in  that  great  dis- 
pensation of  Providence,  the  redemption  of  the  world;  the  one 
our  Mediator,  the  other  our  Sanctifier.  Does  not  then  the  duty 
of  religious  regards  to  both  these  divine  persons,  as  immediately 
arise  to  the  view  of  reason,  out  of  the  very  nature  of  these  offices 
and  relations  ;  as  the  good-will  and  kind  intention,  which  we  owe 
to  our  fellow-creatures,  arise  out  of  the  common  relations  be 
tween  us  and  them?  But  it  will  be  asked,  "What  are  the  in 
ward  religious  regards,  appearing  thus  obviously  due  to  the  Sor 
and  Holy  Spirit ;  as  arising,  not  merely  from  command  in  Scrip- 
ture, but  from  the  very  nature  of  the  revealed  relations,  which 
they  stand  in  to  us?''  I  answer,  the  religious  regards  of  reve- 
rence, honor,  love,  tnist,  gratitude,  fear,  hope. 

In  what  external  manner  this  inward  worship  is  to  be  ex- 
pressed, is  a  matter  of  pure  revealed  command,  as  perhaps  the 
external  manner,  in  which  God  the  Father  is  to  be  worshipped, 
may  be  more  so  than  we  are  ready  to  think.     But  the  worship, 

*■  See  The  Nature,  Obligation,  and  Efficacy,  of  the  Christian  Sacraments, 
*c.,  \hy  Waterland,]  and  Collibkr  of  Revealed  Keligion,  as  there  quoted. 


X96  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  part  it. 

the  internal  worship  itself,  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Ghost,  is  no 
further  matter  of  pure  revealed  command,  than  as  the  relations 
they  stand  in  to  us  are  matter  of  pure  revelation :  for  the  rela- 
tions being  known,  the  obligations  to  such  internal  worship  are 
obligations  of  reason,  arising  out  of  those  relations  themselves. 
In  short,  the  history  of  the  gospel  as  immediately  shows  us  the 
reason  of  these  obligations,  as  it  shows  us  the  meaning  of  the 
words.  Son  and  Holy  Ghost. 

If  this  account  of  the  Christian  religion  be  just,  those  persons 
who  can  speak  lightly  of  it,  as  of  little  consequence,  provided 
jiatural  religion  be  kept  to,  plainly  forget,  that  Christianity,  even 
what  is  peculiarly  so  called,  as  distinguished  from  natural  reli- 
gion, has  yet  somewhat  very  important,  even  of  a  moral  nature. 
For  the  office  of  our  Lord  being  made  known,  and  the  relation 
he  stands  in  to  us,  the  obligation  of  religious  regards  to  him  is 
plainly  moral,  as  much  as  charity  to  mankind  is ;  since  this  obli- 
gation arises,  before  external  command,  immediately  out  of  that 
his  office  and  relation  itself.  Those  persons  appear  to  forget, 
that  revelation  is  to  be  considered,  as  informing  us  of  somewhat 
new,  in  the  state  of  mankind,^  and  in  the  government  of  the 
world :  as  acquainting  us  with  some  relations  we  stand  in,  which 
could  not  otherwise  have  been  known.  These  relations  being  real 
(though  before  revelation  we  could  be  under  no  obligations  from 
them,  yet  upon  their  being  revealed),  there  is  no  reason  to  think, 
but  that  neglect  of  behaving  suitably  to  them  will  be  attended 
with  the  same  kind  of  consequences  under  God's  government,  as 
neglecting  to  behave  suitably  to  any  other  relations,  made  known 
to  us  by  reason.  Ignorance,  whether  unavoidable  or  voluntary, 
so  far  as  we  can  possibly  see,  will  just  as  much,  and  just  as  little, 
excuse  in  one  case  as  in  the  other :  the  ignorance  being  supposed 
equally  unavoidable,  or  equally  voluntary,  in  both  cases. 

If  therefore  Christ  be  indeed  the  mediator  between  God  and 
man,  i.e.  if  Christianity  be  true ;  if  he  be  indeed  our  Lord,  our 
Savior,  and  our  God,  no  one  can  say,  what  may  follow,  not  only 

^  [If  Christianity  were  but  "a  republication  of  natural  religion,"  or  as 
Tindall  says,  "as  old  as  creation,"  why  do  deists  oppose  it?  It  does  indeed 
republish  natural  religion,  but  it  adds  stupendous  truths  beside.  If  it  gave  ua 
no  new  light,  no  new  motives,  it  would  be  but  a  tremendous  curse,  making  ua 
all  the  more  responsible,  and  none  the  more  instructed  or  secure.] 


CHAP.  I.  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  I97 

the  obstinate,  but  the  careless  disregard  to  him,  in  those  high 
relations.  Nay,  no  one  can  say,  what  may  follow  such  disregard, 
even  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence.*  For,  as  the  natural 
consequences  of  vice  in  this  life  are  doubtless  to  be  considered  as 
judicial  punishments  inflicted  by  Grod,  so  for  aught  we  know,  the 
judicial  punishments  of  the  future  life  may  be,  in  a  like  way  or 
a  like  sense,  the  natural  consequence  of  vice  :f  of  men's  violating 
or  disregarding  the  relations  which  God  has  placed  them  in  here, 
and  made  known  to  them. 

If  mankind  are  corrupted  and  depraved  in  their  moral  cha- 
racter, and  so  are  unfit  for  that  state,  which  Christ  is  gone  to 
prepare  for  his  disciples ;  and  if  the  assistance  of  God's  Spirit 
be  necessary  to  renew  their  nature,  in  the  degree  requisite  to 
their  being  qualified  for  that  state ;  (all  which  is  implied  in  the 
express,  though  figurative  declaration,  Except  a  man  he  horn  of 
the  Spirit^  he  cannot  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God:^  supposing 
this,  is  it  possible  any  serious  person  can  think  it  a  slight  matter, 
whether  or  no  he  makes  use  of  the  means,  expressly  commanded 
by  God,  for  obtaining  this  divine  assistance  ?  Especially  since 
the  whole  analogy  of  nature  shows,  that  we  are  not  to  expect 
any  benefits,  without  making  use  of  the  appointed  means  for 
obtaining  or  enjoying  them.  Now  reason  shows  us  nothing,  of 
the  particular  immediate  means  of  obtaining  either  temporal  or 
spiritual  benefits.  This  therefore  we  must  learn,  either  from 
experience  or  revelation.  And  experience,  the  present  case  does 
not  admit  of. 

The  conclusion  from  all  this  evidently  is,  that  Christianity 
being  supposed  either  true  or  credible,  it  is  unspeakable  irreve- 
rence, and  really  the  most  presumptuous  rashness,  to  treat  it  as  a 
light  matter.  It  can  never  justly  be  esteemed  of  little  conse- 
quence, till  it  be  positively  supposed  false.  Nor  do  I  know  a 
higher  and  more  important  obligation  which  we  are  under,  than 
that  of  examining  most  seriously  into  its  evidence,  supposing 
its  credibility;  and  of  embracing  it,  upon  supposition  of  its 
truth. 

The  owo  following  deductions  may  be  proper  to  be  added,  in 
order  to  illustrate  the  foregoing  observations,  and  to  prevent  theii 
being  mistaken. 

*  P.  94.  t  Ch.  V.  ±  John  iii.  I, 

17* 


108  IMPORTANCE   OF   CHRISTIANITY.  part  n 

First,  Hence  we  may  clearly  see,  where  lies  the  distinction 
between  what  is  positive  and  what  is  moral  in  religion.  Moral 
precepts,  are  precepts  the  reasons  of  which  we  see :  positive  pre- 
cepts, are  precepts  the  reasons  of  which  we  do  not  see.*  Moral 
duties  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  case  itself,  prior  to  external 
command.  Positive  duties  do  not  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the 
case,  but  from  external  command;  nor  would  they  be  duties  at 
all,  were  it  not  for  such  command,  received  from  Him  whose 
creatures  and  subjects  we  are.  But  the  manner  in  which  the 
nature  of  the  case  or  the  fact  of  the  relation,  is  made  known,  this 
doth  not  denominate  any  duty  either  positive  or  moral.  That  we 
be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Father  is  as  much  a  positive  duty, 
as  that  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Son,  because  both  arise 
equally  from  revealed  command :  though  the  relation  which  we 
stand  in  to  Grod  the  Father  is  made  known  to  us  by  reason,  and 
the  relation  we  stand  in  to  Christ,  by  revelation  only.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  dispensation  of  the  Gospel  being  admitted,  grati- 
tude as  immediately  becomes  due  to  Christ,  from  his  being  the 
voluntary  minister  of  this  dispensation,  as  it  is  due  to  God  the 
Father,  from  his  being  the  fountain  of  all  good;  though  the  first 
is  made  known  to  us  by  revelation  only,  the  second  by  reason. 
Hence  also  we  may  see,  and,  for  distinctness'  sake,  it  may  be 
worth  mentioning,  that  positive  institutions  come  under  a  twofold 
consideration.  They  are  either  institutions  founded  on  natural 
religion,  as  baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Father;  (though  this  has 
also  a  particular  reference  to  the  gospel  dispensation,  for  it  is  in 
the  name  of  God,  as  the  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ :)  or 
they  are  external  institutions  founded  on  revealed  rt^'giou;  as 
baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Son^  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

Secondly,  From  the  distinction  between  what  is  moral  and 
what  is  positive  in  religion,  appears  the  ground  of  that  peculiar 
preference,  which  the  Scripture  teaches  us  to  be  due  to  the 
former. 

The  reason  of  positive  institutions  in  general,  is  very  obvious; 

*  This  is  the  distinction  between  moral  and  positive  precepts  considered  re- 
spectively as  such.  But  yet,  since  the  latter  have  somewhat  of  a  moral  nature, 
we  may  see  the  reason  of  them,  considered  in  this  view.  Moral  and  positive 
precepts  are  in  some  respects  alike,  in  other  respects  different.  So  far  as  they 
are  alike,  we  discern  the  reasons  of  both  ;  so  far  as  they  are  different,  we  discei»» 
the  reasons  of  the  former,  but  not  of  the  latter.     See  p.  189,  &g. 


CHAP.  I.  IMPORTANCE   OF   CHRISTIANITY.  I99 

though  we  should  not  see  the  reason,  why  particular  ones  are 
pitched  upon  rather  than  others.  Whoever,  therefore,  instead 
of  cavilling  at  words,  will  attend  to  the  thing  itself,  may  clearly 
see,  that  positive  institutions  in  general,  as  distinguished  from 
this  or  that  particular  one,  have  the  nature  of  moral  commands; 
since  the  reasons  of  them  appear.  Thus,  for  instance,  the  external 
worship  of  Grod  is  a  moral  duty,  though  no  particular  mode  of  it 
be  so.  Care  then  is  to  be  taken,  when  a  comparison  is  made  be- 
tween positive  and  moral  duties,  that  they  be  compared  no  further 
than  as  they  are  different;  no  further  than  as  the  former  are 
positive,  or  arise  out  of  mere  external  command,  the  reasons  of 
which  we  are  not  acquainted  with;  and  as  the  latter  are  moral, 
or  arise  out  of  the  apparent  reason  of  the  case,  without  such  ex- 
ternal command.  Unless  this  caution  be  observed,  we  shall  run 
into  endless  confusion. 

Now  this  being  premised,  suppose  two  standing  precepts  en- 
joined by  the  same  authority;  that,  in  certain  conjunctures,  it  is 
impossible  to  obey  both;  that  the  former  is  moral,  i.e.  a  precept 
of  which  we  see  the  reasons,  and  that  they  hold  in  the  particular 
case  before  us;  but  that  the  latter  is  positive,  i.e.  a  precept  of 
which  we  do  not  see  the  reasons :  it  is  indisputable  that  our  obli- 
gations are  to  obey  the  former;  because  there  is  an  apparent 
reason  for  this  preference,  and  none  against  it.  Further,  positive 
institutions,  all  those  I  suppose  which  Christianity  enjoins,  are 
means  to  a  moral  end :  and  the  end  must  be  acknowledged  more 
excellent  than  the  means.*  Nor  is  observance  of  these  institutions 
any  religious  obedience  at  all,  or  of  any  value,  otherwise  than  as 
it  proceeds  from  a  moral  principle.  This  seems  to  be  the  strict 
logical  way  of  stating  and  determining  this  matter;  but  will,  per- 
haps, be  found  less  applicable  to  practice,  than  may  be  thought 
at  first  sight. 

Therefore,  in  a  more  practical,  though  more  lax  way  of  con- 

*  [Without  offering  the  least  objection  to  what  is  here  said  of  the  comparativo 
value  of  moral  and  positive  institutions,  it  should  not  be  overlooked  that  some- 
times, obedience  to  a  positive  rite  is  more  indicative  of  an  obedient  spirit,  than 
obedience  to  a  moral  rule.  The  latter  is  urged  by  its  intrinsic  propriety,  over 
and  above  the  command,  and  appeals  to  several  of  our  finer  impulses.  The 
former  rests  singly  on  our  reverence  for  the  will  of  God.  There  are  many  who 
would  repel  a  temptation  to  steal,  or  to  lie,  who  yet  are  inseunble  to  the  duty 
oi.  baptism  or  the  Lord's  supper.] 


200  IMPORTANCE    OF   CHRISTIANITY.  part  n. 

Bideration,  and  taking  the  words,  moral  lata  and  positive  institu- 
tions, in  the  popular  sense,  I  add,  that  the  whole  moral  law  is  as 
much  matter  of  revealed  command,  as  positive  institutions  are : 
for  the  Scripture  enjoins  every  moral  virtue.  In  this  respect 
then  they  are  both  upon  a  level.  But  the  moral  law  is,  moreover, 
written  upon  our  hearts;  interwoven  into  our  very  nature.  And 
this  is  a  plain  intimation  of  the  Author  of  it,  which  is  to  be 
preferred,  when  they  interfere. 

But  there  is  not  altogether  so  much  necessity  for  the  determi- 
nation of  this  question,  as  some  persons  seem  to  think.  Nor  are 
we  left  to  reason  alone  to  determine  it.  For,  First,  Though 
mankind  have,  in  all  ages,  been  greatly  prone  to  place  their  reli- 
gion in  peculiar  positive  rites,  by  way  of  equivalent  for  obedience 
to  moral  precepts;  yet,  without  making  any  comparison  at  all 
between  them,  and  consequently  without  determining  which  is  to 
have  the  preference,  the  nature  of  the  thing  abundantly  shows  all 
notions  of  that  kind  to  be  utterly  subversive  of  true  religion,  as 
they  are,  moreover,  contrary  to  the  whole  general  tenor  of  Scrip- 
ture; and  likewise  to  the  most  express  particular  declarations  of 
it,  that  nothing  can  render  us  accepted  of  God,  without  moral 
virtue. 

Secondly,  Upon  the  occasion  of  mentioning  together  positive 
and  moral  duties,  the  Scripture  always  puts  the  stress  of  religion 
upon  the  latter,  and  never  upon  the  former.  This,  though  no 
sort  of  allowance  to  neglect  the  former,  when  they  do  not  interfere 
with  the  latter,  is  yet  a  plain  intimation,  that  when  they  do,  the 
latter  are  to  be  preferred.  And  as  mankind  are  for  placing  the 
stress  of  their  religion  anywhere,  rather  than  upon  virtue;  lest 
both  the  reason  of  the  thing,  and  the  general  spirit  of  Christi- 
anity, appearing  in  the  intimation  now  mentioned,  should  be  in- 
effectual against  this  prevalent  folly,  our  Lord  himself,  from 
whose  command  alone  the  obligation  of  positive  institutions  arises, 
has  taken  occasion  to  make  the  comparison  between  them  and 
moral  precepts;  when  the  Pharisees  censured  him,  for  eating 
with  publicans  and  sinners;  and  also  when  they  censured  his 
disciples,  for  pluching  the  ears  of  corn  on  the  Sahhath  day. 
Upon  this  comparison,  he  has  determined  expressly,  and  in  form, 
which  shall  have  the  preference  when  they  interfere.  And  by 
delivering  his  authoritative  determination  in  a  proverbial  manner 


t-nAP.  I.  IMPORTANCE   OF   CHEISTIANITY.  2{jl 

of  expression,  lie  has  made  it  general :  I  will  have  mercy,  and 
not  sacrifice.'^  The  propriety  of  the  word  proverbial,  is  not  the 
thing  insisted  upon :  though  I  think  the  manner  of  speaking  is 
to  be  called  so.  But  that  the  manner  of  speaking  very  remark- 
ably renders  the  determination  general,  is  surely  indisputable. 
For,  had  it  been  said  only,  that  Grod  preferred  mercy  to  the  rigid 
observance  of  the  Sabbath,  even  then,  by  parity  of  reason,  most 
justly  might  we  have  argued,  that  he  preferred  mercy  likewise, 
to  the  observance  of  other  ritual  institutions;  and  in  general, 
moral  duties,  to  positive  ones.  And  thus  the  determination 
would  have  been  general;  though  its  being  so  were  inferred  and 
not  expressed.  But  as  the  passage  really  stands  in  the  Gospel, 
it  is  much  stronger.  For  the  sense  and  the  very  literal  words  of 
our  Lord's  answer,  are  as  applicable  to  any  other  instance  of  a 
comparison,  between  positive  and  moral  duties,  as  to  that  upon 
which  they  were  spoken.  And  if,  in  case  of  competition,  mercy 
is  to  be  preferred  to  positive  institutions,  it  will  scarce  be  thought, 
that  justice  is  to  give  place  to  them.  It  is  remarkable  too,  that, 
as  the  words  are  a  quotation  from  the  Old  Testament,  they  are 
introduced,  on  both  the  forementioned  occasions,  with  a  declara- 
tion, that  the  Pharisees  did  not  understand  the  meaning  of  them. 
This,  I  say,  is. very  remarkable.  For,  since  it  is  scarce  possible, 
for  the  most  \gnorant  person,  not  to  understand  the  literal  sense 
of  the  passage  in  the  prophet ^f  and  since  understanding  the 
literal  sense  would  not  have  prevented  their  condemning  the  guilt- 
less,'^ it  can  hardly  be  doubted,  that  the  thing  which  our  Lord 
really  intended  in  that  declaration  was,  that  the  Pharisees  had 
not  learned  from  it,  as  they  might,  wherein  the  general  spirit  of 
religion  consists:  that  it  consists  in  moral  piety  and  virtue,  as 
distinguished  from  ritual  observances.  However,  it  is  certain  we 
may  learn  this  from  his  divine  application  of  the  passage,  in  the 
Gospel. 

But,  as  it  is  one  of  the  peculiar  weaknesses  of  human  nature, 
when,  upon  a  comparison  of  two  things,  one  is  found  to  be  of 
greater  importance  than  the  other,  to  consider  this  other  as  of 
scarce  any  importance  at  all:  it  is  highly  necessary  that  we  re- 
mind ourselves,  how  great  presumption  it  is,  to  make  light  of  any 
institutions  of  divine  appointment;  that  our  obligations  to  obey 

*  ]Latt.  ix  13,  and  xii.  7.  f  Hosen  vi.  6.  %  See  Matt.  sii.  7. 


202  KEVELATIOX  CONSIDERED  AS  MIRACULOUS.        pakt  ii. 

all  God's  commands  whatever  are  absolute  and  indispensable; 
and  that  commands  merely  positive,  admitted  to  be  from  bim, 
lay  us  under  a  moral  obligation  to  obey  tbem  :  an  obligation 
moral  in  tbe  strictest  and  most  proper  sense. 

To  these  things  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  that  the  account  now 
given  of  Christianity  most  strongly  shows  and  enforces  upon  us 
the  obligation  of  searching  the  Scriptures,  in  order  to  see,  what 
the  scheme  of  revelation  really  is ;  instead  of  determining  before- 
hand, from  reason,  what  the  scheme  of  it  must  be.*  Indeed  if 
in  revelation  there  be  found  any  passages,  the  seeming  meaning 
of  which  is  contrary  to  natural  religion ;  we  may  most  certainly 
conclude,  such  seeming  meaning  not  to  be  the  real  one.J  But  it 
is  not  any  degree  of  a  presumption  against  an  interpretation  of 
Scripture,  that  such  interpretation  contains  a  doctrine,  which  the 
light  of  nature  cannot  discover  ^-j-  or  a  precept,  which  the  law 
of  nature  does  not  oblige  to. 


CHAPTER  II. 


SUPPOSED   PRESUMPTION    AGAINST  A  REVELATION    CONSIDERED 
AS    MIRACULOUS. 

Having  shown  the  importance  of  the  Christian  revelation, 
and  the  obligations  which  we  are  under  seriously  to  attend  to  it, 
upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  or  its  credibility,  the  next  thing  in 

-  See  ch.  iii. 

J  [Dr.  Angus  judiciously  remarks  on  tbis  sentence,  "This  sentiment,  as  un- 
derstood by  Butler,  is  just,  but  very  liable  to  abuse.  Clearly,  tbe  Bible  must  be 
so  interpreted  as  to  agree  with  all  known  truth,  whether  of  natural  religion  or 
natural  science.  At  the  same  time,  to  correct  the  theology  of  the  Bible  by  the 
theology  of  nature,  as  finite  and  guilty  men  understand  it,  may  involve  the 
rejection  of  Bible  theology  entirely;  and  of  the  very  light  and  teaching  it  was 
intended  to  suppl3\  The  converse  of  Butler's  statement  is  equally  true,  and 
even  more  important.  If  in  natural  theology  there  be  found  any  facts,  the 
seeming  lesson  of  which  is  contrary  to  revealed  religion,  such  seeming  lesson 
is  not  the  real  one."  Practically,  it  will  be  found  that  seeming  meanings  of 
Scripture,  really  erroneous,  are  corrected  by  other  parts  of  Scripture  itself.  I 
understand  Butler  as  only  affirming  that  we  must  interpret  Scripture  according 
to  immutable  principles,  and  known  truth.  The  infidel  rejects  it  for  u<  t  con 
forming  to  his  assumed  hi/pothesis.'] 

t  P.  203. 


CHAP.  II.       REVELATION  CONSIDERED  AS  MIRACULOUS.  203 

order,  is  to  consider  the  supposed  presumptions  against  revelation 
in  general;  which  shall  be  the  subject  of  this  chapter:  and  the 
objections  against  the  Christian  in  particular,  which  shall  be  the 
subject  of  some  following  ones.*  For  it  seems  the  most  natural 
method,  to  remove  the  prejudices  against  Christianity,  before  we 
proceed  to  the  consideration  of  the  positive  evidence  for  it,  and 
the  objections  against  that  evidence. "j* 

It  is,  I  think,  commonly  supposed,  that  there  is  some  peculiar 
presumption,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against  the  Christian 
scheme  of  things,  at  least  against  miracles ;  so  as  that  stronger 
evidence  is  necessary  to  prove  the  truth  and  reality  of  them,  than 
would  be  sufl&cient  to  convince  us  of  other  events,  or  matters  of 
fact.  Indeed  the  consideration  of  this  supposed  presumption 
cannot  but  be  thought  very  insignificant,  by  many  persons.  Yet, 
as  it  belongs  to  the  subject  of  this  treatise;  so  it  may  tend  to 
open  the  mind,  and  remove  some  prejudices,  however  needless 
the  consideration  of  it  be,  upon  its  own  account. 

I.  I  find  no  appearance  of  a  presumption,  from  the  analogy  of 
nature,  against  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  that  God 
created  and  invisibly  governs  the  world  by  Jesus  Christ;  and  by 
him  also  will  hereafter  judge  it  in  righteousness,  i.e.  render  to 
every  one  according  to  his  works;  and  that  good  men  are  under 
the  secret  influence  of  his  Spirit.  Whether  these  things  are,  or 
are  not,  to  be  called  miraculous,  is  perhaps  only  a  question  about 
words;  or  however,  is  of  no  moment  in  the  case.  If  the  analogy 
of  nature  raises  any  presumption  against  this  general  scheme  of 
Christianity,  it  must  be,  either  because  it  is  not  discoverable  by 
reason  or  experience ;  or  else,  because  it  is  unlike  that  course  of 
nature,  which  is.  But  analogy  raises  no  presumption  against  the 
truth  of  this  scheme,  upon  either  of  these  accounts. 

First,  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  against  the  truth 
of  it,  upon  account  of  its  not  being  discoverable  by  reason  or  expe- 
rience. Suppose  one  who  never  heard  of  revelation,  of  the  most 
improved  understandiog,  and  acquainted  with  our  whole  system  of 
natural  philosophy  and  natural  religion  ;  such  a  one  could  not  but 
be  sensible,  that  it  was  but  a  very  small  part  of  the  natural  and 
moral  system  of  the  universe,  which  he  was  acquainted  with. 
He  could  not  but  be  sensible,  that  there  must  be  innumerable 

*  Chaps,  iii.,  iv.,  v.,  vi.  t  Chap.  vii. 


.1  EEVELATION  CONSIDERED  AS  MIRACULOUS.        paut  ii. 

things,  i'l  the  dispensations  of  Providence  past,  in  the  invisible 
governmen-^.  over  the  world  at  present  carrying  on,  and  in  what 
is  to  come ;  of  which  he  was  wholly  ignorant,*  and  which  could 
not  be  discovered  without  revelation.  Whether  the  scheme  of 
nature  be,  in  the  strictest  sense,  infinite  or  not ;  it  is  evidently 
vast,  even  beyond  all  possible  imagination.  And  doubtless  that 
part  of  it,  which  is  open  to  our  view,  is  but  as  a  point  in  com- 
parison of  the  whole  plan  of  Providence,  reaching  throughout 
eternity  past  and  future;  in  comparison  of  what  is  even  now 
going  on,  in  the  remote  parts  of  the  boundless  universe,  nay,  in 
comparison  of  the  whole  scheme  of  this  world.  And  therefore, 
that  things  lie  beyond  the  natural  reach  of  our  faculties,  is  no 
sort  of  presumption  against  the  truth  and  reality  of  them  ;  be- 
cause it  is  certain,  there  are  innumerable  things,  in  the  constitu- 
tion and  government  of  the  universe,  which  are  thus  beyond  the 
natural  reach  of  our  faculties. 

Secondly,  Analogy  raises  no  presumption  against  any  of  the 
things  contained  in  this  general  doctrine  of  Scripture  now  men- 
tioned, upon  account  of  their  being  unlike  the  known  course  of 
nature.  For  there  is  no  presumption  at  all  from  analogy,  that 
the  icliole  course  of  things,  or  divine  government  naturally  un- 
known to  us,  and  every  thing  in  it,  is  like  to  any  thing  in  that 
which  is  known ;  and  therefore  no  peculiar  presurap*-ion  against 
any  thing  in  the  former,  upon  account  of  its  being  unlike  to  any 
thing  in  the  latter.  And  in  the  constitution  and  natural  govern- 
ment of  the  world,  as  well  as  in  the  moral  government  of  it,  we 
see  things,  in  a  great  degree,  unlike  one  another :  and  therefore 
ought  not  to  wonder  at  such  unlikeness  between  things  visible 
and  invisible.  However,  the  scheme  of  Christianity  is  by  no 
means  entirely  unlike  the  scheme  of  nature;  as  will  appear  in 
the  following  part  of  this  treatise. 

The  notion  of  a  miracle,  considered  as  a  proof  of  a  divine 
mission,  has  been  stated  with  great  exactness  by  divines;  and  is, 
I  think,  sufficiently  understood  by  every  one.  There  are  also 
invisible  miracles/  the  Incarnation  of  Christ,  for  instance,  which, 

*  P.  172. 

*  [Papists  urge  that  the  antual  conversion  of  tne  bread  and  wine  in  the 
Eucharist  is  an  invisible  miracle.  But  an  invisible  miracle  is  such  because 
wrought  under  circumt-tances  which  exclude  examination :  while  transubstttn- 


CHAP.  11.      REVELATION  CONSIDERED  AS  MIRACULOUS.  205 

being  secret,  cannot  be  alleged  as  a  proof  of  sucb  a  mission  ;  but 
require  themselves  to  be  proved  by  visible  miracles.  Revelation 
itself  too  is  miraculous;  and  miracles  are  the  proof  of  it;  and 
the  supposed  presumption  against  these  shall  presently  be  con- 
sidered. All  which  I  have  been  observing  here  is,  that,  whether 
we  choose  to  call  every  thing  in  the  dispensations  of  Providence, 
not  discoverable  without  revelation,  nor  like  the  known  course  of 
things,  miraculous;  and  whether  the  general  Christian  dispensa- 
tion now  mentioned  is  to  be  called  so,  or  not ;  the  foregoing 
observations  seem  certainly  to  show,  that  there  is  no  presumption 
against  it  from  the  analogy  of  nature. 

II.  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  against  some  opera- 
tions, which  we  should  now  call  miraculous;  particularly  none 
against  a  revelation  at  the  beginning  of  the  world  :  nothing  of 
such  presumption  against  it,  as  is  supposed  to  be  implied  or  ex- 
pressed in  the  word,  miraculous}  A  miracle,  in  its  very  notion, 
is  relative  to  a  course  of  nature;  and  .implies  something  differ- 
ent from  it,  considered  as  being  so.  Now,  either  there  was  no 
course  of  nature  at  the  time  which  we  are  speaking  of;  or  if 
there  were,  we  are  not  acquainted  what  the  course  of  nature  is, 
upon  the  first  peopling  of  worlds.  Therefore  the  question, 
whether  mankind  had  a  revelation  made  to  them  at  that  time,  is 
to  be  considered,  not  as  a  question  concerning  a  miracle,  but  as  a 
common  question  of  fact.  And  we  have  the  like  reason,  be  it 
more  or  less,  to  admit  the  report  of  tradition,  concerning  this 
question,  and  concerning  common  matters  of  fact  of  the  same 
antiquity;  for  instance,  what  part  of  the  earth  was  first  peopled. 

Or  thus  :  When  mankind  was  first  placed  in  this  state,  there 
was  a  power  exerted,  totally  different  from  the  present  course  of 
nature.  Now,  whether  this  power,  thus  wholly  different  from  the 
present  course  of  nature,  (for  we  cannot  properly  apply  to  it  the 
word  miraculous ;~)  whether  this  power  s^o/jpecZ  immediately  after 
it  had  made  man,  or  went  on,  and  exerted  itself  further  in  giving 
him  a  revelation,  is  a  question  of  the  same  kind,  as  whether  an 

nation  invites  and  facilitates  examination.  ''It  is  wrought  publicly,  and  con- 
stantly, and  yet  cannot  be  discovered  to  be  a  miracle.  Indeed  it  supposes  the 
working  of  a  second  miracle,  to  make  the  first  invisible."] 

^  [Paley  shows  conclusively  t'uat  a  denial  of  miracles  leads  not  only  to 
a  denial  of  revelation,  but  a  denial  of  the  existence  of  God,  all  of  whoso 
octraordinc.-y  acts  are  necessarily  miraculous.] 

18 


205  REVELATION   COXSIDERED    A.S   MIRACULOUS,      part  n. 

ordinary  power  exerted  itself  in  such  a  particular  degree  and 
aiauner,  or  not. 

Or  suppose  the  power  exerted  in  the  formation  of  the  world  be 
considered  as  miraculous,  or  rather,  be  called  by  that  name;  the 
case  will  not  be  different :  since  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that 
such  a  power  was  exerted.  For  supposing  it  acknowledged,  that 
our  Savior  spent  some  years  in  a  course  of  working  miracles:" 
there  is  no  more  presumption,  worth  mentioning,  against  his 
haying  exerted  this  miraculous  power,  in  a  certain  degree  greater, 
than  in  a  certain  degree  less;  in  one  or  two  more  instances,  than 
in  one  or  two  fewer;  in  this,  than  in  another  manner. 

It  is  evident  then,  that  there  can  be  no  peculiar  presumption, 
from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against  supposing  a  revelation,  when 
man  was  first  placed  upon  earth. "^ 

Add,'  that  there  does  not  appear  the  least  intimation  in  history 
or  tradition,  that  religion  was  first  reasoned  out :  but  the  whole 
of  history  and  tradition  makes  for  the  other  side,  that  it  came 
into  the  world  by  revelation.  Indeed  the  state  of  religion,  in  the 
first  ages  of  which  we  have  any  account,  seems  to  suppose  and 
imply,  that  this  was  the  original  of  it  among  mankind. "^  And 
these  reflections  together,  without  taking  in  the  peculiar  authority 
of  Scripture,  amount  to  real  and  a  very  material  degree  of  evi- 
dence, that  there  was  a  revelation  at  the  beginning  of  the  world. 

"  [Whately,  in  his  Logic,  b.  iii.,  has  shown  the  folly  of  the  Deistical  at- 
tempts to  explain  our  Savior's  miracles  as  mere  natural  events.  Having 
labored  to  show  this  of  some  one  of  the  miracles,  they  then  do  so  as  to  another, 
and  thence  infer  that  all  were  accidental  conjunctures  of  natural  circumstances. 
He  says,  they  might  as  well  argue  "that  because  it  is  not  improbable  one  may 
throw  sixes  once  in  a  hundred  throws,  therefore  it  is  no  more  improbable  that 
one  may  throw  sixes  a  hundred  times  running." 

Fitzgerald  says,  "the  improbability  of  a  whole  series  of  strange  natural 
events,  taking  place  unaccountably,  one  after  another,  amounts  to  a  far  greater 
improbability  than  is  involved  in  the  admission  of  miracles."] 

<i  [That  man,  at  first,  must  have  had  supernatural  instructions,  or  in  other 
words  some  revelations,  is  shown  by  Archbishop  Whately  in  his  "  Oiigin  of 
Civilization."  Rev.  Samuel  Stanhope  Smith  expresses  his  conviction,  both 
from  reason  and  history,  that  man  in  his  savage  state  could  not  even  have  pre- 
served life  without  instruction  from  his  Creator.] 

®  [The  maintenance  by  the  Jews,  of  a  sj'stem  of  pure  Theism,  through  so 
many  and  so  rude  ages,  without  being  superior,  or  even  equal  to  their  neighbors» 
in  science  and  civilization,  can  only  be  accounted  for  on  the  presumption  of  a 
tevelation.] 


CHAP.  II.      REVELATION   CONSIDEHED   AS   MIRACULOrS.  207 

Now  this,  as  it  is  a  confirmation  of  natural  religion,  and  tlierefora 
mentioned  in  the  former  part  of  this  treatise;*  so  likewise  it 
has  a  tendency  to  remove  any  prejudices  against  a  subsequent 
revelation. 

III.  But  still  it  may  be  objected,  that  there  is  some  peculiar 
presumption,  from  analogy,  against  miracles;  particularly  against 
revelation,  after  the  settlement  and  during  the  continuance  of  a 
course  of  nature. 

Now  with  regard  to  this  supposed  presumption,  it  is  to  be  ob- 
served in  general,  that  before  we  can  have  ground  for  raising 
what  can,  with  any  propriety,  be  called  an  argument  from  analogy, 
for  or  against  revelation  considered  as  something  miraculous,  we 
must  be  acquainted  with  a  similar  or  parallel  case.  But  the  his- 
tory of  some  other  world,  seemingly  in  like  circumstances  with 
our  own,  is  no  more  than  a  parallel  case :  and  therefore  nothing 
short  of  this  can  be  so.  Yet,  could  we  come  at  a  presumptive 
proof,  for  or  against  a  revelation,  from  being  informed,  whether 
such  world  had  one,  or  not;  such  a  proof,  being  drawn  from 
one  single  instance  only,  must  be  infinitely  precarious.  More 
particularly : 

First.  There  is  a  very  strong  presumption  against  common 
speculative  truths,  and  against  the  most  ordinary  facts,  before  the 
proofs  of  them;    which  yet  is  overcome  by  almost  any  proof. 

*  P.  166,  Ac. 

'  [Mills  (Logic,  chap.  24,  ^  5,)  points  out  what  he  deems  a  mistake  of  ''some 
of  the  writers  against  Hume  on  Miracles,"  in  confounding  the  improbabilit}'^  of 
an  event,  before  it?  occurrence,  with  the  improbability  afterwards;  that  is,  con- 
sidering them  equal  in  degree.  He  fully  proves  that  the  great  Laplace  fell 
into  this  error,  and  the  student  should  consult  the  passage. 

Prof.  Fitzgerald  holds  Butler  to  have  fallen  into  the  mistake  adverted  to 
by  Mills;  and  quotes  the  latter  author  in  a  way  which  seems  to  make  him  say 
;hat  such  is  his  opinion  also.  I  do  not  so  understand  Mills,  nor  do  I  see  that 
Butler  has  confounded  these  meanings;  but  the  very  contrary.  He  expressly 
aflarms,  and  most  truly,  that  the  strongest  presumption  may  lie  against  "  tho 
most  ordinary  facts  before  the  proof  which  yet  is  overcome  by  almost  any 
proof."  Butler's  position  here,  may  be  thus  illustrated.  Suppose  a  hundred 
numbers  to  be  put  in  a  box,  and  it  is  proposed  to  draw  out  the  number  42. 
Now  there  are  99  chances  to  1  against  drawing  that,  or  any  other  given  number. 
8ut  suppose  a  child  tells  you  he  put  the  hundred  numbers  into  a  box,  and  drew 
•jut  one,  and  it  proved  to  be  42;  ypu  at  once  believe,  for  that  was  as  likely  to 
come  as  any  other. 

The  proof  of  Christianity  from  prophecy  becomes  amazingly  strong,  thus 
viewed.     There  are  many  predictions,  for  instance  that  Christ  should  be  bom 


208  REVELATION  CONSIDERED  AS  MIRACULOUS.      part  ii. 

There  is  a  presumption  of  millions  to  one,  against  the  story  of 
Caesar,  or  of  any  other  man.  For  suppose  a  number  of  common 
facts  so  and  so  circumstanced,  of  which  we  had  no  kin  I  of  proof, 
should  happen  to  come  into  one's  thoughts;  every  one  would, 
without  any  possible  doubt,  conclude  them  to  be  false.  And  the 
like  may  be  said  of  a  single  common  fact.  Hence  it  appears, 
that  the  question  of  importance,  as  to  the  matter  before  us,  is, 
concerning  the  degree  of  the  peculiar  presumption  supposed 
against  miracles;  not  whether  there  be  any  peculiar  presumption 
at  all  against  them.  For,  if  there  be  the  presumption  of  millions 
to  one,  against  the  most  common  facts;  what  can  a  small  pre- 
sumption, additional  to  this,  amount  to,  though  it  be  peculiar? 
It  cannot  be  estimated,  and  is  as  nothing.  The  only  material 
question  is,  whether  there  be  any  such  presumptions  against 
miracles,  as  to  render  them  in  any  sort  incredible. 

Secondly,  If  we  leave  out  the  consideration  of  religion,  we  are 
in  such  total  darkness,  upon  what  causes,  occasions,  reasons,  or 
circumstances,  the  present  course  of  nature  depends;  that  there 
does  not  appear  any  improbability  for  or  against  supposing,  that 
five  or  six  thousand  years  may  have  given  scope^  for  causes, 
occasions,  reasons,  or  circumstances,  from  whence  miraculous 
interpositions  may  have  arisen.  And  from  this,  joined  with  the 
foregoing  observation,  it  will  follow,  that  there  must  be  a  pre- 
sumption, beyond  all  comparison  greater,  against  the  particular 
common  facts  just  now  instanced  in,  than  against  miracles  in 
general;  before  any  evidence  of  either. 

Thirdly,  Take  in  the  consideration  of  religion,  or  the  moral 
system  of  the  world,  and  then  we  see  distinct  particular  reasons 
for  miracles :  to  afford  mankind  instruction  additional  to  that  of 
nature,  and  to  attest  the  truth  of  it.  This  gives  a  real  credibility 
to  ihe  supposition,  that  it  might  be  part  of  the  original  plan  of 
things,  that  there  should  be  miraculous  interpositions. 

at  a  certain  time,  and  place,  and  under  certain  very  particular  circumstances. 
The  probabilities  against  such  a  conjuncture  of  events  are  almost  infinite;  yet 
they  happened  exactly  as  foretold.] 

s  [For  instance,  a  mass  of  ice  or  snow,  may  imperceptibly  accumulate  for  an 
age,  and  then  suddenly  fall  and  overwhelm  a  village.  Or  a  planet,  or  cornet^ 
may  have  been  gradually  nearing  our  earth  for  a  million  of  years,  without  pro- 
ducing, as  yet,  any  effect  on  our  orbit;  but  in  process  of  time,  its  proxloiity 
may  work  great  changes  in  our  condition.] 


CHAP.  III.  REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OB JECTIOl^S.  209 

Lastly,  Miracles  must  not  be  compared  to  common  natural 
events,  or  to  events  whicli,  though  uncommon,  are  similar  to 
what  we  daily  experience :  but  to  the  extraordinary  phenomena 
of  nature.  And  then  the  comparison  will  be  between  the  pre- 
sumption against  miracles,  and  the  presumption  against  such 
uncommon  appearances,  suppose,  as  comets,  and  against  there 
being  any  such  powers  in  nature  as  magnetism  and  electricity,  so 
contrary  to  the  properties  of  other  bodies  not  endued  with  these 
powers.  And  before  any  one  can  determine,  whether  there  be 
any  peculiar  presumption  against  miracles,  more  than  against 
other  extraordinary  things;  he  must  consider,  what,  upon  first 
hearing,  would  be  the  presumption  against  the  last  mentioned 
appearances  and  powers,  to  a  person  acquainted  only  with  the 
daily,  monthly,  and  annual  course  of  nature  respecting  this  earth, 
and  with  those  common  powers  of  matter  which  we  every  day  see. 

Upon  all  this  I  conclude;  that  there  certainly  is  no  such  pre- 
sumption against  miracles,  as  to  render  them  in  any  wise  in- 
credible :  that,  on  the  contrary,  our  being  able  to  discern  reasons 
for  them,  gives  a  positive  credibility  to  the  history  of  them,  in 
eases  where  those  reasons  hold :  and  that  it  is  by  no  means  cer- 
tain, that  there  is  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all,  from  analogy, 
even  in  the  lowest  degree,  against  miracles,  as  distinguished  from 
other  extraordinary  phenomena :  though  it  is  not  worth  while  to 
perplex  the  reader  with  inquiries  into  the  abstract  nature  of  evi- 
dence, in  order  to  determine  a  question,  which,  without  such  in- 
quiries, we  see*  is  of  no  importance. 


CHAPTER  III. 


OUR  INCAPACITY  OP  JUDGING,  WHAT  WERE  TO  BE  EXPECTED 
IN  A  REVELATION;  AND  THE  CREDIBILITY,  FROM  ANALOGY, 
THAT   IT    MUST    CONTAIN    THINGS    LIABLE    TO    OBJECTIONS. 

Besides  the  objections  against  the  evidence  for  Christianity, 
many  are  alleged  against  the  scheme  of  it;  against  the  whole 
manner  in  which  it  is  put  and  left  with  the  world;  as  well  as 
<gainst  several  particular  relations  in  Scripture:  objections  drawn 

*  P.  208. 
0  IS* 


.-^lO  REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  part  ii. 

from  the  deficiencies  of  revelation :  from  things  in  it  appearing 
to  men  foolishness ;^  from  its  containing  matters  of  ofience, 
■T^hich  have  led,  and  it  must  have  been  foreseen  would  lead,  into 
strange  enthusiasm  and  superstition,  and  be  made  to  serve  the 
purposes  of  tyranny  and  wickedness;  from  its  not  being  universal; 
and,  which  is  a  thing  of  the  same  kind,  from  its  evidence  not 
being  so  convincing  and  satisfactory  as  it  might  have  been :  for 
this  last  is  sometimes  turned  into  a  positive  argument  against  its 
truth.f 

It  would  be  tedious,  indeed  impossible,  to  enumerate  the 
several  particulars  comprehended  under  the  objections  here  re- 
ferred to;  they  being  so  various,  according  to  the  diiferent 
fancies  of  men.  There  are  persons  who  think  it  a  strong  objec- 
tion against  the  authority  of  Scripture,  that  it  is  not  composed  by 
rules  of  art,  agreed  upon  by  critics,  for  polite  and  correct  writing. 
And  the  scorn  is  inexpressible,  with  which  some  of  the  prophetic 
parts  of  Scripture  are  treated :  partly  through  the  rashness  of 
interpreters ;  but  very  much  also,  on  account  of  the  hieroglyphical 
and  figurative  language,  in  which  they  are  left  us. 

Some  of  the  principal  things  of  this  sort  shall  be  particularly 
considered  in  the  following  chapters.  But  my  design  at  present 
is  to  obseiTe  in  general,  with  respect  to  this  whole  way  of  arguing, 
that,  upon  supposition  of  a  revelation,  it  is  highly  credible  before- 
hand, that  we  should  be  incompetent  judges  of  it  to  a  great  de- 
gree: and  that  it  would  contain  many  things  appearing  to  us 
liable  to  great  objections;  in  case  we  judge  of  it  otherwise,  than 
by  the  analogy  of  nature.  Therefore,  though  objections  against 
the  evidence  of  Christianity  are  most  seriously  to  be  considered, 
yet  objections  against  Christianity  itself  are,  in  a  great  measure, 
frivolous:  almost  all  objections  against  it,  excepting  those  which 
are  alleged  against  the  particular  proofs  of  its  coming  from  God. 
I  express  myself  with  caution,  lest  I  should  be  mistaken  to  vilify 
reason;  which  is  indeed  the  only  faculty  we  have  wherewith  to 
judge  concerning  any  thing,  even  revelation  itself:  or  be  mis- 
understood to  assert,  that  a  supposed  revelation  cannot  be  proved 
false,  from  internal  characters.  For,  it  may  contain  clear  immo- 
ralities or  contradictions ;  and  either  of  these  would  prove  it  false. 
Nor  will  I  take  upon  me  to  affirm,  that  nothing  else  can  po-s^ibly 
*  1  Cor.  i.  28.  t  See  Chop.  ri. 


CHAP.  III.  REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  211 

render  any  supposed  revelation  incredible.  Yet  still  the  observa' 
tion  above,  is,  I  think,  true  beyond  doubt;  that  objections  against 
Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  objections  against  its  evidence, 
are  frivolous.  To  make  out  this,  is  the  general  design  of  the 
present  chapter. 

With  regard  to  the  whole  of  it,  I  cannot  but  particularly  wish, 
that  the  i^oofs,  might  be  attended  to;  rather  than  the  assertions 
cavilled  at,  upon  account  of  any  unacceptable  consequences,  real 
or  supposed,  which  may  be  drawn  from  them.  For,  after  all, 
that  which  is  true,  must  be  admitted,  though  it  should  show  us 
the  shortness  of  our  faculties :  and  that  we  are  in  no  wise  judges 
of  many  things,  of  which  we  are  apt  to  think  ourselves  very 
competent  ones.  Nor  will  this  be  any  objection  with  reasonable 
men ;  at  least  upon  second  thought  it  will  not  be  any  objection 
with  such,  against  the  justness  of  the  following  observations. 

As  God  governs  the  world  and  instructs  his  creatures,  accord- 
ing to  certain  laws  or  rules,  in  the  known  course  of  nature; 
known  by  reason  together  with  experience:  so  the  Scripture 
informs  us  of  a  scheme  of  divine  Providence,  additional  to  this. 
It  relates,  that  God  has,  by  revelation,  instructed  men  in  things 
concerning  his  government,  which  they  could  not  otherwise  have 
known;  and  reminded  them  of  things,  which  they  might  other- 
wise know;  and  attested  the  truth  of  the  whole  by  miracles. 
Now  if  the  natural  and  the  revealed  dispensation  of  things  are 
both  from  God,  if  they  coincide  with  each  other,  and  together 
make  up  one  scheme  of  Providence ;  our  being  incompetent 
judges  of  one,  must  render  it  credible,  that  we  may  he  incompe- 
tent judges  also  of  the  other.  Upon  experience,  the  acknow- 
ledged constitution  and  course  of  nature  is  found  to  be  greatly 
diiferent  from  what,  before  experience,  would  have  been  ex- 
pected; and  such  as,  men  fancy,  there  lie  great  objections 
against.  This  renders  it  beforehand  highly  credible,  that  they 
may  find  the  revealed  dispensation  likewise,  if  they  judge  of  it  as 
they  do  of  the  constitution  of  nature,  very  difi"erent  from  expec- 
tations formed  beforehand;  and  liable,  in  appearance,  to  great 
objections:  objections  against  the  scheme  itself,  and  against  the 
degrees  and  manners  of  the  miraculous  interpositions  by  which 
it  was  attested  and  carried  on.  Thus,  suppose  a  prince  to  govern 
Qis  dominions  in  the  wisest  manner  possible,  by  common  known 


212  REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  paiit  ii. 

laws ;  and  that  upon  some  exigencies  he  should  suspend  these 
laws;  and  govern,  in  several  instances,  in  a  different  manner. 
If  one  of  his  subjects  were  not  a  competent  judge  beforehand,  by 
what  common  rules  the  government  should  or  would  be  carried 
on;  it  could  not  be  expected,  that  the  same  person  would  be  a 
competent  judge,  in  what  exigencies,  or  in  what  manner,  or  to 
wliat  degree,  those  laws  commonly  observed  would  be  suspended 
or  deviated  from.  If  he  were  not  a  judge  of  the  wisdom  of  the 
ordinary  administration,  there  is  no  reason  to  think  he  would  be 
a  judge  of  the  wisdom  of  the  extraordinary.  If  he  thought  he 
had  objections  against  the  former;  doubtless,  it  is  highly  sup- 
posable,  he  might  think  also,  that  he  had  objections  against  the 
latter.  And  thus,  as  we  fall  into  infinite  follies  and  mistakes, 
whenever  we  pretend,  otherwise  than  from  experience  and  ana- 
logy, to  judge  of  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature;  it  is  evi- 
dently supposable  beforehand,  that  we  should  fall  into  as  great, 
in  pretending  to  judge  in  like  manner  concerning  revelation. 
Nor  is  there  any  more  ground  to  expect  that  this  latter  should 
appear  to  us  clear  of  objections,  than  that  the  former  should. 

These  observations,  relating  to  the  whole  of  Christianity,  are 
applicable  to  inspiration  in  particular.  As  we  are  in  no  sort 
judges  beforehand,  by  what  laws  or  rules,  in  what  degree,  or  by 
what  means,  it  were  to  have  been  expected,  that  God  would  natu- 
rally instruct  us;  so  upon  supposition  of  his  affording  us  light  and 
instruction  by  revelation,  additional  to  what  he  has  afforded  us 
by  I'eason  and  experience,  we  are  in  no  sort  judges,  by  what 
methods,  and  in  what  proportion,  it  were  to  be  expected  that  this 
supernatural  light  and  instruction  would  be  afforded  us.  We 
know  not  beforehand,  what  degree  or  kind  of  natural  information 
it  were  to  be  expected  Grod  would  afford  men,  each  by  his  own 
reason  and  experience :  nor  how  far  he  would  enable  and  effectu- 
ally dispose  them  to  communicate  it,  whatever  it  should  be,  to 
each  other ;  nor  whether  the  evidence  of  it  would  be  certain, 
highly  probable,  or  doubtful;  nor  whether  it  would  be  given  with 
equal  clearness  and  conviction  to  all.  Nor  could  we  guess,  upon 
any  good  ground  I  mean,  whether  natural  knowledge,  or  even  the 
faculty  itself,  by  which  we  are  capable  of  attaining  it,  reason, 
would  be  given  us  at  once,  or  gradually. 

In  like  manner,  we  are  wholly  ignorant,  what  degree  of  new 


REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECriONS. 


21S 


knowledge,  it  were  to  be  expected,  God  would  give  mankiDd  by 
revelation,  upon  supposition  of  his  affording  one :  or  how  far  or 
in  whai  way,  he  would  interpose  miraculously,  to  qualify  them,  to 
whom  he  should  originally  make  the  revelation,  for  communi- 
cating the  knowledge  given  by  it;  and  to  secure  their  doing  it  to 
the  age  in  which  they  should  live;  and  to  secure  its  being  trans- 
mitted to  posterity.  We  are  equally  ignorant,  whether  the  evi- 
dence of  it  would  be  certain  or  highly  probable,  or  doubtful  :*  or 
whether  all  who  should  have  any  degree  of  instruction  from  it, 
and  any  degree  of  evidence  of  its  truth,  would  have  the  same  : 
or  whether  the  scheme  would  be  revealed  at  once,  or  unfolded 
gradually.*  Nay  we  are  not  in  any  sort  able  to  judge,  whether 
it  were  to  have  been  expected,  that  the  revelation  should  have 
been  committed  to  writing;  or  left  to  be  handed  down,  and 
consequently  corrupted,  by  verbal  tradition,  and  at  length  sunk 
under  it,  if  mankind  so  pleased,  and  during  such  time  as 
they  are  permitted,  in  the  degree  they  evidently  are,  to  act  as 
they  will. 

But  it  may  be  said,  ^'  that  a  revelation  in  some  of  the  above- 
mentioned  circumstances,  one,  for  instauce,  which  was  not  com- 
mitted to  writing,  and  thus  secured  against  danger  of  corruption, 
would  not  have  answered  its  purpose.''  I  ask,  what  purpose  ?  It 
would  not  have  answered  all  the  purposes,  which  it  has  now 
answered,  and  in  the  same  degree  :  but  it  would  have  answered 
others,  or  the  same  in  different  degrees.  And  which  of  these 
were  the  purposes  of  God,  and  best  fell  in  with  his  general 
government,  we  could  not  at  all  have  determined  beforehand. 

Now  since  we  have  no  principles  of  reason,  upon  which  to  judge 
beforehand,  how  it  were  to  be  expected  that  revelation  should 
have  been  left,  or  what  was  most  suitable  to  the  divine  plan  of 
government,  in  any  of  the  forementioned  respects;  it  must  be 
quite  frivolous  to  object  afterwards  as  to  any  of  them,  against  its 
being  left  in  one  way,  rather  than  another:  for  this  would  be  to 
object  against  things,  upon  account  of  their  being  different  from 
expectations,  which  has  been  shown  to  be  without  reason. 

Thus  we  see,  that  the  only  question  concerning  the  truth  of 
Christianity  is,  whether  it  be  a  real  revelation ;  i^ot  whether  it 
^Q   attended  with  every  circumstance  which    we  should   hava 

*  See  Chap.  vi.  a  [See  note,  page  218.] 


214  REA'ELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  part  ii. 

looked  for :  and  concerning  the  authority  of  Scripture,  whether 
it  be  what  it  chiims  to  be ;  not  whether  it  be  a  book  of  such  sort, 
and  so  promulged,  as  weak  men  are  apt  to  fancy  a  book  contain- 
ing a  divine  revehition  should  be.  Therefore,  neither  obscurity, 
nor  seeming  inaccuracy  of  style,  nor  various  readings,  nor  early 
disputes  about  the  authors  of  particular  parts,  nor  any  other 
things  of  the  like  kind,  though  they  had  been  much  more  con- 
siderable in  degree  than  they  are,  could  overthrow  the  authority 
of  the  Scripture  :  unless  the  prophets,  apostles,  or  our  Lord, 
had  promised,  that  the  book  containing  the  divine  revelation 
should  be  exempt  from  those  things.  Nor  indeed  can  any  objec- 
tions overthrow  such  a  kind  of  revelation  as  the  Christian  claims 
to  be,  (since  there  are  no  objections  against  the  morality  of  it,*) 
but  such  as  can  show,  that  there  is  no  proof  of  miracles  wrought 
originally  in  attestation  of  it;  no  appearance  of  any  thing  mira- 
culous in  its  obtaining  in  the  world ;  nor  any  of  prophecy,  that 
is,  of  events  foretold,  which  human  sagacity  could  not  foresee. 
If  it  can  be  shown,  that  the  proof  alleged  for  all  these  is  abso- 
lutely none  at  all,  then  is  revelation  overturned.  But  were  it 
allowed,  that  the  proof  of  any  one  or  all  of  them  is  lower  than 
is  allowed;  yet,  whil-t  any  proof  of  them  remains,  revelation 
will  stand  upon  much  the  same  foot  it  does  at  present,  as  to  all  the 
purposes  of  life  and  practice,  and  ought  to  have  the  like  influence 
upon  our  behavior. 

From  the  foregoing  observations  too,  it  will  follow,  and  those 
who  will  thoroughly  examine  into  revelation  will  find  it  worth 
remarking,  that  there  are  several  ways  of  arguing,  which  though 
just  with  regard  to  other  writings,  are  not  applicable  to  Scrip- 
ture :  at  least  not  to  its  prophetic  parts.  We  cannot  argue,  for  in- 
stance, that  such  and  such  cannot  be  the  sense  or  intent  of  a  passage 
of  Scripture,  for,  if  it  had,  it  would  have  been  expressed  more 
plainly,  or  represented  under  a  more  apt  figure  or  hieroglyphic. 
Yet  we  may  justly  argue  thus,  with  respect  to  common  books. 
And  the  reason  of  this  difi'erence  is  very  evident.  In  Scripture 
we  are  not  competent  judges,  as  we  are  in  common  books,  how 
plainly  it  were  to  have  been  expected,  that  the  sense  should 
have  been  expressed,  or  under  how  apt  an  image  figured.  The 
only  question  is,  what  appearance  there  is,  that -this  h  the  sense; 

*  P.  220. 


CHAP.  III.  REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  215 

and  scarce  at  all,  how  much  more  determinately  or  accurately/  it 
might  have  been  expressed  or  figured.'' 

"But  is  it  not  self-evident,  that  internal  improbabilities  of  all 
kinds  weaken  external  probable  proof?"  Doubtless.  But  to 
what  practical  purpose  can  this  be  alleged  here,  when  it  has  been 
proved  before,*  that  real  internal  improbabilities,  which  rise  even 
to  moral  certainty,  are  overcome  by  the  most  ordinary  testimony; 
and  when  it  now  has  been  made  to  appear,  that  we  scarce  know 
what  are  improbabilities,  as  to  the  matter  we  are  here  consider- 
ing :  as  it  will  further  appear  from  what  follows. 

From  the  observations  made  above  it  is  manifest,  that  we  are 
not  in  any  sort  competent  judges,  what  supernatural  instruction 
were  to  have  been  expected;  and  it  is  self-evident,  that  the 
objections  of  an  incompetent  judgment  must  be  frivolous.  Yet 
it  may  be  proper  to  go  one  step  further,  and  observe,  that  if  men 
will  be  regardless  of  these  things,  and  pretend  to  judge  of  the 
Scripture  by  preconceived  expectations;  the  analogy  of  nature 
shows  beforehand,  not  only  that  it  is  highly  credible  they  may, 
but  also  probable  that  they  will,  imagine  they  have  strong  objec- 
tions against  it,  however  really  unexceptionable.  For  so,  prior  to 
experience,  they  would  think  they  had,  against  the  circumstances, 
and  degrees,  and  the  whole  manner  of  that  instruction,  which  is 
afforded  by  the  ordinary  course  of  nature.  Were  the  instruction 
which  God  affords  to  brute  creatures  by  instincts  and  mere  pro- 
pensions,  and  to  mankind  by  these  together  with  reason,  matter 
of  probable  proof,  and  not  of  certain  observation ;  it  would  be 
rejected  as  incredible,  in  many  instances  of  it,  only  upon  account 
of  the  means  by  which  this  instruction  is  given,  the  seeming  dis- 
proportions, the  limitations,  necessary  conditions,  and  circum- 
stances of  it.  For  instance  :  would  it  not  have  been  though* 
highly  improbable,  that  men  should  have  been  so  much  more 

^  [It  is  not  to  be  understood  that  Butler  would  not  have  the  ordinary  rules 
of  interpretation  applied  to  the  Holy  Scriptures.  Because  the  interpretation, 
"if  not  gathered  otit  of  the  words,  must  be  brought  into  them."  We  cannot 
interpret  them  as  if  we  knew  beforehand,  what  the  Holy  Ghost  meant  to  say; 
as  Spinoza  proposes  to  do,  in  his  Philosophia  Scripturae  Interpretes.  The 
student  will  do  well  to  consult  Benson  •;  Hulsean  Lectures  on  Scripture  Diffi- 
culties :  King's  Morsels  of  Criticism :  Storr,  Exertationes  Exeget. :  Michaelis, 
lutrod.  ad.  Nov.  Test. :  and  Featlky's  Key.] 

*  Pp.  207,  208. 


216  REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  part  ii. 

capable  of  discovering,  even  to  certainty,  tlie  general  laws  of 
matter,  and  the  magnitudes,  paths,  and  revolutions,  of  heavenly 
bodies ;  than  the  occasions  and  cures  of  distempers,  and  many 
other  things  in  which  human  life  seems  so  much  more  nearly  con- 
cerned, than  in  astronomy  ?  How  capricious  and  irregular  a  way 
of  information  would  it  be  said,  is  that  of  invention,  by  means 
of  which  nature  instructs  us  in  matters  of  science,  and  in  many 
things,  upon  which  the  affairs  of  the  world  greatly  depend :  that 
a  man  should,  by  this  faculty,  be  made  acquainted  with  a  thing 
in  an  instant,  (when  perhaps  he  is  thinking  of  something  else,) 
which  he  has  in  vain  been  searching  after,  it  may  be,  for  years. 

So  likewise  the  imperfections  attending  the  only  method,  by 
which  nature  enables  and  directs  us  to  communicate  our  thoughts 
to  each  other,  are  innumerable.  Language  is,  in  its  very  nature, 
inadequate,  ambiguous,  liable  to  infinite  abuse,  even  from  negli- 
gence 3  and  so  liable  to  it  from  design,  that  every  man  can  deceive 
and  betray  by  it.  And,  to  mention  but  one  instance  more;  that 
brutes,  without  reason,  should  act,  in  many  respects,  with  a 
sagacity  and  foresight  vastly  greater  than  what  men  have  in  those 
respects,  would  be  thought  impossible.  Yet  it  is  certain  they  do 
act  with  such  superior  foresight :  whether  it  be  their  own,  indeed, 
is  another  question.  From  these  things,  it  is  highly  credible 
beforehand,  that  upon  supposition  that  God  should  afford  men 
some  additional  instruction  by  revelation,  it  would  be  with  cir- 
cumstances, in  manners,  degrees,  and  respects,  against  the  credi- 
bility of  which  we  should  be  apt  to  fancy  we  had  great  objections. 
Nor  are  the  objections  against  the  Scripture,  nor  against  Chris- 
tianity in  general,  at  all  more  or  greater,  than  the  analogy  of 
nature  would  beforehand — not  perhaps  give  ground  to  expect; 
(for  the  analogy  may  not  be  sufiicient,  in  some  cases,  to  ground 
an  expectation  upon;)  but  no  more  nor  greater,  than  analogy 
would  show  it,  beforehand,  to  be  supposable  and  credible,  that 
there  might  seem  to  lie  against  revelation. 

By  applying  these  general  observations  to  a  particular  objec- 
tion, it  will  be  more  distinctly  seen,  how  they  are  applicable  to 
others  of  the  like  kind;  and  indeed  to  almost  all  objections 
against  Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  objections  against  its 
evidence.  It  appears  from  Scripture,  that,  as  it  was  not  unusual 
in  the  apostolic  age,  for  persons,  upon  their  conversion  to  Chris- 


CHAP.  m.  REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIOXS.  217 

tianity,  to  be  endued  with  miraculous  gifts;  so,  some  of  those 
persons  exercised  these  gifts  in  a  strangely  irregular  and  dis- 
orderly manner;*'  and  this  is  made  an  objection  against  their 
being  really  miraculous.  Now  the  foregoing  observations  quite 
remove  this  objection,  how  considerable  soever  it  may  appear  at 
first  sight.  For,  consider  a  person  endued  with  any  of  these 
gifts,  for  instance  that  of  tongues  :  it  is  to  be  supposed,  that  he 
had  the  same  power  over  this  miraculous  gift,  as  he  would  have 
had  over  it,  had  it  been  the  effect  of  habit,  of  study  and  use,  as  it 
ordinarily  is ;  or  the  same  power  over  it,  as  he  had  over  any  other 
natural  endowment.  Consequently,  he  would  use  it  in  the  same 
Tnanner  as  he  did  any  other;  either  regularly,  and  upon  proper 
occasions  only,  or  irregularly,  and  upon  improper  ones :  accord- 
ing to  his  sense  of  decency,  and  his  character  of  prudence.* 
Where  then  is  the  objection  ?  Why,  if  this  miraculous  power 
was  indeed  given  to  the  world  to  propagate  Christianity,  and 
attest  the  truth  of  it,  we  might,  it  seems,  have  expected,  that 
other  sort  of  persons  should  have  been  chosen  to  be  invested 
with  it;  or  that  these  should,  at  the  same  time,  have  been 
endued  with  prudence;  or  that  they  should  have  been  con- 
tinually restrained  and  directed  in  the  exercise  of  it :  i.e.  that 
God  should  have  miraculously  interposed,  if  at  all,  in  a  different 
manner,  or  higher  degree.  But,  from  the  observations  made 
above,  it  is  undeniably  evident,  that  we  are  not  judges  in  what 
d*3grees  and  manners  it  were  to  have  been  expected  he  should 
miraculously  interpose;  upon  supposition  of  his  doing  it  in  some 
degree  and  manner.  Nor,  in  the  natural  course  of  Providence, 
are  superior  gifts  of  memory,  eloquence,  knowledge,  and  other 
talents  of  great  influence,  conferred  only  on  persons  of  prudence 
and  decency,  or  such  as  are  disposed  to  make  the  properest  use 

«  [See  1  Cor.  xii.  1-10 :  xiii.  1 :  and  xiv.  1-19.] 

^  ["  The  power  of  healing,  or  working  miracles,  is,  during  the  whole  course 
of  its  operation,  one  continued  arrest  or  diversion  of  the  general  laws  of  matter 
and  motion.  It  was  therefore  fit  that  this  power  should  be  given  occasionally. 
But  the  S2)eahing  with  tongues,  when  once  the  gift  was  conferred,  became  thence- 
forth a  natural  power;  just  as  the  free  use  of  members  of  the  body,  after  being 
restored,  by  miracle,  to  the  exercise  of  their  natural  functions.  In  healing,  the 
apostles  are  to  be  considered  as  the  workers  of  a  miracle  ;  in  speaking  strange 
tongues,  as  persons  on  whom  a  miracle  is  performed." — Wakburtox,  Doct.  of 
'vrare,  b.  i.  ch.  iii.] 

19 


218  REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  part  ii. 

of  them.  Nor  is  the  instruction  and  admonition  naturally 
afforded  us  for  the  conduct  of  life,  particularly  in  our  education, 
commonl;y  given  in  a  manner  the  most  suited  to  recommend  it; 
but  often  with  circumstances  apt  to  prejudice  us  against  such 
instruction. 

One  might  go  on  to  add,  there  is  a  great  resemblance  between 
the  light  of  nature  and  of  revelation,  in  several  other  respects. 
Practical  Christianity,  or  that  faith  and  behavior  which  renders 
a  man  a  Christian,  is  a  plain  and  obvious  thing  :  like  the  common 
rules  of  conduct,  with  respect  to  ordinary  temporal  affairs.  The 
more  distinct  and  particular  knowledge  of  those  things,  the  study 
of  which  the  apostle  calls  going  on  unto  perfection,^  and  of  the 
prophetic  parts  of  revelation,  like  many  parts  of  natural  and  even 
civil  knowledge,  may  require  very  exact  thought,  and  careful 
consideration.  The  hinderances  too,  of  natural,  and  of  super- 
natural light  and  knowledge,  have  been  of  the  same  kind.  And 
as  it  is  owned  the  whole  scheme  of  Scripture  is  not  yet  under- 
stood ;  so,  if  it  ever  comes  to  be  understood,  before  the  restitution 
of  all  things,'\  and  without  miraculous  interpositions,  it  must  be 
in  the  same  way  as  natural  knowledge  is  come  at :  by  the  con- 
tinuance and  progress  of  learning  and  of  liberty;®  and  by  par- 
ticular persons  attending  to,  comparing,  and  pursuing,  intimations 
scattered  up  and  down  it,  which  are  overlooked  and  disregarded 
by  the  generality  of  the  world.  For  this  is  the  way  in  which  all 
improvements  are  made;  by  thoughtful  men's  tracing  on  obscure 
hints,  dropped  us  by  nature  as  it  were,  accidentally,  or  which 
seem  to  come  into  our  minds  by  chance.  Nor  is  it  at  all  incredible, 
that  a  book  which  has  been  so  long  in  the  possession  of  man- 
kind, should  contain  many  truths  as  yet  undiscovered.  For,  all 
the  same  phenomena,  and  the  same  faculties  of  investigation, 

*  Heb.  vi.  1.  t  Acts  iii.  21. 

^'  [The  doctrine  of  "  development"  has  of  late  been  popular  in  some  quarters. 
Butler  here  shows  the  only  safe  notion  we  may  entertain  on  that  subject. 
"Exact 'thought,  and  careful  consideration"  may  show  us  bow  to  confute 
specious  heresies,  expound  embarrassing  passages,  dissipate  painful  doubts, 
and  remove  many  prejudices  or  misapprehensions.  But  revelation  is  complete 
as  it  stands. 

We  may  hope  for  progress  in  theology  as  in  other  sciences;  not  in  tho 
development  of  new  facts  or  faith,  as  Papists  and  Socinians  pretend,  but  in 
the  increase  of  sound  wisdom,  aided  by  a  more  perfect  interpretation  oi  God's 
word.] 


CHAP.  iiT.  REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  219 

from  which  such  great  discoveries  in  natural  knowledge  have 
been  made  in  the  present  and  last  age,  were  equally  in  the  pos- 
session of  mankind,  several  thousand  years  before.  And  possibly 
it  might  be  intended,  that  events,  as  they  come  to  pass,  should 
open  and  ascertain  the  meaning  of  several  parts  of  Scripture. 

It  may  be  objected,  that  this  analogy  fails  in  a  material  re- 
spect :  for  that  natural  knowledge  is  of  little  or  no  consequence. 
But  I  have  been  speaking  of  the  general  instruction  which  nature 
does  or  does  not  afford  us.  And  besides,  some  parts  of  natural 
knowledge,  in  the  more  common  restrained  sense  of  the  words, 
are  of  the  greatest  consequence  to  the  ease  and  convenience  of 
life.  But  suppose  the  analogy  did,  as  it  does  not,  fail  in  this 
respect;  yet  it  might  be  abundantly  supplied,  from  the  whole 
constitution  and  course  of  nature  :  which  shows,  that  God  does 
not  dispense  his  gifts  according  to  our  notions  of  the  advantage 
and  consequence  they  would  be  of  to  us.  And  this  in  general, 
with  his  method  of  dispensing  knowledge  in  particular,  would 
together  make  out  an  analogy  full  to  the  point  before  us. 

But  it  may  be  objected  still  further  and  more  generally;  "The 
Scripture  represents  the  world  as  in  a  state  of  ruin,  and  Chris- 
tianity as  an  expedient  to  recover  it,  to  help  in  these  respects 
where  nature  fails :  in  particular,  to  supply  the  deficiencies  of 
natural  light.  Is  it  credible  then,  that  so  many  ages  should  have 
been  let  pass,  before  a  matter  of  such  a  sort,  of  so  great  and  so 
general  importance,  was  made  known  to  mankiud;  and  then  that 
it  should  be. made  known  to  so  small  a  part  of  them?  Is  it  con- 
ceivable, that  this  supply  should  be  so  very  deficient,  should  have 
the  like  obscurity  and  doubtfulness,  be  liable  to  the  like  perver- 
sions, in  short,  lie  open  to  all  the  like  objections,  as  the  light  of 
nature  itself  ?"*" 

Without  determining  how  far  this,  in  fact,  is  so,  I  answer;  it 
is  by  no  means  incredible,  that  it  might  be  so,  if  the  light  of 
nature  and  of  revelation  be  from  the  same  hand.  Men  are 
naturally  liable  to  diseases :  for  which  God,  in  his  good  provi- 
dence, has  provided  natural  remedies. f  But  remedies  existing 
in  nature  have  been  unknown  to  mankind  for  many  ages ;  are 
known  but  to  few  now;  probably  many  valuable  ones  are  not 
•inown  yet.  Great  has  been  and  is  the  obscurit}^  and  difiiculty, 
*■  Chap.  vi.  f  Chap.  v. 


220  BEVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  part  ii. 

in  the  nature  and  application  of  them.  Circumstances  seem 
often  to  make  them  very  improper,  where  they  are  absolutely 
necessary.  It  is  after  long  labor  and  study,  and  many  unsuccess- 
ful endeavors,  that  they  are  brought  to  be  as  useful  as  they  are; 
after  high  contempt  and  absolute  rejection  of  the  most  useful  we 
have;  and  after  disputes  and  doubts,  which  have  seemed  to  be 
endless.  The  best  remedies  too,  when  unskilfully,  much  more 
when  dishonestly  applied,  may  produce  new  diseases ;  and  with 
the  rightest  application  the  success  of  them  is  often  doubtful. 
In  many  cases  they  are  not  effectual :  where  they  are,  it  is  often 
very  slowly:  and  the  application  of  them,  and  the  necessary 
regimen  accompanying  it,  is  not  uncommonly  so  disagreeable, 
that  some  will  not  submit  to  them;  and  satisfy  themselves  with 
the  excuse,  that  if  they  would,  it  is  not  certain  whether  it  would 
be  successful.  And  many  persons,  who  labor  under  diseases,  for 
which  there  are  known  natural  remedies,  are  not  so  happy  as  to 
be  always,  if  ever,  in  the  way  of  them.  In  a  word,  the  remedies 
which  nature  has  provided  for  diseases  are  neither  certain,  per- 
fect, nor  universal.  And  indeed  the  same  principles  of  arguing, 
which  would  lead  us  to  conclude,  that  they  must  be  so,  would 
lead  us  likewise  to  conclude,  that  there  could  be  no  occasion  for 
them ;  i.e.  that  there  could  be  no  diseases  at  all.  And  therefore 
our  experience  that  there  are  diseases,  shows  that  it  is  credible 
beforehand,  upon  supposition  nature  has  provided  remedies  for 
them,  that  these  remedies  may  be,  as  by  experience  we  find  they 
are,  neither  certain,  nor  perfect,  nor  universal ;  because  it  shows, 
that  the  principles  upon  which  we  should  expect  the  contrary  are 
fallacious. 

And  now,  what  is  the  just  consequence  from  all  these  things  ? 
Not  that  reason  is  no  judge  of  what  is  offered  to  us  as  being  of 
divine  revelation.  For  this  would  be  to  infer  that  we  are  unable 
to  judge  of  any  thing,  because  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  all 
things.  Reason  can,  and  it  ought  to  judge,  not  only  of  the 
meaning,  but  also  of  the  morality  and  the  evidence  of  revelation. 

First,  It  is  the  province  of  reason  to  judge  of  the  morality  of 
the  Scripture;  i.e.  not  whether  it  contains  things  different  from 
what  we  should  have  expected  from  a  wise,  just,  and  good  Being; 
(for  objections  from  hence  have  been  now  obviated :)  but  whether 
it   contains   things   plainly  contradictory  to  wisdom,  justice,  or 


CHAP.  III.  REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  221 

goodness;  to  wliat  the  liglit  of  nature  teaches  us  of  God.  And 
I  know  nothing  of  this  sort  objected  against  Scripture,  exceptint^ 
such  objections  as  are  formed  upon  suppositions,  which  would 
equally  conclude,  that  the  constitution  of  nature  is  contradictory 
to  wisdom,  justice,  or  goodness;  which  most  certainly  it  is  not. 
There  are,  indeed,  some  particular  precepts  in  Scripture,  given 
to  particular  persons,  requiring  actions,  which  would  be  immoral 
and  vicious,  were  it  not  for  such  precepts.  But  it  is  easy  to  see, 
that  all  these  are  of  such  a  kind,  as  that  the  precept  changes  the 
whole  nature  of  the  case  and  of  the  action ;  and  both  constitutes 
and  shows  that  not  to  be  unjust  or  immoral,  which,  prior  to  the 
precept,  must  have  appeared  and  really  been  so :  which  may  well 
be,  since  none  of  these  precepts  are  contrary  to  immutable 
morality.  If  it  were  commanded,  to  cultivate  the  principles, 
and  act  from  the  spirit  of  treachery,  ingratitude,  cruelty;  the 
command  would  not  alter  the  nature  of  the  case  or  of  the  action, 
in  any  of  these  instances.  But  it  is  quite  otherwise  in  precepts, 
which  require  only  the  doing  an  external  action :  for  instance, 
taking  away  the  property,  or  life  of  any.  For  men  have  no 
right,  either  to  life  or  property,  but  what  arises  solely  from  the 
grant  of  God.  When  this  grant  is  revoked,  they  cease  to  have 
any  right  at  all  in  either :  and  when  this  revocation  is  made 
known,  as  surely  it  is  possible  it  may  be,  it  must  cease  to  be  un- 
just to  deprive  them  of  either.  And  though  a  course  of  ex- 
ternal acts,  which  without  command  would  be  immoral,  must 
make  an  immoral  habit;  yet  a  few  detached  commands  have  no 
such  natural  tendency.  I  thought  proper  to  say  thus  much  of 
the  few  Scripture  precepts,  which  require,  not  vicious  actions, 
but  actions  which  would  have  been  vicious,  but  for  such  pre- 
cepts; because  they  are  sometimes  weakly  urged  as  immoral,  and 
great  weight  is  laid  upon  objections  drawn  from  them. 

To  me  there  seems  no  difficulty  at  all  in  these  precepts,  but 
what  arises  from  their  being  offences :  i.e.  from  their  being  liable 
to  be  perverted,  as  indeed  they  are,  by  wicked  designing  men, 
to  serve  the  most  horrid  purposes;  and  perhaps  to  mislead  the 
weak  and  enthusiastic.  And  objections  from  this  head  are  not 
objections  against  revelation;  but  against  the  whole  notion  of  re- 
'dgion,  as  a  trial :    and  against  the  general  constitution  of  nature. 

iiecondly,  Reason  is  able  to  judge,  and  must,  of  the  evidence 
19* 


t22  REVELATION  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.  part  n. 

of  revelation,  and  of  the  objections  urged  against  that  evidence: 
which  shall  be  the  subject  of  a  following  chapter.* 

The-  consequence  of  the  foregoing  observations  is,  that  the 
question  upon  which  the  truth  of  Christianity  depends,  is  scarcely 
at  all  what  objections  there  are  against  its  scheme,  since  there 
are  none  against  the  morality  of  it,  but  ichat  objections  there  are 
against  its  evidence;  or,  ichat  ^roof  there  remains  of  it,  after 
due  allowances  are  made  for  the  objections  against  that  proof; 
because  it  has  been  shown,  that  the  objections  against  Chris- 
tianity,  as  distinguished  from  objections  against  its  evidence,  are 
frivolous.  For  surely  very  little  weight,  if  any  at  all,  is  to  be 
laid  upon  a  way  of  arguing  and  objecting,  which,  when  applied 
to  the  general  constitution  of  nature,  experience  shows  not  to  be 
conclusive:  and  such,  I  think,  is  the  whole  way  of  objecting 
treated  of  throughout  this  chapter.  It  is  resolvable  into  princi- 
ples, and  goes  upon  suppositions,  which  mislead  us  to  think,  that 
the  Author  of  nature  would  not  act,  as  we  experience  he  does; 
or  would  act,  in  such  and  such  cases,  as  we  experience  he  does 
not  in  like  cases.  But  the  unreasonableness  of  this  way  of  ob- 
jecting will  appear  yet  more  evidently  from  hence,  that  the  chief 
things  thus  objected  against  are  justified,  as  shall  be  further 
shown, f  by  distinct,  particular,  and  full  analogies,  in  the  consti- 
tution and  course  of  nature. 

It  is  to  be  remembered,  that,  as  frivolous  as  objections  of  the 
foregoing  sort  against  revelation  are,  yet,  when  a  supposed  reve- 
lation is  more  consistent  with  itself,  and  has  a  more  general  and 
uniform  tendency  to  promote  virtue,  than,  all  circumstances  con- 
sidered, could  have  been  expected  from  enthusiasm  and  political 
views,  this  is  a  presumptive  proof  of  its  not  proceeding  from 
them,  and  so  of  its  truth :  because  we  are  competent  judges,  what 
might  have  been  expected  from  enthusiasm  and  political  views.* 

*  Chap.  vii.  f  Chap.  iv.  latter  part,  and  y.  vi. 

f  [This  pregnant  paragraph  should  receive  very  fall  attention.  We  know 
much  of  men,  little  of  God.  What  men  are  likely  to  do,  or  say,  in  certain 
circumstances,  is  often  very  clear;  and  generally  may  be  guessed  at.  But 
Vfhat  God  would  do  or  say  in  new  contingencies,  who  shall  attempt  -to  prescribe 
or  predict?  We  are  poorly  qualified  to  assert  that  such  and  such  declarations 
could  not  have  come  from  infinite  wisdom;  but  we  are  quite  competent  to  a{«^ 
firm  that  such  and  such  things  could  not  have  come  from  humaii  «jottrivanoo 
or  enthusiasm.] 


CHRISTIANITY,  A  SCHEME,  ETC.  223 


CHAPTER  ly. 

CHRISTIANITY,    CONSIDERED   AS   A   SCHEME    OR    CONSTITUTION, 
IMPERFECTLY    COMPREHENDED. 

As  hatli  been  now  shown,*  tlie  analogy  of  nature  renders  it 
highly  credible  beforehand,  that,  supposing  a  revelation  to  be 
made,  it  must  contain  many  things  very  different  from  what  we 
should  have  expected,  and  such  as  appear  open  to  great  objections : 
and  that  this  observation,  in  good  measure,  takes  off  the  force  of 
those  objections,  or  rather  precludes  them.  It  may  be  alleged, 
that  this  is  a  very  partial  answer  to  such  objections,  or  a  very 
unsatisfactory  way  of  obviating  them  :  because  it  does  not  show 
at  all,  that  the  things  objected  against  can  be  wise,  just,  and 
good ;  much  less,  that  it  is  credible  they  are  so.  It  will  there- 
fore be  proper  to  show  this  distinctly;  by  applying  to  these 
objections  against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  Chris- 
tianity, the  answer  above"|"  given  to  the  like  objections  against 
the  constitution  of  nature :  before  we  consider  the  particular 
analogies  in  the  latter,  to  the  particular  things  objected  against 
in  the  former.  Now  that  which  affords  a  sufficient  answer  to 
objections  against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  the  con- 
stitution of  nature,  is  its  being  a  constitution,  a  system,  or 
scheme,  imperfectly  comprehended  ;*  a  scheme  in  which  means 
are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends ;  and  which  is  carried  on  by 
general  laws.  For  from  these  things  it  has  been  proved,  not 
only  to  be  possible,  but  also  to  be  credible,  that  those  things 
which  are  objected  against  may  be  consistent  with  wisdom, 
justice,  and  goodness;  nay,  maybe  instances  of  them  :  and  even 

*  In  the  foregoing  chapter. 

f  Part  I.  ch.  vii.,  to  which  this  all  along  refers. 

^  ["It  is  the  last  step  of  reason  to  know  there  is  an  infinity  of  things 
which  surpass  it." — Pascal.  "  The  wall  of  adamant  which  bounds  human 
inquiry,  has  scarcely  ever  been  discovered  by  any  adventurer,  till  he  was 
aroused  by  the  shock  that  drove  him  back." — Sir  Jas.  Mackintosh.  "  Of  the 
dark  parts  of  revelation  there  are  two  sorts :  one  which  may  be  cleared  up  by 
the  studious;  the  other  which  will  always  reside  within  the  shadow  of  God'a 
throne  where  it  would  be  impiety  to  intrude.'" — Warburton.  "A  Christianity 
Without  mystery  is  as  unphilosophical  as  it  is  unscriptural." — Angus.] 


224   .  CHRISTIANITY  A  SCHEME  part  ii. 

that,  tlie  constitution  and  government  of  nature  may  be  perfect 
in  the  highest  possible  degree.  If  Christianity  then  be  a  scheme, 
and  of  the  like  kind;  it  is  evident,  the  like  objections  against  it 
must  admit  of  the  like  answer.     And, 

I.   Christianity  is  a  scheme,  quite  beyond  our  comprehension. 

The  moral  government  of  God  is  exercised,  by  gradually  con- 
ducting things  so  in  the  course  of  his  providence,  that  every  one, 
at  length  and  upon  the  whole,  shall  receive  according  to  his 
deserts;  and  neither  fraud  nor  violence,  but  truth  and  right, 
shall  finally  prevail.  Christianity  is  a  particular  scheme  under 
this  general  plan  of  Providence,  and  a  part  of  it,  conducive  to 
its  completion,  with  regard  to  mankind  :  consisting  itself  also  of 
various  parts,  and  a  mysterious  economy,  which  has  been  carry- 
ing on  from  the  time  the  world  came  into  its  present  wretched 
state,  and  is  still  carrying  on,  for  its  recovery,  by  a  divine  per- 
son, the  Messiah ;  who  is  to  gather  together  in  one  the  children 
of  Godj  that  are  scattered,  abroad^  and  establish  an  everlasting 
Mngdom,  wherein  dicelleth  rfghteousness.'f  In  order  to  it;  after 
various  manifestations  of  things,  relating  to  this  great  and  gene- 
ral scheme  of  Providence,  through  a  succession  of  many  ages ; 
(For  the  Sjnrit  of  Christ  which  was  in  the  prophets,  testijied  6e- 
forehand  his  sufferings,  and  the  glory  that  shoidd  follow  :  unto 
whom  it  was  revealed,  that  not  unto  themselves,  hut  unto  us  they 
did  minister  the  things  ichich  are  now  reported  unto  us  hy  them 
that  have  preached  the  Gospel ;  ichich  things  the  angels  desire  to 
look  into  ;  J) — aft^r  various  dispensations  looking  forward  and  pre- 
paratory to,  this  final  salvation  :  in  the  fidness  of  time,  when  in- 
finite wisdom  thought  fit;  He,  being  in  the  form  of  God, — made 
himself  of  no  reputation,  and  took  upon  him  the  form  of  a 
servant,  and  was  made  in  the  likeness  of  men:  and  being  found 
in  fashion  as  a  man,  he  humbled  himself,  and  became  obedient 
to  death,  even  the  death  of  the  cross.  Wherefore  God  also  hath 
highly  exalted  him,  and  given  him  a  name,  which  is  above  every 
name :  that  at  the  name  of  Jesus  every  knee  should  bow,  of 
things  in  heaven,  and  things  in  the  earth,  and  things  under  the 
earth  :  and  that  every  tongue  should  confess,  that  Jesus  Christ  is 
Lord,  to  the  glory  of  God  the  Father.^  Parts  likewise  of  this 
economy  are  the  miraculous  mission  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  his 
*  John  xi.  52.     f  2  Peter  iii.  13.      t  1  I'eter  i.  11,  12.     ^  PhU.  ii.  t"&-ll.] 


CHAP.  IV.  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED.  225 

ordinary  assistances  given  to  good  men  :^  the  invisible  govern- 
ment, which  Christ  at  present  exercises  over  his  church  :  that 
which  he  himself  refers  to  in  these  words  :  In  my  Father's  house 
are  many  mansions — I  go  to  prej^are  a  place  for  you  :^  and  his 
future  return  to  judge  the  world  in  7'ighteousness,  and  completely 
re-establish  the  kingdom  of  God.  For  the  Father  judgeth  no 
man;  but  hath  committed  all  judgment  unto  the  Son:  that  all 
men  should  honor  the  Son,  even  as  they  honor  the  Father. "f  All 
power  is  given  unto  liim  in  heaven  and  in  earth."^  And  he  must 
reign,  till  he  hath  put  all  enemies  under  his  feet.  Then  cometh 
the  end,  when  he  shall  have  delivered  up  the  kingdom  to  God, 
even  the  Father ;  when  he  shall  have  put  down  all  rule,  and  all 
authority  and  power.  And  when  all  things  shall  he  subdued 
unto  him,  then  shall  the  Son  also  himself  be  subject  un^o  him  that 
put  all  tilings  under  him,  that  God  may  be  all  in  all\  Surely 
little  need  be  said  to  show,  that  this  system,  or  scheme  of  things, 
is  but  imperfectly  comprehended  by  us.  The  Scripture  expressly 
asserts  it  to  be  so.  And  indeed  one  cannot  read  a  passage  re- 
lating to  this  great  mystery  of  godliness, \\  but  what  immediately 
runs  up  into  something  which  shows  us  our  ignorancf  in  it;  as 
every  thing  in  nature  shows  us  our  ignorance  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  nature.  And  whoever  will  seriously  consider  that  part 
of  the  Christian  scheme,  which  is  revealed  in  Scripture,  will  find 
so  much  more  unrevealed,  as  will  convince  him,  that,  to  all  the 
purposes  of  judging  and  objecting,  we  know  as  little  of  it,  as  of 
the  constitution  of  nature.  Our  ignorance,  therefore,  is  as  much 
an  answer  to  our  objections  against  the  perfection  of  one,  as 
agpinst  the  perfection  of  the  other. ^ 

II.  It  is  obvious  too,  that  in  the  Christian  dispensation,  as 
much  as  in  the  natural  scheme  of  things,  means  are  made  use  of 
to  accomplish  ends. 

The  observation  of  this  furnishes  us  with  the  same  answer,  to 
objections  against  the  perfection  of  Christianity,  as  to  objections 
of  the  like  kind,  against  the  constitution  of  nature.     It  shows 

^  [The  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit  are  not  only  "given  to  good  men,"'  but 
aie  sent  upon  many  who  live  unmindful  of  eternity,  quickening  their  con- 
sciences, enlightening  their  understandings  and  arresting  their  passions,  a«d 
tJius  it  is  they  are  converted  unto  the  truth  in  Christ.] 

«  John  xiv.  2.  f  John  v.  22,  23.  %  Matt,  xxviii.  18. 

J  1  Cor.  XV.  28.  II  1  Tim.  ill.  16.  \  P.  174,  &c. 

P 


226  CHRISTIANITY  A  SCHEME  part  ii. 

the  credibility,  that  tlie  things  objected  against,  how  foolish^ 
soever  they  appear  to  men,  may  be  the  very  best  means  of  ac- 
complishing the  very  best  ends.  And  their  appearing  foolish- 
ness is  no  presumption  against  this,  in  a  scheme  so  greatly  beyond 
our  comprehension. "I" 

III.  The  credibility,  that  the  Christian  dispensation  may  have 
been,  all  along,  carried  on  by  general  laws,J  no  less  than  the 
course  of  nature,  may  require  to  be  more  distinctly  made  out. 

Consider  then,  upon  what  ground  it  is  we  say,  that  the  whole 
common  course  of  nature  is  carried  on  according  to  general  fore- 
ordained laws.  We  know  indeed  several  of  the  general  laws  of 
matter;  and  a  great  part  of  the  natural  behavior  of  living  agents 
is  reducible  to  general  laws.  But  we  know  in  a  manner  nothing, 
by  what  laws,  storms,  tempests,  earthquakes,  femine,  pestilence, 
become  the  instruments  of  destruction  to  mankind.  And  the 
laws  by  which  persons  born  into  the  world  at  such  a  time  and 
place  are  of  such  capacities,  geniuses,  tempers;  the  laws  by 
which  thoughts  come  into  our  mind,  in  a  multitude  of  cases ; 
and  by  which  innumerable  things  happen,  of  the  greatest  influ- 
ence upon  the  affairs  and  state  of  the  world.  These  laws  are  so 
wholly  unknown  to  us,  that  we  call  the  events  which  come  to 
pass  by  them,  accidental;  though  all  reasonable  men  know  cer- 
tainly, that  there  cannot,  in  reality,  be  any  such  thing  as  chance; 
and  conclude  that  the  things  which  have  this  appearance  are  the 
result  of  general  laws,  and  may  be  reduced  to  them.  It  is  but 
an  exceeding  little  way,  and  in  but  a  very  few  respects,  that  we 
can  trace  up  the  natural  course  of  things  before  us,  to  general 
laws.  It  is  only  from  analogy,  that  we  conclude  the  whole  of  it 
to  be  capable  of  being  reduced  to  them  :  only  from  our  seeing 
that  part  is  so.  It  is  from  our  finding,  that  the  course  of  nature, 
in  some  respects  and  so  far,  goes  on  by  general  laws,  that  we  con- 
clude this  of  the  rest. 

If  that  be  a  just  ground  for  such  a  conclusion,  it  is  a  just 
ground  also,  if  not  to  conclude,  yet  to  apprehend,  to  render  it 
Bupposable  and  credible,  which  is  sufficient  for  answering  objec- 
tions, that  God's  miraculous  interpositions  may  have  been,  all 
along  in  like  manner,  by  general  laws  of  wisdom.  Thus,  that 
miraculous  powers  should  be  exerted,  at  such  times,  upon  such 
*  1  Cor.  i.  [18-25.]  t  Pp.  178,  179.  %  Tp.  ISO,  ^8^. 


CHAP.  IV.  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED.  227 

occasions,  in  such  degrees  and  manners,  and  with  regard  to  such 
persons,  rather  than  others;  that  the  affairs  of  tlie  world,  being 
permitted  to  go  on  in  their  natural  course  so  far,  should,  just  at 
such  a  point,  have  a  new  direction  given  them  by  miraculous  in- 
terpositions; that  these  interpositions  should  be  exactly  in  such 
degrees  and  respects  only;  all  this  may  have  been  by  general 
laws.  These  laws  are  indeed  unknown  to  us  :  but  no  more  un- 
known than  the  laws  from  whence  it  is,  that  some  die  as  soon  as 
they  are  born,  and  others  live  to  extreme  old  age ;  that  one  man 
is  so  superior  to  another  in  understanding;  with  innumerable 
more  things,  which,  as  was  before  observed,  we  cannot  reduce  to 
any  laws  or  rules,  though  it  is  taken  for  granted,  they  are  as 
much  reducible  to  general  ones,  as  gravitation.  If  the  revealed^ 
dispensations  of  Providence,  and  miraculous  interpositions,  be 
by  general  laws,  as  well  as  God's  ordinary  government  in  the 
course  of  nature,  made  known  by  reason  and  experience;  there 
is  no  more  reason  to  expect  that  every  exigence,  as  it  arises, 
should  be  provided  for  by  these  general  laws  or  miraculous  inter- 
positions, than  that  every  exigence  in  nature  should  be,  by  the 
general  laws  of  nature.  Yet  there  might  be  wise  and  good 
reasons,  why  miraculous  interpositions  should  be  by  general  laws; 
and  why  these  laws  should  not  be  broken  in  upon,  or  deviated 
from,  by  other  miracles. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  the  appearance  of  deficiencies  and  ir- 
regularities in  nature  is  owing  to  its  being  a  scheme  but  in  part 
made  known,  and  of  such  a  certain  particular  kind  in  other  re- 
spects. We  see  no  more  reason  why  the  frame  and  course  of 
nature  should  be  such  a  scheme,  than  why  Christianity  should. 
And  that  the  former  is  such  a  scheme,  renders  it  credible,  that 
the  latter,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  may  be  so  too.  And  as 
it  is  manifest,  that  Christianity  is  a  scheme  revealed  but  in  part, 
and  a  scheme  in  which  means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish 
ends,  like  to  that  of  nature :  so  the  credibility,  that  it  may  have 
been  all  along  carried  on  by  general  laws,  no  less  than  the  course 
of  nature,  has  been  distinctly  proved.  From  all  this  it  is  before- 
hand credible  that  there  might,  I  think  probable  that  there 
would,  be  the  like  appearance  of  deficiencies  and  irregularities 
In  Christianity,  as  in  nature;  i.e.  that  Christianity  would  be 
liable  to  the  like  objections,  as  the  frame  of  nature.     And  these 


228  CHRISTIANITY  A  SCHEME  part  ii; 

objections  are  answered  by  these  observations  concerning  Chris- 
tianity; as  the  like  objections  against  the  frame  of  nature  are 
answered  by  the  like  observations  concerning  the  frame  of 
nature. 

The  objections  against  Christianity,  considered  as  a  matter  of 
fact,*  having,  in  general,  been  obviated  in  the  preceding  chapter; 
and  the  same,  considered  as  made  against  the  wisdom  and  good- 
ness of  it,  having  been  obviated  in  this:  the  next  thing,  accord- 
ing to  the  method  proposed,  is  to  show,  that  the  principal  objec- 
tions, in  particular,  against  Christianity,  may  be  answered,  by 
particular  and  full  analogies  in  nature.  And  as  one  of  them  is 
made  against  the  whole  scheme  of  it  together,  as  j'ust  now  de- 
scribed, I  choose  to  consider  it  here,  rather  than  in  a  distinct 
chapter  by  itself. 

The  thing  objected  against  this  scheme  of  the  gospel  is,  '^that 
it  seems  to  suppose  God  was  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  a  long 
series  of  intricate  means,  in  order  to  accomplish  his  ends,  the 
recovery  and  salvation  of  the  world :  in  like  sort  as  men,  for 
want  of  understanding  or  power,  not  being  able  to  come  at  their 
ends  directly,  are  forced  to  go  roundabout  ways,  and  make  use 
of  many  perplexed  contrivances  to  arrive  at  them."  Now  every 
thing  which  we  see  shows  the  folly  of  this,  considered  as  an  ob- 
jection against  the  truth  of  Christianity.  For,  according  to  our 
manner  of  conception,  God  makes  use  of  variety  of  means,  what 
we  often  think  tedious  ones,  in  the  natural  course  of  providence, 
for  the  accomplishment  of  all  his  en(is.  Indeed  it  is  certain 
there  is  somewhat  in  this  matter  quite  beyond' our  comprehen- 
sion :  but  the  mystery  is  as  great  in  nature  as  in  Christianity. 
"VYe  know  what  we  ourselves  aim  at,  as  final  ends :  and  what 
courses  we  take,  merely  as  means  conducing  to  those  ends.  But 
we  are  greatly  ignorant  how  far  things  are  considered  by  the 
Author  of  nature,,  under  the  single  notion  of  means  and  ends; 
so  as  that  it  may  be  said,  this  is  merely  an  end,  and  that  merely 
a  means,  in  his  regard.  And  whether  there  be  not  some  peciliar 
absurdity  in  our  very  manner  of  conception,  concerning  this 
matter,  something  contradictory  arising  from  our  extremely  im* 
perfect  views  of  things,  it  is  impossible  to  say. 
*  P.  172,  &c. 


CHAP.  IV.  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED.  229 

However,  this  much  is  manifestj  that  the  whole  natural  world 
and  government  of  it,  is  a  scheme  or  system;  not  a  fixed,  but  a 
progressive  one :  a  scheme  in  which  the  operation  of  various 
means  takes  up  a  great  length  of  time,  before  the  ends  they  tend 
to  can  be  attained.  The  change  of  seasons,  the  ripening  of 
fruits,  the  very  history  of  a  flower,  are  instances  of  this  :  and  so 
is  human  life.  Thus  vegetable  bodies,  and  those  of  animals, 
though  possibly  formed  at  once,  yet  grow  up  by  degrees  to  a 
mature  state.  And  thus  rational  agents,  who  animate  these 
latter  bodies,  are  naturally  directed  to  form  each  his  own  manners 
and  character,  by  the  gradual  gaining  of  knowledge  and  expe- 
rience, and  by  a  long  course  of  action.  Our  existence  is  not  only 
successive,  as  it  must  be  of  necessity;  but  one  state  of  our  life 
and  being  is  appointed  by  God,  to  be  a  preparation  for  another; 
and  that  to  be  the  means  of  attaining  to  another  succeeding  one : 
infancy  to  childhood;  childhood  to  youth;  youth  to  mature  age. 
Men  are  impatient,  and  for  precipitating  things :  but  the  Author 
of  nature  appears  deliberate  throughout  his  operations;  accom- 
plishing his  natural  ends  by  slow  successive  steps."  And  there 
is  a  plan  of  things  beforehand  laid  out,  which,  from  the  nature 
of  it,  requires  various  systems  of  means,  as  well  as  length  of 
time,  in  order  to  the  carrying  on  its  several  parts  into  execution. 

Thus,  in  the  daily  course  of  natural  providence,  God  operates 
in  the  very  same  manner,  as  in  the  dispensation  of  Christianity; 
making  one  thing  subservient  to  another;  this,  to  something 
further ;  and  so  on,  through  a  progressive  series  of  means,  which 
extend,  both  backward  and  forward,  beyond  our  utmost  view. 
Of  this  manner  of  operation,  every  thing  we  see  in  the  course 
of  nature  is  as  much  an  instance,  as  any  part  of  the  Christian 
dispensation. 

c  ["Providence  hurries  not  himself  to  display  to-day  the  consequence  of  tho 
principle  he  yesterday  announced.  He  will  draw  it  out  in  the  lapse  of  ages. 
Even  according  to  our  reasoning  logic  is  none  the  less  sure,  because  it  is  slow." 
— GuizoT  on  Civilization,  Lect.  I. 

How  impressively  is  this  sentiment  sustained  by  modern  geology,  and  as- 
tronomy !] 


20 


^50  ^  THE   APPOINTMENT   OF 


CHAPTER   Y. 

THE  PARTICULAR  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY;  THE  APPOINT- 
MENT OF  A  MEDIATOR,  AND  THE  REDEMPTION  OF  THE 
WORLD    BY    HIM. 

There  is  not,  I  think,  any  tiling  relating  to  Christianity,  which 
has  been  more  objected  against,  than  the  mediation  of  Christ,  in 
some  or  other  of  its  parts.  Yet  upon  thorough  consideration, 
there  seems  nothing  less  justly  liable  to  it.*     For, 

I.  The  whole  analogy  of  nature  removes  all  imagined  presump- 
tion against  the  general  notion  of  a  Mediator  heticeen  God  and 
man.*  For  we  find  all  living  creatures  are  brought  into  the 
world,  and  their  life  in  infancy  is  preserved,  bythe  instnimeut- 
ality  of  others :  and  every  satisfaction  of  it,  some  way  or  other,  is 
bestowed  by  the  like  means.  So  that  the  visible  government, 
which  God  exercises  over  -the  world,  is  by  the  instrumentality 
and  mediation  of  others.  How  far  his  invisible  government  be 
or  be  not  so,  it  is  impossible  to  determine  at  all  by  reason.  The 
supposition,  that  part  of  it  is  so,  appears,  to  say  the  least,  alto- 
gether as  credible,  as  the  contrary.  There  is  then  no  sort  of  ob- 
jection, from  the  light  of  nature,  against  the  general  notion  of  a 
mediator  between  God  and  man,  considered  as  a  doctrine  of  Chris- 
tianity, or  as  an  appointment  in  this  dispensation :  since  we  find 
by  experience,  that  God  does  appoint  mediators,  to  be  the  instru- 
ments of  good  and  evil  to  us :  the  instruments  of  his  justice  and 
his  mercy.  And  the  objection  here  referred  to  is  urged,  not 
against  mediation  in  that  high,  eminent,  and  peculiar  sense,  in 

«■  ["  Philosophers  make  shameful  and  dangerous  mistakes,  when  they  judge 
of  the  Divine  economy.  lie  cannot,  they  tell  us,  act  thus,  it  would  be  contrary 
to  his  wisdom,  or  his  justice,  &c.  But  while  they  make  these  j^eremptory  as- 
sertions they  show  themselves  to  be  unacquainted  with  the  fundamental  rules 
of  their  own  science,  and  with  the  origin  of  all  late  improvements.  True 
philosophy  would  begin  the  other  way,  with  observing  the  constitution  of  the 
world,  how  God  has  made  us,  and  in  what  circumstances  he  has  placed  us,  and 
then  from  what  he  has  done,  form  a  sure  judgment  what  he  would  do.  Thus 
might  they  learn  'the  invisible  things  of  God  from  those  which  ar«  clearly 
Been'  the  things  which  are  not  accomplished  from  those  which  are.*' — -P-MVELii's 
Use  and  Abuse  of  Philosophi/.] 

*  1  Tim.  ii.  5. 


CHAP.  V.  A   MEDIATOR   AXD   REDEEMER.  281 

whicli  Christ  is  our  mediator;  but  absolutely  against  the  whole 
notion  itself  of  a  mediator  at  all. 

II.  As  we  must  suppose,  that  the  world  is  under  the  proper 
moral  government  of  God,  or  in  a  state  of  religion,  before  we  can 
enter  into  consideration  of  the  revealed  doctrine,  concerning  the 
redemption  of  it  by  Christ :  so  that  supposition  is  here  to  be  dis- 
tinctly noticed.  Now  the  divine  moral  government  which  reli- 
gion teaches  us,  implies  that  the  consequence  of  vice  shall  be 
misery,  in  some  future  state,  by  the  righteous  judgment  of  God. 
That  such  consequent  punishment  shall  take  effect  by  his  appoint- 
ment, is  necessarily  implied.  But,  as  it  is  not  in  any  sort  to  be 
supposed,  that  we  are  made  acquainted  with  all  the  ends  or 
reasons,  for  which  it  is  fit  that  future  punishments  should  be  in- 
flicted, or  why  God  has  appointed  such  and  such  consequent 
misery  to  follow  vice;  and  as  we  are  altogether  in  the  dark,  how 
or  in  what  manner  it  shall  follow,  by  what  immediate  occasions, 
or  by  the  instrumentality  of  what  means;  so  there  is  no  absurdity 
in  supposing  it  may  follow  in  a  way  analogous  to  that  in  which 
many  miseries  follow  such  and  such  courses  of  action  at  present; 
poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  untimely  death  by  diseases,  death  from 
the  hands  of  civil  justice.  There  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing 
future  punishment  may  follow  wickedness  of  course,  as  we  speak, 
or  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence  from  God's  original  consti- 
tution of  the  world;  from  the  nature  he  has  given  us,  and  from 
the  condition  in  which  he  places  us;  or  in  a  like  manner,  as  a 
person  rashly  trilling  upon  a  precipice,  in  the  way  of  natural  con- 
sequence, falls  down ;  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence  of  this, 
breaks  his  limbs,  and  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  without 
help,  perishes. 

Some  good  men  may  perhaps  be  offended  with  hearing  it  spoken 
of  as  a  supposable  thing  that  future  punishments  of  wickedness 
may  be  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence :  as  if  this  were  taking 
the  execution  of  justice  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  and  giving  it  to 
nature.  But  they  should  remember,  that  when  things  come  to 
pass  according  to  the  course  of  nature,  this  does  not  hinder  them 
from  being  his  doing,  who  is  the  God  of  nature:  and  that  the 
Scripture  ascribes  those  punishments  to  divine  justice,  which  are 
known  t^  be  natural;  and  which  must  be  called  so,  when  dis- 
tinguished from  such  as  are  miraculous.     After  all,  this  suppo- 


232  THE   APPOINTMENT   OF  part  n. 

sition.  or  rather  this  way  of  speaking,  is  here  made  use  of  only 
by  woy  of  illustration  of  the  subject  before  us.  For  since  it  must 
be  admitted,  that  the  future  punishment  of  wickedness  is  not  a 
matter  of  arbitrary  appointment,  but  of  reason,  equity,  and  justice; 
it. comes  for  aught  I  see,  to  the  same  thing,  whether  it  is  sup- 
posed to  be  inflicted  in  a  way  analogous  to  that  in  which  the 
temporal  punishments  of  vice  and  folly  are  inflicted,  or  in  any 
other  way.  And  though  there  were  a  difi"erence,  it  is  allowable, 
in  the  present  case,  to  make  this  supposition^  plainly  not  an  in- 
credible one,  that  future  punishment  may  follow  wickedness  in 
the  way  of  natural  consequence,  or  according  to  some  general 
laws  of  government  already  established  in  the  universe. 

III.  Upon  this  supposition,  or  even  without  it,  we  may  observe 
Bomewjiat,  much  to  the  present  purpose,  in  the  constitution  of 
nature  or  appointments  of  Providence:  the  provision  which  is 
made,  that  all  the  bad  natural  consequences  of  men's  actions 
should  not  always  actually  follow;  or  that  such  bad  consequences, 
as,  according  to  the  settled  course  of  things,  would  inevitably 
have  followed  if  not  prevented,  should,  in  certain  degrees,  be  pre- 
vented. We  are  apt  presumptuously  to  imagine,  that  the  world 
might  have  been  so  constituted,  as  that  there  would  not  have 
been  any  such  thing  as  misery  or  evil.  On  the  contrary  we  find 
the  Author  of  nature  permits  it:  but  then  he  has  provided  reliefs, 
and  in  many  cases  perfect  remedies  for  it,  after  some  pains  and 
difficulties;  reliefs  and  remedies  even  for  that  evil,  which  is  the 
fruit  of  our  own  misconduct;  and  which,  in  the  course  of  nature, 
would  have  continued,  and  ended  in  our  destruction,  but  for  such 
remedies.  And  this  is  an  instance  both  of  severity  and  of  in- 
dulgence, in  the  constitution  of  nature.  Thus  all  the  bad  conse- 
quences, now  mentioned,  of  a  man's  trifling  upon  a  precipice, 
might  be  prevented.  And  though  all  were  not,  yet  some  of  them 
might,  by  proper  interposition,  if  not  rejected:^  by  another's 
coming  to  the  rash  man's  relief,  with  his  own  laying  hold  on  that 
relief,  in  such  sort  as  the  case  required.     Persons  may  do  a  great 

t>  [The  iutorposition  of  a  man  of  known  probity  and  wortli  often  saves  the 
thoughtless  or  the  guilty  from  punishment.  Mediation  is  seen  in  a  thousand 
forms  in  the  arrangements  of  social  life  j  and  the  common  sense  of  all  mankind 
approves  of  it.  The  release  of  the  offending,  by  the  intercession  of  the  good, 
and  all  the  benefits  of  advice,  caution,  example,  instruction,  persuasion,  ana 
authority,  are  instances  of  mediation.] 


*CHAP.  V.  A   MEDIATOR   AND   REDEEMER.  235 

deal  themselves  towards  preventing  tlie  bad  consequences  of  tlieir 
follies :  and  more  may  be  done  by  themselves,  together  with  the 
assistance  of  others  their  fellow-creatures;  which  assistance  nature 
requires  and  prompts  us  to.  This  is  the  general  constitution  of 
the  world. 

Now  suppose  it  had  been  so  constituted,  that  after  such  actions 
were  done,  as  were  foreseen  naturally  to  draw  after  them  misery 
to  the  doer,  it  should  have  been  no  more  in  human  power  to  have 
prevented  that  naturally  consequent  misery,  in  any  instance,  than 
it  is  in  all :  no  one  can  say,  whether  such  a  more  severe  constitu- 
tion of  things  might  not  yet  have  been  really  good.  But,  on  the 
contrary,  provision  being  made  by  nature,  that  we  may  and  do, 
to  so  great  degree,  prevent  the  bad  natural  effects  of  our  follies; 
this  may  be  called  mercy  or  compassion  in  the  original  constitu- 
tion of  the  world :  compassion,  as  distinguished  from  goodness  in 
general.  And,  the  whole  known  constitution  and  course  of  things 
affording  us  instances  of  such  compassion,  it  would  be  according 
to  the  analogy  of  nature,  to  hope,  that  however  ruinous  the 
natural  consequences  of  vice  might  be,  from  the  general  laws  of 
God's  government  over  the  universe;  yet  provision  might  be 
made,  possibly  might  have  been  originally  made,  for  preventing 
those  ruinous  consequences  from  inevitably  following:  at  least 
from  following  universally,  and  in  all  cases. 

Many,  I  am  sensible,  will  wonder  at  finding  this  made  a  question, 
or  spoken  of  as  in  any  degree  doubtful.  The  generality  of  man- 
kind are  so  far  from  having  that  awful  sense  of  things,  which  the 
present  state  of  vice  and  misery  and  darkness  seems  to  make  but 
reasonable,  that  they  have  scarce  any  apprehension  or  thought  at 
all  about  this  matter,  any  way :  and  some  serious  persons  may 
have  spoken  unadvisedly^  concerning  it.  But  let  us  observe, 
what  we  experience  to  be,  and  what,  from  the  very  xjonstitution 
of  nature  cannot  but  be,  the  consequences  of  irregular  and  dis- 
orderly behavior:  even  of  such  rashness,  wilfulness,  neglects,  as 
we  scarce  call  vicious.  Now  it  is  natural  to  apprehend,  that  the 
bad  consequences  of  irregularity  will  be  greater,  in  proportion  as 
th^  irregularity  is  so.  And  there  is  no  comparison  between  these 
/-Tregularities,  and  the  greater  instances  of  vice,  or  a  dissolute 
profligate  disregard  to  all  religion ;  if  there  be  any  thing  at  all  in 
religion.     For  consider  what  it  is  for  creatures,  moral  agents, 

20* 


234  THE  APPOINTMENT   OF  part  ii. 

presumptuously  to  introduce  that  confusion  and  misery  into  the 
kingdom  of  God,  which  mankind  have  in  fact  introduced:  to 
blaspheme  the  Sovereign  Lord  of  all;  to  contemn  his  authority; 
to  be  injurious,  to  the  degree  they  are,  to  their  fellow- creatures, 
the  creatures  of  God.  Add  that  the  effects  of  vice  in  the  present 
world  are  often  extreme  misery,  irretrievable  ruin,  and  even 
death :  and  upon  putting  all  this  together,  it  will  appear,  that  as 
no  one  can  say,  in  what  degree  fatal  the  unprevented  consequences 
of  vice  may  be,  according  to  the  general  rule  of  divine  govern- 
ment; so  it  is  by  no  means  intuitively  certain,  how  far  these 
consequences  could  possibly,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  pre- 
vented, consistently  with  the  eternal  rule  of  right,  or  with  what 
is,  in  fact,  the  moral  constitution  of  nature.  However,  there 
would  be  large  ground  to  hope,  that  the  universal  government 
was  not  so  severely  strict,  but  that  there  was  room  for  pardon,  or 
for  having  those  penal  consequences  prevented.      Yet, 

ly.  There  seems  no  probability,  that  any  thing  we  could  do 
would  alone  and  of  itself  prevent  them :  prevent  their  following, 
or  being  inflicted.  But  one  would  think  at  least,  it  were  impos- 
sible that  the  contrary  should  be  thought  certain.  For  we  are 
not  acquainted  with  the  whole  of  the  case.  We  are  not  informed 
of  all  the  reasons,  which  render  it  fit  that  future  punishments 
should  be  inflicted:  and  therefore  cannot  know,  whether  any 
thing  we  could  do  would  make  such  an  alteration,  as  to  render  it 
fit  that  they  should  be  remitted.  We  do  not  know  what  the 
whole  natural  or  appointed  consequences  of  vice  are;  nor  in  what 
way  they  would  follow,  if  not  prevented :  and  therefore  can  in  no 
sort  say,  whether  we  could  do  any  thing  which  would  be  sufficient 
to  prevent  them.  Our  ignorance  being  thus  manifest,  let  us 
recollect  the  analogy  of  nature  or  Providence.  For,  though  this 
may  be  but  a  slight  ground  to  raise  a  positive  opinion  upon,  in 
this  matter;  yet  it  is  sufficient  to  answer  a  mere  arbitrary  asser- 
tion, without  any  kind  of  evidence,  urged  by  way  of  objection 
against  a  doctrine,  the  proof  of  which  is  not  reason,  but  revela- 
tion. Consider  then  :  people  ruin  their  fortunes  by  extravagance; 
they  bring  diseases  upon  themselves  by  excess;  they  incur  the 
penalties  of  civil  laws;  and  surely  civil  government  is  natural; 
will  sorrow  for  these  follies  past,  and  behaving  Well  for  the  future, 
alone  and   ^f  itself  prevent  the  natural  consequences  of  them  ? 


CHAP.  V.  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  235 

On  the  contrary,  men's  natural  abilities  of  helpinp;;  themselves 
are  often  impaired ;  or  if  not,  yet  they  are  forced  to  be  beholden 
to  the  assistance  of  others,  upon  several  accounts,  and  in  differ- 
ent ways ;  assistance  which  they  would  have  had  no  occasion  for, 
had  it  not  been  for  their  misconduct ;  but  which,  in  the  disad- 
vantageous condition  they  have  reduced  themselves  to,  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  their  recovery,  and  retrieving  their  affairs. 
Since  this  is  our  case,  considering  ourselves  merely  as  inhabitants! 
of  this  world,  and  as  having  a  temporal  interest  here,  under  the 
natural  government  of  God,  which  however  has  a  great  dea( 
moral  in  it;  why  is  it  not  supposable  that  this  may  be  our  case 
also,  in  our  more  important  capacity,  as  under  his  perfect  moral 
government,  and  having  a  more  general  and  future  interest 
depending?"  If  we  have  misbehaved  in  this  higher  capacity, 
and  rendered  ourselves  obnoxious  to  the  future  punishment, 
which  God  has  annexed  to  vice :  it  is  plainly  credible,  that 
behaving  well  for  the  time  to  come  may  be — not  useless,  God 
forbid — but  wholly  insufficient,  alone  and  of  itself,  to  prevent 
that  punishment :  or  to  put  us  in  the  condition  which  we  should 
have  been  in,  had  we  preserved  our  innocence. 

Though  we  ought  to  reason  with  all  reverence,  whenever  we 
reason  concerning  the  divine  conduct :  yet  it  may  be  added,  that 
it  is  clearly  contrary  to  all  our  notions  of  government,  as  well  as 
to  what  is,  in  fact,  the  general  constitution  of  nature,  to  suppose, 
that  doing  well  for  the  future  should,  in  all  cases,  prevent  all  the 
judicial  bad  consequences  of  having  done  evil,  or  all  the  punish- 
ment annexed  to  disobedience.  We  have  manifestly  nothing 
from  whence  to  determine,  in  what  degree,  and  in  what  cases, 
reformation  would  prevent  this  punishment,  even  supposing  that 
it  would  in  some.     And  though  the  efficacy  of  repentance  itself 

<=  [Mr.  Newman  notices  a  distinction  between  the  facts  of  revelation,  and  its 
principles ;  and  considers  the  argument  from  analogy  more  concerned  with  its 
principles  than  with  its  facts.  "  The  revealed  facts  are  special  and  singular, 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  but  the  revealed  principles  are  common  to  all  the 
works  of  God;  and  if  the  Author  of  nature  be  the  author  of  grace,  it  may  be 
expected  that  the  principles  displayed  in  them  will  be  the  same,  and  form  a 
connecting  link  between  them.  In  this  identity  of  princijjle,  lies  the  analogy 
of  natural  and  revealed  religion,  in  Butler's  sense  of  the  word.  The  Incarna- 
tion is  a  fact,  and  cannot  be  paralleled  by  any  thing  in  nature  :  the  doctrine 
of  mediation  is  a  principle,  and  is  abundantly  exemplified  in  nature." — Essay 
on  Devdopmenls.'] 


236  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  part  ri. 

alone,  to  prevent  what  mankind  had  rendered  themselves  ob- 
noxious to,  and  recover  what  they  had  forfeited,  is  now  insisted 
upon,  in  opposition  to  Christianity;  yet,  by  the  general  preva- 
lence of  propitiatory  sacrifices  over  the  heathen  world,  this  notion 
of  repentance  alone  being  sufficient  to  expiate  guilt,  appears  to 
be  contrary  to  the  general  sense  of  mankind.*^ 

Upon  the  whole  then  ;  had  the  laws,  the  general  laws  of  God's 
government  been  permitted  to  operate,  without  any  interposition 
in  our  behalf,  the  future  punishment,  for  aught  we  know  to 
the  contrary,  or  have  any  reason  to  think,  must  inevitably  have 
followed,  notwithstanding  any  thing  we  could  have  done  to  pre- 
vent it. 

V.  In  this  darkness,  or  this  light  of  nature,  call  it  which  you 
please,  revelation  comes  in;  and  confirms  every  doubting  fear, 
which  could  enter  into  the  heart  of  man,  concerning  the  future 
Tinprevented  consequence  of  wickedness.  It  supposes  the  world 
to  be  in  a  state  of  ruin  (a  supposition  which  seems  the  very 
ground  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  and  which,  if  not  provable 
by  reason,  yet  is  in  no  wise  contrary  to  it ;)  and  teaches  us  too, 
that  the  rules  of  divine  government  are  such,  as  not  to  admit  of 
pardon  immediately  and  directly  upon  repentance,  or  by  the  sole 
efficacy  of  it.  But  teaches  at  the  same  time,  what  nature  might 
justly  have  hoped,  that  the  moral  government  of  the  universe 
was  not  so  rigid,  but  that  there  was  room  for  an  interposition,  to 
avert  the  fatal  consequences  of  vice ;  which  therefore,  by  this 
means,  does  admit  of  pardon.  Revelation  teaches  us,  that  the 
unknown  laws  of  God's  more  general  government,  no  less  than 
the  particular  laws  by  which  we  experience  he  governs  us  at 
present,  are  compassionate,*  as  well  as  good  in  the  more  general 
notion  of  goodness  :  and  that  he  hath  mercifully  provided,  that 
there  should  be  an  interposition  to  prevent  the  destruction  of 
human  kind ;  whatever  that  destruction  unprevented  would  have 
been.  God  so  loved  the  world,  that  lie  gave  his  only  liegottcn 
Son,  that  ichosoever  helieveth,  not,  to  be  sure,  in  a  speculative, 
but  in  a  practical  sense,  that  whosoever  helieveth  in  him,  shoidd 

^  [The  student  will  find  the  inadequacy  of  repentance  to  cancel  guilt,  beauti- 
fully exhibited  by  Waylaxd,  Mor.  Science :  Magee,  Atonement :  Howb. 
Living  Temple.] 

*  P   232.  <fcc. 


CHAP.  V.  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  237 

not  perish  ;*  gave  his  Son  in  the  same  way  of  goodnes?  to  the 
world,  as  he  afibrds  particular  persons  the  friendly  assistance  of 
their  fellow-creatures,  when,  without  it,  their  temporal  ruin  would 
be  the  certain  consequence  of  their  follies  :  in  the  same  way  of 
goodness,  I  say,  though  in  a  transcendent  and  infinitely  higher 
degree.  And  the  Son  of  God  loved  us,  and  gave  himself  /or  ii.s, 
with  a  love,  which  he  himself -compares  to  that  of  human  friend- 
ship :  though,  in  this  case,  all  comparisons  must  fall  infinitely 
short  of  the  thing  intended  to  be  illustrated  by  them.  He  inter- 
posed in  such  a  manner  as  was  necessary  and  efi'ectual  to  prevent 
that  execution  of  justice  upon  sinners,  which  God  had  appointed 
should  otherwise  have  been  executed  upon  them ;  or  in  such  a 
manner,  as  to  prevent  that  punishment  from  actually  following, 
which,  according  to  the  general  laws  of  divine  government,  must 
have  followed  the  sins  of  the  world;  had  it  not  been  for  such 
interposition.*!* 

If  any  thing  here  said  should  appear,  upon  first  thought,  in- 
consistent with  divine  goodness ;  a  second,  I  am  persuaded,  will 
entirely  remove  that  appearance.  For  were  we  to  suppr^se  the 
constitution  of  things  to  be  such,  as  that  the  whole  creation  must 

*  John  iii.  16. 

f  It  cannot,  I  suppose,  he  imagined,  even  by  the  most  cursory  reader,  that 
it  is,  in  any  sort,  afiBrmed  or  implied  in  any  thing  said  in  this  chapter,  that 
none  can  have  the  benefit  of  the  general  redemption,  but  such  as  have  the 
advantage  of  being  made  acquainted  with  it  in  the  present  life.  But  it  may 
be  needful  to  mention,  that  several  questions,  which  have  been  brought  into 
the  subject  before  us,  and  determined,  are  not  in  the  least  entered  into  here . 
questions  which  have  been,  I  fear,  rashly  determined,  and  perhaps  with  equal 
rashness  contrary  ways.  For  instance,  whether  God  could  have  saved  the 
world  by  other  means  than  the  death  of  Christ,  consistently  with  the  gene- 
ral laws  of  his  government.  And  had  not  Christ  come  into  the  world,  what 
■would  have  been  the  future  condition  of  the  better  sort  of  men;  those  just  per- 
sons over  the  face  of  the  earth,  for  whom  Manasses  in  his  prayer^  asserts,  re- 
pentance was  not  appointed.  The  meaning  of  the  first  of  these  questions  is 
greatly  ambiguous  :  and  neither  of  them  can  properly  be  answered,  without 
going  upon  that  infinitely  absurd  supposition,  that  we  know  the  whole  of  the 
case.  And  perhaps  the  very  inquiry,  What  would  have  fvllowed,  if  God  had 
not  done  as  he  has,  may  have  in  it  some  very  great  impropriety  :  and  ought 
not  to  be  carried  on  any  further  than  is  necessary  to  help  our  partial  and 
inadequate  conceptions  of  things. 


e  [The  "praT-er  of  Manasses"'  is  one  of  tte  apocryphal  books  of  the  Old  Testament,  which 
ncyt  precedes  •'Maccabees."] 


288  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  part  ii. 

have  perished,  had  it  not  been  for  something,  which  God  had 
appointed  should  be,  in  order  to  prevent  that  ruin  :  even  this 
Buppasition  would  not  be  inconsistent,  in  any  degree,  with  the 
most  absolutely  perfect  goodness.  Still  it  may  be  thought,  that 
this  whole  manner  of  treating  the  subject  before  us  supposes 
mankind  to  be  naturally  in  a  very  strange  state.  And  truly  so 
it  does.  But  it  is  not  Christianity  which  has  put  us  into  this 
state.  Whoever  will  consider  the  manifold  miseries,  and  the 
extreme  wickedness  of  the  world;  that  the  best  have  great 
wrongnesses  within  themselves,  which  they  complain  of,  and 
endeavor  to  amend ;  but  that  the  generality  grow  more  profligate 
and  corrupt  with  age ;  that  even  moralists  thought  the  present 
state  to  be  a  state  of  punishment :  and,  that  the  earth  our  habi- 
tation has  the  appearances  of  being  a  ruin  :  whoever,  I  say,  will 
consider  all  these,  and  some  other  obvious  things,  will  think  he 
has  little  reason  to  object  against  the  Scripture  account,  that 
mankind  is  in  a  state  of  degradation ;  against  this  being  the 
fact:  how  difficult  soever  he  may  think  it  to  account  for,  or  even 
to  form  a  distinct  conception  of  the  occasions  and  circumstances 
of  it.  But  that  the  crime  of  our  first  parents  was  the  occasion 
of  our  being  placed  in  a  more  disadvantageous  condition,  is  a 
thing  throughout  and  particularly  analogous  to  what  we  see  in 
the  daily  course  of  natural  providence ;  as  the  recovery  of  the 
world  by  the  interposition  of  Christ  has  been  shown  to  be  so  in 
general. 

VI.  The  particular  manner  in  which  Christ  interposed  in  the 
redemption  of  the  world,  or  his  office  as  Mediator,  in  the  largest 
sense,  between  God  and  man,  is  thus  represented  to  us  in  the 
Scripture.  He  is  the  light  of  the  i€orId ;*  the  revealer  of  the 
will  of  God  in  the  most  eminent  sense.  He  is  a  propitiatory 
sacrifice  ;f  the  Lamb  of  God:'l  and,  as  he  voluntarily  offered 
himself  up,  he  is  styled  our  High  Priest. §  And,  which  seems 
of  peculiar  weight,  he  is  described  beforehand  in  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, under  the  same  characters  of  a  priest,  and  an  exjiiatory 
victim. II     And  whereas  it  is  objected,  that  all  this  is  merely  by 

"5  John  i.,  and  viii.  12. 

t  Rom.  iii.  25,  v.  11 :  1  Cor.  v.  7 :  Eph.  v.  2 :  1  Jolin  ii.  2 :  Matt,  xxvi   28. 

J  John  i.  29,  36,  and  throughout  the  book  of  Revelation. 

g  Throughout  the  epistle  to  the  Hebrews. 

II  Isa.  liii,  Dan.  ix.  21:  Ps.  ex  4. 


CHAP.  V.  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  239 

way  of  allusion  to  the  sacrifices  of  the  Mosaic  law,  the  Apostle 
on  the  contrary  affirms,  that  the  law  tvas  a  shadow  of  good  things 
to  come,  and  not  the  very  image  of  the  things  ;*  and  that  the 
priests  that  offer  gifts  according  to  the  law — serve  unto  the  ex- 
ample and  shadow  of  heavenly  things,  as  Moses  was  admonished 
of  God,  when  he  was  about  to  make  the  tabernacle.  For  see, 
saith  he,  that  thou  make  all  things  according  to  the  pattern 
showed  to  thee  in  the  mouiit :"[  i.e.  the  Levitical  priesthood  was  a 
shadow  of  the  priesthood  of  Christ;  in  like  manner  as  the  taber- 
nacle made  by  Moses  was  according  to  that  showed  him  in  the 
mount.  The  priesthood  of  Christ,  and  the  tabernacle  in  the 
mount,  were  the  originals ;  of  the  former  of  which  the  Levitical 
priesthood  was  a  type;  and  of  the  latter  the  tabernacle  made  by 
Moses  was  a  copy.  The  doctrine  of  this  epistle  then  plainly  is, 
that  the  legal  sacrifices  were  allusions  to  the  great  and  final 
atonement  to  be  made  by  the  blood  of  Christ;  and  not  that  this 
was  an  allusion  to  those.  Nor  can  any  thing  be  more  express 
and  determinate  than  the  following  passage.  It  is  not  p>ossible 
that  the  blood  of  bulls  and  of  goats  should  take  away  sin. 
Wherefore  ichen  he  cometh  into  the  world,  he  saith,  Sacrifice 
and  offering,  i.e.  of  bulls  and  of  goats,  thou  icouldest  not,  but  a 
body  hast  thou  prepared  me.  Lol  I  come  to  do  thy  icill,  0  God. 
By  which  will  we  are  sanctified,  through  the  offering  of  the  body 
of  Jesus  Christ  once  for  all.'l  And  to  add  one  passage  more  of 
the  like  kind :  Christ  was  once  offered  to  bear  the  sins  of  many : 
and  unto  them  that  look  for  him  shcdl  he  appear  the  second  time, 
without  sin;  i.e.  without  bearing  sin,  as  he  did  at  his  first 
coming,  by  being  an  offering  for  it;  without  having  our  iniqui- 
ties again  laid  upon  hiyn,  without  being  any  more  a  sin-offering : 
— unto  them  that  look  for  him  shall  he  appear  the  second  time, 
without  sin,  unto  salvation.^  Nor  do  the  inspired  writers  at  all 
confine  themselves  to  this  manner  of  speaking  concerning  the 
satisfaction  of  Christ;  but  declare  an  efficacy  in  What  he  did  and 
suffered  for  us,  additional  to  and  beyond  mere  instruction,  ex- 
ample, and  government,  in  great  variety  of  expression :  That 
Jesus  should  die  for  that  nation,  the  Jews:  aiid  not  for  that 
nation  only,  but  that  also,  plainly  by  the  efficacy  of  his  death, 

*  HeL.  X.  1.  t  Heb.  viii.  4,  5. 

X  Ileb.  X.  4,  5,  7,  9,  10.  g  Heb.  ix.  28. 


240  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  part  n. 

he  should  gather  together  in  one  the  children  of  God  that  were 
scattered  abroad  ;*  tliat  he  suffered  for  sins,  the  just  for  the  un- 
just :'f  that  he  gave  his  life,  himself,  a  ransom  ;|  that  ice  are 
bought,  bought  with  a  price  :§  that  he  redeemed  us  icith  his 
blood:  redeemed  us  from  the  curse  of  the  law,  being  made  a 
curse  for  us  :\\  that  he  is  our  advocate,  intercessor,  and  prop  it  ia- 
tion  ;^  that  he  was  made  perfect,  or  consummate,  through  suffer- 
ings  ;  and  being  thus  made  perfect,  he  became  the  author  of  sal- 
vation ;**  that  God  was  in  Christ  reconciling  the  world  to  him- 
self; by  the  death  of  his  Son,  by  the  cross ;  not  imputing  their 
■trespasses  unto  them  :'\'\  and  lastly,  that  through  death  he  destroyed 
him  that  had  the  power  of  death.\^  Christ  having  thus  humbled 
himself,  and  become  obedient  to  death,  even  the  death  of  the  cross; 
God  also  hath  highly  exalted  him,  and  given  him  a  name,  which 
is  above  every  name  :  hath  given  all  things  into  his  hands  :  hath 
committed  all  judgment  unto  him  ;  that  all  men  should  honor  the 
Son^  even  as  they  honor  the  leather. ^^  For,  worthy  is  the  Lamb 
that  was  slain,  to  receive  power,  and  riches,  a7id  wisdom,  and 
strength,  and  honor,  and  glory,  and  blessing.  And  every  crea- 
ture which  is  in  heaven,  and  on  the  earth,  heard  I,  saying.  Bless- 
ing, and  honor,  and  glory,  and  power,  be  unto  him  that  sitteth 
iip)07i  the  throne,  and  unto  the  Lamb  forever  and  ever.\\\\ 

These  passages  of  Scripture  seem  to  comprehend  and  express 
the  chief  parts  of  Christ's  office,  as  Mediator  between  God  and 
man,  so  far,  I  mean,  as  the  nature  of  this  his  office  is  revealed; 
and  it  is  usually  treated  of  by  divines  under  three  heads. 

First,  He  was,  by  way  of  eminence,  the  Prophet:  that  Pro- 
phet that  should  come  into  the  icorld,\^  to  declare  the  divine 
will.  He  published  anew  the  law  of  nature,  which  men  had 
corrupted;  and  the  very  knowledge  of  which,  to  some  degree, 
was  lost  among  them.  He  taught  mankind,  taught  us  authorita- 
tively, to  live  soberly,  righteously,  and  godly  in  this  j^ resent  world, 
in  expectation  of  the  future  judgment  of  God.     He  confirmed 

*  John  xi.  51,  52.  f  1  Pet.  iii.  18. 

I  Matt.  XX.  28 :  Mark  x.  45 :  1  Tim.  ii.  6. 

^  2  Pet.  ii.  1 :  Rev.  xiv.  4:  1  Cor.  vi.  20. 

I)  1  Pet.  i.  19 :  Rev.  v.  9 :  Gal.  iii.  13.  ^  Heb.  vii.  25 :  1  John  ii.  1,  2. 

«:=:•  Heb.  ii.  10.:  v.  9.  ff  2  Cor.  v.  19  :  Rom.  v.  10 :  Eph.  ii.  16. 

\X  Heb.  ii.  14.     See  also  a  remarkable  passage  in  the  book  of  Job,  xxxiii.  24. 

Ii  Phil.  ii.  8,  9  :  John  iii.  35,  and  v.  22,  23.     \\l  Rev.  v.  12,  13.     1|  f  John  vi.  14. 


CHAP.  V.  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  241 

the  trutli  of  this  moral  system  of  nature,  and  gave  us  additional 
evidence  of  it;  the  evidence  of  testimony.*  He  distinctly- 
revealed  the  manner,  in  which  God  would  be  worshipped,  the 
efficacy  of  repentance,  and  the  rewards  and  punishments  of  a 
future  life.  Thus  he  was  a  prophet  in  a  sense  in  which  no  other 
ever  was.  To  which  is  to  be  added,  that  he  set  us  a  perfect  ex- 
ample,  that  ice  slio id d  folio ic  his  steps. 

Secondly,  He  has  a  hingdom  which  is  not  of  this  luorld.  He 
founded  a  Church,  to  be  to  mankind  a  standing  memorial  of 
religion,  and  invitation  to  it;  which  he  promised  to  be  with 
always  even  to  the  end.  He  exercises  an  invisible  government 
over  it,  himself,  and  by  his  Spirit :  over  that  part  of  it  which  is 
militant  here  on  earth,  a  government  of  discipline,  for  the  per- 
fecting of  the  saints,  for  the  edifying  his  hody :  till  we  all  come 
in  the  unify  of  the  faith,  and  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Son  of 
God,  unto  a  perfect  man,  unto  the  measure  of  the  stature  of  the 
fulness  of  Christ.'\  Of  this  Church,  all  persons  scattered  over 
the  world,  who  live  in  obedience  to  his  laws,  are  members.  For 
these  he  is  gone  to  prepare  a  place,  and  will  come  again  to  re- 
ceive them,  unto  himself  that  where  he  is,  there  tliey  may  he  also; 
and  reign  with  him  forever  and  ever  :^  and  likewise  to  take 
vengeance  on  them  that  hnoio  7iot  God,  and  obey  not  his 
Gospel.  § 

Against  these  parts  of  Christ's  office  I  find  no  objections,  but 
what  are  fully  obviated  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter. 

Lastly,  Christ  offered  himself  a  propitiatory  sacrifice,  and 
made  atonement  for  the  sins  of  the  world;  which  is  mentioned 
last,  in  regard  to  what  is  objected  against  it.  Sacrifices  of  expia- 
tion were  commanded  the  Jews,  and  obtained  among  most  other 
nations,  from  tradition,  whose  original  probably  was  revelation. 
And  they  were  continually  repeated,  both  occasionally,  and  at  the 
returns  of  stated  times :  and  made  up  great  part  of  the  external 
religion  of  mankind.  But  7iow  once  in  the  end  of  the  world 
Christ  ap)peared  to  put  away  sin  by  the  sacrifice  of  himself. \\ 
This  sacrifice  was,  in  the  highest  degree  and  with  the  most  ex- 
tensive influence,  of  that  efficacy  for  obtaining  pardon  of  sin, 
which  the  heathens  may  be  supposed  to  have  thought  their  sacri 

♦  P.  188,  &c.     t  Eph.  iv.  12,  13.     %  John  xiv.  2,  3 :  Rev.  iii.  21,  and  xi.  15 
I  2  Thess.  i.  S.  \\  Ileb.  is.  26. 

Q  21 


242  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  part  it. 

fices  to  have  been^  and  which  the  Jewish  sacrifices  really  were 
in  some  degree,  and  with  regard  to  some  persons.* 

IIow  and  in  what  particular  icay  it  had  this  efficacy,  there  are 
not  wanting  persons  who  have  endeavored  to  explain :  but  I  do 
not  find  that  the  Scripture  has  explained  it.  We  seem  to  be 
very  much  in  the  dark  concerning  the  manner  in  which  the 
ancients  understood  atonement  to  be  made,  i.e.  pardon  to  be 
obtained  by  sacrifices.  And  if  the  Scripture  has,  as  surely  it 
has,  left  this  matter  of  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  mysterious,  left 
somewhat  in  it  unrevealed,  all  conjectures  about  it  must  be,  if 
not  evidently  absurd,  yet  at  least  uncertain.  Nor  has  any  one 
reason  to  complain  for  want  of  further  information,  unless  he  can 
show  his  claim  to  it. 

Some  have  endeavored  to  explain  the  efficacy  of  what  Christ 
has  done  and  sufi'ered  for  us,  beyond  what  the  Scripture  has 
authorized :  others,  probably  because  they  could  not  explain  it, 
have  been  for  taking  it  away,  and  confining  his  office  as  Re- 
deemer of  the  world,  to  his  instruction,  example,  and  government 
of  the  church.  Whereas  the  doctrine  of  the  Gospel  appears  to 
be,  not  only  that  he  taught  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  but  ren- 
dered it  of  the  efficacy  of  which  it  is,  by  what  he  did  and 
sufi'ered  for  us :  that  he  obtained  for  us  the  benefit  of  having  our 
repentance  accepted  unto  eternal  life :  not  only  that  he  revealed 
to  sinners,  that  they  were  in  a  capacity  of  salvation,  and  how 
they  might  obtain  it;  but  moreover  that  he  put  them  into  this 
capacity  of  salvation,  by  what  he  did  and  sufi'ered  for  them;  put 
us  into  a  capacity  of  escaping  future  punishment,  and  obtaining 
future  happiness.  And  it  is  our  wisdom  thankfully  to  accept 
the  benefit,  by  performing  the  conditions,  upon  which  it  is 
ofi'ered,  on  our  part,  without  disputing  how  it  was  procured  on 
his.     For, 

VII.  Since  we  neither  know  by  what  means  punishment  in  a 
future  state  would  have  followed  wickedness  in  this :  nor  in  what 
manner  it  would  have  been  inflicted,  had  it  not  been  prevented; 
nor  all  the  reasons  why  its  infliction  would  have  been  needful, 
nor  the  particular  nature  of  that  state  of  happiness,  which  Christ 
is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  disciples :  and  since  we  are  ignorant 

'■[Consult  Magee,  on  Atonement;  Stapferi  Institutioiies :  Turretin,  I>e 
Satisfactione :  Chalmers,  Discourses :  Owen,  Satis,  uf  Cliiist,.] 


CHAP.  V.  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  213 

how  far  any  thing  which  we  could  do,  would,  alone  and  of  itself, 
have  been  effectual  to  prevent  that  punishment  to  which  we  were 
obnoxious,  and  recover  that  happiness  which  we  had  forfeited; 
it  is  most  evident  we  are  not  judges,  antecedently  to  revelation, 
whether  a  mediator  was  or  was  not  necessary,  to  obtain  those 
ends:  to  prevent  that  future  punishment,  and  bring  mankind  to 
the  final  happiness  of  their  nature.  For  the  very  same  reasons, 
upon  supposition  of  the  necessity  of  a  mediator,  we  are  no  more 
judges,  antecedently  to  revelation,  of  the  whole  nature  of  his 
office,  or  of  the  several  parts  of  which  it  consists ;  or  of  what  was 
fit  and  requisite  to  be  assigned  him,  in  order  to  accomplish  the 
ends  of  divine  Providence  in  the  appointment.  Hence  it  follows, 
that  to  object  against  the  expediency  or  usefulness  of  particular 
things,  revealed  to  have  been  done  or  suffered  by  him,  because 
we  do  not  see  how  they  were  conducive  to  those  ends,  is  highly 
absurd.  Yet  nothing  is  more  common  to  be  met  with,  than  this 
absurdity.  If  it  be  acknowledged  beforehand,  that  we  are  not 
judges  in  the  case,  it  is  evident  that  no  objection  can,  with  any 
shadow  of  reason,  be  urged  against  any  particular  part  of  Christ's 
mediatorial  office  revealed  in  Scripture,  till  it  can  be  shown  posi- 
tively not  to  be  requisite  or  conducive  to  the  ends  proposed  to  be 
accomplished;  or  that  it  is  in  itself  unreasonable. 

There  is  one  objection  made  against  the  satisfaction  of  Christ, 
which  looks  to  be  of  this  positive  kind :  that  the  doctrine  of  his 
being  appointed  to  suffer  for  the  sins  of  the  world,  represents 
God  as  being  indifferent  whether  he  punished  the  innocent  or 
the  guilty.  Now  from  the  foregoing  observations  we  may  see 
the  extreme  slightness  of  all  such  objections;  and  (though  it  is 
most  certain  all  who  make  them  do  not  see  the  consequence)  that 
they  conclude  altogether  as  much  against  Grod's  whole  original 
constitution  of  nature,  and  the  whole  daily  course  of  divine  Provi- 
dence in  the  government  of  the  world,  (i.e.  against  the  whole 
scheme  of  Theism  and  the  whole  notion  of  religion,)  as  against 
Christianity.  For  the  world  is  a  constitution  or  system,  whose 
parts  have  a  mutual  reference  to  each  other:  and  there  is  a 
scheme  of  things  gradually  carrying  on,  called  the  course  of  na- 
ture, to  the  carrying  on  of  which  God  has  appointed  us,  in  various 
ways,  to  contribute.  And  when,  in  the  daily  course  of  natural 
providence;  it  is  appointed  that  innocent  people  should  suffer  for 


241  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  part  il 

the  faults  of  tlie  guilty,  this  is  liable  to  tlie  very  same  objection, 
as  the  instance  we  are  now  considering.  The  infinitely  greatei 
importance  of  that  appointment  of  Christianity,  which  is  objected 
against,  does  not  hinder  but  it  may  be,  as  it  plainly  is,  an  ap- 
pointment of  the  very  same  kind,  with  what  the  world  affords  us 
daily  examples  of.  Nay,  if  there  were  any  force  at  all  in  the  ob- 
jection, it  would  be  stronger,  in  one  respect,  against  natural 
providence,  than  against  Christianity :  because  under  the  former 
we  are  in  many  cases  commanded,  and  even  necessitated  whether 
we  will  or  no,  to  suffer  for  the  faults  of  others;  whereas  the  suffer- 
ings of  Christ  were  voluntary. 

The  world's  being  under  the  righteous  government  of  God 
does  indeed  imply,  that  finally,  and  upon  the  whole,  every  one 
shall  receive  according  to  his  personal  deserts :  and  the  general 
doctrine  of  the  whole  Scripture  is,  that  this  shall  be  the  comple- 
tion of  the  divine  government.  But  during  the  progress,  and, 
for  aught  we  know,  even  in  order  to  the  completion  of  this  moral 
scheme,  vicarious  punishments  may  be  fit,  and  absolutely  neces- 
sary. Men  by  their  follies  run  themselves  into  extreme  distress; 
into  difficulties  which  would  be  absolutely  fatal  to  them,  were  it 
not  for  the  interposition  and  assistance  of  others.  God  commands 
by  the  law  of  nature,  that  we  afford  them  this  assistance,  in  manjr 
cases  where  we  cannot  do  it  without  very  great  pains,  and  labor, 
and  sufferings  to  ourselves.  We  see  in  what  variety  of  ways  one 
person's  sufferings  contribute  to  the  relief  of  another:  and  how, 
or  by  what  particular  means,  this  comes  to  pass,  or  follows,  from 
the  constitution  and  laws  of  nature,  which  came  under  our  notice : 
and,  being  familiarized  to  it,  men  are  not  shocked  with  it.  So 
that  the  reason  of  their  insisting  upon  objections  of  the  foregoing 
kind  against  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  is,  either  that  they  do  not 
consider  God's  settled  and  uniform  appointments  as  his  appoint- 
ments at  all;  or  else  they  forget  that  vicarious  punishment  is  a 
providential  appointment  of  every  day's  experience.  And  then, 
from  their  being  unacquainted  with  the  more  general  laws  of 
nature  or  divine  government  over  the  world,  and  not  seeing  how 
the  sufferings  of  Christ  could  contribute  to  the  redemption  of  it, 
unless  by  arbitrary  and  tyrannical  will,  they  conclude  his  suffer- 
ings could  not  contribute  to  it  any  other  way.  And  yet,  what 
has  been  often  alleged  in  justification  of  this  doctrine,  even  fivui 


CHAv.  V.  A  MEDIATOR  AND  REDEEMER.  245 

the  apparent  natural  tendency  of  this  method  of  our  redemption; 
its  tendency  to  vindicate  the  authority  of  God's  laws^  and  deter 
his  creatures  from  sin;  this  has  never  yet  been  answered,  and  is 
I  think  plainly  unanswerable :  though  I  am  far  from  thinking  it 
an  account  of  the  whole  of  the  case.  But,  without  taking  this 
into  consideration,  it  abundantly  appears,  from  the  observations 
above  made,  that  this  objection  is  not  an  objection  against  Chris- 
tianity, but  against  the  whole  general  constitution  of  nature. 
And  if  it  were  to  be  considered  as  an  objection  against  Chris- 
tianity, or  considering  it  as  it  is,  an  objection  against  the  consti- 
tution of  nature;  it  amounts  to  no  more  in  conclusion  than  this, 
that  a  divine  appointment  cannot  be  necessary  or  expedient,  be- 
cause the  objector  does  not  discern  it  to  be  so:  though  he  must 
own  that  the  nature  of  the  case  is  such,  as  renders  him  incapable 
of  judging,  whether  it  be  so  or  not;  or  of  seeing  it  to  be  neces- 
sary, though  it  were  so ! 

It  is  indeed  a  matter  of  great  patience  to  reasonable  men,  to 
find  people  arguing  in  this  manner:  objecting  against  the  credi- 
bility of  such  particular  things  revealed  in  Scripture,  that  they 
do  not  see  the  necessity  or  expediency  of  them.  For  though  it 
is  highly  right,  and  the  most  pious  exercise  of  our  understanding, 
to  inquire  with  due  reverence  into  the  ends  and  reasons  of  God's 
dispensations :  yet  when  those  reasons  are  concealed,  to  argue  from 
our  ignorance,  that  such  dispensations  cannot  be  from  God,  is  in- 
finitely absurd.  The  presumption  of  this  kind  of  objections 
seems  almost  lost  in  the  folly  of  them.  And  the  folly  of  them 
is  yet  greater,  when  they  are  urged,  as  usually  they  are,  against 
things  in  Christianity  analogous  or  like  to  those  natural  dispensa- 
tions of  Providence,  which  are  matter  of  experience.  Let  reason 
be  kept  to :  and  if  any  part  of  the  Scripture  account  of  the  re- 
demption of  the  world  by  Christ  can  be  shown  to  be  really  con- 
trary to  it,  let  the  Scripture,  in  the  name  of  God,  be  given  up. 
But  let  not  such  poor  creatures  as  we  are,  go  on  objecting  against 
an  infinite  scheme,  that  we  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  usefulness 
of  all  its  parts,  and  call  this  reasoning;  and,  which  still  further 
heightens  the  absurdity  in  the  present  case,  parts  which  we  are 
not  actively  concerned  in.     For  it  may  be  worth  mentioning, 

Lastli/,  That  not  only  the  reason  of  the  thing,  but  the  whole 
analogy  of  nature,  should  teach  us,  not  to  expect  to  have  the  like 


246  THE  APPOINTMENT,  ETC.  part  ii. 

information  concerning  the  divine  conduct,  as  concerning  our 
own  duty.  God  instructs  us  by  experience,  (for  it  is  not  reason, 
but  experience  which  instructs  us,)  what  good  or  bad  conse- 
quences will  follow  from  our  acting  in  such  and  such  manners : 
and  by  this  he  directs  us  how  we  are  to  behave  ourselves.  But, 
though  we  are  sufficiently  instructed  for  the  common  purposes  of 
life :  yet  it  is  but  an  almost  infinitely  small  part  of  natural  provi- 
dence, which  we  are  at  all  let  into.  The  case  is  the  same  with 
regard  to  revelation.  The  doctrine  of  a  mediator  between  God 
and  man,  against  which  it  is  objected,  that  the  expediency  of 
some  things  in  it  is  not  understood,  relates  only  to  what  was  done 
on  God's  part  in  the  appointment,  and  on  the  Mediator's  in  the 
execution  of  it.  For  what  is  required  of  us,  in  consequence  of 
this  gracious  dispensation,  is  another  subject,  in  which  none  can 
complain  for  want  of  information.  The  constitution  of  the  world, 
and  God's  natural  government  over  it,  is  all  mystery,  as  much  as 
the  Christian  dispensation.  Yet  under  the  first  he  has  given 
men  all  things  pertaining  to  life;  and  under  the  other  all  things 
pertaining  unto  godliness.  And  it  may  be  added,  that  there  is 
nothing  hard  to  be  accounted  for  in  any  of  the  common  precepts 
of  Christianity :  though  if  there  were,  surely  a  divine  command 
is  abundantly  sufficient  to  lay  us  under  the  strongest  obligations 
to  obedience.  But  the  fact  is,  that  the  reasons  of  all  the  Chris- 
tian precepts  are  evident.  Positive  institutions  are  manifestly 
necessary  to  keep  up  and  propagate  religion  among  mankind. 
And  our  duty  to  Christ,  the  internal  and  external  worship  of 
him;  this  part  of  the  religion  of  the  Gospel  manifestly  arises 
out  of  what  he  has  done  and  suffered,  his  authority  and 
dominion,  and  the  relation  which  he  is  revealed  to  stand  ia 
to  us.* 

*  P.  194,  &c. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE    WANT    OF    UNIVERSALITY   IN    REVELATION;    AND   TEC 
SUPPOSED    DEFICIENCY    IN    THE    PROOF    OF   IT 

It  has  been  thouglit  by  some  persons,  that  if  the  evidence  of 
revelation  appears  doubtful,  this  itself  turns  into  a  positive  argu- 
ment against  it :  because  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that,  if  it  were 
true,  it  would  be  left  to  subsist  upon  doubtful  evidence.  And 
the  objection  against  revelation  from  its  not  being  universal  is 
often  insisted  upon  as  of  great  weight. 

The  weakness  of  these  opinions  may  be  shown,  by  observing 
the  suppositions  on  which  they  are  founded :  which  are  really 
such  as  these ;  that  it  cannot  be  thought  Grod  would  have  be- 
stowed any  favor  at  all  upon  us,  unless  in  the  degree  which  we 
think  he  might,  arid  which,  we  imagine,  would  be  most  to  our 
particular  advantage;  and  also  that  it  cannot  be  thought  he 
would  bestow  a  favor  upon  any,  unless  he  bestowed  the  same 
upon  all ;  suppositions,  which  we  find  contradicted,  not  by  a  few 
instances  in  God's  natural  government  of  the  world,  but  by  the 
general  analogy  of  nature  together. 

Persons  who  speak  of  the  evidence  of  religion  as  doubtful, 
and  of  this  supposed  doubtfulness  as  a  positive  argument  against 
it,  should  be  put  upon  considering,  what  that  evidence  is,  which 
they  act  upon  with  regard  to  their  temporal  interests.  It  is  not 
only  extremely  difficult,  but  in  many  cases  absolutely  impossible, 
to  balance  pleasure  and  pain,  satisfaction  and  uneasiness,  so  as  to 
be  able  to  say  on  which  side  is  the  overplus.  There  are  the  like 
difficulties  and  impossibilities  in  making  the  due  allowances  for  a 
change  of  temper  and  taste,  for  satiety,  disgusts,  ill  health  :  any 
of  which  render  men  incapable  of  enjoying,  after  they  have  ob- 
tained what  they  most  eagerly  desired.  Numberless  too  are  the 
accidents,  besides  that  one  of  untimely  death,  which  may  even 
probably  disappoint  the  best-concerted  schemes :  and  strong 
objections  are  often  seen  to  lie  against  them,  not  to  be  removed 
or  answered,  but  which  seem  overbalanced  by  reasons  on  the 
other  side;  so  as  that  the  certain  difficulties  and  dangers  of  the 
pursuit    are,    by  every  one,   thought  justly   disregarded^   upon 

247 


248  BEYELATION"  NOT  UNIVERSAL  :  part  a 

account  of  llie  appearing  greater  advantages  in  case  of  success, 
though  there  be  but  little  probability  of  it.  Lastly,  every  one 
observes  our  liableness,  if  we  be  not  upon  our  guard,  to  be 
deceived  by  the  falsehood  of  men,  and  the  false  appearances  of 
things  :  and  this  danger  must  be  greatly  increased,  if  there  be  a 
strong  bias  within,  suppose  from  indulged  passion,  to  favor  the 
deceit.  Hence  arises  that  great  uncertainty  and  doubtfulness  of 
proof,  wherein  our  temporal  interest  really  consists;  what  are  the 
most  probable  means  of  attaining  it;  and  whether  those  means 
will  eventually  be  succes^iful.  And  numberless  instances  there 
are,  in  the  daily  course  of  life,  in  which  all  men  think  it  reason- 
able to  engage  in  pursuits,  though  the  probability  is  greatly 
against  succeeding ;  and  to  make  such  provision  for  themselves, 
as  it  is  supposable  they  may  have  occasion  for,  though  the  plain 
acknowledged  probability  is,  that  they  never  shall. 

Those  who  think  the  objection  against  revelation,  from  its  light 
not  being  universal,  to  be  of  weight,^  should  observe,  that  the 
Author  of  nature,  in  numberless  instances,  bestows  that  upon 
some,  which  he  does  not  upon  others,  who  seem  equally  to  stand 
in  need  of  it.  Indeed  he  appears  to  bestow  all  his  gifts  with  the 
most  promiscuous  variety  among  creatures  of  the  same  species  : 
health  and  strength,  capacities  of  prudence  and  of  knowledge, 
means  of  improvement,  riches,  and  all  external  advantages.  As 
there  are  not  any  two  men  found,  of  exactly  like  shape  and 
features ;  so  it  is  probable  there  are  not  any  two,  of  an  exactly 
like  constitution,  temper,  and  situation,  with  regard  to  the  goods 
and  evils  of  life.  Yet,  notwithstanding  these  uncertainties  and 
varieties,  God  does  exercise  a  natural  government  oter  the  world; 
and  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  prudent  and  imprudent  institution 
of  life,  with  regai-d  to  our  health  and  our  affairs,  under  that  his 
natural  government. 

As  neither  the  Jewish  nor  Christian  revelation  have  been  uni- 
versal ;  and  as  they  have  been  afforded  to  a  greater  or  less  part 

a  [This  objection  is  ably  urged  by  Tixdall.  The  answer  of  our  author  is 
complete.  We  should  remember,  that  twice  in  the  history  of  mankind,  revela- 
tion has  been  universal.  The  first  pair,  and  the  occupants  of  the  ark,  ocm- 
prised  the  whole  population.  But  how  soon  was  light  rejected!  Christianity 
is  universal,  in  nature  and  intention';  is  to  become  so  in  fact;  and  accoraing 
to  a  very  probable  construction  of  prophecy,  will  continue  to  be  universal,  for 
three  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  years.] 


CHAP.  VI.  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  24& 

of  the  world,  at  clifFereut  times;  so  likewise  at  different  times, 
both  revelations  have  had  different  degrees  of  evidence.  The 
Jews  who  lived  during  the  succession  of  prophets,  that  is,  froxu 
Moses  till  after  the  Captivity,  had  higher  evidence  of  the  truth 
of  their  religion,  than  those  had,  who  lived  in  the  interval  be- 
tween the  last-mentioned  period,  and  the  coming  of  Christ.  And 
the  first  Christians  had  higher  evidence  of  the  miracles  wrought 
in  attestation  of  Christianity,  than  what  we  have  now.  They 
had  also  a  strong  presumptive  proof  of  the  truth  of  it,  perhaps 
of  much  greater  force,  in  way  of  argument,  than  many  think,  of 
which  we  have  very  little  remaining;  I  mean  the  presumptive 
proof  of  its  truth,  from  the  influence  which  it  had  upon  the  lives 
of  the  generality  of  its  professors.  And  we,  or  future  ages,  may 
possibly  have  a  proof  of  it,  which  they  could  not  have,  from  the 
conformity  between  the  prophetic  history,  and  the  state  of  the 
world**  and  of  Christianity. 

And  further :  if  we  were  to  suppose  the  evidence,  which  some 
have  of  religion,  to  amount  to  little  more  than  seeing  that  it  tnay 
be  true ;  but  that  they  remain  in  great  doubts  and  uncertainties 
about  both  its  evidence  and  its  nature,  and  great  perplexities  con- 
cerning the  rule  of  life  :  others  to  have  a  full  conviction  of  the 
truth  of  religion,  with  a  distinct  knowledge  of  their  duty;  and 
others  severally  to  have  all  the  intermediate  degrees  of  religious 
light  and  evidence,  which  lie  between  these  two — if  we  put  the 
case,  that  for  the  present,  it  was  intended  that  revelation  should  be 
no  more  than  a  small  light,  in  the  midst  of  a  world  greatly  over- 
spread, notwithstanding  it,  with  ignorance  and  darkness:  that 
certain  glimmerings  of  this  light  should  extend,  and  be  directed, 
to  remote  distances,  in  such  a  manner  as  that  those  who  really 
partook  of  it  should  not  discern  whence  it  originally  came  :  that 
some  in  a  nearer  situation  to  it  should  have  its  light  obscured, 
and,  in  different  ways  and  degrees,  intercepted :  and  that  others 
should  be  placed  within  its  clearer  influence,  and  be  much  more 
enlivened,  cheered,  and  directed  by  it;  but  yet  that  even  to  these 

^  [May  not  this  be  a  principal  object  of  the  Apocalypse  ?  As  the  book  of 
Daniel  furnished  a  constant  and  powerful  support  to  the  faith  of  the  Jew,  by 
the  constant  development  of  prophecy,  so  the  Apocalypse,  rightly  studied  must 
powerfully,  and  through  all  time,  support  the  faith  of  the  Christian  by  the 
continual  unfolding  and  verification  of  its  predictions.] 


250  REVELATION  KOT  UNIVERSAL:  part  ii. 

it  sbould  be  no  more  than  a  light  sliining  in  a  darh  place:  all 
this  would  be  perfectly  uniform,  and  of  a  piece  with  the  conduct 
of  Providence,  in  the  distribution  of  its  other  blessings.  If  the 
fact  of  the  case  really  were,  that  some  have  received  no  light  at 
all  from  the  Scripture  ;  as  many  ages  and  countries  in  the  heathen 
world  :  that  others,  though  they  have,  by  means  of  it,  had  essen- 
tial or  natural  religion  enforced  upon  their  consciences,  yet  have 
never  had  the  genuine  Scripture  revelation,  with  its  real  evidence, 
proposed  to  their  consideration;  and  the  ancient  Persians  and 
modern  Mahometans  may  possibly  be  instances  of  people  in  a 
situation  somewhat  like  to  this;  that  others,  though  they  have 
had  the  Scripture  laid  before  them  as  of  divine  revelation,  yet 
have  had  it  with  the  system  and  evidence  of  Christianity  so  in- 
terpolated, the  system  so  corrupted,  the  evidence  so  blended  with 
false  miracles,  as  to  leave  the  mind  in  the  utmost  doubtfulness 
and  uncertainty  about  the  whole ;  which  may  be  the  state  of 
some  thoughtful  men,  in  most  of  those  nations  who  call  them- 
selves Christian  :  and  lastly,  that  others  have  had  Christianity 
offered  to  them  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  and  with  its  proper 
evidence,  as  persons  in  countries  and  churches  of  civil  and  of 
Christian  liberty;  but  that  even  these  persons  are  left  in  great 
ignorance  in  many  respects,  and  have  by  no  means  light  afforded 
them  enough  to  satisfy  their  curiosity,  but  only  to  regulate  their 
life,  to  teach  them  their  duty,  and  encourage  them  in  the  careful 
discharge  of  it.  I  say,  if  we  were  to  suppose  this  somewhat  of 
a  general  true  account  of  the  degrees  of  moral  and  religious  light 
and  evidence,  which  were  intended  to  be  afforded  mankind,  and 
of  what  has  actually  been  and  is  their  situation,  in  their  moral 
and  religious  capacity;  there  would  be  nothing  in  all  this  igno- 
rance, doubtfulness,  and  uncertainty,  in  all  these  varieties,  and 
supposed  disadvantages  of  some  in  comparison  of  others,  respect- 
ing religion,  but  may  be  paralleled  by  manifest  analogies  in  the 
natural  dispensations  of  Providence  at  present,  considering  our- 
selves merely  in  our  temporal  capacity. 

Nor  is  there  any  thing  shocking  in  all  this,  or  which  would 
seem  to  bear  hard  upon  the  moral  administration  in  nature,  if  we 
would  really  keep  in  mind,  that  every  one  shall  be  dealt  equitably 
with :  instead  of  forgetting  this,  or  explaining  it  away,  after  it  ie 
acknowledged  in  words.     All  shadow  of  injustice,  and  indeed  all 


CHAP.  VI.  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  251 

harsh  appearaDces,  in  tliis  various  economy  of  Providence,  would 
be  lost,  if  we  would  keep  in  mind,  that  every  merciful  allowance 
shall  be  made,  and  no  more  be  required  of  any  one,  than  what 
might  have  been  equitably  expected  of  him,  from  thp  circum- 
stances in  which  he  was  placed;  and  not  what  might  have  been 
expected,  had  he  been  placed  in  other  circumstances:  i.e.  in 
Scripture  language,  that  every  man  shall  be  accepted  according 
to  what  he  had,  not  according  to  wliat  he  had  not*  This  how- 
ever does  not  by  any  means  imply,  that  all  persons'  condition 
here  is  equally  advantageous  with  respect  to  futurity.  And 
Providence's  designing  to  place  some  in  greater  darkness  with 
respect  to  religious  knowledge,  is  no  more  a  reason  why  they 
should  not  endeavor  to  get  out  of  that  darkness,  and  others  to 
bring  them  out  of  it,  than  why  ignorant  and  slow  people  in 
matters  of  other  knowledge  should  not  endeavor  to  learn,  or 
should  not  be  instructed. 

It  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose,  that  the  same  wise  and  good 
principle,  whatever  it  was,  which  disposed  the  Author  of  nature 
to  make  different  kinds  and  orders  of  creatures,  disposed  him  also 
to  place  creatures  of  like  kinds  in  different  situations.  And  that 
the  same  principle  which  disposed  him  to  make  creatures  of 
different  moral  capacities,  disposed  him  also  to  place  creatures  of 
like  moral  capacities  in  different  religious  situations;  and  even 
the  same  creatures,  in  different  periods  of  their  being.  The  ac- 
count or  reason  of  this  is  also  most  probably  the  account  why  the 
constitution  of  things  is  such,  as  that  creatures  of  moral  natures 
or  capacities,  for  a  considerable  part  of  that  duration  in  which 
they  are  living  agents,  are  not  at  all  subjects  of  morality  and  reli- 
gion ;  but  grow  up  to  be  so,  and  grow  up  to  be  so  more  and  more, 
gradually  from  childhood  to  mature  age. 

What,  in  particular,  is  the  account  or  reason  of  these  things, 
we  must  be  greatly  in  the  dark,  were  it  only  that  we  know  so 
very  little  even  of  our  own  case.  Our  present  state  may  possibly 
be  the  consequence  of  something  past,  of  which  we  are  wholly 
ignorant :  as  it  has  a  reference  to  somewhat  to  come,  of  which 
we  know  scarce  any  more  than  is  necessary  for  practice.  A 
system  or  constitution,  in  its  notion,  implies  variety;  and  so 
implicated  a  one  as  this  world,  very  great  variety.  So  that 
*  2  Cor.  viii.  12. 


252  KEVELATIOX  XOT  UNIVERSAL:  part  ii. 

were  revelation  universal,  yet,  from  men's  different  capacities  of 
"understanding,  from  the  different  lengths  of  their  lives,  their 
different  educations  and  other  external  circumstances,  and  from 
their  difference  of  temper  and  bodily  constitution,  their  religious 
situations  would  be  widely  different,  and  the  disadvantage  of  some 
in  comparison  of  others,-perhaps,  altogether  as  much  as  at  present. 
The  true  account,  whatever  it  be,  why  mankind,  or  such  a  part 
of  mankind,  are  ^^laced  in  this  condition  of  ignorance,  must  be 
supposed  also  the  true  account  of  our  further  ignorance,  in  not 
knowing  the  reasons  why,  or  whence  it  is,  that  they  are  placed 
in  this  condition. 

The  following  practical  reflections  may  deserve  the  serious  con- 
sideration of  those  persons,  who  think  the  circumstances  of  man- 
kind or  their  own,  in  the  forementioned  respects,  a  ground  of 
complaint. 

First,  The  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  obvious,  may 
constitute  one  particular  part  of  some  men's  trial  in  the  religious 
sense :  as  it  gives  scope,  for  a  virtuous  exercise,  or  vicious  neglect 
of  their  understanding,  in  examining  or  not  examining  into  that 
evidence.  There  seems  no  possible  reason  to  be  given,  why  we 
may  not  be  in  a  state  of  moral  probation,  with  regard  to  the  exer- 
cise of  our  understanding  upon  the  subject  of  religion,  as  we  are 
with  regard  to  our  behavior  in  common  affairs.  The  former  is  as 
much  a  thing  within  our  power  and  choice  as  the  latter.  And  I 
s'uppose  it  is  to  be  laid  down  for  certain,  that  the  same  character, 
the  same  inward  principle,  which,  after  a  man  is  convinced  of 
the  truth  of  religion,  renders  him  obedient  to  the  precepts  of  it, 
would,  were  he  not  thus  convinced,  set  him  about  an  examination 
of  it,  upon  its  system  and  evidence  being  offered  to  his  thoughts : 
and  that  in  the  latter  state  his  examination  would  be  with  an 
impartiality,  seriousness,  and  solicitude,  proportionable  to  what 
his  obedience  is  in  the  former.  And  as  inattention,  negligence, 
want  of  all  serious  concern,  about  a  matter  of  such  a  nature  and 
such  importance,  when  offered  to  men's  consideration,  is,  before 
a  distinct  conviction  of  its  truth,  as  real  depravity  and  dissolute- 
ness, as  neglect  of  religious  practice  after  such  conviction:  so 
active  solicitude  about  it,  and  fair  impartial  consideration  of  its 
evidence  before  such  conviction,  is  as  really  an  exercise  of  a 
morally  right  temper;  as  is  religious  practice  after.     Thus,  thai 


^HAP.  VI.  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF,  253 

religion  is  nc^  intuitively  true,  but  a  matter  of  deducti  m  and 
inference;  that  a  conviction  of  its  truth  is  not  forced  upon  every 
one,  but  left  to  be,  by  some,  collected  with  heedful  attention  to 
premises;  this  as  much  constitutes  religious  probation,  as  much 
affords  sphere,  scope,  opportunity,  for  right  and  wrong  behavior, 
as  any  thing  whatever  does.  And  their  manner  of  treating  this 
subject,  when  laid  before  them,  shows  what  is  in  their  heart,  and 
is  an  exertion  of  it. 

Secondly,  It  appears  to  be  a  thing  as  evident,  though  it  is  not 
so  much  attended  to,  that  if,  upon  consideration  of  religion,  the 
evidence  of  it  should  seem  to  any  persons  doubtful,  in  the  highest 
supposable  degree;  even  this  doubtful  evidence  will,  however, 
put  them  into  a  general  state  of  lyrobatlon  in  the  moral  and  reli- 
gious sense.  For,  suppose  a  man  to  be  really  in  doubt,  whether 
such  a  person  had  not  done  him  the  greatest  favor;  or,  whether 
his  whole  temporal  interest  did  not  depend  upon  that  person;  no 
one,  who  had  any  sense  of  gratitude  and  of  prudence,  could 
possibly  consider  himself  in  the  same  situation,  with  regard  to 
such  person,  as  if  he  had  no  such  doubt.  In  truth,  it  is  as  just 
to  say,  that  certainty  and  doubt  are  the  same,  as  to  say  the  situa- 
tions now  mentioned  would  leave  a  man  as  entirely  at  liberty  in 
point  of  gratitude  or  prudence,  as  he  would  be,  were  he  certain 
he  had  received  no  favor  from  such  person;  or  that  he  no  way 
depended  upon  him.  Thus,  though  the  evidence  of  relioion 
which  is  afforded  to  some  men  should  be  little  more  than  they 
are  given  to  see,  the  system  of  Christianity,  or  religion  in  general, 
to  be  supposable  and  credible;  this  ought  in  all  reason  to  beo-et  a 
serious  practical  apprehension,  that  it  may  be  true.  And  even 
this  will  afford  matter  of  exercise  for  religious  suspense  and  de- 
liberation, for  moral  resolution  and  self-government;  because  the 
apprehension  that  religion  may  be  true  does  as  really  lay  men 
under  obligations,  as  a  full  conviction  that  it  is  true.  It  gives 
occasion  and  motives  to  consider  further  the  important  subject; 
to  preserve  attentively  upon  their  minds  a  general  implicit  sense 
that  they  may  be  under  divine  moral  government,  an  awful  solici- 
tude about  religion,  whether  natural  or  revealed.  Such  appre- 
hension ought  to  turn  men's  eyes  to  every  degree  of  new  light 
which  may  be  had,  from  whatever  side  it  comes;  and  induce 
♦,hem  to  refrain,  in  the  mean  time,  from  all  immoralities,  and  live 

22 


254  BEVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL:  paet  n. 

in  the  conscientious  practice  of  every  common  virtue.  Especially 
arc  they  bound  to  keep  at  the  greatest  distance  from  all  dissolute 
profaneness,  for  this  the  very  nature  of  the  case  forbids;  and  to 
treat  with  highest  reverence  a  matter,  upon  which  their  own 
whole  interest  and  being,  and  the  fate  of  nature,  depend.  This 
behavior,  and  an  active  endeavor  to  maintain  within  themselves 
this  temper,  is  the  business,  the  duty,  and  the  wisdom  of  those 
persons,  who  complain  of  the  doubtfulness  of  religion :  is  what 
they  are  under  the  most  proper  obligations  to.  And  such  beha- 
vior is  an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  tendency  to  improve  in  them, 
that  character,  which  the  practice  of  all  the  several  duties  of  reli- 
gion, from  a  full  conviction  of  its  truth,  is  an  exertion  of,  and 
has  a  tendency  to  improve  in  others:  others,  I  say,  to  whom  God 
has  afforded  such  conviction.  Nay,  considering  the  infinite  im- 
portance of  religion,  revealed  as  well  as  natural,  I  think  it  may 
be  said  in  general,  that  whoever  will  weigh  the  matter  thoroughly 
may  see,  there  is  not  near  so  much  difference,  as  is  commonly 
imagined,  between  what  ought  in  reason  to  be  the  rule  of  life,  to 
those  persons  who  are  fully  convinced  of  its  truth,  and  to  those 
who  have  only  a  serious  doubting  apprehension,  that  it  may  be 
true.  Their  hopes,  and  fears,  and  obligations,  will  be  in  various 
degrees:  but,  as  the  subject-matter  of  their  hopes  and  fears  is 
the  same,  so  the  subject-matter  of  their  obligations,  what  they 
are  bound  to  do  and  to  refrain  from,  is  not  so  very  unlike. 

It.  is  to  be  observed  further,  that,  from  a  character  of  under- 
standing, or  a  situation  of  influence  in  the  world,  some  persons 
have  it  in  their  power  to  do  infinitely  more  harm  or  good,  by 
setting  an  example  of  profaneness  and  avowed  disregard  to  all 
religion,  or,  on  the  contrary,  of  a  serious,  though  perhaps  doubt- 
ing, apprehension  of  its  truth,  and  of  a  reverent  regard  i-o  it 
under  this  doubtfulness;  than  they  can  do,  by  acting  well  or  ill 
in  all  the  common  intercourses  among  mankind.  Consequp^itly 
they  are  most  highly  accountable  for  a  behavior,  which,  they  may 
easily  foresee,  is  of  such  importance,  and  in  which  there  is  tnost 
plainly  a  right  and  a  wrong;  even  admitting  the  evidence  ot  reli- 
gion to  be  as  doubtful  as  is  pretended. 

The  ground  of  these  observations,  and  that  which  renders  them 
just  and  true,  is,  that  doubting  necessarily  implies  somt  decree 
of  evidence  for  that,  of  which  we  doubt.     For  no  person  would 


CHAP.  VI.  SUPPOSED  DEFICiEiNCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  255 

be  in  doubt  concerning  the  triitli  of  a  number  of  facts  so  and  so 
circumstanced,  which  should  accidentally  come  into  his  thoughts, 
and  of  which  he  had  no  evidence  at  all.  And  though  in  the 
case  of  an  even  chance,  and  where  consequently  we  were  in 
doubt,  we  should  in  common  language  say,  that  we  had  no  evi- 
dence at  all  for  either  side;  yet  that  situation  of  things,  which 
renders  it  an  even  chance  and  no  more,  that  such  an  event  will 
happen,  renders  this  case  equivalent  to  all  others,  where  there  is 
such  evidence  on  both  sides  of  a  question,*  as  leaves  the  mind  in 
doubt  concerning  the  truth.  Indeed  in  all  these  cases,  there  is 
no  more  evidence  on  one  side  than  on  the  other;  but  there  is 
(what  is  equivalent  to)  much  more  for  either,  than  for  the  truth 
of  a  number  of  facts,  which  come  into  one's  thoughts  at  random. 
Thus,  in  all  these  cases,  doubt  as  much  presupposes  evidence,  in 
lower  degrees,  as  belief  presupposes  higher,  and  certainty  higher 
still.  Any  one,  who  will  a  little  attend  to  the  nature  of  evidence, 
will  easily  carry  this  observation  on,  and  see,  that  between  no 
evidence  at  all,  and  that  degree  of  it  which  affords  ground  of 
doubt,  there  are  as  many  intermediate  degrees,  as  there  are,  be- 
tween that  degree  which  is  the  ground  of  doubt,  and  demonstra- 
tion. And  though  we  have  not  faculties  to  distinguish  these 
degrees  of  evidence  with  any  sort  of  exactness;  yet,  in  proportion 
as  they  are  discerned,  they  ought  to  influence  our  practice.  It 
is  as  real  an  imperfection  in  the  moral  character,  not  to  be  in- 
fluenced in  practice  by  a  lower  degree  of  evidence  when  discerned, 
as  it  is  in  the  understanding,  not  to  discern  it.  And  as,  in  all 
subjects  which  men  consider,  they  diiicern  the  lower  as  well  as 
higher  degrees  of  evidence,  proportionably  to  their  capacity  of 
understanding;  so,  in  practical  subjects,  they  are  influenced  in 
practice,  by  the  lower  as  well  as  higher  degrees  of  it,  proportion- 
ably  to  their  fairness  and  honesty.  And  as,  in  proportion  to  de- 
fects in  the  understanding,  men  are  unapt  to  see  lower  degrees 
of  evidence,  are  in  danger  of  overlooking  evidence  when  it  is  not 
glaring,  and  are  easily  imposed  upon  in  such  cases;  so,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  corruption  of  the  heart,  they  seem  capable  of  satis- 
fying themselves  with  having  no  regard  in  practice  to  evidence 
acknowledged  to  be  real,  if  it  be  not  overbearing.  From  these 
things  it  must  follow,  that  doiibting  concerning  religion  implies 
*  Intruduotion. 


256  EEVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL;  part  ir. 

6ucl.  a  degree  of  evidence  for  it,  as,  joined  with  tlie  consideration 
of  its  importance,  unquestionably  lays  men  under  the  obligations 
before  mentioned^  to  have  a  dutiful  regard  to  it  in  all  their 
behavior. 

Thirdly^  The  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence  of  religion  is 
involved,  which  some  complain  of,  is  no  more  a  just  ground  of 
complaint,  than  the  external  circumstances  of  temptation,  which 
others  are  placed  in;  or  than  difficulties  in  the  practice  of  it, 
after  a  full  conviction  of  its  truth.  Temptations  render  our  state 
a  more  improving  state  of  discipline,*  than  it  would  be  other- 
wise :  as  they  give  occasion  for  a  more  attentive  exercise  of  the 
virtuous  principle,  which  confirms  and  strengthens  it  more,  than 
an  easier  or  less  attentive  exercise  of  it  could.  Speculative  diffi- 
culties are,  in  this  respect,  of  the  very  same  nature  with  these 
external  temptations.  For  the  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing 
obvious,  is  to  some  persons  a  temptation  to  reject  it,  without  any 
consideration  at  all;  and  therefore  requires  such  an  attentive 
exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle,  seriously  to  consider  that  evi- 
dence, as  there  would  be  no  occasion  for,  but  for  such  temptation. 
And  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  its  evidence,  after  it  has  been 
in  some  sort  considered,  affords  opportunity  to  an  unfair  mind  of 
explaining  away,  and  deceitfully  hiding  from  itself,  that  evidence 
which  it  might  see;  and  also  for  men's  encouraging  themselves 
in  vice,  from  hopes  of  impunity,  though  they  do  clearly  see  thus 
much  at  least,  that  these  hopes  are  uncertain.  In  like  manner 
the  common  temptation  to  many  instances  of  folly,  which  end  in 
temporal  infamy  and  ruin,  is  the  ground  for  hope  of  not  being 
detected,  and  of  escaping  with  impunity;  i.e.  the  doubtfulness 
of  the  proof  beforehand,  that  such  foolish  behavior  will  thus  end 
in  infamy  and  ruin.  On  the  contrary,  supposed  doubtfulness  in 
the  evidence  of  religion  calls  fur  a  more  careful  and  attentive 
exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle,  in  fairly  yielding  themselves 
up  to  the  proper  influence  of  any  real  evidence,  though  doubtful; 
and  in  practising  conscientiously  all  virtue,  though  under  some 
uncertainty,*  whether  the  government  in  the  universe  may  nut 
possibly  be  such,  as  that  vice  may  escape  with  impunity.  And 
in  general,  temptation,  meaning  by  this  word  the  lesser  allure- 
ments to  wrong  and  difficulties  in  the  discbarge  of  our  duty,  a? 

*  Part  I.  chap.  v. 


CHAP.  VI.  SUPPOSED  DEFICIEXCT  IN  ITS  PROOF.  257 

well  as  tlie  greater  ones;  temptation,  I  say,  as  such  and  of  every 
kind  and  degree,  as  it  calls  forth  some  virtuous  efforts,  additional 
to  what  would  otherwise  have  been  wanting,  cannot  but  be  an 
additional  discipline  and  improvement  of  virtue,  as  well  as  proba- 
tion of  it  in  the  other  senses  of  that  word.*  So  that  the  very 
same  account  is  to  be  given,  why  the  evidence  of  religion  should 
be  left  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  require,  in  some,  an  attentive, 
solicitous,  perhaps  painful  exercise  of  their  understanding  about 
it;  as  why  others  should  be  placed  in  such  circumstances,  as  that 
the  practice  of  its  common  duties,  after  a  full  conviction  of  the 
truth  of  it,  should  require  attention,  solicitude,  and  pains:  or, 
why  appearing  doubtfulness  should  be  permitted  to  aiford  matter 
of  temptation  to  some;  as  why  external  difficulties  and  allure- 
ments should  be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of  temptation  to  others. 
The  same  account  also  is  to  be  given,  why  some  should  be  exer- 
cised with  temptations  of  both  these  kinds;  as  why  others  should 
be  exercised  with  the  latter  in  such  very  high  degrees,  as  some 
have  been,  particularly  as  the  primitive  Christians  were. 

Nor  does  there  appear  any  absurdity  in  supposing,  that  the 
speculative  difficulties,  in  which  the  evidence  of  religion  is  in- 
volved, may  make  even  the  principal  part  of  some  persons'  trial. 
For  as  the  chief  temptations  of  the  generality  of  the  world  are 
the  ordinary  motives  to  injustice,  or  unrestrained  pleasure,  or  to 
live  in  the  neglect  of  religion,  from  that  frame  of  mind  which 
renders  many  persons  almost  without  feeling  as  to  any  thing  dis- 
tant, or  which  is  not  the  object  of  their  senses;  so  there  are 
other  persons  without  this  shallowness  of  temper,  persons  of  a 
deeper  sense  as  to  what  is  invisible  and  future;  who  not  only  see, 
but  have  a  general  practical  feeling,  that  what  is  to  come  will  be 
present,  and  that  things  are  not  less  real  for  their  not  being  the 
objects  of  sense;  and  who,  from  their  natural  constitution  of 
body  and  of  temper,  and  from  their  external  condition,  may  have 
small  temptations  to  behave  ill,  small  difficulty  in  behaving  well, 
in  the  common  course  of  life.  Now  when  these  latter  persons 
have  a  distinct  full  conviction  of  the  truth  of  religion,  ;vithout 
any  possible  doubts  or  difficulties,  the  practice  of  it  is  to  them 
unavoidable,  unless  they  do  a  constant  violence  to  their  own 
minds;  and  religion  is  scarce  any  more  a  discipline  to  them,  than 
*  Part  I.  cbap.  iv.  and  pp.  150,  157. 


258  REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL :  part  n, 

it  is  to  creatures  in  a  state  of  perfection.  Yet  these  persons  may 
possibly  stand  in  need  of  moral  discipline  and  exercise,  in  a  higher 
degree  than  they  would  have  by  such  an  easy  practice  of  religion. 
Or  it  may  be  requisite,  for  reasons  unknown  to  us,  that  they 
should  give  some  further  manifestation*  what  is  their  moral  cha- 
racter, to  the  creation  of  God,  than  such  a  practice  of  it  would 
be.  Thus  in  the  great  variety  of  religious  situations  in  which 
men  are  placed,  what  constitutes,  what  chiefly  and  peculiarly 
constitutes,  the  probation,  in  all  senses,  of  some  persons,  may  be 
the  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence  of  religion  is  involved  :  and 
their  principal  and  distinguished  trial  may  be,  how  they  will 
behave  under  and  with  respect  to  these  difficulties.  Circum- 
stances in  men's  situation  in  their  temporal  capacity,  analogous 
in  good  measure  to  this  respecting  religion,  are  to  be  observed. 
We  find  some  persons  are  placed  in  such  a  situation  in  the  world, 
as  that  their  chief  difficulty  with  regard  to  conduct,  is  not  the 
doing  what  is  prudent  when  it  is  known ;  for  this,  in  numberless 
cases,  is  as  easy  as  the  contrary :  but  to  some  the  principal  exer- 
cise is,  recollection  and  being  upon  their  guard  against  deceits, 
the  deceits  suppose  of  those  about  them ;  against  false  appear- 
ances of  reason  and  prudence.  To  persons  in  some  situations, 
the  principal  exercise  with  respect  to  conduct  is,  attention  in 
order  to  inform  themselves  what  is  proper,  what  is  really  the 
reasonable  and  prudent  part  to  act. 

[^Fourthly.']  As  I  have  hitherto  gone  upon  supposition,  that 
men's  dissatisfaction  with  the  evidence  of  religion  is  not  owing 
to  their  neglects  or  prejudices;  it  must  be  added,  on  the  other 
hand,  in  all  common  reason,  and  as  what  the  truth  of  the  case 
plainly  requires  should  be  added,  that  such  dissatisfaction  pos- 
sibly may  be  owing  to  those,  possibly  may  be  men's  own  fault. 
For, 

If  there  are  any  persons,  who  never  set  themselves  heartily 
and  in  earnest  to  be  informed  in  religion  :  if  there  are  any,  who 
secretly  wish  it  may  not  prove  true;  and  are  less  attentive  to 
evidence  than  to  difficulties,  and  more  to  objections  than  to  what 
is  said  in  answer  to  them  :  these  persons  will  scarce  be  thought 
in  a  likely  way  of  seeing  the  evidence  of  religion,  though  it  were 
most  certainly  true,  and  capable  of  being  ever  so  fully  proved 
*  Pp.  156, 157. 


CHAP.  VI.  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  259 

If  any  accustom  themselves  to  consider  this  subject  m  the 
way  of  mirth  and  sport:  if  they  attend  to  forms  and  repre- 
sentations, and  inadequate  manners  of  expression,  instead  of  the 
real  things  intended  by  them  :  (for  signs  often  can  be  no  more 
than  inadequately  expressive  of  the  things  signified  :)  or  if  they 
substitute  human  errors  in  the  room  of  divine  truth ;  why  may 
not  all,  or  any  of  these  things,  hinder  some  men  from  seeing  that 
evidence,  which  really  is  seen  by  others ;  as  a  like  turn  of  mind, 
with  respect  to  matters  of  common  speculation  and  practice,  does, 
we  find  by  experience,  hinder  them  from  attaining  that  knowledge 
and  right  understanding,  in  matters  of  common  speculation  and 
practice,  which  more  fair  and  attentive  minds  attain  to?  And 
the  efi"ect  will  be  the  same,  whether  their  neglect  of  seriously 
considering  the  evidence  of  religion,  and  their  indirect  behavior 
with  regard  to  it,  proceed  from  mere  carelessness,  or  from  the 
grosser  vices;  or  whether  it  be  owing  to  this,  that  forms  and 
figurative  manners  of  expression,  as  well  as  errors,  administer 
occasions  of  ridicule,  when  the  things  intended,  and  the  truth 
itself,  would  not.  Men  may  indulge  a  ludicrous  turn  so  far  as  to 
lose  all  sense  of  conduct  and  prudence  in  worldly  affairs,  and  even, 
as  it  seems,  to  impair  their  faculty  of  reason.  And  in  general, 
levity,  carelessness,  passion,  and  prejudice  do  hinder  us  from 
being  rightly  informed,  with  respect  to  common  things  :  and  they 
mai/,  in  like  manner,  and  perhaps,  in  some  further  providential 
manner,  with  respect  to  moral  and  religious  subjects  :  may  hinder 
evidence  from  being  laid  before  us,  and  from  being  seen  when  it 
is.  The  Scripture*  does  declare,  that  every  one  sJiall  not  iinder- 
stand.  And  it  makes  no  difference,  by  what  providential  con- 
duct this  comes  to  pass  :  whether  the  evidence  of  Christianity 
was,  originally  and  with  design,  put  and  left  so,  as  that  those  who 
are  desirous  of  evading  moral  obligations  should  not  see  it ;  and 

*-  Dan.  xii.  10.  See  also  Isa.  xxix.  13, 14 :  Matt.  vi.  23,  and  xi.  25,  and  xiii. 
11,  12 :  John  iii.  19,  and  v.  44:  1  Cor.  ii.  14,  and  2  Cor.  iv.  4 :  2  Tim.  iii.  13: 
and  that  affectionate  as  well  as  authoritative  admonition,  so  very  many  times 
inculcated,  He  that  hath  ears  to  hear,  let  him  hear.  Grotius  saw  so  strongly  the 
thing  intended  in  these  and  other  passages  of  Scripture  of  the  like  sense,  as 
to  say,  that  the  proof  given  us  of  Christianity  was  less  than  it  might  have  been, 
for  this  very  purpose :  Ut  ita  sennn  Uvangelii  tanquam  lapis  esset  Lydius  ad 
quern  ivc/eiiia  sanabilia  explorarentur.  De  Ver.  R.  C.  lib.  ii.  [So  that  the 
Gospel  should  be  a  touchstone,  to  test  the  honesty  of  men's  dispositions.] 


200  REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL;  part  ir. 

that  lionest-minded  persons  should  :  or,  whether  it  comes  to  pass 
by  any  other  means. 

Further  :  \_FtfthIi/.'\  The  general  proof  of  natural  religion  and 
of  Christianity  does,  I  think,  lie  level  to  common  men  :  even 
those,  the  greatest  part  of  whose  time,  from  childhood  to  old  age, 
is  taken  up  with  providing  for  themselves  and  their  families  the 
common  conveniences,  perhaps  necessaries,  of  life  :  those  I  mean, 
of  this  rank,  who  ever  think  at  all  of  asking  after  proof,  or 
attending  to  it.  Common  men,  were  they  as  much  in  earnest 
about  religion,  as  about  their  temporal  affairs,  are  capable  of 
being  convinced  upon  real  evidence,  that  there  is  a  God  who 
governs  the  world  :  and  they  feel  themselves  to  be  of  a  moral 
nature,  and  accountable  creatures.  And  as  Christianity  entirely 
falls  in  with  this  their  natural  sense  of  things,  so  they  are  capa- 
ble, not  only  of  being  persuaded,  but  of  being  made  to  see,  that 
there  is  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  it,  and 
many  appearing  completions  of  prophecy. 

This  proof,  though  real  and  conclusive,  is  liable  to  objections, 
and  may  be  run  up  into  difficulties ;  which  however  persons  who 
are  capable  not  only  of  talking  of,  but  of  really  seeing,  are  capa- 
ble also  of  seeing  through  :  i.e.  not  of  clearing  up  and  answering 
them,  so  as  to  satisfy  their  curiosity,  for  of  such  knowledge  we 
are  not  capable  with  respect  to  any  one  thing  in  nature  ',  but 
capable  of  seeing  that  the  proof  is  not  lost  in  these  difficulties, 
or  destroyed  by  these  objections.  But  then  a  thorough  examina- 
tion into  religion  with  regard  to  these  objections,  which  cannot 
be  the  business  of  every  man,  is  a  matter  of  pretty  large  compass, 
and,  from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  some  knowledge,  as  well  as 
time  and  attention ;  to  see,  how  the  evidence  comes  out,  upon 
balancing  one  thing  with  another,  and  what,  upon  the  whole,  is 
the  amount  of  it.  If  persons  who  pick  up  these  objections  from 
others,  and  take  for  granted  they  are  of  weight,  upon  the  word 
of  those  from  whom  they  received  them,  or,  by  often  retailing  of 
them,  come  to  see  or  fancy  they  see  them  to  be  of  weight ;  will 
not  prepare  themselves  for  such  an  examination,  with  a  com- 
petent degree  of  knowledge;  or  will  not  give  that  time  and 
attention  to  the  subject,  which,  from  the  nature  of  it,  is  neces- 
sary for  attaining  such  information  :  in  this  case,  they  must 
remain  in  doubtfulness,  ignorance^  or  error :  in  the  same  way  as 


CHAP.  VI.  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  ITS  PROOF.  261 

they  must,  with  regard  to  common  sciences,  and  matters  of  com- 
mon life,  if  they  neglect  the  necessary  means  of  being  informed 
in  them. 

Perhaps  it  will  still  be  objected,  that  if  a  prince  or  com- 
mon master  were  to  send  directions  to  a  servant,  he  would  take 
care,  that  they  should  always  bear  the  certain  marks,  who  they 
came  from,  and  that  their  sense  should  be  always  plain:  so  as 
that  there  should  be  no  possible  doubt  if  he  could  help  it,  con- 
cerning the  authority  or  meaning  of  them.  The  proper  answer 
to  all  this  kind  of  objections  is,  that,  wherever  the  fallacy  lies,  it 
is  even  certain  we  cannot  argue  thus  with  respect  to  Him  who  is 
the  Governor  of  the  world  :  and  that  he  does  not  afford  us  such 
information,  with  respect  to  our  temporal  affairs  and  interests, 
experience  abundantly  shows. 

However,  there  is  a  full  answer  to  this  objection,  from  the  very 
nature  of  religion.  The  reason  why  a  prince  would  give  his 
directions  in  this  plain  manner  is,  that  he  absolutely  desires  an 
external  action  done,  without  concerning  himself  with  the  motive 
or  principle  upon  which  it  is  done  :  i.e.  he  regards  only  the  ex- 
ternal event,  or  the  thing's  being  done ;  and  not  at  all,  properly 
speaking,  the  doing  of  it,  or  the  action.  Whereas  the  whole 
of  morality  and  religion  consisting  merely  in  action  itself,  there 
is  no  sort  of  parallel  between  the  cases.  But  .if  the  prince  be 
supposed  to  regard  only  the  action  ;  i.e.  only  to  desire  to  exercise, 
or  in  any  sense  prove,  the  understanding  or  loyalty  of  a  servant ; 
he  would  not  always  give  his  orders  in  such  a  plain  manner.  It 
may  be  proper  to  add,  that  the  will  of  God,  respecting  morality 
and  religion,  may  be  considered  either  as  absolute,  or  as  only  con- 
ditional. If  it  be  absolute,  it  can  only  be  thus,  that  we  should 
act  virtuously  in  such  given  circumstances  ;  not  that  we  should  be 
brought  to  act  so,  by  this  changing  of  our  circumstances.  And  if 
God's  will  be  thus  absolute,  then  it  is  in  our  power,  in  the  highest 
and  strictest  sense,  to  do  or  to  contradict  his  will ;  which  is  a 
most  weighty  consideration.  Or  his  will  maj^  be  considered  only 
as  conditional,  that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  we  shall  be  rewarded ;  if 
otherwise,  punished :  of  which  conditional  will  of  the  xiuthor 
of  nature,  the  whole  constitution  of  it  affords  most  certain 
instances. 

Upcn  the  whole  :  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  religion  necessarily 


262  REVELATION  NOT  UNIVERSAL.  part  ii. 

implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  probation  :  and  tne  credibility 
of  our  being  at  all  in  such  a  state  being  admitted,  there  seems  no 
peculiar  difficulty  in  supposing  our  probation  to  be,  just  as  it  is, 
in  those  respects  which  are  above  objected  against.  There  seems 
no  pretence,  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  to  say,  that  the  trial 
cannot  equitably  be  any  thing,  but  whether  persons  will  act 
suitably  to  certain  information,  or  such  as  admits  no  room  for 
doubt;  so  as  that  there  can  be  no  danger  of  miscarriage,  but 
either  from  their  not  attending  to  what  they  certainly  know,  or 
from  overbearing  passion  hurrying  them  on  to  act  contrary  to  it. 
For,  since  ignorance  and  doubt,  afford  scope  for  probation  in  all 
senses,  as  really  as  intuitive  conviction  or  certainty;  and  since 
the  two  former  are  to  be  put  to  the  same  account  as  difficulties  in 
practice ;  men's  moral  probation  may  also  be,  whether  they  will 
take  due  care  to  inform  themselves  by  impartial  consideration, 
and  afterwards  whether  they  will  act  as  the  case  requires,  upon 
the  evidence  which  they  have,  however  doubtful.  And  this,  we 
find  by  ex2^erience,  is  frequently  our  probation,*  in  our  temporal 
capacity.  For,  the  information  which  we  want  with  regard  to 
our  worldly  interests  is  by  no  means  always  given  us  of  course, 
without  any  care  of  our  own.  And  we  are  greatly  liable  to  self- 
deceit  from  inward  secret  prejudices,  and  also  to  the  deceits  of 
others.  So  that  to  be  able  to  judge  what  is  the  prudent  part, 
often  requires  much  and  difficult  consideration.  Then  after  we 
have  judged  the  very  best  we  can,  the  evidence  upon  which  we 
must  act,  if  we  will  live  and  act  at  all,  is  perpetually  doubtful  to 
a  very  high  degree.  And  the  constitution  and  course  of  the 
world  in  fact  is  such,  as  that  want  of  impartial  consideration 
what  we  have  to  do,  and  venturing  upon  extravagant  courses  be- 
cause it  is  doubtful  what  will  be  the  consequence,  are  often  natu- 
rally, i.e.  providentially,  altogether  as  fatal,  as  misconduct  occa- 
sioned by  heedless  inattention  to  what  we  certainly  know,  or 
disregarding  it  from  overbearing  passion. 

Several  of  the  observations  here  made  may  well  seem  strange, 
perhaps  unintelligible,  to  many  good  men.  But  if  the  persons 
for  whose  sake  they  are  made  think  so,  (persons  who  object  as 
above,  and  throw  off  all  regard  to  religion  under  pretence  of  wanl 
of  evidence ;)  I  desire  them  to  consider  again,  whether  their  thiuk- 
*  Pp.  100,  257,  Ac. 


CHAP.  vii.    PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  263 

ing  so  be  owing  to  any  thing  unintelligible  in  these  observations, 
or  to  their  own  not  having  such  a  sense  of  religion  and  serious 
solicitude  about  it,  as  even  their  state  of  scepticism  does  in  all 
reason  require  ?  It  ought  to  be  forced  upon  the  reflection  of 
these  persons,  that  our  nature  and  condition  necessarily  require 
us,  in  the  daily  course  of  life,  to  act  upon  evidence  much  lower 
than  what  is  commonly  called  probable  :  to  guard,  not  only  against 
what  we  fully  believe  will,  but  also  against  what  we  think  it  sup- 
posable  may,  happen ;  and  to  engage  in  pursuits  when  the  proba- 
bility is  greatly  against  success,  if  it  even  be  credible,  that 
possibly  we  may  succeed  in  them. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE    PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE    FOR    CHRISTIANITY. 

The  presumptions  against  revelation,  and  objections  against 
the  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  and  particular  things  relating 
to  it,  being  removed,  there  remains  to  be  considered,  what  posi- 
tive evidence  we  have  for  the  truth  of  it;  chiefly  in  order  to  see, 
what  the  analogy  of  nature  suggests  with  regard  to  that  evidence, 
and  the  objections  against  it :  or  to  see  what  is,  and  is  allowed 
to  be,  the  plain  natural  rule  of  judgment  and  of  action,  in  our 
temporal  concerns,  in  cases  where  we  have  the  same  kind  of 
evidence,  and  the  same  kind  of  objections-  against  it,  that  we 
have  in  the  case  before  us. 

In  the  evidence  of  Christianity  there  seem  to  be  several  things 
of  great  weight,  not  reducible  to  the  head,  either  of  miracles,  or 
the  completion  of  prophecy,  in  the  common  acceptation  of  the 
words.  But  these  two  are  its  dire'ct  and  fundamental  proofs : 
and  those  other  things,  however  considerable  they  are,  yet  ought 
never  to  be  urged  apart  from  its  direct  proofs,  but  always  to  be 
joined  with  them.  Thus  the  evidence  of  Christianity  will  be  a 
long  series  of  things,  reaching,  as  it  seems,  from  the  beginning 
of  the  world  to  the  present  time,  of  great  variety  and  compass, 
taking  in  both  the  direct  and  also  the  collateral,  proofs,  and 
making  up,  all  of  them  together,  one  argument.  The  conviction 
arising  from  this  kind  of  pruof  may  be  compared  to  what  they 


2C4  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  part  it. 

call  the  effect,  in  architecture  or  other  works  of  art;  a  result  from 
a  great  number  of  things,  so  and  so  disposed,  and  taken  into  one 
view.  I  shall  therefore,  firs,t,  make  some  observations  relating 
to  miracles,  and  the  appearing  completions  of  prophecy;  and 
consider  what  analogy  suggests,  in  answer  to  the  objections 
brought  against  this  evidence.  And,  secondly,  I  shall  endeavor 
to  give  some  account  of  the  general  argument  now  mentioned, 
consisting  both  of  the  direct  and  collateral  evidence,  considered 
as  making  up  one  argument :  this  being  the  kind  of  proof,  upon 
which  we  determine  most  questions  of  difficulty,  concerning 
common  facts,  alleged  to  have  happened,  or  seeming  likely  to 
happen ;   especially  questions  relating  to  conduct. 

First,  I  shall  make  some  observations  upon  the  direct  proof  of 
Christianity  from  miracles  and  prophecy,  and  upon  the  objections 
alleged  against  it.* 

I.  Now  the  following  observations  relating  to  the  historical 
evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity  ap- 
pear to  be  of  great  weight. 

1.  The  Old  Testament  affords  us  the  same  historical  evidence 
of  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  of  the  prophets,  as  of  the  common 
civil  history  of  Moses  and  the  kings  of  Israel;  or,  as  of  the 
affairs  of  the  Jewish  nation.  And  the  Gospels  and  the  Acts 
afford  us  the  same  historical  evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Christ 
and  the  apostles,  as  of  the  common  matters  related  in  them. 
This  indeed  could  not  have  been  affirmed  by  any  reasonable  man, 
if  the  authors  of  tl*ese  books,  like  many  other  historians,  had 
appeared  to  aim  at  an  entertaining  manner  of  writing,  and  hence 
interspersed  miracles  in  their  works,  at  proper  distances  and  upon 
proper  occasions.  These  might  have*  animated  a  dull  relation, 
amused  the  reader,  and  engaged  his  attention.  And  the  same 
account  would  naturally  have  been  given  of  them,  as  of  the 
speeches  and  descriptions  given  by  such  authors :  the  same  ac- 
count, in  a  manner,  as  is  to  be  given,  why  the  poets  make  use  of 
wonders  and  prodigies.  But  the  facts,  both  miraculous  and 
natural,  in  Scripture,  are  related  in  plain  unadorned  narratives, 

«•  [See  WiTSii  Meletemeta,  Diss.  IV. :  Pfafii  Disput:  Campbell  on  Miracles  : 
Douglass'  Criterion  :  Farmer's  Dissertations  :  Paley's  Evid. :  Taylor's  ApoL 
of  Ben  Mordecai :  Tucker's  Light  of  Nat. :  Watson's  Tracts,  vol.  iv. :  Jortin'8 
Bermons  :  Bp.  Fleetwood's  Essays  :  Boyle  Lectures  :  Lakdner  s  Credibility.] 


CHAP.  VII.  FOR  CHHISTIANITY.  265 

and  both  of  them  appear,  in  all  respects,  to  stand  upon  the  same 
foot  of  historical  evidence.'' 

Further:  some  parts  of  Scripture,  containing  an  account  of 
miracles  fully  sufficient  to  prove  the  truth  of  Christianity,  are 
quoted  as  genuine,  from  the  age  in  which  they  are  said  to  be 
written,  down  to  the  present :  and  no  other  parts  of  them, 
material  in  the  present  question,  are  omitted  to  be  quoted  in  such 
manner,  as  to  aiford  any  sort  of  proof  of  their  not  being  genuine. 
And,  as  common  history,  when  called  in  question  in  any  instance, 
may  often  be  greatly  confirmed  by  contemporary  or  subsequent 
events  more  known  and  acknowledged;  and  as  the  common 
Scripture  history,  like  many  others,  is  thus  confirmed;  so  like- 
wise is  the  miraculous  history  of  it,  not  only  in  particular  in- 
stances, but  in  general.  For,  the  establishment  of  the  Jewish 
and  Christian  religions,  which  were  events  contemporary  with  the 
miracles  related  to  be  wrought  in  attestation  of  both,  or  subse- 
quent to  them,  these  events  are  just  what  we  should  have  ex- 
pected,  upon  supposition  such  miracles  were  really  wrought  to 
attest  the  truth  of  those  religions.  These  miracles  are  a  satis- 
factory account  of  those  events :  of  which  no  other  satisfactory 
account  can  be  given;  nor  any  account  at  all,  but  what  is  merely 
imaginary  and  invented 

It  is  to  be  added,  that  the  most  obvious,  the  most  easy  and 
direct  account  of  this  history,  how  it  came  to  be  written,  and  to 
be  received  in  the  world  as  a  true  history,  is  that  it  really  is  so; 
nor  can  any  other  account  of  it  be  easy  and  direct.  Now,  though 
an  account,  not  at  all  obvious,  but  very  far-fetched  and  indirect, 
may  be  and  often  is,  the  true  account  of  a  matter,  yet  it  cannot 
be  admitted  on  the  authority  of  its  being  asserted.  Mere  guess, 
supposition,  and  possibility,  when  opposed  to  historical  evidence, 
prove  nothing,  but  that  historical  evidence  is  not  demonstrative. 

The  just  consequence  from  all  this,  I  think  is,  that  the  Scrip- 
ture history  in  general  is  to  be  admitted  as  an  authentic  genuine 
history,  till  something  positive  be  alleged  sufficient  to  invalidate 

^  ["  The  miracles  of  the  Jewish  historian,  are  intimately  connected  with  all 
the  civil  aflfairs,  and  make  a  necessary  and  inseparable  part.  The  whole 
history  is  founded  in  them ;  it  cousirts  of  little  else ;  and  if  it  were  not  a 
history  of  them,  it  would  he  a  history  of  nothing." — Bolingbroke,  Posthumous 
"Works,  vol.  iii.  p.  279.] 

23 


266  THE  PARTICULAK  EYIDEXCE  part  ii. 

it.  No  man  will  deny  the  consequence  to  be,  that  it  cannot  be 
rejected,  or  thrown  by  as  of  no  authority,  till  it  can  be  proved  to 
be  of  none;  even  though  the  evidence  now  mentioned  for  its 
authority  were  doubtful.  This  evidence  may  be  confronted  by 
historical  evidence  on  the  other  side,  if  there  be  any:  or  general 
incredibility  in  the  things  related,  or  inconsistence  in  the  general 
turn  of  the  history,  would  prove  it  to  be  of  no  authority.  But 
since,  upon  the  face  of  the  matter,  upon  a  first  and  general  view, 
the  appearance  is,  that  it  is  an  authentic  history,  it  cannot  be 
determined  to  be  fictitious,  without  some  proof  that  it  is  so. 
The  following  observations  in  support  of  these,  and  coincident 
with  them,  will  greatly  confirm  the  historical  evidence  for  the 
truth  of  Christianity. 

2.  The  Epistles  of  Paul,  from  the  nature  of  epistolary  writing, 
and  moreover  from  several  of  them  being  written,  not  to  particu- 
lar persons  but  to  churches,  carry  in  them  evidences  of  their 
being  genuine,  beyond  what  can  be  in  a  mere  historical  narrative, 
left  to  the  world  at  large.  This  evidence,''  joined  with  that 
which  they  have  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the  New  Testament, 
seems  not  to  leave  so  much  as  any  particular  pretence  for  deny- 
ing their  genuineness,  considered  as  an  ordinary  matter  of  fact, 
or  of  criticism:  I  say  particular  pretence,  for  denying  it;  be- 
cause any  single  fact,  of  such  a  kind  and  such  antiquity,  may 
have  general  doubts  raised  concerning  it,  from  the  very  nature  of 
human  affairs  and  human  testimony.  There  is  also  to  be  men- 
tioned a  distinct  and  particular  evidence  of  the  genuineness  of 
the  epistle  chiefly  referred  to  here,  the  first  to  the  Corinthians; 
from  the  manner  in  which  it  is  quoted  by  Clemens  Romanus,  in 
an  epistle  of  his  own  to  that  church.*     Now  these  epistles  afford 

<!  [An  admirable  work  on  this  recondite  mode  of  proving  the  truth  of  the  New 
Testament  narrative,  is  Paley's  Horte  Paulinae.  The  same  department  of  evi- 
dence is  ably  handled  by  Birk,  in  his  Horae  Evangelicae,  and  Horse  Apostolicae  : 
Graves  on  the  Pentateuch :  and  Bltjnt  in  his  "  Undesigned  Coincidences  both 
of -the  Old  and  New  Testament."  Grotius,  De  Yeritate,  has  some  excellent 
passages  on  the  same  subject.] 

*  [Clem.  Rom.  Ep.  1.  c.  47.]  CLEirEXT,  who  is  here  quoted,  lived  in  the  first 
century,  and  is  mentioned  Phil.  iv.  3.  His  epistle  to  the  Corinthians,  written 
in  Greek,  contains  the  passage  here  referred  to,  which  may  be  thus  translated- 
"Take  the  letter  of  the  blessed  Paul  the  Apostle.  What  did  he  write  to  you, 
in  the  first  beginning  of  the  Gospel?  Truly  he  sent  you  a  divinely  inspired 
letter  about  himself,  and  Cephas,  and  Apollos.^' 


CHAP.  VII.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  267 

a  proof  of  Christianity,  detached  from  all  others,  which  is,  1 
think,  a  thing  of  weight;  and  also  a  proof  of  a  nature  and  kind 
peculiar  to  itself.     For, 

In  them  the  author  declares,  that  he  received  the  Gospel  in 
general,  and  the  institution  of  the  Communion  in  particular,  not 
from  the  rest  of  the  apostles,  or  jointly  together  with  them,  but 
alone,  from  Christ  himself;  whom  he  declares  likewise,  conform- 
ably to  the  history  in  the  Acts,  that  he  saw  after  his  ascension.* 
So  that  the  testimony  of  Paul  is  to  be  considered,  as  detached 
from  that  of  the  rest  of  the  apostles. 

He  declares  further,  that  he  was  endued  with  a  power  of  work- 
ing miracles,  as  what  was  publicly  known  to  those  very  people, 
speaks  of  frequent  and  great  variety  of  miraculous  gifts  as  then 
subsisting  in  those  very  churches,  to  which  he  was  writing; 
which  he  was  reproving  for  several  irregularities,  and  where  he 
had  personal  opposers.  He  mentions  these  gifts  incidentally,  in 
the  most  easy  manner,  and  without  effort;  by  way  of  reproof  to 
those  who  had  them,  for  their  indecent  use  of  them;  and  by 
way  of  depreciating  them,  in  comparison  of  moral  virtues.  In 
short  he  speaks  to  these  churches,  of  these  miraculous  powers, 
in  the  manner  any  one  would  speak  to  another  of  a  thing,  which 
was  as  familiar,  and  as  much  known  in  common  to  them  both,  as 
any  thing  in  the  world. f  And  this,  as  hath  been  observed  by 
several  persons,  is  surely  a  very  considerable  thing. 

3.  It  is  an  acknowledged  historical  fact,  that  Christianity 
offered  itself  to  the  world,  and  demanded  to  be  received,  upon 
the  allegation,  (i.e.  as  unbelievers  would  speak,  upon  the  pre- 
tence,) of  miracles,  publicly  wrought  to  attest  the  truth  of  it,  in 
such  an  age;  and  that  it  was  actually  received  by  great  numbers 
in  that  very  age,  and  upon  the  professed  belief  of  the  reality  of 
these  miracles.  And  Christianity,  including  the  dispensation  of 
the  Old  Testament,  seems  distinguished  by  this  from  all  other 
religions.  I  mean,  that  this  does  not  ajjpear  to  be  the  case  with 
regard  to  any  other;  for  surely  it  will  not  be  supposed  to  lie 
upon  any  person,  to  prove  by  positive  historical  evidence,  that  it 
was  not.     It  does  in  no  sort  appear  that  Mahometanism  was  first 

*  Gal.  i. :  1  Cor.  xi.  23,  &c.  :  1  Cor.  xv.  8. 

t  Rom.  XV.  19  :  1  Cor.  xii.  8,  9,  10-28,  kc,  and  xiii.  1,  2,  8,  and  the  whole 
I4th  chapter :  2  Cor.  xii.  12,  13  :  Gal.  iii,  2,  5. 


268  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  part  n. 

received  in  tlie  world  upon  the  foot  of  supposed  miracles,*  i.e. 
public  ones  :^  lor,  as  revelation  is  itself  miraculous,  all  pretence 
to  it  must  necessarily  imply  some  pretence  of  miracles.  And  it 
is  a  known  fact,  that  it  was  immediately,  at  the  very  first,  pro- 
pagated by  other  means.  And  as  particular  institutions,  whether 
in  Paganism  or  Popery,  said  to  be  confirmed  by  miracles  after 
those  institutions  had  obtained,  are  not  to  the  purpose :  so,  were 
there  what  might  be  called  historical  proof,  that  any  of  them 
were  introduced  by  a  supposed  divine  command,  believed  to  be 
attested  by  miracles;  these  would  not  be  in  any  wise  parallel. 
For  single  things  of  this  sort  are  easy  to  be  accounted  for,  after 
parties  are  formed,  and  have  power  in  their  hands;  and  the 
leaders  of  them  are  in  veneration  with  the  multitude ;  and  politi- 
cal interests  are  blended  with  religious  claims,  and  religious  dis- 
tinctions. But  he/ore  any  thing  of  this  kind,  for  a  few  persons, 
and  those  of  the  lowest  rank,  all  at  once,  to  bring  over  such  great 
numbers  to  a  new  religion,  and  get  it  to  be  received  upon  the 
particular  evidence  of  miracles;  this  is  quite  another  thing. 

I  think  it  will  be  allowed  by  any  fair  adversary,  that  the  fact 
now  mentioned,  taking  in  all  the  circumstances,  is  peculiar  to  the 
Christian  religion.  However,  the  fact  itself  is  allowed,  that 
Christianity  obtained,  i.e.  was  professed  to  be  received  in  the 
world,  upon  the  belief  of  miracles,  immediately  in  the  age  in 
which  it  is  said  those  miracles  were  wrought:  or  that  this  is 
what  its  first  converts  would  have  alleged,  as  the  reason  for 
their  embracing  it.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  such  numbers 
of  men,  in  the  most  distant  parts  of  the  world,  should  forsake  the 
religion  of  their  country,  in  which  they  had  been  educated; 
separate  themselves  from  their  friends,  particularly  in  their 
festival  shows  and  solemnities,  to  which  the  common  people  are 
so  greatly  addicted,  and  which  were  of  a  nature  to  engage  them 
much  more,  than  any  thing  of  that  sort  among  us :  and  embrace 

••■  See  the  Koran,  chap.  xiii.  and  chap.  xvii. 

d  [Mahomet  expressly  declares  that  he  worked  no  ]puhlic  miracles  in  con- 
firmation of  his  mission,  "because  the  former  nations  have  charged  them  with 
imposture."  He  claims,  however,  to  have  had  private  miraculous  assurancea 
of  his  mission,  and  most  preposterous  they  were. 

Whately,  in  his  Christian  Evidences,  has  handled  this  aspect  of  miracles 
•with  great  ability.  See  also  Paley's  Eviderces,  sec.  3  :  and  Gibbon's  Decline 
and  Fall,  chap.  1.] 


CHAP.  VII.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  ft(j9 

a  religion^  wliicli  could  not  but  expose  them  to  many  incon 
veniences,  and  indeed  must  have  been  a  giving  up  the  world  in  a 
great  degree,  even  from  the  very  first,  and  before  the  empire  en- 
gaged in  form  against  them :  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that  such 
numbers  should  make  so  great,  and  to  say  the  least,  so  incon- 
venient a  change  in  their  whole  institution  of  life,  unless  they 
were  really  convinced  of  the  truth  of  those  miracles,  upon  the 
knowledge  or  belief  of  which  they  professed  to  make  it.  And 
it  will,  I  suppose,  readily  be  acknowledged,  that  the  generality 
of  the  first  converts  to  Christianity  must  have  believed  them : 
that  as  by  becoming  Christians  they  declared  to  the  world,  they 
were  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  those  miracles;  so  this  declaratiSh 
was  to  be  credited.  And  this  their  testimony  is  the  same  kind 
of  evidence  for  those  miracles,  as  if  they  had  put  it  in  writing, 
and  these  writings  had  come  down  to  us.  And  it  is  real  evi- 
dence, because  it  is  of  facts,  which  they  had  capacity  and  full 
opportunity  to  inform  themselves  of. 

It  is  also  distinct  from  the  direct  or  express  historical  evidence, 
though  it  is  of  the  same  kind :  and  would  be  allowed  to  be  dis- 
tinct in  all  cases.  For  were  a  fact  expressly  related  by  one  or 
more  ancient  historians,  and  disputed  in  after  ages;  that  this 
fact  is  acknowledged  to  have  been  helieved  by  great  numbers  of 
the  age  in  which  the  historian  says  it  was  done,  would  be  allowed 
an  additional  proof  of  such  fact,  quite  distinct  from  the  express 
testimony  of  the  historian.  The  credulity  of  mankind  is  acknow- 
ledged :  and  the  suspicions  of  mankind  ought  to  be  acknowledged 
too;  and  their  backwardness  even  to  believe,  and  greater  still  to 
practise,  what  makes  against  their  interest.  And  it  must  par- 
ticularly be  remembered,  that  education,  and  prejudice,  and 
authority,  were  against  Christianity,  in  the  age  I  am  speaking 
of.  So  that  the  immediate  conversion  of  such  numbers  is  a  real 
presumption  of  somewhat  more  than  human  in  this  matter.^     I 

e  [Alexander,  in  his  Evidences,  and  several  other  writers  have  placed  this 
argument  in  a  very  convincing  light.  Arnobius,  one  of  the  earliest  Christian 
writers,  asks,  "Shall  we  say  that  the  men  of  those  times  were  inconsiderate, 
deceitful,  stupid,  and  brutish  enough  to  feign  having  seen  what  they  never 
saw?  and  that  when  they  might  have  lived  in  peace  and  comfort,  they  chose 
gratuitous  hatred  and  obloquy?" 

The  rejection  of  Christianity  by  so  many  in  the  first  age  was  the  result  of 
tJie  continued  action   of  personal  and  hereditary  prejudice  and   depravity 

23* 


270  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  part  n. 

say  presumption,  for  it  is  not  alleged  as  a  proof  alone  and  by 
itself.  Nor  need  any  one  of  the  things  mentioned  in  this 
chapter  be  considered  as  a  proof  by  itself:  and  yet  all  of  them 
together  may  be  one  of  the  strongest.* 

Upon  the  whole:  as  there  is  large  historical  evidence,  both 
direct  and  circumstantial,  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of 
Christianity,  collected  by  those  who  have  writ  upon  the  subject; 
it  lies  upon  unbelievers  to  show  why  this  evidence  is  not  to  be 
credited.  This  way  of  speaking  is,  I  thint,  just;  and  what  per- 
sons who  write  in  defence  of  religion  naturally  fall  into.  Yet,  in 
a  matter  of  such  unspeakable  importance,  the  proper  question  is, 
not  whom  it  lies  upon,  according  to  the  rules  of  argument,  to 
maintain  or  confute  objections  :  but  whether  there  really  are  any, 
against  this  evidence,  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  destroy  the  credit 
of  it.  However,  unbelievers  seem  to  take  upon  them  the  part 
of  showing  that  there  are. 

They  allege,  that  numberless  enthusiastic  people,  in  different 
ages  and  countries,  expose  themselves  to  the  same  difficulties 
which  the  primitive  Christians  did;  and  are  ready  to  give  up 
their  lives  for  the  most  idle  follies  imaginable.  It  is  not  very 
clear,  to  what  purpose  this  objection  is  brought.  For  surely, 
every  one,  in  every  case,  must  distinguish  between  opinions  and 
facts.  And  though  testimony  is  no  proof  of  enthusiastic  opinions, 
or  of  any  opinion  at  all;  yet  it  is  allowed,  in  all  other  cases,  to 
be  a  proof  of  facts.  A  person's  laying  down  his  life  in  attesta- 
tion of  facts  or  of  opinions,  is  the  strongest  proof  of  his  believ- 
ing them.  And  if  the  apostles  and  their  contemporaries  did  be- 
lieve the  facts,  in  attestation  of  which  they  exposed  themselves 
to  sufferings  and  death;  this  their  belief,  or  rather  knowledge, 
must  be  a  proof  of  those  facts:  for  they  were  such  as  came 
under  the  observation  of  their  senses.  And  though  it  is  not  of 
equal  weight,  yet  it  is  of  weight,  that  the  martyrs  of  the  next 
age,  notwithstanding  they  were  not  eye-witnesses  of  those  facts. 

capable  of  resisting  any  supposable  evidence.  The  recejytion  of  Christianity 
by  multitudes,  under  the  same  evidences,  and  to  their  immediate  personal 
damage,  shows  strongly  that  there  was  enough  evidence  to  produce  those 
effects.  Thus  the  rejection  by  some  does  not  countervail  Jhe  accep*^nce  by 
others.] 

*  P.  294,  &c. 


CHAP.  vir.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  271 

as  were  the  apostles  and  their  contemporaries,  had,  however,  full 
opportunity  to  inform  themselves  whether  they  were  true  or  not. 
and  gave  equal  proof  of  their  believing  them  to  be  true. 

But  enthusiasm,  it  is  said,  greatly  weakens  the  evidence  of 
testimony  even  for  facts,  in  matters  relating  to  religion:  some 
seem  to  think  it  totally  and  absolutely  destroys  the  evidence  of 
testimony  upon  this  subject.  The  powers  of  enthusiasm,  and  of 
diseases  too,  which  operate  in  a  like  manner,  are  indeed  very 
wonderful,  in  particular  instances.  But  if  great  numbers  of 
men,  not  appearing  in  any  peculiar  degree  weak,  nor  under  any 
peculiar  suspicion  of  negligence,  affirm  that  they  saw  and  heard 
such  things  plainly,  with  their  eyes  and  their  ears,  and  are 
admitted  to  be  in  earnest;  such  testimony  is  evidence  of  the 
strongest  kind  we  can  have,  for  any  matter  of  fact.  Possibly  it 
may  be  overcome,  strong  as  it  is,  by  incredibility  in  the  things 
thus  attested,  or  by  contrary  testimony.  And  in  an  instance 
where  one  thought  it  was  so  overcome,  it  might  be  just  to  consider, 
how  far  such  evidence  could  be  accounted  for  by  enthusiasm;  for 
it  seems  as  if  no  other  imaginable  account  were  to  be  given  of  it. 
But  till  such  incredibility  be  shown,  or  contrary  testimony  pro- 
duced, it  cannot  surely  be  expected,  that  so  far-fetched,  so  in- 
direct and  wonderful  an  account  of  such  testimony,  as  that  of 
enthusiasm  must  be ;  an  account  so  strange,  that  the  generality 
of  mankind  can  scarce  be  made  to  understand  what  is  meant  by 
it;  it  cannot,  I  say,  be  expected  that  such  an  account  will  be 
admitted  of  such  evidence;  when  there  is  this  direct,  easy,  and 
obvious  account  of  it,  that  people  really  saw  and  heard  a  thing 
not  incredible,  which  they  affirm,  sincerely  and  with  full  as- 
surance, they  did  see  and  bear. 

Granting  then  that  enthusiasm  is  not  (strictly  speaking)  an 
absurd,  but  a  possible  account  of  such  testimony,  it  is  manifest, 
that  the  very  mention  of  it  goes  upon  the  previous  supposition, 
that  the  things  so  attested  are  incredible  :  and  therefore  need  not 
be  considered,  till  they  are  shown  to  be  so.  Much  less  need  it 
be  considered,  after  the  contrary  has  been  proved.  And  I  think 
it  has  been  proved,  to  full  satisfaction,  that  there  is  no  incredi- 
bility in  a  revelation,  in  general;  or  in  such  a  one  as  the  Chris- 
tian, in  particular.  However,  as  religion  is  supposed  peculiarly 
liable  to  enthusiam,  it  may  just  be  observed,  that  prejudiceii 


272  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  part  il 

almost  without  number,  and  without  name,  such  as  romance, 
affection,  humor,  a  desire  to  engage  attention,  or  to  surprise, 
party  spirit,  custom,  little  competitions,  unaccountable  likings 
and  dislikings;  these  influence  men  strongly  in  common  matters. 
And  as  these  prejudices  are  often  scarce  known  or  reflected  upon 
by  the  persons  themselves  who  are  influenced  by  them,  they  are 
to  be  considered  as  influences  of  a  like  kind  to  enthusiasm.  Yet 
human  testimony,  in  common  matters,  is  naturally  and  justly 
believed,  notwithstanding. 

It  is  intimated  further,  in  a  more  refined  way  of  observation, 
that  though  it  should  be  proved,  that  the  apostles  and  first  Chris- 
tians could  not,  in  some  respects,  be  deceived  themselves,  and 
in  other  respects,  cannot  be  thought  to  have  intended  to  impose 
upon  the  world,  yet  it  will  not  follow  that  their  general  testi- 
mony is  to  be  believed,  though  truly  handed  down  to  us  :  because 
they  might  still  in  part,  i.e.  in  other  respects,  be  deceived  them- 
selves, and  in  part  also  designedly  impose  upon  others;  which, 
it  is  added,  is  a  thing  very  credible,  from  that  mixture  of  real 
enthusiasm,  and  real  knavery,  'to  be  met  with  in  the  same 
characters/ 

I  must  confess,  I  think  the  matter  of  fact  contained  in  this 
<)bservation  upon  mankind  is  not  to  be  denied ;  and  that  some- 
thing very  much  akin  to  it  is  often  supposed  in  Scripture  as  a 
very  common  case,  and  most  severely  reproved.  But  it  were  to 
have  been  expected,  that  persons  capable  of  applying  this  obser- 
vation as  applied  in  the  objection,  might  also  frequently  have 
met  with  the  like  mixed  character,  in  instances  where  religion 
was  quite  out  of  the  case.  The  thing  plainly  is,  that  mankind 
are  naturally  endued  with  reason,  or  a  capacity  of  distinguishing 
between  truth  and  falsehood ;  and  as  naturally  they  are  endued 
with  veracity,  or  a  regard  to  truth  in  what  they  say:  but  from 
many  occasions  they  are  liable  to  be  prejudiced  and  biassed  and 
deceived  themselves,  and  capable  of  intending  to  deceive  others, 
in  every  degree  :  insomuch  that,  as  we  are  all  liable  to  be  de- 
ceived by  prejudice,  so  likewise  it  seems  to  be  not  an  uncommon 
thing,  for  persons  who,  from  their  regard  to  truth,  would  not 
invent  a  lie  entirely  without  any  foundation  at  all,  to  propagate 
it  with  heightening  circumstances,  after  it  is  once  invented  and 
'  [Compare  Butler's  Sermons;  on  Balaam,  and  on  Self-d<»;(?Jt.] 


CHAP.  VII.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  27S 

set  a-going.  And  others,  tliougli  they  would  notjjrojpar/afe  a  lie, 
yet,  which  is  a  lower  degree  of  falsehood,  will  let  it  pass  without 
contradiction.  But  notwithstanding  all  this,  human  testimony 
remains  still  a  natural  ground  of  assent;  and  this  assent  a 
natural  principle  of  action. 

It  is  objected  further,  that  however  it  has  happened,  the  fa<:,t 
is,  that  mankind  have,  in  different  ages,  been  strangely  deluded 
with  pretences  to  miracles  and  wonders.  But  it  is  by  no  means 
to  be  admitted,  that  they  have  been  oftener,  or  are  at  all  more 
liable  to  be  deceived  by  these  than  by  other  pretences. 

It  is  added,  that  there  is  a  very  considerable  degree  of  his- 
torical evidence  for  miracles,  which  are,  on  all  hands,  acknow- 
ledged to  be  fabulous.  But  suppose  there  were  even  the  like 
historical  evidence  for  these,  to  what  there  is  for  those  alleged  in 
proof  of  Christianity,  which  yet  is  in  no  wise  allowed,  but  sup- 
pose this ;  the  consequence  would  not  be,  that  the  evidence  of 
the  latter  is  not  to  be  admitted.  Nor  is  there  a  man  in  the 
world,  who  in  common  cases,  would  conclude  thus.  For  what 
would  such  a  conclusion  really  amount  to  but  this,  that  evidence, 
confuted  by  contrary  evidence,  or  any  way  overbalanced,  destroys 
the  credibility  of  other  evidence,  neither  confuted  nor  over- 
balanced ?  To  argue  that  because  there  is,  if  there  were,  like 
evidenoe  from  testimony,  for  miracles  acknowledged  false,  as  for 
those  in  attestation  of  Christianity,  therefore  the  evidence  in  the 
latter  case  is  not  to  be  credited ;  this  is  the  same  as  to  argue,  that 
if  two  men  of  equally  good  reputation  had  given  evidence  in 
different  cases  no  way  connected,  and  one  of  them  had  been 
convicted  of  perjury,  this  confuted  the  testimony  of  the  other ! 

Upon  the  whole  then,  the  general  observation,  that  human 
creatures  are  so  liable  to  be  deceived,  from  enthusiasm  in  reli- 
gion, and  principles  equivalent  to  enthusiasm  in  common  matters, 
and  in  both  from  negligence ;  and  that  they  are  so  capable  of 
dishonestly  endeavoring  to  deceive  others;  this  does  indeed 
weaken  the  evidence  of  testimony  in  all  cases,  but  does  not 
destroy  it  in  any.  And  these  things  will  appear,  to  different 
men,  to  weaken  the  evidence  of  testimony,  in  different  degrees : 
in  degrees  proportionable  to  the  observations  they  have  made,  or 
the  notions  they  have  any  way  taken  up,  concerning  the  weak- 
ness and  negligence  and  dishonesty  of  mankind ;  or  concerning 


274.  THE  PARTICULAR  EYIDEXCE  part  ii. 

the  powers  of  entliusiasm,  and  prejudices  equivalent  to  it.  But 
it  seems  to  me,  that  people  do  not  know  what  they  say,  who  affirm 
these  things  to  destroy  the  evidence  from  testimony  which  we 
have,  of  the  truth  of  Christianity.  Nothing  can  destroy  the 
evidence  of  testimony  in  any  case,  but  a  proof  or  probability, 
that  persons  are  not  competent  judges  of  the  facts  to  which  they 
give  testimony;  or  that  they  are  actually  under  some  indirect 
influence  in  giving  it,  in  such  particular  case.  Till  this  be  made 
out,  the  natural  laws  of  human  actions  require,  that  testimony 
be  admitted.  It  can  never  be  sufficient  to  overthrow  direct 
historical  evidence,  indolently  to  say,  that  there  are  so  many  prin- 
ciples, from  whence  men  are  liable  to  be  deceived  themselves, 
and  disposed  to  deceive  others,  especially  in  matters  of  religion, 
that  one  knows  not  what  to  believe.  And  it  is  surprising  per- 
sons can  help  reflecting,  that  this  very  manner  of  speaking  sup- 
poses they  are  not  satisfied  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  evidence, 
of  which  they  speak  thus ;  or  that  they  can  avoid  observing,  if 
they  do  make  this  reflection,  that  it  is  on  such  a  subject,  a  very 
material  one.* 

Over  against  all  these  objections  is  to  be  set  the  importance  of 
Christianity,  as  what  must  have  engaged  the  attention  of  its  first 
converts,  so  as  to  have  rendered  them  less  liable  to  be  deceived 
from  carelessness,  than  they  would  in  common  matters ;  and  like- 
wise the  strong  ohllgations  to  veracity^  which  their  religion  laid 
them  under  :  so  that  the  first  and  most  obvious  presumption  is, 
that  they  could  not  be  deceived  themselves  nor  deceive  others. 
And  this  presumption,  in  this  degree,  is  peculiar  to  the  testimony 
we  have  been  considering. 

In  argument,  assertions  are  nothing  in  themselves,  and  have 
an  air  of  positiveness  which  sometimes  is  not  very  easy :  yet  they 
are  necessary,  and  necessary  to  be  repeated ;  in  order  to  connect 
a  discourse,  and  distinctly  to  lay  before  the  view  of  the  reader, 
what  is  proposed  to  be  proved,  and  what  is  left  as  proved.  Now 
the  conclusion  from  the  foregoing  observations  is,  I  think,  beyond 
all  doubt,  this :  that  unbelievers  must  be  forced  to  admit  the  ex- 
ternal evidence  for  Christianity,  i.e.  the  proof  of  miracles  wrought 
to  attest  it,  to  be  of  real  weight  and  very  considerable ;  thouo-h 
they  cannot  allow  it  to  be  sufficient,  to  convince  thofa  of  the 
*  See  the  foregoing  chapter. 


CHAP.  vrr.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  275 

reality  of  those  miracles.  And  as  tliey  must,  in  all  reason,  admit 
this;  so  it  seems  to  me,  that  upon  consideration  they  would,  in 
fact,  admit  it;  those  of  them,  I  mean,  who  know  any  thing  at 
all  of  the  matter;  in  like  manner  as  persons,  in  many  cases,  own 
they  see  strong  evidence  from  testimony,  for  the  truth  of  things, 
which  yet  they  cannot  be  convinced  are  true  :  cases,  suppose, 
where  there  is  contrary  testimony;  or  things  which  they  think, 
whether  with  or  without  reason,  to  be  incredible.  But  there  is 
no  testimony  contrary  to  that  which  we  have  been  considerino- : 
and  it  has  been  fully  proved,  that  there  is  no  incredibility  in 
Christianity  in  general,  or  in  any  part  of  it. 

II.  As  to  the  evidence  for  Christianity  from  prophecy,  I  shall 
only  make  some  few  general  observations,  which  are  suggested 
by  the  analogy  of  nature;  i.e.  by  the  acknowledged  natural  rules 
of  judging  in  common  matters,  concerning  evidence  of  a  like 
kind  to  this  from  prophecy. 

1.  The  obscurity  or  unintelligibleness  of  one  part  of  a  prophecy 
does  not,  in  any  degree,  invalidate  the  proof  of  foresight,  arising 
from  the  appearing  completion  of  those  other  parts,  whicb  are 
understood.  For  the  case  is  evidently  the  same,  as  if  those  parts 
which  are  not  understood  were  lost,  or  not  written  at  all,  or 
written  in  an  unknown  tongue.  Whether  this  observation  be 
commonly  attended  to  or  not,  it  is  so  evident,  that  one  can  scarce 
bring  oneself  to  set  down  an  instance  in  common  matters,  to 
exemplify  it.  However,  suppose  a  writing,  partly  in  cipher,  and 
partly  in  plain  words  at  length;  and  that  in  the  part  one  under- 
stood, there  appeared  mention  of  several  known  facts ;  it  would 
never  come  into  any  man's  thoughts  to  imagine,  that  if  he  under- 
stood the  whole,  perhaps  he  might  find,  that  those  facts  were  not 
in  reality  known  by  the  writer.  Indeed,  both  in  this  example 
and  in  the  thing  intended  to  be  exemplified  by  it,  our  not  under- 
standing the  whole  (the  whole,  suppose,  of  a  sentence  or  a  para- 
graph) might  sometimes  occasion  a  doubt,  whether  one  understood 
the  literal  meaning  of  such  a  part :  but  this  comes  under  another 
consideration. 

For  the  same  reason,  thougb  a  man  should  be  incapable,  for 
want  of  learning,  or  opportunities  of  inquiry,  or  from  not  having 
turned  his  studies  this  way,  even  so  much  as  to  judge  whether 
particular  prophecies  have  been  throughout  completely  fulfilled; 


I>76  THE  PAETICULAR  EVIDENCE  part  ii. 

yet  lie  may  se^,  m  general,  that  they  have  been  fulfilled  to  such 
a  degree,  as,  upon  very  good  ground,  to  be  convinced  of  foresight 
more  than  human  in  such  prophecies,  and  of  such  events  being 
intended  by  them.  For  the  same  reason  also,  though,  by  means 
of  the  deficiencies  in  civil  history,  and  the  difierent  accounts  of 
historians,  the  most  learned  should  not  be  able  to  make  out  to 
satisfaction,  that  such  parts  of  the  prophetic  history  have  been 
minutely  and  throughout  fulfilled;  yet  a  very  strong  'proof  of 
foresight  may  arise,  from  that  general  completion  of  them,  which 
is  made  out.  As  much  perhaps,  as  the  giver  of  prophecy  in- 
tended should  ever  be  afibrded  by  such  parts  of  prophecy. 

2.  A  long  series  of  prophecy  being  applicable  to  such  and  such 
events,  is  itself  a  proof  that  it  was  intended  of  them :  as  the  rules 
by  which  we  naturally  judge  and  determine,  in  common  cases 
parallel  to  this,  will  show.^  This  observation  I  make  in  answer 
to  the  common  objection  against  the  application  of  the  prophe- 
cies, that,  considering  each  of  them  distinctly  by  itself,  it  does 
not  at  all  appear,  that  they  were  intended  of  those  particular 
events  to  which  they  are  applied  by  Christians;  and  therefore  it 
is  to  be  supposed,  that  if  they  meant  any  thing,  they  were  in- 
tended of  other  events  unknown  to  us^  and  not  of  these  at  all. 

Now  there  are  two  kinds  of  writing,  which  bear  a  great  re- 
semblance to  prophecy,  with  respect  to  the  matter  before  us :  the 
mythological,  and  the  satirical,  where  the  satire  is  to  a  certain 
degree  concealed.  And  a  man  might  be  assured,  that  he  under- 
stood what  an  author  intended  by  a  fable  or  parable  related  with- 
out any  application  or  moral,  merely  from  seeing  it  to  be  easily 
capable  of  such  application,  and  that  such  a  moral  might  natu- 
rally be  deduced  from  it.  And  he  might  be  fully  assured,  that 
such  persons  and  events  were  intended  in  a  satirical  writing, 
merely  from  its  being  applicable  to  them.  And,  agreeable  to  the 
last  observation,  he  might  be  in  a  good  measure  satisfied  of  it, 

s  [""Whenever  a  general  scheme  is  known  to  be  pursued  by  a  writer,  that 
Bcheme  becomes  the  true  key  in  the  hands  of  his  reader,  for  unlocking  the 
meaninj^  of  particular  parts,  which  would  otherwise  not  be  seen  clearly  to  refer 
to  such  scheme.  The  inspired  writers  had  one  common  and  predominant 
Bcheme  in  view,  which  was  to  hear  testimony  to  Jesus.  Whatever  passages 
occur  in  their  writings,  which  bear  an  apt  and  easy  resemblance  to  the  hi?tory 
of  Jesus,  may,  or  rather  must  in  all  reasonable  construction,  be  applied  to 
him." — HuRD  on  the  Proph.,  p.  117.] 


CHAP.  VII.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  27? 

though  he  were  not  enough  informed  in  affairs,  or  in  the  storj 
of  such  persons  to  understand  half  the  satire.  For,  his  satisfac- 
tion that  he  understood  the  meaning,  the  intended  meaning,  of 
these  writings,  would  be  greater  or  less  in  proportion  as  he  saw 
the  general  turn  of  them  to  be  capable  of  such  application;  and 
in  proportion  to  the  number  of  particular  things  capable  of  it. 
And  thus,  if  a  long  series  of  prophecy  is  applicable  to  the  present 
state  of  the  church,  and  to  the  political  situations  of  the  king- 
doms of  the  world,  some  thousand  years  after  these  prophecies 
were  delivered ;  and  a  long  series  of  prophecy  delivered  before 
the  coming  of  Christ  is  applicable  to  him;  these  things  are  in 
themselves  a  proof,  that  the  prophetic  history  was  intended  of 
him,  and  of  those  events :  in  proportion  as  the  general  turn  of  it 
ts  capable  of  such  application,  and  to  the  number  and  variety  of 
particular  prophecies  capable  of  it.  And  though,  in  all  just  way 
of  consideration,  the  obvious  completion  of  prophecies  is  to  be 
allowed  to  be  thus  explanatory  of,  and  to  determine,  their  mean- 
ing; yet  it  is  to  be  remembered  further,  that  the  ancient  Jews 
applied  the  prophecies  to  a  Messiah  before  his  coming,*"  in  much 
the  same  manner  as  Christians  do  now :  and  that  the  primitive 
Christians  interpreted  the  prophecies  respecting  the  state  of  the 
church  and  of  the  world  in  the  last  ages,  in  the  sense  which  the 
event  seems  to  confirm  and  verify.  From  these  things  it  may  be 
made  appear : 

3.  That  the  showing  even  to  a  high  probability,  if  that  could 
be,  that  the  prophets  thought  of  some  other  events,  in  such  and 
such  predictions,  and  not  those  which  Christians  allege  to  be 
completions  of  those  predictions;  or  that  such  and  such  prophe- 
cies are  capable  of  being  applied  to  other  events  than  those,  to 
which  Christians  apply  them — that  this  would  not  confute  or 
destroy  the  force  of  the  argument  from  prophecy,  even  with  re- 
gard to  those  very  instances.  For,  observe  how  this  matter  really 
is.  If  one  knew  such  a  person  to  be  the  sole  author  of  such  a 
book,  and  was  certainly  assured,  or  satisfied  to  any  degree,  that 
one  knew  the  whole  of  what  he  intended  in  it;  one  should  be 
assured  or  satisfied  to   such  degree,  that  one  knew  the  whole 

*'  [Consult  on  this  point,  Gulick,  Tlieologia  Prophetica:  Vitringa,  Observa- 
tiones  :  Hengstenburg,  Christologia:  Horsley's  Tracts  and  Sermons:  King's 
Morsels  c*"  Criticism  :  Waugh's  Dissertations  :  Lyall's  Propcedia  Piophetica.] 

24 


278  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  part  n. 

meaning  of  that  book :  for  the  meaning  of  a  book  is  nothing  but 
the  meaning  of  the  author.  But  if  one  knew  a  person  to  have 
compiled  a  book  out  of  memoirs,  which  he  received  from  another, 
of  vastly  superior  knowledge  in  the  subject  of  it,  especially  if  it 
were  a  book  full  of  great  intricacies  and  dijficulties;  it  would  in 
no  wise  follow,  that  one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of  the  book, 
from  knowing  the  whole  meaning  of  the  compiler :  for  the  original 
author  of  them,  might  have,  and  there  would  be  no  presumption, 
in  many  cases,  against  supposing  him  to  have,  some  further 
meaning  than  the  compiler  saw.  To  say  then  that  the  Scrip- 
tures, and  the  things  contained  in  them,  can  have  no  other  oi 
further  meaning  than  those  persons  had,  who  first  recited  or 
wrote  them,  is  evidently  saying,  that  those  persons  were  the 
original,  proper,  and  sole  authors  of  those  books,  i.e.  that  they 
are  not  inspired :  which  is  absurd,  while  the  authority  of  these 
books  is  under  examination;  i.e.  till  you  have  determined  they 
are  of  no  divine  authority  at  all.  Till  this  be  determined,  it 
must  in  all  reason  be  supposed,  not  indeed  that  they  have,  (for 
this  is  taking  for  granted  that  they  are  inspired;)  but  that  they 
may  have,  some  further  meaning  than  what  the  compilers  saw  or 
understood.  And,  upon  this  supposition,  it  is  supposable  also, 
that  this  further  meaning  may  be  fulfilled. 

Events  corresponding  to  prophecies,  interpreted  in  a  difierent 
meaning  from  that,  in  which  the  prophets  are  supposed  to  have 
understood  them;  afi'ords  in  a  manner,  the  same  proof,  that  this 
difierent  sense  was  originally  intended,  as  it  would  have  aff"orded, 
if  the  prophets  had  not  understood  their  predictions  in  the  sense 
-it  is  supposed  they  did :  because  there  is  no  presumption  of  their 
sense  of  them  being  the  whole  sense  of  them.  And  it  has  been 
already  shown,  that  the  apparent  completions  of  prophecy  must 
be  allowed  to  be  explanatory  of  its  meaning.  So  that  the  ques- 
tion is,  whether  a  series  of  prophecy  has  been  fulfilled,  in  a 
natural  or  proper,  i.e.  in  any  real  sense  of  the  words  of  it.  For 
such  completion  is  equally  a  proof  of  foresight  more  than  human, 
whether  the  prophets  are,  or  are  not,  supposed  to  have  under- 
stood it  in  a  difi'erent  sense.  I  say,  supposed:  for,  though  1 
think  it  clear,  that  the  prophets  did  not  understand  the  full 
meaning  of  their  predictions,  it  is  another  question,  how  far  they 
thought  they  did;  and  in  what  sense  they  understood  them 


CHAP.  VII.  FOR  CHRISTIAXITY.  279 

Hence  may  be  seen,  to  how  little  purpose  those  persons  busy 
themselves,  who  endeavor  to  prove,  that  the  prophetic  history  js 
applicable  to  events  of  the  age  in  which  it  was  written,  or  of  ages 
before  j.t.  To  have  proved  this,  before  there  was  any  appearance 
of  a  further  completion  of  it,  might  have  answered  some  purpose; 
for  it  might  have  prevented  the  expectation  of  any  such  further 
completion.  Thus  could  Porphyry  have  shown,  that  some  prin- 
cipal parts  of  the  book  of  Daniel,  for  instance  the  seventh  verse 
of  the  seventh  chapter,  which  the  Christians  interpreted  of  the 
latter  ages,  was  applicable  to  events,  which  happened  before  or 
about  the  age  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes;  this  might  have  prevented 
them  from  expecting  any  further  completion  of  it.  And,  unless 
there  was  then,  as  I  think  there  must  have  been,  external  evi- 
dence concerning  that  book,  more  than  is  come  down  to  us;  such 
a  discovery  might  have  been  a  stumbling-block  in  the  way  of 
Christianity  itself:  considering  the  authority  which  our  Savior 
has  given  to  the  book  of  Daniel,  and  how  much  the  general 
scheme  of  Christianity  presupposes  the  truth  of  it.  But  even 
this  discovery,  had  there  been  any  such,'''  would  be  of  very  little 
weight  with  reasonable  men  now;  if  this  passage,  thus  applicable 
to  events  before  the  age  of  Porphyry,  appears  to  be  applicable 
also  to  events,  which  succeeded  the  dissolution  of  the  Roman 
empire.  I  mention  this,  not  at  all  as  intending  to  insinuate,  that 
the  division  of  this  empire  into  ten  parts,  for  it  plainly  was 
divided  into  about  that  number,  were,  alone  and  by  itself,  of  any 
moment  in  verifying  the  prophetic  history :  but  only  as  an  ex- 
ample of  the  thing  I  am  speaking  of.  Thus  upon  the  whole,  the 
matter  of  inquiry  evidently  must  be,  as  above  put,  Whether  the 
prophecies  are  applicable  to  Christ,  and  to  the  present  state  of 
the  world,  and  of  the  church;  applicable  in  such  a  degree,  as  to 
imply  foresight :  not  whether  they  are  capable  of  any  other  appli- 

*  It  appears  that  Porphyry  did  nothing  -worth  mentioning  in  this  way.  For 
Jerome  on  the  place  says  :  Duas  ]posteriores  bestias — in  imo  Macedonum  regno 
ponit.  And  as  to  the  ten  kings;  Decern  reges  ennmerat,  qui  fuernnt  scevissimi  : 
ipsosque  regea  non  unius  ponit  regni,  verhi  gratia,  Mucedoniai,  Syrian,  Asiix,  et 
/Egypti ;  sed  de  diversis  rfgnis  unura  efficit  regum  ordiiiem.  ["The  two  latter 
ieasts  he  places  in  one  of  the  Macedonian  kingdoms."  "  He  reckons  up  ten  kings 
who  hud  been  excessively  cruel  and  these  not  kings  of  one  country,  as  Mace- 
donia,  for  instance,  or  Syria,  or  Asia,  or  Egypt;  but  makes  up  his  set  of  kinga 
out  of  different  kingdoms."]  In  this  way  of  interpretation,  any  thing  may  b« 
made  of  -any  thing. 


280  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  part  n. 

cation.  Though  I  know  no  pretence  for  saying  the  general  turn 
of  them  is  capable  of  any  other. 

These  observations  are,  I  think,  just,  and  the  evidence  referred 
to  in  them  real :  though  there  may  be  people  who  will  not  accept 
of  such  imperfect  information  from  Scripture.  Some  tjo  have 
iiot  integrity  and  regard  enough  to  truth,  to  attend  to  evidence, 
which  keeps  the  mind  in  doubt,  perhaps  perplexity,  and  which 
is  much  of  a  different  sort  from  what  they  expected.  It  plainly 
requires  a  degree  of  modesty  and  fairness,  beyond  what  every 
one  has,  for  a  man  to  say,  not  to  the  world  but  to  himself,  that 
there  is  a  real  appearance  of  great  weight  in  this  matter,  though 
he  is  not  able  thoroughly  to  satisfy  himself  about  it;  but  that  it 
shall  have  its  influence  upon  him,  in  proportion  to  its  apparent 
reality  and  weight.  It  is  much  more  easy,  and  more  falls  in  with 
the  negligence,  presumption,  and  wilfulness  of  the  generality,  to 
determine  at  once,  with  a  decisive  air,  There  is  nothing  in  it. 
The  prejudices  arising  from  that  absolute  contempt  and  scorn, 
with  which  this  evidence  is  treated  in  the  world,  I  do  not  men- 
tion. For  what  can  be  said  to  persons,  who  are  weak  enough  in 
their  understandings  to  think  this  any  presumption  against  it; 
or,  if  they  do  not,  are  yet  weak  enough  in  their  temper  to  be  in- 
fluenced by  such  prejudices,  upon  such  a  subject  i' 

JSecondlj/,  I  shall  endeavor  to  give  some  account  of  the  general 
argument  for  the  truth  of  Christianity,  consisting  both  of  the 
direct  and  circumstantial  evidence  considered  as  making  up  one 
argument.  To  state  and  examine  this  argument  fully,  would  be 
a  work  much  beyond  the  compass  of  this  whole  treatise;  nor  is  so 
much  as  a  proper  abridgment  of  it  to  be  expected  here.  Yet  the 
present  subject  requires  to  have  some  brief  account  of  it  given. 
For  it  is  the  kind  of  evidence,  upon  which  most  questions  of  diffi- 
culty, in  common  practice,  are  determined  :  evidence  arising  from 
various  coincidences,  which  support  and  confirm  each  other,  and 
in  this  manner  prove,  with  more  or  less  certainty,  the  point  under 
consideration.  I  choose  to  do  it  also:  First,  because  it  seems  to 
be  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  not  duly  attended  to  by  every 
one,  that  the  proof  of  revelation  is  not  some  direct  and  express 
things  only,  but  a  great  variety  of  circumstantial  things  also; 
and  that  though  each  of  these  direct  and  circumstantial  things  is 
indeed  to  be  considered  separately,  yet  they  are  afterwards  to  be 


CHAP.  vn.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  281 

joined  together;  for  that  the  proper  force  of  the  c/idence  con- 
sists in  the  result  of  those  several  things,  consider-sd  in  their 
respects  to  each  other,  and  united  into  one  view.  Ii  the  next 
place,  because  it  seems  to  me,  that  the  matters  of  fact  here  set 
down,  which  are  acknowledged  by  unbelievers,  must  b-^  acknow- 
ledged by  them  also  to  contain  together  a  degree  of  evidence  of 
great  weight,  if  they  could  be  brought  to  lay  these  several  things 
before  themselves  distinctly,  and  then  with  attention  consider 
them  together;  instead  of  that  cursory  thought  of  them,  to  which 
we  are  familiarized.  For  being  familiarized  to  the  cursory  thought 
of  things  as  really  hinders  the  weight  of  them  from  beino-  seen, 
as  from  having  its  due  influence  upon  practice. 

The  thing  asserted,  and  the  truth  of  which  is  to  be  inquired 
into,  is  this:  That  over  and  above  our  reason  and  affections, 
which  God  has  given  us  for  the  information  of  our  judgment  and 
the  conduct  of  our  lives,  he  has  also,  by  external  revelation,  given 
us  an  account  of  himself  and  his  moral  government  over  the  world, 
implying  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments;  i.e.  hath 
revealed  the  system  of  natural  religion :  (for  natural  religion  may 
be  externally*  revealed  by  God,  as  the  ignorant  may  be  taught  it 
by  their  fellow-creatures) — that  God,  I  say,  has  given  us  the  evi- 
dence of  revelation,  as  well  as  the  evidence  of  reason,  to  ascertain 
this  moral  system;  together  with  an  account  of  a  particular  dis- 
pensation of  Providence,  which  reason  could  no  way  have  dis- 
covered, and  a  particular  institution  of  religion  founded  on  it,  for 
the  recovery  of  mankind  out  of  their  present  wretched  condition, 
and  raising  them  to  the  perfection  and  final  happiness  of  their 
nature. 

This  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  may  be  considered 
as  wholly  historical.  For  prophecy  is  nothing  but  the  history  of 
events  before  they  come  to  pass;  doctrines  also  are  matters  of 
fact;  and  precepts  come  under  the  same  notion.  The  general 
design  of  Scripture,  which  contains  in  it  this  revelation,  thus 
considered  as  historical,  may  be  said  to  be,  to  give  us  an  account 
of  the  world  in  this  one  single  view,  as  God's  world:  by  which 
it  appears  essentially  distinguished  from  all  other  books,  so  far  as 
i  have  found,  except  such  as  are  copied  from  it.  It  begins  with 
an  account  of  G-)d's  creation  of  the  world,  in  order  to  ascertain, 

*  P.  1S9,  (fee. 
24* 


282  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  part  n. 

and  distmginsli  from  all  others,  who  is  the  object  of  our  worship, 
by  what  he  has  done :  in  order  to  ascertain,  who  he  is,  concerning 
whose  providence,  commands,  promises,  and  threatenings,  this 
sacred  book,  all  along,  treats;  [viz.]  the  Maker  and  Proprietor 
of  the  world,  he  whose  creatures  we  are,  the  God  of  nature:  in 
order  likewise  to  distinguish  him  from  the  idols  of  the  nations, 
which  are  either  imaginary  beings,  i.e.  no  beings  at  all;  or  else 
part  of  that  creation,  the  historical  relation  of  which  is  here  given. 
And  John,  not  improbably  with  an  eye  to  this  Mosaic  account 
of  the  creation,  begins  his  Gospel  with  an  account  of  our  Savior's 
pre-existence,  and  that  all  things  were  tnade  by  him;  and  with- 
out him  was  not  any  thing  made  that  was  made:*  agreeably  to 
the  doctrine  of  Paul,  that  God  created  all  things  by  Jesus  Christ.'\ 
This  being  premised,  the  Scripture,  taken  together,  seems  to  pro- 
fess to  contain  a  kind  of  an  abridgment  of  the  history  of  the 
world,  in  the  view  just  now  mentioned:  that  is,  a  general  account 
of  the  condition  of  religion  and  its  professors,  during  the  continu- 
ance of  that  apostasy  from  God,  and  state  of  wickedness,  which 
it  everywhere  supposes  the  world  to  lie  in.  And  this  account 
of  the  state  of  religion  carries  with  it  some  brief  account  of  the 
political  state  of  things,  as  religion  is  aflPected  by  it.  Revelation 
indeed  considers  the  common  affiiirs  of  this  world,  and  what  is 
going  on  in  it,  as  a  mere  scene  of  distraction ;  and  cannot  be  sup- 
posed to  concern  itself  with  foretelling  at  what  time  Rome,  or 
Babylon,  or  Greece,  or  any  particular  place,  should  be  the  most 
conspicuous  seat  of  that  tyranny  and  dissoluteness,  which  all 
places  equally  aspire  to  be;  cannot,  I  say,  be  supposed  to  give 
any  account  of  this  wild  scene  for  its  own  sake.  But  it  seems  to 
contain  some  very  general  account  of  the  chief  governments  of 
the  world,  as  the  general  state  of  religion  has  been,  is,  or  shall 
be,  affected  by  them,  from  the  first  transgression,  and  during  the 
whole  interval  of  the  world's  continuing  in  its  present  state,  to  a 
certain  future  period,  spoken  of  both  in  the  Old  and  ^ew  Testa- 
ment, very  distinctly,  and  in  great  variety  of  expression :  The 
times  of  the  restitution  of  all  things  :\  when  the  mystery  of  God 
shall  be  finished,  as  he  hath  declared  to  his  servants  the  2)rophets  :^ 
when  the  God  of  heaven  shcdl  set  up  a  kingdom,  which  shall 
•never  be  destroyed :  and  the  kingdom,  shall  not  be  left  to  otlier 
*  John  i.  3.  t  Eph.  iii.  9.  J  Acts  iii.  21.  ^  Rev.  x  7. 


CHAP.  vn.  FOR  CnRISTIANITY.  283 

people,'^  as  it  is  represented  to  be  during  this  apostasy,  but  judg- 
ment shall  he  given  to  the  saints{\  and  they  shall  reign  .-^  ann  the 
hingdom  and  dominion,  and  the  greatness  of  the  kingdom  under 
the  'wliole  heaven,  shall  he  given  to  the  people  of  the  saints  of  the 
3IostHigh.% 

Upon  this  general  view  of  the  Scripture,  I  would  remark,  how 
great  a  length  of  time  the  whole  relation  takes  up,  near  six  thou- 
sand years  of  which  are  past;  and  how  great  a  variety  of  things 
it  treats  of;  the  natural  and  moral  system  or  history  of  the  world, 
including  the  time  when  it  was  formed,  all  contained  in  the  very 
first  book,  and  evidently  written  in  a  rude  and  unlearned  age; 
and  in  subsequent  books,  the  various  common  and  projjhetic  his- 
tory, and  the  particular  dispensation  of  Christianity.  Now  all 
this  together  gives  the  largest  scope  for  criticism;  and  for  the 
confutation  of  what  is  capable  of  being  confuted,  either  from 
reason,  or  from  common  history,  or  from  any  inconsistence  in  its 
several  parts.  And  it  deserves,  I  think,  to  be  mentioned,  that 
whereas  some  imagine  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  the  evidence 
for  revelation  implies  a  positive  argument  that  it  is  not  true;  it 
appears,  on  the  contrary,  to  imply  a  positive  argument  that  it  is 
true.  For,  could  any  common  relation  of  such  antiquity,  extent, 
and  variety  (for  in  these  things  the  stress  of  what  I  am  now  ob- 
serving lies)  be  proposed  to  the  examination  of  the  world :  that 
it  could  not,  in  an  age  of  knowledge  and  liberty,  be  confuted,  or 
shown  to  have  nothing  in  it,  to  the  satisfaction  of  reasonable 
men;  would  be  thought  a  strong  presumptive  proof  of  its  truth. 
Indeed  it  must  be  a  proof  of  it,  just  in  proportion  to  the  proba- 
bility, that  if  it  were  false,  it  might  be  shown  to  be  so:  which,  I 
think,  is  scarce  pretended  to  be  shown,  but  upon  principles  and 
in  ways  of  arguing,  which  have  been  clearly  obviated.  ||  Nor 
does  it  at  all  appear,  that  any  set  of  men,  who  believe  natural 
religion,  are  of  the  opinion,  that  Christianity  has  been  thus 
confuted.     But  to  proceed  : 

Together  with  the  moral  system  of  the  world,  the  Old  Testa- 
ment contains  a  chronological  account  of  the  beginning  of  it, 
■Jind  from  thence,  an  unbroken  genealogy  of  mankind  for  many 
ages  before,  common  history  begins;    and  carried  on  as  much 

*  Dan.  ii.  44.  f  ^^^'  v".  22.  J  Rev.  xi.  17,  IS;  xx.  6. 

I  Pan.  vii.  27.  H  Chap.  ii.  iii.  (fee. 


284  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  pakt  n. 

farther  as  to  make  up  a  continued  thread  of  history,  of  the 
length  of  between  three  and  four  thousand  years.  It  contains 
an  account  of  God's  making  a  covenant  with  a  particular  nation, 
that  they  should  be  his  people,  and  he  would  be  their  God,  in  a 
peculiar  sense ;  of  his  often  interposing  miraculously  in  their 
affairs ;  giving  them  the  promise,  and  long  after,  the  possession, 
of  a  particular  country;  assuring  them  of  the  greatest  national 
prosperity  in  it,  if  they  would  worship  him,  in  opposition  to  the 
idols  which  the  rest  of  the  world  worshipped,  and  obey  his  com- 
mands ;  and  threatening  them  with  unexampled  punishments  if 
they  disobeyed  him,  and  fell  into  the  general  idolatry  :  insomuch 
that  this  one  nation  should  continue  to  be  the  observation  and 
the  wonder  of  all  the  world.  It  declares  particularly,  that  God 
would  scatter  them  among  all  jyeo^le,  from  one  end  of  the  eai^th 
unto  the  other  ^  but  that  when  they  shoidd  return  unto  the  Lord 
their  God,  he  would  have  com2Dassion  upon  them,  and  gather 
them  from  all  the  nations,  whither  he  had  scattered  them:  that 
Israel  should  he  saved  in  the  Lord,  with  an  everlasting  salvation  ; 
and  not  he  ashamed  or  confounded  toorld  without  end*  And  as 
some  of  these  promises  are  conditional,  others  are  as  absolute  as 
any  thing  can  be  expressed :  that  the  time  should  come,  when 
the  people  shoidd  he  all  righteous,  and  inherit  the  land  forever  : 
that  though  God  would  make  a  full  end  of  all  nations  whither 
he  had  scattered  them,  yet  would  he  not  make  a  full  end  of 
them, :  that  he  would  hring  again  the  captivity  of  his  people 
Israel,  and  plant  them  upon  their  land,  and  they  should  he  no 
moi^e  pulled  up  out  of  their  land :  that  the  seed  of  Israel  shoidd 
not  cease  from  heing  a  nation  forever.^  It  foretells,  that  God 
would  raise  them  up  a  particular  person,  in  whom  all  his  promises 
should  finally  be  fulfilled;  the  Messiah,  who  should  be,  in  a  high 
and  eminent  sense,  their  anointed  Prince  and  Savior.  This  was 
foretold  in  such  a  manner,  as  raised  a  general  expectation  of  such 
9,  person  in  the  nation,  as  appears  from  the  New  Testament,  and 
is  an  acknowledged  fact ;  an  expectation  of  his  coming  at  such  a 
particular  time,  before  any  one  appeared  claiming  to  be  that  per- 
son, and  when  there  was  no  ground  for  such  an  expectation,  but 
from  the  prophecies  :  which  expectation,  therefore,  must  \\i  all 

*  Deut.  xxviii.  64;  xxx.  2,  3  :  Isa.  xlv.  17. 

t  Isa,  Ix.  21 :  Jer.  xxx.  11 ;  xlvi.  28:  Amos  ix.  14,  15  :  Jer.  xxxi.  3(^ 


CHAP.  VII.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  285 

reason  be  presumed  to  be  explanatory  of  those  prophecies,  if 
there  were  any  doubt  about  their  meaning.  It  seems  moreovei 
to  foretell,  that  this  person  should  be  rejected  by  the  nation  to 
whom  he  had  been  so  long  promised,  though  he  was  so  much 
desired  by  them.*  And  it  expressly  foretells,  that  he  should  be 
the  Savior  of  the  Gentiles;  and  that  the  completion  of  the 
scheme  contained  in  this  book,  and  then  begun,  and  in  its  pro- 
gress, should  be  something  so  great,  that  in  comparison  with  it, 
the  restoration  of  the  Jews  alone  would  be  but  of  small  account. 
It  is  a  light  thing  that  thou  shoiddest  he  my  servant  to  raise  up 
the  tribes  of  Jacob,  and  to  restore  the  preserved  of  Israel :  I  will 
also  give  thee  for  a  light  to  the  Gentiles,  that  thou  may  est  be  for 
salvation  unto  the  end  of  the  earth.  And,  In  the  last  days,  the 
mountain  of  the  Loj-d's  house  shall  he  established  in  the  top  of 
the  mountains,  and  shall  he  exalted  above  the  hills  ;  and  all  na- 
tions shall  flow  into  it — for  out  of  Zion  shall  go  forth  the  laio, 
and  the  word  of  the  Lord  from  Jerusalem.  And  he  shall  judge 
among  the  nations — and  the  Lord  alone  shall  be  exalted  in  that 
day,  and  the  idols  he  shall  utterly  abolish.f 

The  Scripture  further  contains  an  account,  that  at  the  time 
the  Messiah  was  expected,  a  person  rose  up  in  this  nation,  claim- 
ing to  be  that  Messiah,  to  be  the  person  to  whom  all  the  pro- 
phecies referred,  and  in  whom  they  should  center :  that  he  spent 
some  years  in  a  continued  course  of  miraculous  works ;  and 
endued  his  immediate  disciples  and  followers  with  a  power  of 
doing  the  same,  as  a  proof  of  the  truth  of  that  religion,  which 
he  commissioned  them  to  publish :  that  invested  with  this  au- 
thority and  power,  they  made  numerous  converts  in  the  remotest 
countries,  and  settled  and  established  his  religion  in  the  world  j 
to  the  end  of  which  the  Scripture  professes  to  give  a  prophetic 
account  of  the  state  of  this  religion  among  mankind.' 

Let  us  now  suppose  a  person  utterly  ignorant  of  history,  to  have 

»  Isa.  viii.  14,  15 ;  xlix.  5;  chap.  liii.  :  Mai.  i.  10,  11,  and  chap.  iii. 

f  Isa.  xlix.  6,  chap,  ii.,  chap,  xi.,  chap.  Ivi.  7:  Mai,  i.  11.  To  -n-hich  must 
be  added,  the  other  prophecies  of  the  like  kind,  several  in  the  New  Testament, 
and  very  many  in  the  Oldj  which  describe  what  shall  be  the  completion  of  the 
revealed  plan  of  Providence. 

*  [See  Davidson's  Disc,  on  PropL. :  Bi,aney  on  Daniel's  LXX.  Weeks  : 
Hurd's  In^rod.  to  the  Study  of  Proph. :  Jortin's  Ser.  at  Boyle  Lect. :  Ful- 
ler's Go.<p  its  own  Witness,  part  ii. :  WAroH's  Diss. :  Apthorpe's  Discoursee.l 


286  THE  PARTIC^'LAR  EVIDENCE  part  n. 

all  tliis  related  to  him  out  of  the  Scripture.  Or  suppose  such 
an  one,  hiiving  the  Scripture  put  into  his  hands,  to  remark  these 
things  in  it,  not  knowing  but  that  the  whole,  even  its  civil  his- 
tory, as  well  as  the  other  parts  of  it,  might  be,  from  beginning 
to  end,  an  entire  invention;  and  to  ask.  What  truth  was  in  it, 
and  whether  the  revelation  here  related  was  real,  or  a  fiction  ? 
Aod,  instead  of  a  direct  answer,  suppose  him,  all  at  once,  to  be 
told  the  following  confessed  facts;  and  then  to  unite  them  into 
one  view. 

Let  him  first  be  told,  in  how  great  a  degree  the  profession  and 
establishmenc  of  natural  religion,  the  belief  that  there  is  one 
God  to  be  worshipped,  that  virtue  is  his  law,  and  that  mankind 
shall  be  rewarded  and  punished  hereafter,  as  they  obey  and  dis- 
obey it  here ;  in  how  very  great  a  degree,  I  say,  the  profession 
and  establishment  of  this  moral  system  in  the  world  is  owing  to 
the  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  contained  in  this  book : 
the  establishment  of  this  moral  system,  even  in  those  countries 
which  do  not  acknowledge  the  proper  authority  of  the  Scripture.* 
Let  him  be  told  also,  what  number  of  nations  do  acknowledge  its 
proper  authority.  Let  him  then  take  in  the  consideration,  of 
what  importance  religion  is  to  mankind.  And  upon  these  things 
he  might,  I  think,  truly  observe,  that  this  supposed  revelation's 
obtaining  and  being  received  in  the  world,  with  all  the  circum- 
stances and  efiects  of  it,  considered  together  as  one  event,  is  the 
most  conspicuous  and  important  event  in  the  history  of  mankind: 
that  a  book  of  this  nature,  and  thus  promulged  and  recommended 
to  our  consideration,  demands,  as  if  by  a  voice  from  heaven,  to 
have  its  claims  most  seriously  examined ;  and  that,  before  such 
examination,  to  treat  it  with  any  kind  of  scoffing  and  ridicule,  is 
an  offence  against  natural  piety.  It  is  to  be  remembered,  that 
how  much  soever  the  establishment  of  natural  religion  in  the 
world  is  owing  to  the  Scripture  revelation,  this  does  not  destroy 
the  proof  of  religion  from  reason,  any  more  than  the  proof  of 
Euclid's  Elements  is  destroyed,  by  a  man's  knowing  or  thinking, 
that  he  shouM  never  have  seen  the  truth  of  the  several  proposi- 
tions contained  in  it,  nor  had  those  propositions  come  into  hi* 
thoughts,  but  for  that  mathematician. 

Let  such  a  person  as  we  are  speaking  of  be,  in  the  next  pliice, 
*  P.  250. 


CHAP.  yii.  FOE  CHRISTIANITY.  287 

informed  of  the  acknowledged  antiquity  of  the  first  parts  of  this 
book;  and  that  its  chronology,  its  account  of  the  time  when  the 
earth,  and  the  several  parts  of  it,  were  first  peopled  with  human 
creatures,  is  no  way  contradicted,  but  is  really  confirmed,  by  the 
natural  and  civil  history  of  the  world,  collected  from  common 
historians,  from  the  state  of  the  earth,  and  from  the  late  inven- 
tion of  arts  and  sciences. 

And  as  the  Scripture  contains  an  unbroken  thread  of  common 
and  civil  history,  from  the  creation  to  the  captivity,  for  between 
three  and  four  thousand  years ;  let  the  person  we  are  speaking 
of  be  told,  in  the  next  place,  that  this  general  history,  as  it  is 
not  contradicted,  but  confirmed  by  profane  history"  as  much  as 
there  would  be  reason  to  expect,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth ;  so 
there  is  nothing  in  the  whole  history  itself,  to  give  any  reasonable 
ground  of  suspicion  of  its  not  being,  in  the  general,  a  faithful 
and  literally  true  genealogy  of  men,  and  series  of  things.  I 
speak  here  only  of  the  common  Scripture  history,  or  of  the 
course  of  ordinary  events  related  in  it,  as  distinguished  from 
miracles,  and  from  the  prophetic  history.  In  all  the  Scripture 
narrations  of  this  kind,  following  events  arise  out  of  foregoing 
ones,  as  in  all  other  histories.  There  appears  nothing  related  as 
done  in  any  age,  not  conformable  to  the  manners  of  that  age : 
nothing  in  the  account  of  a  succeeding  age,  which  one  would 
say  could  not  be  true,  or  was  improbable,  from  the  account  of 
things  in  the  preceding  one.  There  is  nothing  in  the  characters, 
which  would  raise  a  thought  of  their  being  feigned ;  but  all  the 
internal  marks  imaginable  of  their  being  real.  It  is  to  be  added 
also,  that  mere  genealogies,  bare  narratives  of  the  number  of 

^  [Hundreds  of  instances  might  be  adduced,  in  which  profane  historians 
corroborate  the  statements  of  the  Scriptures.  The  following  are  merely  speci- 
mens:  DiODORtJS  SicuLus,  Strabo,  Tacitus,  Pliny,  and  Solinus,  speak  of 
the  destruction  of  Sodom  and  Gomorrah.  The  lives  of  David  and  Solomon  are 
given  in  the  remains  of  the  Ph(enician  Annals,  in  Damascenus,  and  Ei:po- 
LEMus.  Menander  describes  the  carrying  away  of  the  Ten  Tribes  by  Sal 
manasor.  Suetonius,  Tacitus,  Pliny  the  younger,  and  Numenius,  speak  of 
Jesus  Christ.  His  miracles  are  owned  by  Celsus,  Porphyry,  Julian,  and 
Jewish  writers  opposed  to  Christianity.  Suetonius,  Tacitus,  Pliny,  Julian, 
and  ol-hers  describe  his  being  put  to  death ;  and  Tacitus  says  that  many  were 
put  to  death  for  adhering  to  his  religion.  Phlegon  mentions  the  miracles  of 
Peter;  and  Paul  is  enumerated  among  eminent  authors,  in  a  fragment  of 
LonGtnus.] 


288  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  part  n. 

years,  whicli  persons  called  by  sucli  and  sucli  names  lived,  do  not 
carry  the  face  of  fiction;  perhaps  do  carry*some  presumption  of 
veracity:  and  all  unadorned  narratives,  which  have  nothing  to 
surprise,  may  be  thought  to  carry  somewhat  of  the  like  presump- 
tion too.  And  the  domestic  and  the  political  history  is  plainly 
credible.  There  may  be  incidents  in  Scripture,  which,  taken 
alone  in  the  naked  way  they  are  told,  may  appear  strange;  espe- 
cially to  persons  of  other  manners,  temper,  education :  but  there 
are  also  incidents  of  undoubted  truth,  in  many  or  most  persons' 
lives,  which,  in  the  same  circumstances,  would  appear  to  the  full 
as  strange.^  There  may  be  mistakes  of  transcribers,  th^re  may 
be  other  real  or  seeming  mistakes,  not  easy  to  be  particularly  ac- 
counted for :  but  there  are  certainly  no  more  things  of  this  kind 
in  the  Scripture,  than  what  were  to  have  been  expected  in  books 
of  such  antiquity;  and  nothing,  in  any  wise,  sufficient  to  dis- 
credit the  general  narrative. 

Now,  that  a  history,  claiming  to  commence  from  the  creation, 
and  extending  in  one  continued  series,  through  so  great  a  length 
of  time,  and  variety  of  events,  should  have  such  appearances  of 
reality  and  truth  in  its  whole  contexture,  is  surely  a  very  remark- 
able circumstance  in  its  favor.  And  as  all  this  is  applicable  to 
the  common  history  of  the  New  Testament,  so  there  is  a  further 
credibility,  and  a  very  high  one,  given  to  it  by  profane  authors: 
many  of  these  writing  of  the  same  times,  and  confirming  the  truth 
of  customs  and  events,  which  are  incidentally  as  well  as  more 
purposely  mentioned  in  it.  And  this  credibility  of  the  common 
Scripture-history,  gives  some  credibility  to  its  miraculous  history : 

1  [This  thought  is  elaborated  with  skill  by  Whately  in  his  "  Historic  Doubts.'* 
He  takes  up  all  the  popular  infidel  objections  as  to  the  life  of  Christ,  and  applies 
them  with  undiminished  or  even  increased  force  against  the  evidences  that  such 
a  man  as  Buonaparte  ever  existed. 

Johnson  in  a  lively  sally  once  said — "  It  is  easy  to  be  on  the  negative  side. 
I  deny  that  Canada  is  taken.  The  French  are  a  much  more  numerous  people 
than  we;  and  it  is  not  likely  they  would  allow  us  to  take  it.'  *  But  the  Govern- 
ment have  announced  the  fact.'  'Very  true.  But  the  ministry  have  put  us  to 
an  enormous  expense  by  the  war  in  America,  and  it  is  their  interest  to  persuade 
us  that  we  have  got  something  for  our  money.'  '*  But  the  fact  is  confirmed  by 
thousands  who  were  at  the  taking  of  it.'  *  Aye,  but  these  men  have  an  interest 
in  deceiving  us :  they  don't  want  you  should  think  the  French  have  beat  them. 
Now  suppose  you  go  over  and  find  it  so,  that  would  only  satisfy  yourself;  for 
when  you  come  back  we  will  not  believe  you.  ^V^e  will  say  you  have  beeu 
bribed.' '' — Boswell.] 


CHAP.  vir.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  289 

especially  as  this  is  interwoven  with  the  common,  so  as  that  they 
imply  each  other,  and  both  together  make  up  one  relation. 

Let  it  then  be  more  particularly  observed  to  this  person,  that 
it  is  an  acknowledged  matter  of  fact,  which  is  indeed  implied  in 
the  foregoing  observation,  that  there  was  such  a  nation  as  the 
Jews,  of  the  greatest  antiquity,  whose  government  and  general 
polity  was  founded  on  the  law,  here  related  to  be  given  them  by 
Moses  as  from  heaven :  that  natural  religion,  with  rites  additional 
yet  no  way  contrary  to  it,  was  their  established  religion,  which 
cannot  be  said  of  the  Gentile  world :  and  that  their  very  being 
as  a  nation,  depended  upon  their  acknowledgment  of  one  Grod, 
the  God  of  the  universe.  For,  suppose  in  their  captivity  in 
Babylon,  they  had  gone  over  to  the  religion  of  their  conquerors, 
there  would  have  remained  p^  bond  of  union,  to  keep  them  a 
distinct  people.  And  while  they  were  under  their  own  kings,  in 
their  own  country,  a  total  apostasy  from  God  would  have  been 
the  dissolution  of  their  whole  government.  They  in  such  a  sense 
nationally  acknowledged  and  worshipped  the  Maker  of  heaven 
and  earth,  when  the  rest  of  the  world  were  sunk  in  idolatry,  as 
rendered  them,  in  fact,  the  peculiar  people  of  God.  This  re- 
markable establishment  and  preservation  of  natural  religion 
among  them,  seems  to  add  peculiar  credibility  to  the  historical 
evidence  for  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  the  prophets.  Because 
these  miracles  are  a  full  satisfactory  account  of  this  event,  which 
plainly  needs  to  be  accounted  for,  and  cannot  be  otherwise. 

Let  this  person,  supposed  wholly  ignorant  of  history,  be  ac- 
quainted further,  that  one  claiming  to  be  the  Messiah,  of  Jewish 
extraction,  rose  up  at  the  time  when  this  nation,  from  the  pro- 
phecies above  mentioned,  expected  the  Messiah:  that  he  was 
rejected,  as  it  seemed  to  have  been  foretold  he  should,  by  the 
body  of  the  people,  under  the  direction  of  their  rulers :  that  in 
the  course  of  a  very  few  years,  he  was  believed  on  and  acknow- 
ledged as  the  promised  Messiah,  by  great  numbers  among  the 
Gentiles,  agreeably  to  the  prophecies  of  Scripture,  yet  not  upon 
the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles,*  of  which  miracles  we 
have  also  strong  historical  evidence;  (by  which  I  mean  here  no 
more  than  must  be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers;  for  let  pious 
frauds  and  follies  be  admitted  to  weaken,  it  is  absurd  to  say  they 

*  P.  26r,  4c. 
T  26 


290  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  part  ,i. 

destroy  our  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  proof  of  Christianity  :)* 
that  this  religion  approving  itself  to  the  reason  of  mankind,  and 
carrying  its  own  evidence  with  it,  so  far  as  reason  is  a  judge  of 
its  system,  and  being  no  way  contrary  to  reason  in  those  parts  of 
it  which  require  to  be  believed  upon  the  mere  authority  of  its 
Author;  that  this  religion,  I  say,  gradually  spread  and  supported 
itself  for  some  hundred  years,  not  only  without  any  assistance 
from  temporal  power,  but  under  constant  discouragements,  and 
often  the  bitterest  persecutions  from  it;  and  then  became  the 
religion  of  the  world :  that  in  the  mean  time  the  Jewish  nation 
and  government  were  destroyed  in  a  very  remarkable  manner, 
and  the  people  carried  away  captive  and  dispersed  through  the 
most  distant  countries;  in  which  state  of  dispersion  they  have 
remained  fifteen  hundred  years :  and  that  they  remain  a  numerous 
people,  united  among  themselves,  and  distinguished  from  the  rest 
of  the  world,  as  they  were  in  the  days  of  Moses,  by  the  profession 
of  his  law;  and  everywhere  looked  upon  in  a  manner,  which 
one  scarce  knows  how  distinctly  to  express,  but  in  the  words 
of  the  prophetic  account  of  it,  given  so  many  ages  before  it 
came  to  pass:  Tliou  shalt  become  an  astonishment,  a  proverb, 
and  a  byioord,  among  all  nations  whither  the  Lord  shall  lead 
thee.'\ 

The  appearance  of  a  standing  miracle,  in  the  Jews  remaining 
a  distinct  people  in  their  dispersion,  and  the  confirmation  which 
this  event  appears  to  give  to  the  truth  of  revelation,  may  be 
thought  to  be  answered,  by  their  religion's  forbidding  them  inter- 
marriages with  those  of  other  nations,  and  prescribing  them  many 
peculiarities  in  their  food,  by  which  they  are  debarred  from  in- 
corporating with  the  people  in  whose  countries  they  live.  This 
is  not,  I  think,  a  satisfactory  account  of  that  which  it  pretends  to 
account  for.  But  what  does  it  pretend  to  account  for?  The 
correspondence  between  this  event  and  the  prophecies;  or  the 
coincidence  of  both,  with  a  long  dispensation  of  Providence,  of  a 
peculiar  nature,  towards  that  people  ?  No.  It  is  only  the  event 
itself,  which  is  offered  to  be  thus  accounted  for:  which  single 
event,  taken  alone,  abstracted  from  all  such  correspondence  and 
coincidence,  perhaps  would  not  have  appeared  miraculous:  but 
that  correspondence  and  coincidence  may  be  so,  though  the  event 
*  P.  270,  &c.  t  Deut.  xxviii.  37 


CHAP.  vir.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  291 

itself  be  supposed  not.  Thus  the  concurrence  of  our  Saviour's 
being  born  at  Bethlehem,  with  a  long  foregoing  series  of  prophecy 
and  other  coincidences,  is  doubtless  miraculous;  the  series  of 
prophecy,  and  other  coincidences,  and  the  event,  being  admitted : 
though  the  event  itself  appears  to  have  been  brought  about  in  a 
natural  way;  of  which,  however,  no  one  can  be  certain. 

As  several  of  these  events  seem,  in  some  degree  expressly,  to 
have  verified  the  prophetic  history  already,  so  likewise  they  may 
be  considered  further,  as  having  a  peculiar  aspect  towards  the 
full  completion  of  it;  as  affording  some  presumption  that  the 
whole  of  it  shall,  one  time  or  other,  be  fulfilled.  Thus,  that  the 
Jews  have  been  so  wonderfully  preserved  in  their  long  and  wide 
dispersion;  which  is  indeed  the  direct  fulfilling  of  some  prophe- 
cies, but  is  now  mentioned  only  as  looking  forward  to  somewhat 
yet  to  come :  that  natural  religion  came  forth  from  Judea,  and 
spread,  in  the  degree  it  has  done  over  the  world,  before  lost  in 
idolatry;  which,  together  with  some  other  things,  have  distin- 
guished that  very  place,  in  like  manner  as  the  people  of  it  are 
distinguished :  that  this  great  change  of  religion  over  the  earth 
was  brought  about  under  the  profession  and  acknowledgment, 
that  Jesus  was  the  promised  Messiah :  things  of  this  kind  natu- 
rally turn  the  thoughts  of  serious  men  towards  the  full  completion 
of  the  prophetic  history,  concerning  the  final  restoration  of  that 
people;  concerning  the  establishment  of  the  everlasting  kingdom 
amoug  them,  the  kingdom  of  the  Messiah;  and  the  future  state 
of  the  world,  under  this  sacred  government.  Such  circumstances 
and  events,  compared  with  these  prophecies,  though  no  comple- 
tions of  them,  yet  would  not,  I  think,  be  spoken  of  as  nothing  in 
the  argument,  by  a  person  upon  his  first  being  informed  of  them. 
They  fall  in  with  the  prophetic  history  of  things  still  future,  give 
it  some  additional  credibility,  and  have  the  appearance  of  being 
somewhat  in  order  to  the  full  completion  of  it. 

Indeed  it  requires  a  good  degree  of  knowledge,  and  great 
calmness  and  consideration,  to  be  able  to  judge  thoroughly  of 
the  evidence  for  the  truth  of  Christianity,  from  that  part  of  the 
prophetic  history  which  relates  to  the  situation  of  the  kingdoms 
of  the  world,  and  to  the  state  of  the  church,  from  the  establish- 
ment of  Christianity  to  the  present  time.  But  it  appears  from  a 
general  view  of  it,  to  be  very  material.     And  those  persons  who 


292  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  part  ii. 

have  thoroughly  examined  it,  and  some  of  them  were  men  of  the 
coolest  tempers,  greatest  capacities,  and  least  liable  to  imputations 
of  prejudice,  insist  upon  it  as  detenu inately  conclusive. 

[Conclusion.]  Suppose  now  a  person  quite  ignorant  of  his- 
tory, first  to  recollect  the  passages  above  mentioned  out  of  Scrip- 
ture, without  knowing  but  that  the  whole  was  a  late  fiction,  then 
to  be  informed  of  the  correspondent  facts  now  mentioned,  and  to 
unite  them  all  into  one  view :  that  the  profession  and  establish- 
ment of  natural  religion  in  the  world  is  greatly  owing,  in  differ- 
ent ways,  to  this  book,  and  the  supposed  revelation  which  it 
contains;  that  it  is  acknowledged  to  be  of  the  earliest  antiquity; 
that  its  chronology  and  common  history  are  entirely  credible ; 
that  this  ancient  nation,  the  Jews,  of  whom  it  chiefly  treats, 
appear  to  have  been,  in  fact,  the  people  of  God,  in  a  distin- 
guished sense ;  that,  as  there  was  a  national  expectation  among 
them,  raised  from  the  prophecies,  of  a  Messiah  to  appear  at  such 
a  time,  so  one  at  this  time  appeared  claiming  to  be  that  Messiah; 
that  he  was  rejected  by  this  nation,  but  received  by  the  Gentiles, 
not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles ;  that  the 
religion  he  taught  supported  itself  under  the  greatest  difiiculties, 
gained  ground,  and  at  length  became  the  religion  of  the  world ; 
that  in  the  mean  time  the  Jewish  polity  was  utterly  destroyed, 
and  the  nation  dispersed  over  the  face  of  the  earth ;  that  not- 
withstanding this,  they  have  remained  a  distinct  numerous  people 
for  so  many  centuries,  even  to  this  day;  which  not  only  appears 
to  be  the  express  completion  of  several  prophecies  concerning 
them,  but  also  renders  it,  as  one  may  speak,  a  visible  and  easy 
possibility  that  the  promises  made  to  them  as  a  nation,  may  yet 
be  fulfilled. 

To  these  acknowledged  truths,  let  the  person  we  have  been 
supposing  add,  as  I  think  he  ought,  whether  every  one  will  allow 
it  or  no,  the  obvious  appearances  which  there  are,  of  the  state 
of  the  world,  in  other  respects  besides  what  relates  to  the  Jews, 
and  of  the  Christian  church,  having  so  long  answered,  and  still 
answering  to  the  prophetic  history.  Suppose,  I  say,  these  facts 
set  over  against  the  things  before  mentioned  out  of  the  Scrip- 
ture, and  seriously  compared  with  them ;  the  joint  view  of  both 
together  must,  I  think,  appear  of  very  great  weight  to  a  con 
Biderate  reasonable  person  :  of  much  greater  indeed,  upon  having 


CHAP.  VII.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  293 

them  first  laid  before  him,  than  is  easy  for  us,  who  are  so  familiar- 
ized to  them,  to  conceive,  without  some  particular  attention  for 
that  purpose. 

All  these  things,  and  the  several  particulars  contained  under 
them,  require  to  be  distinctly  and  most  thoroughly  examined 
into ;  that  the  weight  of  each  may  be  judged  of,  upon  such  exa- 
mination, and  such  conclusion  drawn,  as  results  from  their  united 
force.     But  this  has  not  been  attempted  here.     I  have  gone  no 
further  than  to  show,  that  the  general  imperfect  view  of  them 
now  given,  the  confessed  historical  evidence  for  miracles,  and  the 
many  obvious  appearing  completions  of  prophecy,  together  with 
the    collateral   things*  here   mentioned,   and  there  are  several 
others  of  the  like  sort ;  that  all  this  together,  which,  being  fact, 
must  be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers,  amounts  to  real  evidence  of 
somewhat  more  than  human  in  this  matter :  evidence  much  more 
important,  than  careless  men,  who  have  been  accustomed  only  to 
transient  and  partial  views  of  it,  can  imagine ;  and  indeed  abun- 
dantly sufficient  to  act  upon.     And  these  things,  I  apprehend, 
must  be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers.     For  though  they  may 
say,  that  the  historical  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attesta- 
tion of  Christianity,  is  not  sufficient  to  convince  them,  that  such 
miracles  were  really  wrought :  they  cannot  deny,  that  there  is 
such  historical  evidence,  it  being  a  known  matter  of  fact  that 
there  is.     They  may  say,  the  conformity  between  the  prophecies 
and  events  is  by  accident :  but  there  are  many  instances  in  which 
such  conformity  itself  cannot  be  denied.     They  may  say,  with 
regard  to  such  kind  of  collateral  things  as  those  above  mentioned, 
that  any  odd  accidental  events,  without  meaning,  will  have  a 
meaning  found  in  them  by  fanciful  people  :  and  that  such  as  are 
fanciful  in  any  one  certain  way,  will  make  out  a  thousand  coinci- 
dences, which  seem  to  favor  their  peculiar  follies.     Men,  I  say, 
may  talk  thus  :  but  no  one  who  is  serious,  can  possibly  think 
these  things  to  be  nothing,  if  he  considers  the  importance  of 
collateral  things,  and  even  of  lesser  circumstances,  in  the  evi- 
dence of  probability,  as  distinguished  in  nature,  from  the  evidence 
of  demonstration.     In  many  cases  indeed  it  seems  to  require  the 
truest  judgment,  to  determine  with  exactness  the  weight  of  cir- 

*  All  the  particular  things  mentioned  in  this  chapter,  not  reducible  to  the 
tead  of  "certain  miracles,  or  determinate  completions  of  prophecy.    See  p.  263. 

26* 


294  THE  PARTICITLAR  EVIDENCE  part  ii. 

cuinstantial  evidence :  but  it  is  very  often  altogether  as  convincing, 
as  that  wUch  is  the  most  express  and  direct. 

This  general  view  of  the  evidence  for  Christianity,  considered 
as  making  one  argument,  may  also  serve  to  recommend  to  serious 
persons,  to  set  down  every  thing  which  they  think  may  be  of 
any  real  weight  at  all  in  proof  of  it,  and  particularly  the  many 
seeming  completions  of  prophecy:  and  they  will  find,  that, 
judging  by  the  natural  rules,  by  which  we  judge  of  probable 
evidence  in  common  matters,  they  amount  to  a  much  higher 
degree  of  proof,  upon  such  a  joiiit  revieio,  than  could  be  sup- 
posed upon  considering  them  separately,  at  different  times;  how 
strong  soever  the  proof  might  before  appear  to  them,  upon  such 
separate  views  of  it.  For  probable  proofs,  by  being  added,  not 
only  increase  the  evidence,  but  multiply  it.°*  Nor  should  I  dis- 
suade any  one  from  setting  down,  what  he  thought  made  for  the 
contrary  side.  But  then  it  is  to  be  remembered,  not  in  order  to 
influence  his  judgment,  but  his  practice,  that"  a  mistake  on  one 
side  may  be,  in  its  consequences,  much  more  dangerous,  than  a 
mistake  on  the  other.  And  what  course  is  most  safe,  and  what 
most  dangerous,  will  be  thought  a  very  material  consideration, 
when  we  deliberate,  not  concerning  events,  but  concerning  con- 
duct in  our  temporal  affairs.  To  be  influenced  by  this  considera- 
tion in  our  judgment,  to  believe  or  disbelieve  upon  it,  is  indeed 
as  much  prejudice,  as  any  thing  whatever.  And,  like  other  pre- 
judices, it  operates  contrary  ways,  in  different  men;  for  some  are 

^  [Butler  states  this  argument  with  more  than  his  usual  brevity,  and  its 
force  is  not  seen  without  reflection.  "  If  contrivance  or  accident  could  have 
given  to  Christianity  any  of  its  apparent  testimonies,  its  miracles,  its  prophe- 
cies, its  morals,  its  propagation,  or  [the  character  of]  its  founder,  there  could 
be  no  room  to  believe,  or  even  imagine,  that  cr^^  these  appearances  of  great 
credibility,  could  be  tinited  together,  by  any  such  means.  If  successful  craft 
could  have  contrived  its  public  miracles,  or  the  pretence  of  them,  it  requires 
another  reach  of  craft,  to  adopt  its  prophecies  to  the  same  object.  Further,  it 
required  not  only  a  different,  but  a  totally  opposite  art  to  conceive  and  pro- 
mulgate its  admirable  morals.  Again,  its  propagation,  in  defiance  of  the 
powers  and  terrors  of  the  world,  implied  still  other  qualities  of  action.  Lastly, 
the  model  of  the  life  of  its  founder,  is  a  work  of  such  originality  and  wisdom, 
as  could  be  the  ofif?i3ring  only  of  consummate  poweis  "^f  invention,  or  rather 
never  could  have  been  devised,  but  must  have  come  from  real  li^e.  The  hypo- 
thesis sinks  under  its  incredibility.  Each  of  these  supposirions  of  coitrivauce, 
being  arbitrary  and  unsupported,  the  climax  of  them  is  an  extra. fagaace."— 
Davjson,  on  Prophecy.] 


CHAP.  VII.  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.  295 

iuclined  to  believe  what  they  hope,  and  others  what  they  fear. 
And  it  is  manifest  unreasonableness  to  apply  to  men's  passions 
in  order  to  jrain  their  assent.  But  in  deliberations  concerning: 
conduct,  there  is  nothing  which  reason  more  requires  to  be  taken 
into  the  account,  than  the  importance  of  it.  For,  suppose  it 
doubtful,  what  would  be  the  consequence  of  acting  in  this,  or  in 
the  contrary  manner  :  still,  that  taking  one  side  could  be  attended 
with  little  or  no  bad  consequence,  and  taking  the  other  might  be 
attended  with  the  greatest,  must  appear,  to  unprejudiced  reason, 
of  the  highest  moment  towards  determining  how  we  are  to  act. 
The  truth  of  our  religion,  like  the  truth  of  common  matters,  is 
to  be  judged  of  by  all  the  evidence  taken  together.  And  unless 
the  whole  series  of  things  which  may  be  alleged  in  this  argu- 
ment, and  every  particular  thing  in  it,  can  reasonably  be  sup- 
posed to  have  been  by  accident  (for  here  the  stress  of  the 
argument  for  Christianity  lies) ;  then  is  the  truth  of  it  proved : 
in  like  manner,  as  if  in  any  common  case,  numerous  events 
acknowledged,  were  to  be  alleged  in  proof  of  any  other  event 
disputed ;  the  truth  of  the  disputed  event  would  be  proved,  not 
only  if  any  one  of  the  acknowledged  ones  did  of  itself  clearly 
imply  it,  but,  though  no  one  of  them  singly  did  so,  if  the  whole 
of  the  acknowledged  events  taken  together  could  not  in  reason 
be  supposed  to  have  happened,  unless  the  disputed  one  were 
true. 

It  is  obvious,  how  much  advantage  the  nature  of  this  evidence 
gives  to  those  persons  who  attack  Christianity,  especially  in  con- 
versation. For  it  is  easy  to  show,  in  a  short  and  lively  manner, 
that  such  and  such  things  are  liable  to  objection,  that  this  and 
another  thing  is  of  little  weight  in  itself;  but  impossible  to 
show,  in  like  manner,  the  united  force  of  the  whole  argument 
in  one  view. 

Lastly,  as  it  has  been  made  appear,  that  there  is  no  presump- 
tion against  a  revelation  as  miraculous ;  that  the  general  scheme 
of  Christianity,  and  the  principal  parts  of  it,  are  conformable  to 
the  experienced  constitution  of  things,  and  the  whole  perfectly 
credible  :  so  the  account  now  given  of  the  positive  evidence  for 
it,  shows,  that  this  evidence  is  such,  as,  from  the  nature  of  it, ' 
cannot  be  destroyed,  though  it  should  be  lessened. 


CHAPTEH  VIII. 

OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  ARGUING  FROM  THE  ANALOGY  OP 
NATURE,  TO  RELIGION. 

If  every  one  would  consider,  with  such  attention  as  they  are 
bound,  even  in  point  of  morality,  to  consider,  what  they  judge 
and  give  characters  of;  the  occasion  of  this  chapter  would  be,  in 
some  good  measure  at  least,  superseded.  But  since  this  is  not  to 
be  expected;  for  some  we  find  do  not  concern  themselves  to 
understand  even  what  they  write  against :  since  this  treatise,  in 
common  with  most  others,  lies  open  to  objections,  which  may 
appear  very  material  to  thoughtful  men  at  first  sight ;  and,  be- 
sides that,  seems  peculiarly  liable  to  the  objections  of  such  as  can 
judge  without  thinking,  and  of  such  as  can  censure  without 
judging;  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  set  down  the  chief  of  these 
objections  which  occur  to  me,  and  consider  them  to  their  hands. 
Th(-y  are  such  as  these  : 

*<-That  it  is  a  poor  thing  to  solve  difiiciilties  in  revelation,  by 
sayidg,  that  there  are  the  same  in  natural  religion  ;  when  what 
is  w&nting  is  to  clear  both  of  them  of  these  their  common,  as 
well  as  other  their  respective,  difficulties;  that  it  is  a  strange 
way  Indeed  of  convincing  men  of  the  obligations  of  religion,  to 
show  them,  that  they  have  as  little  reason  for  their  worldly  pur- 
suits :  and  a  strange  way  of  vindicating  the  justice  and  goodness 
of  the  Author  of  nature,  and  of  removing  the  objections  against 
both,  to  which  the  sj^stem  of  religion  lies  open,  to  show,  that  the 
like  objections  lie  against  natural  providence;  a  way  of  answering 
objections  against  religion,  without  so  much  as  pretending  to 
make  out,  that  the  system  of  it,  or  the  particular  things  in  it 
objected  against,  are  reasonable — especially,  perhaps  some  may 
be  inattentive  enough  to  add,  must  this  be  thought  strange,  when 
it  is  confessed  that  analogy  is  no  answer  to  such  objections :  that 
when  this  sort  of  reasoning  is  carried  to  the  utmost  length  it  can 
be  imagined  capable  of,  it  will  yet  leave  the  mind  in  a  very  uq- 
satistied  state ;  and  that  it  must  be  unaccountable  ignorance  of 
mankind,  to  imagine  they  will  be  prevailed  with  to  forego  their 
296  • 


CHAP.  Till.  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE  ANALOGY.  291 

present  interests  and  pleasures,  from  regard  to  religion,  upon 
doubtful  evidence.'^ 

Now,  as  plausible  as  this  way  of  talking  may  appear,  that  ap- 
pearance will  be  found  in  a  great  measure  owing  to  half  views, 
which  show  but  part  of  an  object,  yet  show  that  indistinctly,  and 
to  undeterminate  language.  By  these  means  weak  men  are  often 
deceived  by  others,  and  ludicrous  men,  by  themselves.  And  even 
those,  who  are  serious  and  considerate,  cannot  always  readily  dis- 
entangle, and  at  once  clearly  see  through  the  perplexities,  in 
which  subjects  themselves  are  involved;  and  which  are  height- 
ened by  the  deficiencies  and  the  abuse  of  words.  To  this  latter 
sort  of  persons,  the  following  reply  to  each  part  of  this  objection 
severally,  may  be  of  some  assistance ;  as  it  may  also  tend  a  little 
to  stop  and  silence  others. 

First,  The  thing  wanted,  i.e.  what  men  require,  is  to  have  all 
difficulties  cleared.  And  this  is,  or  at  least  for  any  thing  we 
know  to  the  contrary,  it  may  be,  the  same  as  requiriog  to  com- 
prehend the  divine  nature,  and  the  whole  plan  of  Providence 
from  everlasting  to  everlasting  !  But  it  hath  always  been  allowed 
to  argue  from  what  is  acknowledged,  to  what  is  disputed.  And 
it  is  in  no  other  sense  a  poor  thing,  to  argue  from  natural  reli- 
gion to  revealed,  in  the  manner  found  fault  with,  than  it  is  to 
argue  in  numberless  other  ways  of  probable  deduction  and  infer- 
ence, in  matters  of  conduct,  which  we  are  continually  reduced  to 
the  necessity  of  doing.  Indeed  the  epithet  poor  may  be  applied, 
I  fear  as  properly,  to  great  part  or  the  whole  of  human  life,  as  it 
is  to  the  things  mentioned  in  the  objection.  Is  it  not  a  poor 
thing,  for  a  physician  to  have  so  little  knowledge  in  the  cure  of 
diseases,  as  even  the  most  eminent  have?  To  act 'upon  con- 
jecture and  guess,  where  the  life  of  man  is  concerned  ?  Un- 
doubtedly it  is  :  but  not  in  comparison  of  having  no  skill  at  all 
in  that  useful  art,  and  being  obliged  to  act  wholly  in  the  dark. 

Further :  since  it  is  as  unreasonable,  as  it  is  common,  to  urge 
objections  against  revelation,  which  are  of  equal  weight  aj^ainst 
natural  religion;  and  those  who  do  this,  if  they  are  not  confused 
themselves,  deal  unfiiirly  with  others,  in  making  it  seem  that 
they  are  arguing  only  against  revelation,  or  particular  doctrines 
of  it,  when  in  reality  they  are  arguing  against  moral  providence ; 
:t  is  a  thing  of  consequence  to  show,  that  such  objections  are  as 


298  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  part  ii. 

mucli  lavel'ed  against  natural  religion,  as  against  revealed.  Ob- 
jections, which  are  equally  applicable  to  both,  are  properly  speaking 
answered,  by  its  being  shown  that  they  are  so,  provided  the 
former  be  admitted  to  be  true.  And  without  taking  in  the  con- 
sideration how  distinctly  this  is  admitted,  it  is  plainly  very  mate- 
rial to  observe,  that  as  the  things  objected  against  in  natural 
religion  are  of  the  same  kind  with  what  is  certain  matter  of  expe- 
rience in  the  course  of  providence,  and  in  the  information  which 
God  affords  us  concerning  our  temporal  interest  under  his  govern- 
ment; so  the  objections  against  the  system  of  Christianity,  and 
the  evidence  of  it,  are  of  the  very  same  kind  with  those  which 
are  made  against  the  system  and  evidence  of  natural  religion. 
However,  the  reader  upon  review  may  see,  that  most  of  the 
analogies  insisted  upon,  even  in  the  latter  part  of  this  treatise,  do 
not  necessarily  require  to  have  more  taken  for  granted  than  is  in 
the  former;  [viz.]  that  there  is  an  Author  of  nature,  or  natural 
Governor  of  the  world:  and  Christianity  is  vindicated,  not  from 
its  analogy  to  natural  religion,  but  chiefly  from  its  analogy  to  the 
experienced  constitution  of  nature. 

Secondly/,  Religion  is  a  practical  thing,  and  consists  in  such  a 
determinate  course  of  life,  as  what,  there  is  reason  to  think,  is 
commanded  by  the  Author  of  nature,  and  will,  upon  the  whole, 
be  our  happiness  under  his  government.  If  men  can  be  con- 
vinced, that  they  have  the  like  reason  to  believe  this,  as  to  be- 
lieve that  taking  care  of  their  temporal  affairs  will  be  to  their 
advantage;  such  conviction  cannot  but  be  an  argument  to  them 
for  the  practice  of  religion.  And  if  there  be  really  any  reason 
for  believing  one  of  these,  and  endeavoring  to  preserve  life,  and 
secure  ourselves  the  necessaries  and  conveniences  of  it;  then 
there  is  reason  also  for  believing  the  other,  and  endeavoring  to 
secure  the  interest  it  proposes  to  us.  And  if  the  interest,  which 
religion  proposes  to  us,  be  infinitely  greater  than  our  whole  tem- 
poral interest;  then  there  must  be  proportionably  greater  reason 
for  endeavoring  to  secure  one,  than  the  other;  since,  by  the  sup- 
position, the  probability  of  our  securing  one  is  equal  to  the  proba- 
bility of  our  securing  the  other.  This  seems  plainly  unanswerable; 
and  has  a  tendency  to  influence  fair  minds,  who  consider  what 
our  condition  really  is,  or  upon  what  evidence  we  are  naturally 
appointed  to  act;  and  who  are  disposed  to  acquiesce  in  the  termd 


CHAP.  viir.  THE  ANALOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  299 

upon  whicli  we  live,  and  attend  to  and  follow  that  practical  in- 
struction, whatever  it  be,  which  is  afforded  us. 

But  the  chief  and  proper  force  of  the  argument  referred  to  in 
the  objection,  lies  in  another  place.  The  proof  of  religion,  it  is 
said,  is  involved  in  such  inextricable  difficulties,  as  to  render  it 
doubtful ;  and  that  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  if  it  wero  true,  it 
would  be  left  upon  doubtful  evidence.  Here  then,  over  and 
above  the  force  of  each  particular  difficulty  or  objection,  these 
difficulties  and  objections  taken  together  are  turned  into  a  posi- 
tive argument  against  the  truth  of  religion;  which  argument 
would  stand  thus.  If  religion  were  true,  it  would  not  be  left 
doubtful,  and  open  tq  objections  to  the  degree  in  which  it  is: 
therefore  that  it  is  thus  left,  not  only  renders  the  evidence  of  it 
weak,  and  lessens  its  force,  in  proportion  to  the  weight  of  such 
objections,  but  also  shows  it  to  be  false,  or  is  a  general  presump- 
tion of  its  being  so.  Now  the  observation,  that  from  the  natural 
constitution  and  course  of  things,  we  must  in  our  temporal  con- 
cerns, almost  continually,  and  even  in  matters  of  great  conse- 
quence, act  upon  evidence  of  a  like  kind  and  degree  to  the  evidence 
of  religion,  is  an  answer  to  this  argument.  Because  it  shows, 
that  it  is  according  to  the  conduct  and  character  of  the  Author 
of  nature  to  appoint  we  should  act  upon  evidence  like  to  that, 
which  this  argument  presumes  he  cannot  be  supposed  to  appoint 
we  should  act  upon :  it  is  an  instance,  a  general  one,  made  up  of 
numerous  particular  ones,  of  somewhat  in  his  dealing  with  us, 
similar  to  what  is  said  to  be  incredible.  As  the  force  of  this 
answer  lies  merely  in  the  parallel,  which  there  is  between  the 
evidence  for  religion  and  for  our  temporal  conduct;  the  answer 
is  equally  just  and  conclusive,  whether  the  parallel  be  made  out, 
by  showing  the  evidence  of  the  former  to  be  higher,  or  the  evi- 
dence of  the  latter  to  be  lower. 

Thirdly,  The  design  of  this  treatise  is  not  to  vindicate  the 
character  of  God,  but  to  show  the  obligations  of  men  :  it  is  not  to 
justify  his  providence,  but  to  show  what  belongs  to  us  to  do. 
These  are  two  subjects,  and  ought  not  to  be  confounded.  Though 
they  may  at  length  run  up  into  each  other,  yet  observations  may 
immediately  tend  to  make  out  the  latter,  which  do  not  appear,  by 
any  immediate  connection,  to  the  purpose  of  the  former;  which 
is  less  our  concern,  than  many  seem  to  think.     For,  first, 


300  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  part  ii. 

It  is  not  necessary  we  should  justify  the  dispensations  of  Provi- 
dence against  objections^  any  farther  than  to  show,  that  the  things 
objected  against  may,  for  aught  we  know,  be  consistent  with  jus- 
tice and  goodness.  Suppose  then,  that  there  are  things  in  the 
system  of  this  world,  and  plan  of  Providence  relating  to  it,  which 
taken  alone  would  be  unjust :  yet  it  has  been  shown  unanswer- 
ably, that  if  we  could  take  in  the  reference,  which  these  things 
may  have  to  other  things,  present  past  and  to  come;  to  the 
whole  scheme,  which  the  things  objected  against  are  parts  of; 
these  very  things  might,  for  aught  we  know,  be  found  to  be,  not 
only  consistent  with  justice,  but  instances  of  it.  Indeed  it  has 
been  shown,  by  the  analogy  of  what  we  see,  not  only  possible  that 
this  may  be  the  case,  but  credible  that  it  is.  And  thus  objec- 
tions, drawn  from  such  things,  are  answered,  and  Providence  is 
vindicated,  as  far  as  religion  makes  its  vindication  necessary. 

Hence  it  appears.  Secondly,  that  objections  against  the  Divine 
justice  and  goodness  are  not  endeavored  to  be  removed,  by  show- 
ing that  the  like  objections,  allowed  to  be  really  conclusive,  lie 
against  natural  providence:  but  those  objections  being  supposed 
and  shown  not  to  be  conclusive,  the  things  objected  against,  con- 
sidered as  matters  of  fact,  are  farther  shown  to  be  credible,  from 
their  conformity  to  the  constitution  of  nature;  for  instance,  that 
God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their  actions  hereafter,  from 
the  observation,  that  he  does  reward  and  punish  them  for  their 
actions  here.     And  this,  I  apprehend,  is  of  weight. 

Thirdly,  it  would  be  of  weight,  even  though  those  objections 
were  not  answered.  For,  there  being  the  proof  of  religion  above 
set  down;  and  religion  implying  several  facts;  for  instance  again, 
the  fact  last  mentioned,  that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for 
their  actions  hereafter;  the  observation,  that  his  present  method 
of  government  is  by  rewards  and  punishments,  shows  that  future 
fact  not  to  be  incredible:  whatever  objections  men  may  think 
they  have  against  it,  as  unjust  or  unmerciful,  according  to  their 
notions  of  justice  and  mercy;  or  as  improbable  from  their  belief 
of  necessity.  I  say,  as  im]?rol>ahlc :  for  it  is  evident  no  objec- 
tion against  it,  as  unjust,  can  be  urged  from  necessity;  since  this 
notion  as  much  destroys  injustice,  as  it  does  justice. 

Fourthly,  Though  objections  against  the  reasonableness  of  the 
system  of  religion  cannot  indeed  be  answered  without  entering 


CHAP.  Yiii.  THE  ANALOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  301 

into  consideration  of  its  reasonableness;  yet  objections  against 
the  credibility  or  truth  of  it  may.  Because  the  system  of  it  is 
reducible  into  what  is  properly  matter  of  fact:  and  the  truth,  the 
probable  truth  of  facts,  may  be  shown  without  consideration  of 
their  reasonableness.  Nor  is  it  necessary,  though,  in  some  cases 
and  respects,  it  is  highly  useful  and  proper,  yet  it  is  not  neces- 
sary, to  give  a  proof  of  the  reasonableness  of  every  precept  en- 
joined us,  and  of  every  particular  dispensation  of  Providence, 
which  comes  into  the  system  of  religion.  Indeed  the  more 
thoroughly  a  person  of  a  right  disposition  is  convinced  of  the 
perfection  of  the  Divine  nature  and  conduct,  the  farther  he 
will  advjince  towards  that  perfection  of  religion,  which  John* 
speaks  of.^  But  the  general  obligations  of  religion  are  fully 
made  out,  by  proving  the  reasonableness  of  the  practice  of  it. 
And  that  the  practice  of  religion  is  reasonable,  may  be  shown, 
though  no  more  could- be  proved,  than  that  the  sj^stem  of  it  mai/ 
be  so,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary:  and  even  without 
entering  into  the  distinct  consideration  of  this. 

Fifthly,  It  is  easy  to  see,  that  though  the  analogy  of  nature  is 
not  an  immediate  answer  to  objections  against  the  wisdom,  the 
justice,  or  goodness,  of  any  doctrine  or  precept  of  religion;  yet 
it  may  be,  as  it  is,  an  immediate  and  direct  answer  to  what  is 
really  intended  by  such  objections;  which  is,  to  show  that  the 
things  objected  against  are  incredible. 

FourthJi/,  It  is  most  readily  acknowledged,  that-  the  foregoing 
treatise  is  by  no  means  satisfactory;  very  far  indeed  from  it:  but 
so  would  any  natural  institution  of  life  appear,  if  reduced  into  a 
system,  together  with  its  evidence.  Leaving  religion  out  of  the 
case,  men  are  divided  in  their  opinions,  whether  our  pleasures 
overbalance  our  pains:  and  whether  it  be,  or  be  not,  eligible  to 
live  in  this  world.''  And  were  all  such  controversies  settled, 
which  perhaps,  in  speculation,  would  be  found  involved  in  great 

*  1  John  iv,  18. — [''There  is  no  fear  in  love,"  &o.] 

*  [Obedience  from  dread,  if  it  continue  to  be  the  only  motive,  precludes  ad- 
vance toward  perfection;  for  "He  that  feareth  is  not  made  perfect  in  love." 
But  obedience  from  a  discernment  of  the  reasonableness  and  beneiicence  of 
religion,  and  of  the  perfections  of  its  Author,  increases  love  till  it  "  casteth  out 
fear."] 

b  [See  a  discussion  of  this  subject,  in  Bayle's  Historical  and  Biographical 
Dicti'^nary:  art.  Xexophanes  :  notes  D,  E,  F,  G.] 

26 


302  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  part  ii. 

difficulties ;  anJ  were  it  determined  upon  the  evidence  of  reason, 
as  nature  has  determined  it  to  our  hands,  that  life  is  to  be  pre- 
served :  still,  the  rules  which  God  has  been  pleased  to  afford  us, 
for  escaping  the  miseries  of  it,  and  obtaining  its  satisfactions,  the 
rules,  for  instance,  of  preserving  health,  and  recovering  it  when 
lost,  are  not  only  fallible  and  precarious,  but  very  far  from  being 
exact.  Nor  are  we  informed  by  nature,  as  to  future  contingen- 
cies and  accidents,  so  as  to  render  it  at  all  certain,  what  is  the 
best  method  of  managing  our  affairs.  What  will  be  the  success 
of  our  temporal  pursuits,  in  the  common  sense  of  the  word  suc- 
cess, is  highly  doubtful.  And  what  will  be  the  success  of  them 
in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word;  i.e.  what  happiness  or  enjoy- 
ment we  shall  obtain  by  them,  is  doubtful  in  a  much  higher 
degree.  Indeed  the  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  evidence,  with 
which  we  are  obliged  to  take  up,  in  the  daily  course  of  life,  is 
scarce  to  be  expressed.  Yet  men  do  not  throw  away  life,  or  dis- 
regard the  interests  of  it,  upon  account  of  this  doubtfulness. 
The  evidence  of  religion  then  being  admitted  real,  those  who 
object  against  it,  as  not  satisfactory,  i.e.  as  not  being  what  they 
wish  it,  plainly  forget  the  very  condition  of  our  being  :  for 
satisfaction,  in  this  sense,  does  not  belong  to  such  a  creature 
as  man. 

And,  what  is  more  material,  they  forget  also  the  very  nature 
of  religion.  For,  religion  presupposes,  in  all  those  who  will 
embrace  it,  a  certain  degree  of  integrity  and  honesty;  which  it 
was  intended  to  try  whether  men  have  or  not,  and  to  exercise  in 
such  as  have  it,  in  order  to  its  improvement.  Religion  presup- 
poses this  as  much,  and  in  the  same  sense,  as  speaking  to  a  man 
presupposes  he  understands  the  language  in  which  you  speak ;  or 
as  warning  a  man  of  any  danger  presupposes  that  he  hath  such 
a  regard  to  himself,  as  that  he  will  endeavor  to  avoid  it.  There^ 
fore  the  question  is  not  at  all.  Whether  the  evidence  of  religion 
be  satisfactory;  but  Whether  it  be,  in  reason,  sufficient  to  prove 
and  discipline  that  virtue,  which  it  presupposes.  Now  the  evi- 
dence of  it  is  fully  sufficient  for  all  those  purposes  oi  probation  ; 
how  far  soever  it  is  from  being  satisfactory,  as  to  the  purposes  of 
curiosity,  or  any  other :  and  indeed  it  answers  the  purposes  of 
the  former  in  several  respects,  which  it  would  not  do,  if  it  were 
as  overpowering  as  is  required.     Besides,  whether  tl»e  motives  or 


CHAP.  viir.  THE  ANALOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  303 

the  evidence  for  any  course  of  action  be  satisfactory,  meaning 
here,  by  that  word,  what  satisfies  a  man  that  such  a  course  of 
action  will  in  event  be  for  his  good;  this  need  never  be,  and  I 
think,  strictly  speaking,  never  is,  the  practical  question  in  com- 
mon matters.  The  practical  question  in  all  cases  is.  Whether 
the  evidence  for  a  course  of  action  be  such  as,  taking  in  all  cir- 
cumstances, makes  the  faculty  within  us,  which  is  the  guide  and 
judge  of  conduct,*  determine  that  course  of  action  to  be  pru- 
dent. Indeed,  satisfaction  that  it  will  be  for  our  interest  or 
happiness,  abundantly  determines  an  action  to  be  prudent :  but 
evidence  almost  infinitely  lower  than  this,  determines  actions  to 
be  so  too ;  even  in  the  conduct  of  every  day. 

Fifthli/,  As  to  the  objection  concerning  the  influence  which 
this  argument,  or  any  part  of  it,  may,  or  may  not  be  expected  to 
have  upon  men  ;  I  observe,  as  above,  that  religion  being  intended 
for  a  trial"  and  exercise  of  the  morality  of  every  person's  cha- 
racter, who  is  a  subject  of  it;  and  there  being,  as  I  have  shown, 
such  evidence  for  it,  as  is  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  influence  men 
to  embrace  it :  to  object,  that  it  is  not  to  be  imagined  mankind 
will  be  influenced  by  such  evidence,  is  nothing  to  the  purpose  of 
the  foregoing  treatise.  For  the  purpose  of  it  is  not  to  inquire, 
what  sort  of  creatures  mankind  are  ;  but  what  the  light  and 
knowledge,  which  is  afi"orded  them,  requires  they  should  be  :  to 
show  how,  in  reason,  they  ought  to  behave;  not  how,  in  fact, 
they  will  behave.  This  depends  upon  themselves,  and  is  their 
own  concern ;  the  personal  concern  of  each  man  in  particular. 
How  little  regard  the  generality  have  to  it,  experience  indeed 
does  too  fully  show.  But  religion,  considered  as  a  probation, 
has  had  its  end  upon  all  persons,  to  whom  it  has  been  proposed 
with  evidence  sufficient  in  reason  to  influence  their  practice  :  for 
by  this  means  they  have  been  put  into  a  state  of  probation ;  let 

*  See  Dissertation  IL 

o  [It  is  remarked  by  Dean  Fitzgerald,  that  "It  is  not  inconceivable  that 
the  Almighty  should  apply  such  a  test  of  men's  candor  and  fidelity,  as  should 
require  them  first  to  act  upon  a  thins;  as  true,  before  they  were  so  fully  satis- 
fied of  its  truth  as  to  leave  no  doubt  remaining.  Such  a  course  of  action 
might  be  the  appointed,  and  for  all  we  know,  the  only  possible  way  of  over- 
coming habits  of  thought  and  feeling,  repugnant  to  the  belief  demanded,  so 
that  a  fixed  religious  faith  might  be  the  reward,  as  it  were,  of  a  sincere  course 
of  pradent  behavior. "j 


304  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  part  ii. 

them  behave  as  they  will  in  it.  Thus,  not  only  revelation,  but 
reason  also,  teaches  us,  that  by  the  evidence  of  religion  being 
laid  before  men,  the  designs  of  Providence  are  carrying  on,  not 
only  with  regard  to  those  who  will  be  influenced  by  it,  but  like- 
wise with  regard  to  those  who  will  not.  Lastly,  the  objection  here 
referred  to,  allows  the  thing  insisted  upon  in  this  treatise  to  be 
of  some  weight ;  and  if  so,  it  may  be  hoped  it  will  have  some 
influence.  And  if  there  be  a  probability  that  it  will  have  any  at 
all,  there  is  the  same  reason  in  kind,  though  not  in  degree,  to  lay 
it  before  men,  as  there  would  be,  if  it  were  likely  to  have  a  greater 
influence. 

Further,  I  desire  it  may  be  considered,  with  respect  to  the 
whole  of  the  foregoing  objections,  that  in  this  treatise  I  have 
argued  upon  the  principles  of  others,*  not  my  own :  and  have 
omitted  what  I  think  true,  and  of  the  utmost  importance,  because 
by  others  thought  unintelligible,  or  not  true.  Thus  I  have  arscued 
upon  the  principles  of  the  fatalists,  which  I  do  not  believe  :  and 
have  omitted  a  thing  of  the  utmost  importance  which  I  do  be- 
lieve,— [viz.]  the  moral  fitness  and  unfitness  of  actions,  prior 
to  all  will  whatever;  which  as  certainly  determine  the  divine 
conduct,  as  speculative  truth  and  falsehood  necessarily  determine 
the  divine  judgment.  Indeed  the  principle  of  liberty,  and  that 
of  moral  fitness,  so  force  themselves  upon  the  mind,  that  moral- 
ists, ancient  as  well  as  modern,  have  formed  their  language  upon 
it.  And  probably  it  may  appear  in  mine,  though  I  have  endea- 
vored to  avoid  it  ]  and,  in  order  to  avoid  it,  have  sometimes  been 
obliged  to  express  myself  in  a  manner,  which  will  appear  strange 
to  such  as  do  not  observe  the  reason  for  it.  But  the  general 
argument  here  pursued,  does  not  at  air  suppose,  or  proceed  upon 
these  principles. 

Now,  these  two  abstract  principles  of  liberty  and  moral  fitness 
being  omitted,  religion  can  be  considered  in  no  other  view,  than 
merely  as  a  question  of  fact :  and  in  this  view  it  is  here  con- 
sidered. It  is  obvious,  that  Christianity,  and  the  proof  of  it, 
are  both  historical.     Even  natural  religion  is,  properly,  a  matter 

*  By  nrgtiing  upon  the  principles  of  others,  the  reader  will  observe  is  meant, 
not  proviug  any  thing  from  those  principles,  but  notioithstanding  them.  Thug 
religion  is  proved,  not  from  the  opinion  of  necessity j  which  is  absurd:  out, 
notwithstanding  or  even  though  that  opinion  were  admitted  to  be  true. 


CHAP.  Ym.  THE  ANALOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  805 

of  fact.  For,  tliat  there  is  a  righteous  Governor  of  the  world,  ia 
so  :  and  this  proposition  contains  the  4!;eneral  system  of  natural 
religion.  But  then,  several  abstract  truths,  and  in  particular 
those  two  principles,  are  usually  taken  into  consideration  in  the 
proof  of  it :  whereas  it  is  here  treated  of  only  as  a  matter  of 
fact.  To  explain  this ;  That  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are 
equal  to  two  right  ones,  is  an  abstract  truth  ',  but  that  they  ap- 
pear so  to  our  mind,  is  only  a  matter  of  fact.  This  last  must 
have  been  admitted,  if  any  thing  was,  by  those  ancient  sceptics, 
who  woTild  not  admit  the  former :  but  pretended  to  doubt, 
whether  there  were  any  such  thing  as  truth,  or  whether  we 
could  certainly  depend  upon  our  faculties  of  understanding  for 
the  knowledge  of  it  in  any  case. 

The  assertion  that  there  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  an  original 
standard  of  right  and  wrong  in  actions,  independent  upon  all 
will,  but  which  unalterably  determines  the  will  of  God,  to  exer- 
cise that  moral  government  over  the  world,  which  religion  teaches, 
(i.e.  finally  and  upon  the  whole  to  reward  and  punish  men  re- 
spectively as  they  act  right  or  wrong;)  contains  an  abstract  truth, 
as  well  as  matter  of  fact.  But  suppose  that  in  the  present  state, 
every  man  without  exception,  was  rewarded  and  punished,  in 
exact  proportion  as  he  followed  or  transgressed  that  sense  of 
right  and  wrong,  which  God  has  implanted  in  his  nature  :  this 
would  not  be  at  all  an  abstract  truth,  but  only  a  matter  of  fact. 
And  though  this  fact  were  acknowledged  by  every  one,  yet  the 
same  difficulties  might  be  raised  as  now  are,  concerning  the  ab- 
stract questions  of  liberty  and  moral  fitness.  And  we  should 
have  a  proof,  even  the  certain  one  of  experience,  that  the  govern- 
ment of  the  world  was  perfectly  moral,  without  taking  in  the  con- 
sideration of  those  questions  :  and  this  proof  would  remain,  in 
what  way  soever  they  were  determined. 

Thus,  God  having  given  mankind  a  moral  faculty,  the  object 
of  which  is  actions,  and  which  naturally  approves  some  actions 
as  right,  and  of  good  desert,  and  condemns  others  as  wrong,  and 
of  ill  desert;  that  he  will,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  reward  the 
former  and  punish  the  latter,  is  not  an  assertion  of  an  abstract 
truth,  but  of  what  is  as  mere  a  fact,  as  his  doing  so  at  present 
would  be.  This  future  fact  I  have  not,  indeed,  proved  with  the 
foi-ce  with  which  it  might  be  proved,  from  the  principles  of  liberty 
U  26* 


30(5  "         CONCLUSION.  PART  II. 

and  moral  fitness;  but  witlioiit  tliem  have  given  a  really  conclu- 
sive practical  proof  of  it,  which  is  greatly  strengthened  by  the 
general  analogy  of  nature ;  a  proof  easily  cavilled  at,  easily  shown 
not  to  be  demonstrative,  (and  it  is  not  offered  as  such;)  but  im- 
possible, I  think,  to  be  evaded,  or  answered.  Thus  the  obliga- 
tions of  religion  are  made  out,  exclusive  of  the  questions  con- 
cerning liberty  and  moral  fitness;  which  have  been  perplexed 
with  difficulties  and  abstruse  reasonings,  as  every  thing  may. 

Hence  therefore  may  be  observed  distinctly,  what  is  the  force 
of  this  treatise.  It  will  be,  to  such  as  are  convinced  of  religion 
upon  the  proof  arising  out  of  the  two  last  mentioned  principles, 
an  additional  proof  and  confirmation  of  it:  to  such  as  do  not 
admit  those  principles,  an  original  proof  of  it,*  and  a  confirma- 
tion of  that  proof.  Those  who  believe,  will  here  find  the  scheme 
of  Christianity  cleared  of  objections,  and  the  evidence  of  it  in  a 
peculiar  manner  strengthened.  Those  who  do  not  believe  will  at 
least  be  shown  the  absurdity  of  all  attempts  to  prove  Christianity 
false,  the  plain  undoubted  credibility  of  it;  and,  I  hope,  a  good 
deal  more. 

Thus,  though  some  perhaps  may  seriously  think,  that  analogy, 
as  here  urged,  has  too  great  stress  laid  upon  it;  and  ridicule,  un- 
answerable ridicule,  may  be  applied,  to  show  the  argument  from 
it  in  a  disadvantageous  light;  yet  there  can  be  no  question,  but 
that  it  is  a  real  one.  For  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed, 
implying  in  it  numerous  facts;  analogy,  being  a  confirmation  of 
all  facts  to  which  it  can  be  applied,  and  the  oidi/  'proof  of  most, 
cannot  but  be  admitted  by  every  one  to  be  a  material  thing,  and 
truly  of  weight  on  the  side  of  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed. 
And  it  ought  to  be  particularly  regarded  by  such  as  profess  to 
follow  nature,  and  to  be  less  satisfied  with  abstract  reasonings. 


CONCLUSION. 


Whatever  account  may  be  given  of  the  strange  inattention 

and  disregard,  in  some  ages  and  countries,  to  a  matter  of  such 

importance  as  religion;  it  would,  before  experience,  be  incredible, 

that  there  should  be  the  like  disregard  in  those,  who  have  ha»I 

«-  P.  141,  <fec. 


PART  II.  CONCLUSION.  SOT 

the  moral  system  of  the  world  laid  before  them,  as  it  is  by  Chris- 
tianity, and  often  inculcated  upon  them:  because  this  moral 
system  carries  in  it  a  good  degree  of  evidence  for  its  truth,  upon 
its  being  barely  proposed  to  our  thoughts.  There  is  no  need  of 
abstruse  reasonings  and  distinctions,  to  convince  an  unprejudiced 
understanding,  that  there  is  a  God  who  made  and  governs  the 
world,  and  will  judge  it  in  righteousness;  though  they  may  be 
necessary  to  answer  abstruse  difficulties,  when  once  such  are 
raised :  when  the  very  meaning  of  those  words,  which  express 
most  intelligibly  the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  is  pretended  to 
be  uncertain;  and  the  clear  truth  of  the  thing  itself  is  obscured 
by  the  intricacies  of  speculation.  To  an  unprejudiced  mind,  ten 
thousand  thousand  instances  of  design  cannot  but  prove  a  de- 
signer. And  it  is  intuitively  manifest,  that  creatures  ought  to 
live  under  a  dutiful  sense  of  their  Maker;  and  that  justice  and 
charity  must  be  his  laws,  to  creatures  whom  he  has  made  social, 
and  placed  in  society. 

The  truth  of  revealed  religion,  peculiarly  so  called,  is  not  in- 
deed self-evident,  but  requires  external  proof,  in  order  to  its 
being  received.  Yet  inattention,  among  us,  to  revealed  religion, 
will  be  found  to  imply  the  same  dissolute  immoral  temper  of 
mind,  as  inattention  to  natural  religion :  because,  when  both  are 
laid  before  us,  in  the  manner  they  are  in  Christian  countries  of 
liberty,  our  obligations  to  inquire  into  both,  and  to  embrace  both 
upon  supposition  of  their  truth,  are  obligations  of  the  same  nature. 
Eevelation  claims  to  be  the  voice  of  God :  and  our  obligation  to 
attend  to  his  voice  is  surely  moral,  in  all  cases.  And  as  it  is  in- 
sisted, that  its  evidence  is  conclusive,  upon  thorough  considera« 
tion  of  it;  so  it  offers  itself  with  obvious  appearances  of  having 
something  more  than  human  in  it,  and  therefore  in  all  reason 
requires  to  have  its  claims  most  seriously  examined  into. 

It  is  to  be  added,  that  though  light  and  knowledge,  in  what 
manner  soever  afforded,  is  equally  from  God;  yet  a  miraculous 
revelation  has  a  peculiar  tendency,  from  the  first  principles  of 
our  nature,  to  awaken  mankind,  and  inspire  them  with  reverence 
and  awe.  And  this  is  a  peculiar  obligation,  to  attend  to  what 
claims  to  be  so,  with  such  appearances  of  truth.  It  is  therefure 
most  certain,  that  our  obligations  to  inquire  seriously  into  the 
evidence  of  Christianity,  and,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  to 


308  CONCLUSION.  PART  iw 

embrace  it,  are  of  the  utmost  importance,  and  moral  in  the  highest 
and  most  proper  sense.  Let  us  then  suppose,  that  the  evidence 
of  religion  in  general,  and  of  Christianity,  has  been  seriously  in- 
quired into,  by  all  reasonable  men  among  us.  Yet  we  find  many 
professedly  to  reject  both,  upon  speculative  principles  of  infi- 
delity. All  of  them  do  not  content  themselves  with  a  bare  neg- 
lect of  religion,  and  enjoying  their  imaginary  freedom  from  its 
restraints.  Some  go  much  beyond  this.  They  deride  God's 
moral  government  over  the  world.  They  renounce  his  protection, 
and  defy  his  justice.  They  ridicule  and  vilify  Christianity,  and 
blaspheme  the  author  of  it;  and  take  all  occasions  to  manifest 
scorn  and  contempt  of  revelation.  This  amounts  to  an  active 
setting  themselves  against  religion;  to  what  may  be  considered 
as  a  positive  principle  of  irreligion,  which  they  cultivate  within 
themselves;  and,  whether  they  intend  this  efi"ect  or  not,  render 
habitual,  as  a  good  man  does  the  contrary  principle.  Others, 
who  are  not  chargeable  with  all-this  profligateness,  yet  are  in 
avowed  opposition  to  religion,  as  if  discovered  to  be  groundless. 

Now  admitting,  which  is  the  supposition  we  go  upon,  that 
these  persons  act  upon  what  they  think  principles  of  reason,  (and 
otherwise  they  are  not  to  be  argued  with,)  it  is  really  inconceiv- 
able, that  they  should  imagine  they  clearly  see  the  whole  evidence 
of  it,  considered  in  itself,  to  be  nothing  at  all :  nor  do  they  pre- 
tend this.  They  are  far  indeed  from  having  a  just  notion  of  its 
evidence :  but  they  would  not  say  its  evidence  was  nothing,  if 
they  thought  the  system  of  it,  with  all  its  circumstances,  were 
credible,  like  other  matters  of  science  or  history.  Their  manner 
of  treating  it  must  proceed,  either  from  such  kind  of  objections 
aoainst  all  religion,  as  have  been  answered  or  obviated  in  the 
former  part  of  this  treatise;  or  else  from  objections,  and  diffi- 
culties, supposed  more  peculiar  to  Christianity.  Thus,  they 
entertain  prejudices  against  the  whole  notion  of  a  revelation,  and 
miraculous  interpositions.  They  find  thiogs  in  Scripture,  whether 
in  incidental  passages,  or  in  the  general  scheme  of  it,  which 
appear  to  them  unreasonable.  They  take  for  granted,  that  if 
Christianity  were  true,  the  light  of  it  must  have  been  more 
general,  and  the  evidence  of  it  more  satisfactory,  or  rather  over- 
powering :  that  it  must  and  would  have  been,  in  some  way,  other- 
wise put  and  left,  than  it  is.     Now  this  is  not  imagining  thej 


PART  11.  CONCLUSION.  309 

see  the  evidence  itself  to  be  nothing,  or  inconsiderable;  but  ^^uite 
another  thing.  It  is  being  fortified  against  the  evidence,  in 
some  degree  acknowledged,  by  thinking  they  see  the  system  of 
Christianity,  or  something  which  appears  to  them  necessarily  con- 
nected with  it,  to  be  incredible  or  false;  fortified  against  that 
evidence,  which  might  otherwise  make  great  impression  upon 
them.  Or,  lastly,  if  any  of  these  persons  are,  upon  the  whole,  in 
doubt  concerning  the  truth  of  Christianity;  their  behavior  seems 
owing  to  their  taking  for  granted,  through  strange  inattention, 
that  such  doubting  is,  in  a  manner,  the  same  thing  as  being 
certain  against  it. 

To  these  persons,  and  to  this  state  of  opinion  concerning  reli- 
gion, the  foregoing  treatise  is  adapted.  For,  all  the  general 
objections  against  the  moral  system  of  nature  having  been  ob- 
viated, it  is  shown,  that  there  is  not  any  peculiar  presumption  at 
all  against  Christianity,  considered  either  as  not  discoverable  by 
reason,  or  as  unlike  to  what  is  so  discovered;  nor  any,  worth 
mentioning,  against  it  as  miraculous,  if  any  at  all;  none,  cer- 
tainly, which  can  render  it  in  the  least  incredible.  It  is  shown, 
that,  upon  supposition  of  a  divine  revelation,  the  analogy  of 
nature  renders  it  beforehand  highly  credible,  I  think  probable, 
that  many  things  in  it  must  appear  liable  to  great  objections; 
and  that  we  must  be  incompetent  judges  of  it,  to  a  great  degree. 
This  observation  is,  I  think,  unquestionably  true,  and  of  the  very 
utmost  importance.  But  it  is  urged,  as  I  hope  it  will  be  under- 
stood, with  great  caution  not  to  vilify  the  faculty  of  reason, 
which  is  the  candle  of  the  Lord  icithin  us;^  though  it  can  afi"ord 
no  light,  where  it  does  not  shine;  nor  judge,  where  it  has  no 
principles  to  judge  upon.  The  objections  here  spoken  of,  being 
first  answered  in  the  view  of  objections  against  Christianity  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  are  in  the  next  place  considered  as  urged  more 
immediately  against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  the 
Christian  dispensation.  And  it  is  fully  made  out,  that  they 
admit  of  exactly  the  like  answer,  in  every  respect,  to  what  the 
like  objections  against  the  constitution  of  nature  admit  of:  that, 
as  partial  views  give  the  appearance  of  wrong  to  things,  which, 
upon  further  consideration  and  knowledge  of  their  relations  to 
other  things,  are  found  just  and  good;  so  it  is  perfectly  credible, 
*  Prov.  XX.  27. 


810  CONCLUSION.  PART  m 

that  tlie  tliino's  objected  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the 
Christian  dispensation,  may  be  rendered  instances  of  wisdom 
and  goodness,  by  their  reference  to  other  things  beyond  our 
view.  Because  Christianity  is  a  scheme  as  much  above  our 
comprehension,  as  that  of  nature;  and  like  that,  a  scheme  in 
which  means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends,  and  which, 
as  is  most  credible,  may  be  carried  on  by  general  laws.  And 
it  ought  to  be  attended  to,  that  this  is  not  an  answer  taken 
merely  or  chiefly  from  our  ignorance  :  but  from  something  posi- 
tive, which  our  observation  shows  us.  For,  to  like  objections, 
the  like  answer  is  experienced  to  be  just,  in  numberless  parallel 
cases. 

The  objections  against  the  Christian  dispensation,  and  the 
method  by  which  it  is  carried  on,  having  been  thus  obviated,  in 
general,  and  together;  the  chief  of  them  are  considered  dis- 
tinctly, and  the  particular  things  objected  to  are  shown  credible, 
by  their  perfect  analogy,  each  apart,  to  the  constitution  of  nature. 
Thus,  if  man  be  fallen  from  his  primitive  state,  and  to  be  re- 
stored, and  infinite  wisdom  and  power  engages  in  accomplishing 
our  recovery:  it  were  to  have  been  expected,  it  is  said,  that  this 
should  have  been  effected  at  once;  and  not  by  such  a  long  series 
of  means,  and  such  a  various  economy  of  persons  and  things; 
one  dispensation  preparatory  to  another,  this  to  a  further  one, 
and  so  on  through  an  indefinite  number  of  ages,  before  the  end 
of  the  scheme  proposed  can  be  completely  accomplished;  a 
scheme  conducted  by  infinite  wisdom,  and  executed  by  almighty 
power.  But  now,  on  the  contrary,  our  finding  that  every  thing 
in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  is  thus  carried  on,  shows 
such  expectations  concerning  revelation  to  be  highly  unreason- 
able; and  is  a  satisfactory  answer  to  them,  when  urged  as  objec- 
tions against  the  credibility,  that  the  great  scheme  of  Providence 
in  the  redemption  of  the  world  may  be  of  this  kind,  and  to  be 
accomplished  in  this  manner. 

As  to  the  particular  method  of  our  redemption,  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  Mediator  between  God  and  man  :  this  has  been  shown 
to  be  most  obviously  analogous  to  the  general  conduct  of  nature, 
i.e.  the  God  of  nature,  in  appointing  others  to  be  the  instru- 
ments of  his  mercy,  as  we  experience  in  the  daily  course  of  Pro- 
vidence.    The  condition  of  this  world,  which  the  doctrine  of  ou? 


PART  II.  CONCLUSION.  311 

redemption  by  Clirlst  presupposes,  so  much  falls  in  witt  nntural 
appearances,  that  heathen  moralists  inferred  it  from  those  appear- 
ances :  inferred  that  human  nature  was  fallen  from  its  original 
rectitude,  and  in  consequence  of  this^  degraded  from  its  primi- 
tive happiness.  However  this  opinion  came  into  the  world,  these 
appearances  kept  up  the  tradition,  and  confirmed  the  belief  of  it. 
And  as  it  was  the  general  opinion  under  the  light  of  nature,  that 
repentance  and  reformation,  alone  and  by  itself,  was  not  sufiicient 
to  do  away  sin,  and  procure  a  full  remission  of  the  penalties  an- 
nexed to  it;  and  as  the  reason  of  the  thing  does  not  at  all  lead 
to  any  such  conclusion ;  so  every  day's  experience  shows  us,  that 
reformation  is  not,  in  any  sort,  sufficient  to  prevent  the  present  dis- 
advantages and  miseries,  which,  in  the  natural  course  of  things, 
God  has  annexed  to  folly  and  extravagance. 

Yet  there  may  be  ground  to  think,  that  the  punishments, 
which,  by  the  general  laws  of  divine  government,  are  annexed 
to  vice,  may  be  prevented  :  that  provision  may  have  been,  even 
originally,  made,  that  they  should  be  prevented  by  some  means 
or  other,  though  they  could  not  by  reformation  alone.  For  we 
have  daily  instances  of  such  mercy,  in  the  general  conduct  of 
nature  :  compassion  provided  for  misery,*  medicines  for  diseases, 
friends  against  enemies.  There  is  provision  made,  in  the  original 
constitution  of  the  world,  that  much  of  the  natural  bad  conse- 
quences of  our  follies,  which  persons  themselves  alone  cannot 
prevent,  may  be  prevented  by  the  assistance  of  others ;  assistance 
which  nature  enables,  and  disposes,  and  appoints  them  to  afford. 
By  a  method  of  goodness  analogous  to  this,  when  the  world  lay 
in  wickedness,  and  consequently  in  ruin,  God  so  loved  the  ivorld, 
that  he  gave  his  onJi/ -begotten  Son  to  save  it :  and  he  being  made 
'perfect  by  suffering,  became  the  author  of  eternal  scdvation  to  all 
them  that  obey  liivi.-\  Indeed  neither  reason  nor  analogy  would 
lead  us  to  think,  in  particular,  that  the  interposition  of  Christ,  ia 
the  manner  in  which  he  did  interpose,  would  be  of  that  efficacy 
for  recovery  of  the  world,  which  the  Scripture  teaches  us  it  was. 
But  neither  would  reason  nor  analogy  lead  us  to  think,  that  other 
particular  means  would  be  of  the  efficacy,  which  experience  shows 
they  are,  in  numberless  instances.  Therefore,  as  the  case  before 
us  does   not  admit  of  experience;   so,  that  neither  reason  nor 

*  Serin,  at  the  Rolh,  p.  106.  f  John  iii.  16 :  Heb.  v.  9. 


^12  CONCLUSION.  PARTir. 

analogy  can  show  how,  or  in  what  particular  way,  the  interposi- 
tion of  Christ,  as  revealed  in  Scripture,  is  of  that  efficacy,  which 
it  is  there  represented  to  be ;  this  is  no  kind  nor  degree  of  pre- 
sumption against  its  being  really  of  that  efficacy. 

Further:  the  objections  against  Christianity,  from  the  light  of 
it  not  being  universal,  nor  its  evidence  so  strong  as  might  possi- 
bly be  given,  have  been  answered  by  the  general  analogy  of 
nature.  That  God  has  made  such  variety  of  creatures,  is  indeed 
an  answer  to  the  former :  but  that  he  dispenses  his  gifts  in  such 
variety,  both  of  degrees  and  kinds,  among  creatures  of  the  same 
species,  and  even  to  the  same  individuals  at  different  times ;  is  a 
more  obvious  and  full  answer  to  it.  And  it  is  so  far  from  being 
the  method  of  Providence  in  other  cases,  to  afford  us  such  over- 
bearing evidence,  as  some  require  in  proof  of  Christianity;  that 
on  the  contrary,  the  evidence  upon  which  we  are  naturally  ap- 
pointed to  act  in  common  matters,  throughout  a  very  great  part 
of  life,  is  doubtful  in  a  high  degree.  And  admitting  the  fact, 
that  God  has  afforded  to  some  no  more  than  doubtful  evidence  of 
religion ;  the  same  account  may  be  given  of  it,  as  of  difficulties 
and  temptations  with  regard  to  practice.  But  as  it  is  not  im- 
possible,* surely,  that  this  alleged  doubtfulness  may  be  men's 
own  fault;  it  deserves  their  most  serious  consideration,  whether 
it  be  not  so.  However,  it  is  certain,  that  doubting  implies  a 
degree  of  evidence  for  that  of  which  we  doubt :  and  that  this 
degree  of  evidence  as  really  lays  us  under  obligations  as  demon- 
strative evidence. 

The  whole  of  religion  then  is  throughout  credible  :  nor  is 
there,  I  think,  any  thing,  relating  to  the  revealed  dispensation 
of  things,  more  different  from  the  experienced  constitution  and 
course  of  nature,  than  some  parts  of  the  constitution  of  nature, 
are  from  other  parts  of  it.  If  so,  the  only  question  which  re- 
mains is,  What  positive  evidence  can  be  alleged  for  the  truth  of 
Christianity?  This  too  in  general  has  been  considered,  and  the 
objections  against  it  estimated.  Deduct,  therefore,  what  is  to 
be  deducted  from  that  evidence,  upon  account  of  any  weight 
which  may  be  thought  to  remain  in  these  objections,  after  what 
the  analogy  of  nature  has  suggested  in  answer  to  them  :  and 
then  consider,  what  are  the  practical  consequences  from  all  this 
*  P.  258,  «fcc. 


PART  II.  CONCLUSION.  813 

upon  the  most  sceptical  principles  one  can  argue  upon  (for  I  am 
writing  to  persons  wlio  entertain  these  principles) :  and  upon 
such  consideration  it  will  be  obvious,  that  immorality,  as  little 
excuse  as  it  admits  of  in  itself,  is  greatly  aggravated,  in  persons 
who  have  been  made  acquainted  with  Chriatianity,  whether  they 
believe  it  or  not :  because  the  moral  system  of  nature,  or  natural 
religion,  which  Christianity  Inys  before  us,  approves  itself,  almost 
intuitively,  to  a  reasonable  mind,  upon  seeing  it  proposed. 

In  the  next  place,  with  regard  to  Christianity,  it  will  be  ob- 
served that  there  is  a  middle  between  a  full  satisfaction  of  the 
truth  of  it,  and  a  satisfaction  of  the  contrary.  The  middle  state 
of  mind  between  these  two  consists  in  a  serious  apprehension, 
that  it  may  be  true,  joined  with  doubt  whether  it  is  so.  And  this, 
upon  the  best  judgment  I  am  able  to  make,  is  as  far  towards 
speculative  infidelity,  as  any  sceptic  can  at  all  be  supposed  to  go, 
who  has  had  true  Christianity,  with  the  proper  evidences  of  it, 
laid  before  him,  and  has  in  any  tolerable  measure  considered  them. 
For  I  would  not  be  mistaken  to  comprehend  all  who  have  ever 
heard  of  it;  because  it  seems  evident,  that  in  many  countries 
called  Christian,  neither  Chiristianity  nor  its  evidence,  is  fairly 
laid  before  men.  And  in  places  where  both  are,  there  appear 
to  be  some  who  have  very  little  attended  to  either,  and  who  reject 
Christianity  with  a  scorn  proportionate  to  their  inattention^  and 
yet  ai'fe  by  no  means  without  understanding  in  other  matters. 
Now  it  has  been  shown,  that  a  serious  apprehension  that  Chris- 
tianity may  be  true,  lays  persons  under  the  strictest  obligations 
of  a  serious  regard  to  it,  throughout  the  whole  of  their  life ;  a 
regard  not  the  same  exactly,  but  in  many  respects  nearly  the  same 
with  what  a  full  conviction  of  its  truth  would  lay  them  under. 

Lastly,  it  will  appear,  that  blasphemy  and  profaneness,  with 
regard  to  Christianity,  are  absolutely  without  excuse.  There  is 
no  temptation  to  it,  but  from  the  wantonness  of  vanity  or  mirth; 
and  these,  considering  the  infinite  importance  of  the  subject,  are 
no  such  temptations  as  to  afford  any  excuse  for  it.  If  this  be  a 
just  account  of  things,  and  yet  men  can  go  on  to  vilify  or  dis- 
regard Christianity,  which  is  to  talk  and  act  as  if  they  had  a 
demonstration  of  its  falsehood,  there  is  no  reason  to  think  they 
would  alter  their  behavior  to  any  purpose,  though  there  were  a 
demonstration  of  its  truth. 

27 


DISSEETATIONS. 


OF  PERSOI^AL  IDEl^TITY. 
OF  THE  E"ATUEE  OF  VIRTUE. 


^Hn'tistmtnt. 


In  the  first  copy  of  tnese  papers,  I  had  inserted  the 
two  following  dissertations  into  the  chapters,  on  a  Future 
Life,  and  on  the  3Ioral  Cfovernmcnt  of  Crod;  with  *^hich 
they  are  closely  connected.  But  as  these  do  not  directly 
fall  under  the  title  of  the  foregoing  treatise,  and  would 
have  kept  the  subject  of  it  too  long  out  of  sight,  it  seems 
more  proper  to  place  them  by  themselves. 


316 


DISSERTATION   I. 


Whether  we  are  to  live  in  a  future  state,  as  it  is  the  most 
important  question  wliich  can  possibly  be  asked,  so  it  is  the  most 
intelligible  one  which  can  be  expressed  in  language.  Yet  strange 
perplexities  have  been  raised  about  the  meaning  of  that  identity 
or  sameness  of  person,  which  is  implied  in  the  notion  of  our 
living  now  and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two  successive  moments. 
And  the  solution  of  these  difficulties  hath  been  stranger  than  the 
difficulties  themselves.  For,  personal  identity  has  been  explained 
so  by  some,  as  to  render  the  inquiry  concerning  a  future  life  of  no 
consequence  at  all  to  us  the  persons  who  are  making  it.  And 
though  few  men  can  be  misled  by  such  subtleties;  yet  it  may  be 
proper  to  consider  them  a  little. 

When  it  is  asked  luherein  personal  identity  consists,  the  answer 
should  be  the  same,  as  if  it  were  asked  wherein  consists  simili- 
tude, or  equality;  that  all  attempts  to  define  would  but  perplex 
it.  Yet  there  is  no  difficulty  at  all  in  ascertaining  the  idea.  For 
as,  upon  two  triangles  being  compared  or -viewed  together,  there 
arises  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  similitude ;  or  upon  twice  two  and 
four,  the  idea  of  equality:  so  likewise,  upon  comparing  the 
consciousness  of  one's  self,  or  one's  own  existence,  in  any  two 
moments,  there  as  immediately  arises  to  the  mind  the  idea  of 
personal  identity.  And  as  the  two  former  comparisons  not  only 
give  us  the  ideas  of  similitude  and  equality;  but  also  show  us 
that  two  triangles  are  alike,  and  twice  two  and  four  are  equal :  so 
the  latter  comparison  not  only  gives  us  the  idea  of  personal 
identity,  but  also  shows  us  the  identity  of  ourselves  in  those  two 
moments;  the  present,  suppose,  and  that  immediately  past;  or 
the  present,  and  that  a  month,  a  year,  or  twenty  years  past.     In 

27*  317 


318  PEKSONAL  IDENTITY. 

other  words,  by  reflecting  upon  that  which  is  myself  now,  and 
that  which  was  myself  twenty  years  ago,  I  discern  they  are  not 
two,  but  one  and  the  same  self. 

But  though  consciousness  of  what  is  past  does  thus  ascertain 
our  personal  identity  to  ourselves,  yet  to  say,  that  it  makes  per- 
sonal identity,  or  is  necessary  to  our  being  the  same  persons,  is  to 
say,  that  a  person  has  not  existed  a  single  moment,  nor  done  one 
action,  but  what  he  can  remember;  indeed  none  but  what  he 
reflects  upon.  And  one  should  really  think  it  self-evident,  that 
consciousness  of  personal  identity  presupposes,  and  therefore 
cannot  constitute,  personal  identity;  anymore  than  knowledge, 
in  any  other  case,  can  constitute  truth,  which  it  presupposes. 

This  wonderful  mistake  may  possibly  have  arisen  from  hence; 
that  to  be  endued  with  consciousness  is  inseparable  from  the  idea 
of  a  person,  or  intelligent  being.  For,  this  might  be  expressed 
inaccurately  thus,  that  consciousness  makes  personality:  and 
from  hence  it  might  be  concluded  to  make  personal  identity 
But  though  present  consciousness  of  what  we  at  present  do  and 
feel  is  necessary  to  our  being  the  persons  we  now  are;  yet  pre- 
sent consciousness  of  past  actions  or  feelings  is  not  necessary  to 
our  being  the  same  persons  who  performed  those  actions,  or  once 
had  those  feelings. 

The  inquiry,  what  makes  vegetables  the  same,  in  the  common 
acceptation  of  the  word,  does  not  appear  to  have  any  relation  to 
this  of  personal  identity :  because,  the  word  same,  when  applied 
to  them  and  to  a  person,  is  not  only  applied  to  different  subjects, 
but  it  is  also  used  in  different  senses.  For  when  a  man  swears 
to  the  same  tree,  as  having  stood  fifty  years  in  the  same  place,  he 
means  only  the  same  as  to  all  the  purposes  of  property,  and  uses 
of  common  life;  and  not  that  the  tree  has  been  all  that  time  the 
same,  in  the  strict  philosophical  sense  of  the  word.  For  he  does 
not  know,  whether  any  one  particle  of  the  present  tree  be  the 
same  with  any  one  particle  of  the  tree  which  stood  in  the  same 
place  fifty  years  ago.  And  if  they  have  not  one  common  particle 
of  matter,  they  cannot  be  the  same  tree  in  the  proper  philosophic 
sense  of  the  word  same:  it  being  evidently  a  contradiction  in 
terms,  to  say  they  are,  when  no  part  of  their  substance,  and  no 
one  of  their  properties  is  the  same :  no  part  of  their  substance, 
by  the  supposition;    no  one  of  their   properties,  be^.ause  it  is 


PERSONAL  IDENTITY.  319 

allowed,  that  the  same  property  cannot  be  transferred  from  ono 
substance  to  another.  Therefore  when  we  say  the  identity  of 
sameness  of  a  plant  consists  in  a  continuation  of  the  same  life, 
communicated  under  the  same  organization,  to  a  number  of  par- 
ticles of  matter,  whether  the  same  or  not ;  the  word  same,  when 
applied  to  life  and  to  organization,  cannot  possibly  be  understood 
to  signify,  what  it  signifies  in  this  very  sentence,  when  applied  to 
matter.  In  a  loose  and  popular  sense  then,  the  life  and  the  organ- 
ization and  the  plant  are  justly  said  to  be  the  same,  notwith- 
standing the  perpetual  change  of  the  parts.  But  in  strict  and 
philosophical  language^  no  man,  no  being,  no  mode  of  being,  no 
any  thing,  can  be  the  same  with  that,  with  which  it  has  indeed 
nothing  the  same.  Now  sameness  is  used  in  this  latter  sense, 
when  applied  to  persons.  The  identity  of  these,  therefore,  can^ 
not  subsist  with  diversity  of  substance. 

The  thing  here  considered,  and  as  I  think,  demonstratively 
determined,  is  proposed  by  Mr.  Locke  in  these  words,  Whether 
it,  i.e.  the  same  self  or  person,  he  the  same  identical  substance? 
And  he  has  suggested  what  is  a  much  better  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion, than  that  which  he  gives  it  in  form.  For  he  defines  person, 
a  thinking  inteliigent  being,  &c.,  and  personal  identity,  the  same- 
ness of  a  rational  being.^  The  question  then  is,  whether  the 
same  rational  being  is  the  same  substance :  which  needs  no  an- 
swer, because  being  and  substance,  in  this  place,  stand  for  the 
same  idea.  The  ground  of  the  doubt,  whether  the  same  person 
be  the  same  substance,  is  said  to  be  this;  that  the  consciousness 
of  our  own  existence,  in  youth  and  in  old  age,  or  in  any  two 
joint  successive  moments,  is  not  the  same  individual  action,^ 
i.e.  not  the  same  consciousness,  but  difi'erent  successive  conscious- 
nesses. Now  it  is  strange  that  this  should  have  occasioned  such 
perplexities.  For  it  is  surely  conceivable,  that  a  person  may 
have  a  capacity  of  knowing  some  object  or  other  to  be  the  same 
now,  which  it  was  when  he  contemplated  it  formerly :  yet  in  this 
case,  where,  by  the  supposition,  the  object  is  perceived  to  be  the 
same,  the  perception  of  it  in  any  two  moments  cannot  be  one  and 
the  same  perception.  And  thus,  though  the  successive  conscious- 
nesses, which  we  have  of  our  own  existence,  are  not  the  same, 
yet  are  they  consciousnesses  o^  one  and  the  same  thing  or  object; 
*  Locke's  Works,  voL  i.  p.  146.  f  Locke,  pp.  146,  147. 


S20  PERSOXAL  IDENTITY. 

of  the  same  person,  self,  or  living  agent.  The  person,  of  whose 
existence  the  consciousness  is  felt  now,  and  was  felt  an  hour  or  a 
year  ago,  is  discerned  to  be,  not  two  persons,  but  one  and  the 
same  person;  and  therefore  is  one  and  the  same. 

Mr.  Locke's  observations  upon  this  subject  appear  hasty:  and 
he  seems  to  profess  himself  dissatisfied  with  suppositions,  which 
he  has  made  relating  to  it.*  But  some  of  those  hasty  observa- 
tions have  been  carried  to  a  strange  length  by  others;  whose 
notion,  when  traced  and  examined  to  the  bottom,  amounts,  I 
think,  to  this :")"  "  That  personality  is  not  a  permanent,  but  a  tran- 
sient thing:  that  it  lives  and  dies,  begins  and  ends  continually: 
that  no  one  can  any  more  remain  one  and  the  same  person  two 
moments  together,  than  two  successive  moments  can  be  one  and 
the  same  moment:  that  our  substance  is  indeed  continually 
changing;  but  whether  this  be  so  or  not,  is,  it  seems,  nothing  to 
the  purpose;  since  it  is  not  substance,  but  consciousness  alone, 
which  constitutes  personality :  which  consciousness,  being  succes- 
sive, cannot  be  the  same  in  any  two  moments,  nor  consequently 
the  personality  constituted  by  it."  Hence  it  must  follow,  that  it 
is  a  fallacy  upon  ourselves,  to  charge  our  present  selves  with  any 
thing  we  did,  or  to  imagine  our  present  selves  interested  in  any 
thing  which  befell  us  yesterday;  or  that  our  present  self  will  be 
interested  in  what  will  befall  us  to-morrow:  since  our  present 
self  is  not,  in  reality,  the  same  with  the  self  of  yesterday,  but 
another  like  self  or  person  coming  in  its  room,  and  mistaken  for 
it;  to  which  another  self  will  succeed  to-morrow.  This,  I  say, 
must  follow.  For  if  the  self  or  person  of  to-day,  and  that  of  to- 
morrow, are  not  the  same,  but  only  like  persons;  the  person  of 
to-day  is  really  no  more  interested  in  what  will  befall  the  person 
of  to-morrow,  than  in  what  will  befall  any  other  person. 

It  may  be  thought,  perhaps,  that  this  is  not  a  just  representa- 
tion of  the  opinion  we  are  speaking  of:  because  those  who  main- 
tain it  allow,  that  a  person  is  the  same  as  far  back  as  his  remem- 
brance reaches.  Indeed  they  use  the  words,  identity,  and  same 
person.  Nor  will  language  permit  these  words  to  be  laid  aside; 
since  if  they  were,  there  must  be  I  know  not  what  ridiculous 

*  Locke,  p.  152. 

■j-  See  an  answer  to  Dr.  Clarke's  Third  Defence  of  his  Letter  to  Mr.  Dodweli, 
2d  edit.  p.  44,  56,  Ac. 


PERSONAL  IDENTITt.  321 

periphrasis  substituted  in  the  room  of  them.  But  they  cannot, 
consistently  loith  themselves,  mean,  that  the  person  is  really  the 
same.  For  it  is  self-evident,  that  the  personality  cannot  be  really 
the  same,  if,  as  they  expressly  assert,  that  in  which  it  consists  is 
not  the  same.  And  as,  consistently  with  themselves,  they  can- 
not, so,  I  think  it  appears,  they  do  not  tnean,  that  the  person  is 
really  the  same,  but  only  that  he  is  so  in  a  fictitious  sense :  in 
such  a  sense  only  as  they  assert,  for  this  they  do  assert,  that  any 
number  of  persons  whatever  may  be  the  same  person.  The  bare 
unfolding  this  notion,  and  laying  it  thus  naked  and  open,  seems 
the  best  confutation  of  it.  However,  since  great  stress  is  said  to 
be  put  upon  it,  I  add  the  following  things. 

First,  This  notion  is  absolutely  contradictory  to  that  certain 
conviction,  which  necessarily  and  every  moment  rises  within  us, 
when  we  turn  our  thoughts  upon  ourselves,  when  we  reflect  upon 
what  is  past,  and  look  forward  upon  what  is  to  come.  All  imagi- 
nation of  a  daily  change  of  that  living  agent  which  each  man 
calls  himself,  for  another,  or  of  any  such  change  throughout  our 
whole  present  life,  is  entirely  borne  down  by  our  natural  sense 
of  things.  Nor  is  it  possible  for  a  person  in  his  wits  to  alter  his 
conduct,  with  regard  to  his  health  or  affairs,  from  a  suspicion, 
that,  though  he  should  live  to-morrow,  he  should  not,  however, 
be  the  same  person  he  is  to-day.  Yet,  if  it  be  reasonable  to  act, 
with  respect  to  a  future  life,  upon  the  notion  that  personality  is 
transient,  it  is  reasonable  to  act  upon  it,  with  respect  to  the  pre- 
sent. Here  then  is  a  notion  equally  applicable  to  religion  and  to 
temporal  concerns.  Every  one  sees  and  feels  the  inexpressible 
absurdity  of  it  in  the  latter  case ;  therefore,  if  any  can  take  up 
with  it  in  the  former,  this  cannot  proceed  from  the  reason  of  the 
thing,  but  must  be  owing  to  inward  unfairness,  and  secret  cor- 
ruption of  heart. 

Secondly,  It  is  not  an  idea,  or  abstract  notion,  or  quality,  but 
a  heing  only,  which  is  capable  of  life  and  action,  of  happiness  and 
misery.  Now  all  beings  confessedly  continue  the  same,  during 
the  whole  time  of  their  existence.  Consider  then  a  living  being 
now  existing,  and  which  has  existed  for  any  time  alive.  This 
living  being  must  have  done  and  suffered  and  enjoyed,  what  it 
has  done  and  suffered  and  enjoyed  formerly,  (this  living  being,  I 
Bay,  and  not  another)  as  really  as  it  does  and  suffers  and  enjoys, 
V 


S22  PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 

what  it  does  and  suffers  and  enjoys  this  instant.  All  these  suc- 
cessive actions,  enjoyments,  and  sufferings,  are  actions,  enjoy- 
ments, and  sufferings,  of  the  same  living  being.  And  they  are 
so,  prior  to  all  consideration  of  its  remembering  or  forgetting : 
since  remembering  or  forgetting  can  make  no  alteration  in  the 
truth  of  past  matter  of  fact.  And  suppose  this  being  endued 
with  limited  powers  of  knowledge  and  memory,  there  is  no 
more  difficulty  in  conceiving  it  to  have  a  power  of  knowing 
itself  to  be  the  same  living  being  which  it  was  some  time  ago, 
of  remembering  some  of  its  actions,  sufferings,  and  enjoyments, 
and  forgetting  others,  than  in  conceiving  it  to  know  or  remember 
or  forget  any  thing  else. 

Thirdly^  Every  person  is  conscious,  that  he  is  now  the  same 
person  or  self  he  was  as  far  back  as  his  remembrance  reaches : 
since  when  any  one  reflects  upon  a  past  action  of  his  own,  he 
is  just  as  certain  of  the  person  who  did  that  action,  namely, 
himself  who  now  reflects  upon  it,  as  he  is  certain  that  the 
action  was  done  at  all.  Nay,  very  often  a  person's  assurance 
of  an  action  having  been  done,  of  which  he  is  absolutely  assured, 
arises  wholly  from  the  consciousness  that  he  himself  did  it. 
This  he,  person,  or  self,  must  either  be  a  substance,  or  the 
property  of  some  substance.  If  he,  a  person,  be  a  substance; 
then  consciousness  that  he  is  the  same  person  is  consciousness 
that  he  is  the  same  substance.  If  the  person,  or  he,  be  the 
property  of  a  substance,  still  consciousness  that  he  is  the  same 
property  is  as  certain  a  proof  that  his  substance  remains  the 
same,  as  consciousness  that  he  remains  the  same  substance  would 
be ;  since  the  same  property  cannot  be  transferred  from  one 
substance  to  another. 

But  though  we  are  thus  certain,  that  we  are  the  same  agents, 
living  beings,  or  substances,  now,  which  we  were  as  far  back  as 
our  remembrance  reaches;  yet  it  is  asked,  whether  we  may  not 
possibly  be  deceived  in  it  ?  And  this  question  may  be  asked  at 
the  end  of  any  demonstration  whatever  :  because  it  is  a  question 
concerning  the  truth  of  perception  by  memory.  He  who  can 
doubt,  whether  perception  by  memory  can  in  this  case  be  de- 
pended upon,  may  doubt  also,  whether  perception  by  deduction 
and  reasoning,  which  also  include  memory,  or  indeed  whether 
intuitive  perception  can.     Here  then  we  can  go  no  further.     Fo/" 


PERSONAL  IDENTITY.  323 

it  is  ridiculous  to  attempt  to  prove  the  truth  of  those  perceptions, 
whose  truth  we  can  no  otherwise  prove,  than  by  other  perceptions 
of  exactly  the  same  kind  with  them,  and  which  there  is  just  the 
same  ground  to  suspect;  or  to  attempt  to  prove  the  truth  of  our 
faculties,  which  can  no  otherwise  be  proved,  than  by  the  use  or 
means  of  those  very  suspected  faculties  themselves.* 

*  ["One  is  continually  reminded  throughout  this  dissertation,  of  what  is 
called  The  common-sense  echool  of  Scotch  metaphysicians.  Nor  can  there  be 
any  doubt  that  Reid,  in  particular,  was  largely  indebted  to  Butler,  of  whose 
writings  he  was  a  diligent  student,  for  forming  that  sober  and  manly  character 
of  understanding  which  is,  I  think,  his  great  merit." — Fitzgerald.] 


DISSERTATION  II. 

f  fee  iatott  jof  f  irtae. 


That  whicli  renders  beings  capable  of  moral  government,  is 
their  having  a  moral  nature,  and  moral  faculties  of  perception 
and  of  action.  Brute  creatures  are  impressed  and  actuated  by 
various  instincts  and  propensions  :  so  also  are  we.  But  addi- 
tional to  this,  we  have  a  capacity  of  reflecting  upon  actions  and 
characters,  and  making  them  an  object  to  our  thought :  and  on 
doing  this,  we  naturally  and  unavoidably  approve  some  actions, 
under  the  peculiar  view  of  their  being  virtuous  and  of  good 
desert;  and  disapprove  others,  as  vicious  and  of  ill  desert.  That 
we  have  this  moral  approving  and  disapproving"^  faculty,  is  cer- 
tain from  our  experiencing  it  in  ourselves,  and  recognising  it  in 
each  other.  It  appears  from  our  exercising  it  unavoidably,  in  the 
approbation  and  disapprobation  even  of  feigned  characters;  from 
the  words  right  and  wrong,  odious  and  amiable,  base  and  worthy, 
with  many  others  of  like  signification  in  all  languages  applied  to 
actions  and  characters  :  from  the  many  written  systems  of  morals 
which  suppose  it,  since  it  cannot  be  imagined,  that  all  these 
authors,  throughout  all  these  treatises,  had  absolutely  no  mean- 
ing at  all  to  their  words,  or  a  meaning  merely  chimerical :  from 

*  This  way  of  speaking  is  taken  from  Epietetus,f  and  is  made  use  of  as 
seeming  the  most  full,  and  least  liable  to  cavil.  And  the  moral  faculty  may  be 
understood  to  have  these  two  epithets,  doKiixaarlKii  and  aTtoioKijimTLKn  [applauding 
and  condemning]  upon  a  double  account ;  because,  upon  a  survey  of  actions, 
whether  before  or  after  they  are  done,  it  determines  them  to  be  good  or  evil ; 
and  also  because  it  determines  itself  to  be  the  guide  of  action  and  of  life,  in 
contradistinction  from  all  other  faculties,  or  natural  principles  of  action;  in 
ihe  very  same  manner  as  speculative  reason  directly  and  naturally  judges  of 
speculative  truth  and  falsehood:  and  at  the  same  time  is  attended  with  a  con- 
sciousness upon  reflection,  that  the  natural  right  to  judge  of  them  belongs  to  it. 

f  Arr.  Epict.  lib.  i.  cap.  L 
324 


NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  325 

our  natural  sense  of  gratitude,  wMcli  implies  a  distinction  be- 
tween merely  being  the  instrument  of  good,  and  intending  it : 
from  tlie  distinction  every  one  makes  between  injury  and  mere 
harm,  which,  Hobbes  says,  is  peculiar  to  mankind ;  and  between 
injury  and  just  punishment,  a  distinction  plainly  natural,  prior 
to  the  consideration  of  human  laws. 

It  is  manifest  that  great  part  of  common  language,  and  of 
common  behavior  over  the  world,  is  formed  upon  supposition  of 
such  a  moral  faculty;  whether  called  conscience,  moral  reason, 
moral  sense,  or  divine  reason  ;  whether  considered  as  a  sentiment 
of  the  understanding,  or  as  a  perception  of  the  heart;  or,  which 
seems  the  truth,  as  including  both.  Nor  is  it  at  all  doubtful  in 
the  general,  what  course  of  action  this  faculty,  or  practical  dis- 
cerning power  within  us,  approves  and  what  it  disapproves.  For, 
as  much  as  it  has  been  disputed  wherein  virtue  consists,  or  what- 
ever ground  for  doubt  there  ma}^  be  about  particulars ;  yet,  in 
general,  there  is  in  reality  a  universally  acknowledged  standard 
of  it.  It  is  that,  which  all  ages  and  all  countries  have  made 
profession  of  in  public  :  it  is  that,  which  every  man  you  meet 
]mts  on  the  show  of:  it  is  that,  which  the  primary  and  funda- 
mental laws  of  all  civil  constitutions  over  the  face  of  the  earth 
make  it  their  business  and  endeavor  to  enforce  the  practice  of 
upon  mankind  :  namely,  justice,  veracity,  and  regard  to  common 
good^  It  being  manifest  then,  in  general,  that  we  have  such  a 
faculty  or  discernment  as  this,  it  may  be  of  use  to  remark  some 
things  more  distinctly  concerning  it. 

Firsty  It  ought  to  be  observed,  that  the  object  of  this  faculty 
is  actions,*  comprehending  under  that  name  active  or  practical 
principles  :  those  principles  from  which  men  would  act,  if  occa- 
sions and  circumstances  gave  them  power;  and  which,  when 
fixed  and  habitual  in  any  person,  we  call  his  character.  It  does 
not  appear,  that  brutes  have  the  least  reflex  sense  of  actions,  as 
distinguished  from  events  :  or  that  will  and  design,  which  con- 
stitute the  very  nature  of  actions  as  such,  are  at  all  an  object  to 
their  perception.  But  to  ours  they  are:  and  they  are  the  object, 
and  the  only  one,  of  the  approving   and   disapproving  faculty. 

*  Owi  !]  lipe-rj  Kal  kokio — ev  netaei,  dWa  kvzfiyda,  [Virtue  and  vice  are  not  in  feel- 
ing, but  in  action,]  M.  Anton,  lib.  ix.  16.  Virtutis  laus  omnis  in  actione  con- 
%istjc.    "The  whole  praise  of  virtue,  depends  on  action.]    Cie.  Off.  lib.  i.  cap.  6. 

28 


326  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 

Acting,  noncluct,  behavior,  abstracted  from  all  regard  to  wbat  is 
in  fact  and  event  the  consequence  of  it,  is  itself  the  natural  ob- 
ject of  the  moral  discernment;  as  speculative  truth  and  false- 
hood is  of  speculative  reason.  Intention  of  such  and  such 
consequences,  is  indeed,  always  included;  for  it  is  part  of  the 
action  itself:  but  though  the  intended  good  or  bad  consequences 
do  not  follow,  we  have  exactly  the  same  sense  of  the  action,  as 
if  they  did.  In  like  manner  we  think  well  or  ill  of  characters, 
abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the  good  or  the  evil,  which 
persons  of  such  characters  have  it  actually  in  their  power  to  do. 
We  never,  in  the  moral  way,  applaud  or  blame  either  ourselves 
or  others,  for  what  we  enjoy  or  what  we  suffer,  or  for  haviog  im- 
pressions made  upon  us,  which  we  consider  as  altogether  out  of 
our  power :  but  only  for  what  we  do  or  would  have  done,  had  it 
been  in  our  power  ;  or  for  what  we  leave  undone,  which  We  might 
have  done,  or  would  have  left  undone,  though  we  could  have 
done. 

Secondly,  Our  sense  or  discernment  of  actions  as  morally  good 
or  evil,  implies  in  it  a  sense  or  discernment  of  them  as  of  good 
or  ill  desert.  It  may  be  difficult  to  explain  this  percep- 
tion, so  as  to  answer  all  the  questions  which  may  be  asked  con- 
cerning it :  but  every  one  speaks  of  such  and  such  actions  as 
deserving  punishment;  and  it  is  not,  I  suppose,  pretended,  that 
they  have  absolutely  no  meaning  at  all  to  the  expression.  Now 
the  meaning  plainly  is  not,  that  we  conceive  it  for  the  good  of 
society,  that  the  doer  of  such  actions  should  be  made  to  suffer. 
For  if,  unhappily,  it  were  resolved,  that  a  man,  who  by  some 
innocent  action,  was  infected  with  the  plague,  should  be  left  to 
perish,  lest,  by  other  people's  coming  near  him,  the  infection 
should  spread ;  no  one  would  say  he  deserved  this  treatment. 
Innocence  and  ill  desert  are  inconsistent  ideas.  Ill  desert  always 
supposes  guilt :  and  if  one  be  no  part  of  the  other,  yet  they  are 
evidently  and  naturally  connected  in  our  mind.  The  sight  of  a 
man  in  misery  raises  our  compassion  towards  him ;  and  if  this 
misery  be  inflicted  on  him  by  another,  our  indignation  against 
the  author  of  it.  But  when  we  are  informed,  that  the  sufferer 
is  a  villain,  and  is  punished  only  for  his  treachery  or  cruelty; 
our  compassion  exceedingly  lessens,  and  in  many  instances  our 
indignation  wholly  subsides.     Now  what  produces  this  effect  is 


NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  327 

ilie  conception  of  that  in  tlie  sufferer,  whicli  we  call  ill  desert 
Upon  considering  then,  or  viewing  together,  our  notion  of  vice 
and  that  of  misery,  there  results  a  third,  that  of  ill  desert.  And 
thus  there  is  in  human  creatures  an  association  of  the  two  ideas, 
natural  and  moral  evil,  wickedness  and  punishment.  If  this 
association  were  merely  artificial  or  accidental,  it  were  nothing : 
but  being  most  unquestionably  natural,  it  greatly  concerns  us  to 
attend  to  it,  instead  of  endeavoring  to  explain  it  away. 

It  may  be  observed  further,  concerning  our  perception  of  good 
and  of  ill  desert,  that  the  former  is  very  weak  with  respect  to 
common  instances  of  virtue.  One  reason  of  which  may  be,  that 
it  does  not  appear  to  a  spectator,  how  far  such  instances  of  virtue 
proceed  from  a  virtuous  principle,  or  in  what  degree  this  principle 
is  prevalent :  since  a  very  weak  regard  to  virtue  may  be  sufficient 
to  make  men  act  well  in  many  common  instances.  On  the  other 
hand,  our  perception  of  ill  desert  in  vicious  actions  lessens,  in 
proportion  to  the  temptations  men  are  thought  to  have  had  to 
such  vices.  For,  vice  in  human  creatures  consisting  chiefly  in 
the  absence  or  want  of  the  virtuous  principle;  though  a  man  be 
overcome,  suppose  by  tortures,  it  does  not  from  thence  appear  to 
what  degree  the  virtuous  principle  was  wanting.  All  that  ap- 
pears is,  that  he  had  it  not  in  such  a  degree,  as  to  prevail  over 
the  temptation;  but  possibly  he  had  it  in  a  degree,  which  would 
have  rendered  him  proof  against  common  temptations. 

Thirdltj,  Our  perception  of  vice  and  ill  desert  arises  from,  and 
is  the  result  of,  a  comparison  of  actions  with  the  nature  and  capa- 
cities of  the  agent.  For  the  mere  neglect  of  doing  what  we 
ought  to  do,  would,  in  many  cases,  be  determined  by  all  men  to 
be  in  the  highest  degree  vicious.  This  determination  must  arise 
from  such  comparison,  and  be  the  result  of  it;  because  such 
neglect  would  not  be  vicious  in  creatures  of  other  natures  and 
capacities,  as  brutes.  It  is  the  same  also  with  respect  to  positive 
vices,  or  such  as  consist  in  doing  what  we  ought  not.  For 
every  one  has  a  different  sense  of  harm  done  by  an  idiot,  mad- 
man, or  child,  and  by  one  of  mature  and  common  understanding.: 
though  the  action  of  both,  including  the  intention,  which  is  pan 
of  the  action,  be  the  same :  as  it  may  be,  since  idiots  and  mad- 
men, as  well  as  children,  are  capable  not  only  of  doing  mischief 
but  also  of  inteudino-  it.     Now  this  difference  must  arise  from 


328  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 

BomewLat  discerned  in  the  nature  or  capacities  of  one,  whicK 
renders  the  action  vicious;  and  the  want  of  which,  in  the  other, 
renders  the  same  action  innocent  or  less  vicious:  and  this  plainly 
supposes  a  comparison,  whether  reflected  upon  or  not,  between 
the  action  and  capacities  of  the  agent,  previous  to  our  determining 
an  action  to  be  vicious.  Hence  arises  a  proper  application  of  the 
epithets,  incongruous,  unsuitable,  disproportionate,  unfit,  to  ac- 
tions which  our  moral  faculty  determines  to  be  vicious. 

Fourthly,  It  deserves  to  be  considered,  whether  men  are  more 
at  liberty,  in  point  of  morals,  to  make  themselves  miserable  with- 
out reason,  than  to  make  other  people  so:  or  dissolutely  to 
neglect  their  own  greater  good,  for  the  sake  of  a  present  lesser 
gratification,  than  they  are  to  neglect  the  good  of  others,  whom 
nature  has  committed  to  their  care.  It  would  seem,  that  a  due 
concern  about  our  own  interest  or  happiness,  and  a  reasonable 
endeavor  to  secure  and  promote  it,  (which  is,  I  think,  very  much 
the  meaning  of  the  word  prudence,  in  our  language;)  it  would 
seem,  that  this  is  virtue,  and  the  contrary  behavior  faulty  and 
blamable;  since,  in  the  calmest  way  of  reflection,  we  approve  of 
the  first,  and  condemn  the  other  conduct,  both  in  ourselves  and 
others.  This  approbation  and  disapprobation  are  altogether 
difi"erent  from  mere  desire  of  our  own,  or  of  their  happiness,  and 
from  sorrow  upon  missing  it.  For  the  object  or  occasion  of  this 
last  kind  of  perception  is  satisftiction  or  uneasiness:  whereas  the 
object  of  the  first  is  active  behavior.  In  one  case,  what  our 
thoughts  fix  upon  is  our  condition :  in  the  other,  our  conduct. 

It  is  true  indeed,  that  nature  has  not  given  us  so  sensible  a 
disapprobation  of  imprudence  and  folly,  either  in  ourselves  or 
others,  as  of  falsehood,  injustice,  and  cruelty :  I  suppose,  because 
that  constant  habitual  sense  of  private  interest  and  good,  which 
we  always  carry  about  with  us,  renders  such  sensible  disapproba- 
tion less  necessary,  less  wanting,  to  keep  us  from  imprudently 
neglecting  our  own  happiness,  and  foolishly  injuring  ourselves, 
than  it  is  necessary  and  wanting  to  keep  us  from  injuring  others, 
to  whose  good  we  cannot  have  so  strong  and  constant  a  regard : 
and  also  because  imprudence  and  folly,  appearing  to  bring  its 
own  punishment  more  immediately  and  constantly  than  injurious 
behavior,  it  less  needs  the  additional  punishment,  which  would 
be  inflicted  upon  it  by  others,  had  they  the  same  sensible  iudigua- 


NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  329 

tion  against  it^  as  ajxainst  injustice,  and  fraud,  and  cruelty.  Be^ 
sides,  unhappiness  being  in  itself  the  natural  object  of  compassion^ 
the  unhappiness  which  people  bring  upon  themselves,  though  it 
be  wilfully,  excites  in  us  some  pity  for  them;  and  this  of  course 
lessens  our  displeasure  against  them.  Still  it  is  matter  of  expe- 
rience, that  we  are  formed  so  as  to  reflect  very  severely  upon  the 
greater  instances  of  imprudent  neglect  and  foolish  rashness,  both 
in  ourselves  and  others.  In  instances  of  this  kind,  men  often 
say  of  themselves  with  remorse,  and  of  others  with  some  indigna- 
tion, that  they  deserved  to  suffer  such  calamities,  because  they 
brought  them  upon  themselves,  and  would  not  take  warning. 
Particularly  when  persons  come  to  poverty  and  distress  by  a  long 
course  of  extravagance,  and  after  frequent  admonitions,  though 
without  falsehood  or  injustice;  we  plainly,  do  not  regard  such 
people  as  alike  objects  of  compassion  with  those,  who  are  brought 
into  the  same  condition  by  unavoidable  accidents.  From  these 
things  it  appears,  that  prudence  is  a  species  of  virtue,  and  folly 
of  vice :  meaning  by  folly ^  something  quite  different  from  mere 
incapacity;  a  thoughtless  want  of  that  regard  and  attention  to 
our  own  happiness,  which  we  had  capacity  for.  And  this  the 
word  properly  includes;  and,  as  it  seems,  in  its  usual  accepta- 
tion :  for  we  scarcely  apply  it  to  brute  creatures. 

However,  if  any  person  be  disposed  to  dispute  the  matter,  I 
shall  very  willingly  give  him  up  the  words  virtue  and  vice,  as 
not  applicable  to  prudence  and  folly :  but  must  insist,  that  the 
faculty  within  us,  which  is  the  judge  of  actions,  approves  of  pru- 
dent actions,  and  disapproves  imprudent  ones :  I  say  prudent  and 
imprudent  actions  as  such,  and  considered  distinctly  from  the 
happiness  or  misery  which  they  occasion.  And  by  the  way,  this 
observation  may  help  to  determine  what  justness  there  is  in  the 
objection  against  religion,  that  it  teaches  us  to  be  interested  and 
selfish. 

Fifthly,  Without  inquiring  how  far,  and  in  what  sense,  virtue 
is  resolvable  into  benevolence,  and  vice  into  the  want  of  it;  it 
may  be  proper  to  observe,  that  benevolence,  and  the  want  of  it, 
singly  considered,  are  in  no  sort  the  ichole  of  virtue  and  vice. 
For  if  this  were  the  case,  in  the  review  of  one's  own  character,  or 
that  of  others,  our  moral  understanding  and  moral  sense  would 
be  indifferent  to  every  thing,  but  the  degrees  in  which  benevo- 

28* 


850  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 

lence  prevailed,  and  the  degrees  in  wliich  it  was  wanting.  That 
is,  we  should  neither  approve  of  benevolence  to  some  persons 
rather  than  to  others,  nor  disapprove  injustice  and  falsehood  upon 
any  other  account,  than  merely  as  an  overbalance  of  happiness 
was  foreseen  likely  to  be  produced  by  the  first,  and  of  misery  by 
the  second.  On  the  contrary,  suppose  two  men  competitors  for 
any  thing  whatever,  which  would  be  of  equal  advantage  to  each 
of  them;  though  nothing  indeed  would  be  more  impertinent, 
than  for  a  stranger  to  busy  himself  to  get  one  of  them  preferred 
to  the  other;  yet  such  endeavor  would  be  virtue,  in  behalf  of  a 
friend  or  benefactor,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  distant 
consequences:  as  that  examples  of  gratitude,  and  the  cultivation 
of  friendship,  would  be  of  general  good  to  the  world.  Again, 
suppose  one  man  should,  by  fraud  or  violence,  take  from  another 
the  fruit  of  his  labor,  with  intent  to  give  it  to  a  third,  who  he 
thought  would  have  as  much  pleasure  from  it  as  would  balance 
the  pleasure  which  the  first  possessor  would  have  had  in  the 
enjoyment,  and  his  vexation  in  the  loss  of  it;  suppose  also  that 
no  bad  consequences  would  follow :  yet  such  an  action  would 
surely  be  vicious.  Nay  further,  were  treachery,  violence,  and 
injustice,  no  otherwise  vicious,  than  as  foreseen  likely  to  produce 
an  overbalance  of  misery  to  society;  then,  if  in  any  case  a  man 
could  procure  to  himself  as  great  advantage  by  an  act  of  injustice, 
as  the  whole  foreseen  inconvenience,  likely  to  be  brought  upon 
others  by  it,  would  amount  to;  such  a  piece  of  injustice  would 
not  be  faulty  or  vicious  at  all :  because  it  would  be  no  more  than, 
in  any  other  case,  for  a  man  to  prefer  his  own  satisfaction  to 
another's,  in  equal  degrees. 

The  fact,  then,  appears  to  be,  that  we  are  constituted  so  as  to 
condemn  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  injustice,  and  to  ap- 
prove of  benevolence  to  some  preferably  to  others,  abstracted 
from  all  consideration,  which  conduct  is  likeliest  to  produce  an 
overbalance  of  happiness  or  misery.  Therefore,  were  the  Author 
of  nature  to  propose  nothing  to  himself  as  an  end  but  the  pro- 
duction of  happiness,  were  his  moral  character  merely  that  of 
benevolence ;  yet  ours  is  not  so.  Upon  that  supposition  indeed, 
the  only  reason  of  his  giving  us  the  above  mentioned  approbation 
of  benevolence  to  some  persons  rather  than  others,  and  disappro- 
bation of  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  and  injustice,  must  h'i, 


NATURE  OF  VIRTUE.  331 

tliat  he  foresaw  tins  constitution  of  our  nature  would  produce 
more  happiness,  than  forming  us  with  a  temper  of  mere  general 
benevolence.  But  still,  since  this  is  our  constitution,  falsehood, 
violence,  injustice,  must  be  vice  in  us;  and  benevolence  to  some, 
preferably  to  others,  virtue ;  abstracted  from  all  consideration  ot 
the  overbalance  of  evil  or  good,  which  they  may  appear  likely  to 
produce. 

Now  if  human  creatures  are  endued  with  such  a  moral  nature 
as  we  have  been  explaining,  or  with  a  moral  faculty,  the  natural 
object  of  which  is  actions :  moral  government  must  consist  in 
rendering  them  happy  and  unhappy,  in  rewarding  and  punishing 
them,  as  they  follow,  neglect,  or  depart  from,  the  moral  rule  of 
action  interwoven  in  their  nature,  or  suggested  and  enforced  by 
this  moral  faculty;*  in  rewarding  and  punishing  them  upon  ac- 
count of  their  so  doing. 

I  am  not  sensible  that  I  have,  in  this  fifth  observation,  contra- 
dicted what  any  author  designed  to  assert.  But  some  of  great 
and  distinguished  merit,  have,  I  think,  expressed  themselves  in 
a  manner,  which  may  occasion  some  danger,  to  careless  readers, 
of  imagining  the  whole  of  virtue  to  consist  in  singly  aiming,  ac- 
cording to  the  best  of  their  judgment,  at  promoting  the  happiness 
of  mankind  in  the  present  state;  and  the  whole  of  vice,  in  doing 
what  they  foresee,  or  might  foresee,  is  likely  to  produce  an  over- 
balance of  unhappiness  in  it :  than  which  mistakes,  none  can  be 
conceived  more  terrible.  For  it  is  certain,  that  some  of  the  most 
shocking  instances  of  injustice,  adultery,  murder,  perjury,  and 
even  of  persecution,  may,  in  many  supposable  cases,  not  have  the 
appearance  of  being  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of  misery 
in  the  present  state;  perhaps  sometimes  may  have  the  contrary 
appearance. 

This  reflection  might  easily  be  carried  on,  but  I  forbear.  The 
happiness  of  the  world  is  the  concern  of  Him  who  is  the  lord  and 
the  proprietor  of  it:  nor  do  we  know  what  we  are  about,  when 
we  endeavor  to  promote  the  good  of  mankind  in  any  ways,  but 
those  which  he  has  directed;  that  is  indeed  in  all  ways  not  con- 
trary to  veracity  and  justice.  I  speak  thus  upon  supposition  of 
persons  really  endeavoring,  in  some  sort,  to  do  good  without 
regard  to  these.     But  the  truth  seems  to  be,  that  such  supposed 

->  P.  145. 


332  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 

endeavors  proceed,  almost  always,  from  ambition,  tlie  spirit  of 
party,  or  some  indirect  principle,  concealed  perhaps  in  great 
measure  from  persons  themselves.  And  though  it  is  our  business 
and  our  duty  to  endeavor,  within  the  bounds  of  veracity  and 
justice,  to  contribute  to  the  ease,  convenience,  and  even  cheerful- 
ness and  diversion  of  our  fellow-creatures  :  yet,  from'  our  short 
views,  it  is  greatly  uncertain,  whether  this  endeavor  will,  in  par- 
ticular instances,  produce  an  overbalance  of  happiness  upon  the 
whole;  since  so  many  and  distant  things  must  come  into  the  ac- 
count. And  that  which  makes  it  our  duty  is,  that  there  is  some 
appearance  that  it  will,  and  no  positive  appearance  sufficient  to 
balance  this,  on  the  contrary  side;  and  also,  that  such  benevolent 
endeavor  is  a  cultivation  of  that  most  excellent  of  all  virtuous 
principles,  the  active  principle  of  benevolence. 

However,  though  veracity,  as  well  as  justice,  is  to  be  our  rule 
of  life;  it  must  be  added,  otherwise  a  snare  will  be  laid  in  the 
way  of  some  plain  men,  that  the  use  of  common  forms  of  speech, 
generally  understood,  cannot  be  falsehood;  and  in  general,  that 
there  can  be  no  designed  falsehood,  without  designing  to  deceive. 
It  must  likewise  be  observed,  that  in  numberless  cases,  a  man 
may  be  under  the  strictest  obligations  to  what  he  foresees  will 
deceive,  without  his  intending  it.  For  it  is  impossible  not  to 
foresee,  that  the  words  and  actions  of  men,  in  different  ranks  and 
employments,  and  of  different  educations,  will  perpetually  be 
mistaken  by  each  other.  And  it  cannot  but  be  so,  while  they 
will  judge  with  the  utmost  carelessness,  as  they  daily  do,  of  what 
they  are  not,  perhaps,  enough  informed  to  be  competent  judges 
of,  even  though  they  considered  it  with  great  attention. 


INDEX  TO  PART  I. 


REFERENCES  TO  THE  EDITOR'S  NOTES  ARE  IN  BRACKETS. 


PAGE 

Abstract  reasonings  may  mislead.  1C2 

fitness  of  things note  1S6 

Actions 

distinguished  from  their  quali- 
ties   Ill 

manifest  character 156 

rewarded  and  punished £8 

this  world  a  theater  of. 156 

what  sort  exercise  virtue 152 

Active  and  passive  impressions.  .  140 

Advantages  of  virtue 113 

may  never  recur 101 

Affections,  excited  by  objects.  .  .  .  145 

need  control 1C6 

part  of  our  constitution 147 

Affliction,  a  discipline 150 

chiefly  of  our  own  making.  .  .  .  10-0 

Agent,  the  living,  not  compounded  81 

Alienation  of  parts  of  our  body.  .  Si 

All  things  made  double IS'' 

Allurements,  use  of. 151 

Analogy 

answers  objections  as  to  a  pre- 
sent state  of  trial 135 

as  to  modes  of  existence 78 

carrying  the  force  of  positive 

argument [105 

deals  only  with  facts 171 

indicates  future  punishment.  .  101 

may  amount  to  proof. 168 

objections  which  it  cannot  an- 
swer   171 

the  only  proof  of  some  things.  79 

Antiquity  of  religion 167 


PAQS 

Atheists  not  argued  with,  in  this 

treatise. 181 

Beginnings  of  a  righteous  govern- 
ment seen  on  earth 107 

Bible,    teaches    the    existence   of 

general  laws [99 

Bodies 

not  necessary  to  us 82 

not  ourselves.  ." 83 

only   instruments 85,  86 

their  solid  elements 88 

Bodily  and  mental  habits 134 

Brain,  does  not  think [89 

Brahminical  notion  of  death .92 

Brutes, 

are  they  immortal  ? [88 

may  have  greater  strength  than 

man 119 

under  man's  control 119 

Capacities, 

state  of  in  infancy 88 

not  destroyed  by  death 89 

not  dependent  on  the  body.  .  .     79 

Causes  and  ends  incomprehensible  172 

Changes    compatible   with    iden- 
tity  78,  83 

Character 

manifested  by  probation 156 

not  given  but  acquired 155 

what  it  means note  163 

Conscience, 

how  it  acts 164^ 

333 


334 


INDEX  TO  PART  I. 


PAGE 

Conscience 

implies  government 115 

a  rule 164 

authority 164 

future  retribution.  ...  165 

may  be  impaired 168 

perverted 168 

Conscionisness    an    indiscerptible 

entity 82 

presupposes  identity [77 

Consequences 

may  sometimes  be  avoided.  .  .  102 

may  be  foreseen 98 

show  a  moral  government.  ...     98 

Course  of  nature  constant 97 

Cpeatures  finitely  perfect 147 

may  fall 148 

have  each  a  way  of  life 137 

Panger  of  wrong  doing,  how  in- 
creased  132 

Death 

and  birth  similar 91 

enlar^^es  our  sphere 92 

has  no  power  over  matter.  .  .  .   [91 
is    not  a  suspension    of   our 

powers 91 

is  not  our  destruction 80 

what  it  is 80 

Decay    c^    vegetables,    inference 

from 92 

Definitions  of  identity 77 

Delivering  up  of  the  Lord  Jesus 

Christ [Ill 

Destruction  of  seeds 153 

Different  states  of  human  existence.     89 
Difficulties  belong  to  all  subjects.  [96 
exercise  the  virtuous  principle.  152 
Disadvantages   of  virtue   tempo- 
rary  126 

Discipline,    its    true    nature   and 

use [148 

Disease  not  destructive  to  the  soul.     90 

sometimes  remedial 177 

Disorder  produced  by  sin 148 

Distress  excites  passive  pity  and 

active  relief. ,    .  .  140 


Distributive  justice  a  natural  rule.  110 
Divine  government  a  scheme,  chap.vii. 

Domestic  goverament 114 

Dreams,  what  they  prove 86 

Earthly  satisfactions  attainable.  .  183 
Effects  of  actions  on  the  actor.  .  .  [143 
Ends  often  produced  by  unlikely 

means 180 

Enjoyments  in  our  own  power  to 

a  great  degree 95 

Error,  how  spread [96 

Evidence  of  natural  religion 166 

Evil,  may  possibly  be  useful.  .  .  .  177 

its  possible  origin 147 

not  a  necessary  part  of  proba- 
tion  [128 

Exceptions   to   the   happiness   of 

virtue 108 

Experience   indispensable 141 

Faculties,  human,  not  perfect  at 

first 141 

Fall  of  man 133,  [148 

Fallacy  in  fatalism 169 

Fallen  creatures  require  discipline.  150 

Fatalism, — see  Necessity. 

Fear   a   proper    motive    to    obe- 
dience  154 

Folly,    destructive,    as    weU    as 

crime 132 

Formal  notion  of  government.  ...     99 

Foundation    of    moral    improve- 
ment  [108 

Future    advantages,  how  propor- 
tioned      93 

Future  existence  probable.  .  .  chap.  i. 
of  brutes [79 

Future  interest  dependent  on  con- 
duct      95 

Future  life, 

a  solemn  subject 95 

not  an  inactive  condition.  .  .  .  144 
reconcilable  with  atheism.  ...  94 
this  life  preparatory  to  it.  chap.  Y. 

Future  punishment  credible 103 

Future  retribution,  how  proved. .  i2d 


INDEX  TO  PART  I. 


335 


Future  state 

different  from  the  present.  ...  78 
brings  us  into  new  scenes.  ...     93 

may  have  temptations [146 

social 14.4 

will  not  require  such   virtues 

as  does  the  present  life.  .  154 

General  laws 

govern  the  world 177,  [99 

produce  punishment 103 

wisdom  of  them 178 

General  method  of  God's  govern- 
ment      97 

General  system  of  r^igion 124 

Gradual     improvement,     a    wise 

arrangement.  » .  .  .  .  141,  142 

GOD 

an  intelligent  governor 106 

determined  by  what  is  fit,  .  .  .  [166 
governs  by  human  instruments.  Ill 

governs    justly [108 

has  a  will  and  a  character.  .  .  .  163 
his  aims  incomprehensible.  .  .  97 
his  attributes  inferred  from  our 

own [115 

his  general  government 97 

his  government  just  and  good.  176 

his  indirect  commands 165 

moral  government  of.  .  .  chap.  iii. 

natural  "         "        ii. 

necessarily  existent 159 

not  indifferent  to   human  ac- 
tions  125 

not  simply  benevolent 106 

rewards  and  punishes 169 

the  only  necessary  being 159 

Good  actions,  how  punished Ill 

Good  habits  necessary  even  to  the 

virtuous 149 

Good  men  befriended  as  such.  .  .  112 
cannot  now  all  unite 121 

Good  not  forced  upon  us [134 

Government, 

civil,  an  ordinance  of  God.  .  .  Ill 
considered  as  a  scheme,  chap.  vii. 
of  God CHAP.  n. 


Government, 

not  perfected  in  this  world.  .  .  107 

the  formal  notion  of  it 98 

the  perfection  of. 106 

Habits, 

how  formed,  &c 139 

necessary  to  us  hereafter.  .  .  .  [145 

of  resignation 155 

often  ruinous 101 

of  virtue  an  improvement  in 

virtue. 147 

passive 138 

shape  the  character 141 

Happiness 

not  always  the  immediate  re- 
ward of  virtue 108 

not  given  promiscuously 138 

requisites  for 137 

the  result  of  virtue 118 

Helplessness  of  man [138 

Higher  degrees  of  retribution  pro- 
bable  127 

Hinderances  to  virtue 121 

History  of  religion 169 

Honest  men  befriend  the  honest.  .  112 
Hope   and   fear   appeal    to    self- 
love 153 

are  just  principles  of  action.  .  154 

Human  life  preparatory 144 

Hume's  wonderful  discovery.  ,  .  .  [162 
Human  powers  may  be  overtasked.  152 

Identity 

does  not  depend  on  the  same- 
ness of  the  body 83 

of  living  agents 77,  78 

not   explicable [77 

Ignorance 

acknowledged  on  all  subjects 

but  religion 174 

answers  objections 175 

the  argument  from 180 

total,  destroys  proof. 178 

Illustration  of  the  modification  of 
an  action  by  its  inten- 
tion  [Ill 


INDEX  TO  PART  I. 


PAGE 

Imagination  a  source  of  discontent.  154 

produces  much  error 81 

Immortality  of  brutes 88 

Improvement 

by  discipline 144 

by  habit. 147 

of  our  faculties  gradual 141 

wisdom  of  this 142 

Incomprehensibilityof  God's  plans     97 
Inconsiderateness    destructive.  .  .  102 

Inferiority  of  brute  force 119 

Infidelity  unjustifiable 105 

Insignificance  of  our  knowledge.  .  [174 
Interest  coincident  with  virtue.  .  .  154 
not  a  sufficient  restraint.  .  note  146 
Interpositions  to  prevent  irregu- 
larities  177 

would  produce  evil 178 

Intentional  good  rewarded 114 

Irregularities    perhaps    unavoid- 
able  177 

seeming  may  not  be  such.  .  .  .  176 
Inward  peace  attends  virtue.  .  .  .  112 

Kingdom,  idea  of  a  perfect 123 

Knowledge  of  man  insignificant.  [174 

Liberty  does  not  account  for  the 

f\ill 147 

implied  in  ourpresent  condition  162 
Life  a  probation 128 

one  part  of  it  preparatory  to 

another [142 

what  is  it  intended  for 137 

Living  agent  not  subject  to  death.     79 

Living  powers see  Death. 

Locke  on  human  identity [77 

Maimonides,  his  similitude [173 

Man 

an  inferior  part  of  creation.  .  .  133 

a  system  of  parts [98 

by  nature  social [93 

capable  of  improvement 145 

connected  with  present,  past, 

and  future 181 

dealt  with  as  if  free 102 


PAOl 

Man 

has  a  moral  nature 115 

his  fall  not  accounted  for  by 

his  free  agency 147 

his  helplessness [138 

knows  nothing  fully 173 

may  become  qualified  for  new 

states 137 

not  a  competent  judge  of  God's 

schemes 174 

requires  moral  culture 145 

Mania  often  produced  by  moral 

causes [85 

Materialism,  its  philosophical  ab- 
surdity. ' [81 

Matter  and  mind  not  the  same.  .  .   [83 

affect  each  other 85 

Means 

learned  by  experience 176 

man  not  a  competent  judge  of 

the  fitness  of  them 178 

not  always  agreeable 176 

Men  often  miss  possible  temporal 

good 129 

Men's  temporal  interests  greatly 

depend  on  themselves.  .  131 

Might  of  unarmed  virtue [121 

Mind 

influenced  by  the  passions.  .  .  131 

is  the  man [87 

its  effects  on  the  body [85 

may  survive  the  body [89 

the  only  real  percipient 85 

uses   the   body  as   an   instru- 
ment  [87 

Miracles,  properly  speaking,  not 

unnatural 94 

Miseries  as  contingent  as  conduct.  135 

generally  are  avoidable 100 

IMixture  of  suffering  and  enjoy- 
ment in  this  world.  .  .  .  [128 
Moral  and  natural  government  of 
God     similar     to     each 

other 184 

Moral  attributes  of  God  may  be 

inferred  from  our  own.  .  [115 
Moral  discipline.  .  .     chap.  y. 


INDEX  TO  PART  I. 


837 


Moral  government  of  God.  .  chap.  hi. 
Moral  improvement,  basis  of. .  .  .  [108 
Moral  world,  its  apparent  irregu- 
larities  176 

Mystery  of  God,  finished.  .  .  .  note  102 

Natural,  the  true  meaning  of  the 

word 94 

Natural  government  of  God.  chap.  ii. 
Natural  religion, 

its  evidences  not  affected  by  the 

doctrine  of  necessity.  .  .  166 

proof  of. 166 

teaches  the  doctrine  of  punish- 
ment  102 

Necessary  agents  may  be  punished  169 
Necessary  bulk  of  one's  self.  ....     84 

Necessary  existence  of  God 159 

Necessary  tendencies  of  virtue.  .  .  118 
Negligence  and  folly  disastrous.  .  132 
Necessity 

consigns  us  to  a  fallacy 169 

contradicts  the  constitution  of 

nature 170 

destroys  no  proof  of  religion.  .  170 

different  kinds  of. [157 

does  not  exclude  design 160 

doctrine  of. chap,  vi., 

not  an  agent 159 

not  applicable  to  practice.  ...  163 
not  in  conflict  with  religion.  .  .  160 
our  condition  indicates  freedom  162 
reconcilable  with  religion.  .  .  .  168 

the  doctrine  absurd 157 

what  it  means 158 

writers  for  and  against [170 

New  scenes  in  the  next  world.  .  .     93 

Obedience,  reluctant,  useful [152 

Objections 

against  a  proof  and  against  a 

thing  to  be  proved 179 

against  the  scheme  of  Provi- 
dence  174 

analogy  of  plants 92 

Christianity  not  universal,  .  .  .  169 

course  of  nature 97 

W 


Objections, 

destruction  of  seeds 153 

difference     between    temporal 

and  eternal  things [135 

discipline    might    have    been 

avoided 156 

God  simply  benevolent 106 

good  and  evil  may  be  mixed  in 

the  next  world 124 

gratification  of  appetites  natu- 
ral and  proper 98 

ignorance,  the  argument  from 
invalidates  the  proof  of 

religion 178 

immortality  of  brutes 87 

incredible  that  necessary  agents 

should  be  punished.  .  .  .  169 
irregularities  of  the  moral  world  176 
necessity  destroys  the  proof  of 

religion 165 

our  powers  may  be  overtasked  152 
probabilities     may    be     over- 
balanced   by    probabili- 
ties  169 

punishments  are  only  natural 

events 99 

rectitude  arising  from  hope  and 

fear,  sordid 153 

rewards  and  punishments.  ...     95 
sin  need  not  have  entered  the 

world 177 

society  punishes  good  actions.  Ill 
special     interpositions    might 

prevent  evil 177,  178 

to     the     doctrine     of    neces- 
sity  CHAP.  VI. 

to  the  doctrine  of  future  punish- 
ments   100-103 

virtue  sometimes  punished.  .  .  Ill 
virtues  of  the  present  life  not 

wanted  hereafter 154 

world  disciplines  some  to  vice.  153 
Obligation    certain,    when   proofs 

are  not 179 

Occasional  disadvantages  of  virtue  117 
Occasional  indulgences  in  wrong- 
doing awfully  dangerous  [143 


838 


INDEX  TO  PART  I. 


One  period  of  life  preparatory  to 

anothe'r [142 

Opportunities  once  lost  irrecover- 
able  143 

Organs  of  sense  mere  instruments     89 

Our  moral  nature  proves  a  moral 

government 115 

Pain,  no  contrivance  for  it  in  man.  [110 
Partial  ignorance  does  not  destroy 

proof. 178 

Passions 

carry  away  the  judgment.  .  .  .  131 
make    our    condition    one    of 

trial 130 

may  account  for  the  fall  of  man  147 
may  be  excited  where  gratifi- 
cation  is   impossible   or 

unlawful 146 

may  remain  in  a  future  state.  .  147 
should  be  subject  to  the  moral 

principle 145 

the  bare    excitement    of,   not 

criminal 145 

but  dangerous 146 

Passive  habits 138 

Passive  impressions  weakened  by 

repetition 139 

Passive  submission  essential.  .  .  .  155 

Peace  of  the  virtuous 112 

Perception,  instruments  of. 85 

possible  without  instruments.  .     86 
Perfection  of  moral  government  106,107 

of  an  earthly  kingdom 123 

Persecution  unnatural Ill 

Philosophy  never  arrogan-t [174 

what  it  cannot  teach [87 

Pleasure 

not  a  sufficient  reason  for  action     98 
and    pain   mostly   depend   on 

ourselves 95 

the  distribution  indicates  moral 

government ,  105 

Powers 

may  be  improved  by  exercise.  .  138 

may  be  overtasked 152 

may  exist  and  not  be  exercised.     80 


Powers 

no   reason  for  supposing  that 

death  will  destroy  them.     81 

Practical  proof,  what 168 

Present  existence  unaccounted  for 

by  atheism 94 

Presumptions  that  death  will  de- 
stroy us 81 

that  it  will  suspend  our  exist- 
ence      91 

Presumptuousness   unjustifiable.  .  105 
Private  vices  not  public  benefits.  [Ill 
Probabilities  in  favor  of  religion 
may  be  overbalanced  by 
probabilities  against  it.  .  169 

Probation chap.  it. 

applies  to  the  present  life  as 

well  as  the  future 130 

does    not     necessarily    imply 

suffering [128 

implies   allurements 129 

is   more   than   moral   govern- 
ment  128 

requires  severe  discipline.  ...  150 

Proofs  of  natural  religion 166 

of  religion  not  affected  by  the 

doctrine  of  necessity.  .  .  .  160 
Propensions     necessarily     create 

temptations 146 

are  excited  by  their  appropriate 

objects 147 

Proper  gratification  of  the  appe- 
tites      98 

Prosperity  of  a  virtuous  commu- 
nity  123 

may  beget  discontent 154 

Providence,  objections  to  God's  140, 174 
Public  spirit  a  fruit  of  virtue.  .  .  .  120 
Punishment 

an  alarming  subject 105 

especially  considered 100 

greater  hereafter  than  now.  .  .  127 
in  a  future  state  credible.  103,  125 
is  God's  voice  of  instruction.  .  [108 

is  sometimes  capital 102 

not  unjust 163 

often  long  delayed -  101 


INDEX  TO  PART  I. 


839 


PAGE 

Punishment 

often  overtakes  suaaeniy.  ...  101 

of  virtuous   actions Ill 

religious  and  natural  similar.  .  100 
results  from   folly  as  well  as 

crime 132 

the  result  of  general  laws.  .  .  .  103 

Quotations. 

Aristotle [152 

Chalmers [131,  138,  148 

Cicero [82,  86 

Clarke [97 

Fitzgerald [145 

Robert  Hall [US 

Hume [162 

Maimonides [173 

Mandeville [Ill 

Plato [87, 113 

Son  of  Sirac [137 

Strabo [92 

Rashness,  consequences  of. 96 

Reason 

an  incompetent  judge  of  means  178 
gives  power  over  brute  force.  .  119 

needs  experience 141 

not  dependent  on  bodily  powers     89 
requires  a  fair  opportunity  119-121 

Recapitulation  of  the  whole  argu- 
ment  180 

Rectitude,  is  self-interest  a  proper 

motive  to  it? 153 

References  to  other  authors. 

Bates [128 

Baxter [88 

Bayle [88 

Beattie [170 

Belsham [170 

Berkeley [Ill 

Bonnett [89 

Bramhall [171 

Brown [Ill 

Bryant [171 

Butterworth [107 

Calcott [128 

Cnpf,.  .  , [109 


PAQB 

References  to  other  authors. 

Chalmers [77,  79,  148 

Charnock [158 

Cheyne [88 

Clarke 82,  [81,  97,  171 

Colliber [88 

Collings [158,170 

Compte [170 

Crombie [170 

Crouse [170 

Davies [109 

D'Holbach [170 

Descartes [88 

Ditton [88 

Doddridge [109 

Dodwell [81 

Dwight [109 

Edwards [88,  170 

Fabricius [128 

Fichte [170 

Gibbs [171 

Grove [171 

Haller. [89 

Harris [171 

Hartley [170 

Hegel [170 

Henly [128 

Hobbes [170 

Holtzfusius [128 

Holyoake [170 

Horseley [109 

Hume [88 

Hunt [109 

Jackson [171 

Kennicott [128 

King.  ..- [98,  171 

Law [98 

Lawson [171 

Le  Clerc [128 

Leland [109 

Leroux [170 

Liefchild [109 

Locke [88 

Manton [128 

Martineau [170 

Martinius [119 

Milman [142 


S'iO 


INDEX  TO  PART  I. 


References  to  other  authors. 

Morgagni [89 

Morton [109 

MusEeus [128 

Palmer [171 

Pearson [128 

Polignac [88 

Porteus [109 

Price [158 

Priestley [142,  170 

Reid [170 

Rutherford [109,  158 

Search [88 

Seed ., .  .  .  [109 

Selden [128 

Shaftesbury 108 

Sherlock [109 

Shuckford [128 

Son  of  Sirac [137 

South [109,  128 

Stapfer [128 

Strabo 92 

Toplady f .  .  .  [128 

Topping [109 

Twisse [109 

"WagstaflF. [88 

Warburton [Ill 

Watts [77,  88,  171 

Whately [142,  158 

Willis [88 

Wisheart [109 

Witsius [128 

Wittichius [109 

jReflection  not  dependent  on  sensa- 
tion      91 

Reformation  is  attended  with  dis- 
comfort  108 

may  not  prevent  penalties.  .  .  .  102 

Relation  between  us  and  our  bodies     85 

Relations  of  things,  limitless.  .  .  .  173 

Religion 

a  question  of  fact 165 

historical  evidence  of. 168 

professed  in  all  ages 167 

its  proofs  not  affected  by  the 

doctrine  of  necessity.  .  .  170 
nor  by  our  ignorance 178 


Reluctant  obedience  profitable.  .  [152 
Remedies  often  very  disagreeable  176 

Repentance  may  be  too  late 104 

Requisites   to   the   superiority  of 

reason 119 

of  virtue 120,  121 

Resentment  of  injuries 114 

Resignation 

a  temper  consonant  with  God's 

sovereignty 155 

essential  to  virtue 154 

the  fruit  of  affliction 155 

the  habit  necessary  hereafter.  .  155 
Retributions  are  divine  teachings  [108 
Revelation, 

antiquity  of. 167 

not  improbable 167 

not  universal note  107 

Rewards   and  punishments,   how 

distributed 126 

Satisfactions  of  virtue 108 

Scheme  of  God  incomprehensible.  172 
Self-denial,  its  relations  to  present 

happiness 134 

not  essential  to  piety 152 

Self-discipline,    what [148 

Self-love 

a  just  principle  of  action.  .  .  .  154 

appealed  to 153 

how  moderated  and  disciplined  155 
not  a  sufficient  restraint.  .  note  146 

reasonable  and  safe 130 

Sensation  not  necessary  to  reflec- 
tion      91 

Senses  not  percipients 85 

Severe  discipliae  necessary 150 

Similitude  of  a  historical  painting  [174 
Simplicity  of  the  living  agent.  .  .  83 
Sin,  why  not  kept  out  of  the  world  177 
Skepticism  does  not  justify  irre- 

ligion 105 

Social,  our  nature  essentially  such  [93 
Society 

must  punish  vice 110 

natural  and  necessary [93 

sometimes  punishes  the  good-  111 


INDEX  TO  PART  I. 


341 


Soul 

a  simple  substance 82 

not  destroyed  with  the  body.  .     79 

not  naturally  immortal [81 

Souls  of  brutes 88 

Special   interpositions    of   Provi- 
dence  177,  178 

Stages  of  existence 78 

State  of  probation chap.  iv. 

State  of  discipline  and  improve- 
ment  CHAP.   V. 

Submissive  temper  necessary.  .  .  .  155 
Subordinations  exceedingly  bene- 
ficial  142 

Subserviencies  in  nature 173 

Sufferings  may  be  avoided 95 

not  necessary  to  the  cultiva- 
tion of  virtue [128 

Temporal  and  religious  probation 

similar 132 

Temptations 

increased  by  bad  examples.  .  .  132 

and  by  former  errors 132 

intended  for  our  improvement.  136 

involve  probation 129 

may  improve  or  injure  us.  .  .  .  153 

security  against  their  evils.  .  .  146 

sources  of,  to  upright  beings.  .  147 
the  necessary  result  of  propen- 

sions 146 

Tendencies  of  virtue 118 

hindered 121 

essential,  not  accidental 126 

Terms  "nature"  and  "course   of 

nature" [97 

Theorizing  no  aid  to  virtue 139 

Thoughtlessness  often  fatal 101 

Transmigration  of  souls [87 

Trials 

manifest  character 156 

may  exist  in  a  future  state.  .  .  147 

produced  by  our  propensions.  131 

qualify  for  a  better  state 144 

unreasonable  ones  are  not  in- 
flicted   133 

why  we  are  subjected  to  them.  136 
29 


Ultimate  design  of  man [98 

Understanding  may  bo  perverted.  168 
Uneasiness   produced   by   former 

sins 109 

Union  of  good  beings 122 

Unjustifiableness  of  religious  in- 
difference  105 

Upright  creatures  may  fall 147 

need  good  habits 149 

Universe  and  its  government  im- 
mense  123 

Vice 

actually  punished  by  society  110,111 

must  produce  uneasiness 112 

never  rewarded  as  such 116 

not  only  criminal  but  depraving  149 

often  increased  by  trials 153 

punished  as  such 114 

Vicious  men  lose  their  influence.  [121 

Virtue 

a  bond  of  union 122 

as  su(jti,  rewarded  on  earth.  .  .  Ill 
"brings  its  own  reward".  ...  [118 
has  occasional  disadvantages.  [117 

hinderances  accidental 121 

how  and  why  rewarded Ill 

improved  by  trials 151 

its  benefits  to  a  community.  .  .  123 

natural,  not  vice 116 

not  always  rewarded  in  this  life  108 
on  the  whole  happier  than  vice  113 

secures  peace 112 

tendencies  essential 126 

tends  to  give  power.  .  .  .  118,  [121 

Virtuous    beings    need    virtuous 

habits 149 

Virtuous  habits  a  security 147 

how  formed 139 

improve  virtue 147 

necessary  in  a  future  state.  .  .  [145 

Voice  of  nature  is  for  virtue 117 

Waste  of  seeds 163 

Wickedness    may   produce    some 

benefits 177 

voluntary 136 


342 


INDEX  TO  PART  I. 


Will  and  character 

of  God,  how  determined.  .  note  166 
what  they  mean iiote  163 

Wonderful  discovery  of  Hume.  .  [162 

World 

a  system  of  subordinations.  .  .  173 
a  thedter  for  the  manifestation 

of  character 156 


PA3B 

World,  (continued.) 

disciplines  some  to  vice 153 

fitted  for  man's  discipline.  .  .  ,  150 
governed  by  fixed  laws 110 

Youth 

a  determining  period 101 

if  lost,  not  to  be  recovered.  .  .  143 
its  beneficial  subordinations.  .  143 


INDEX  TO  PART  11. 


REFERENCES  TO  THE  EDITOR'S  NOTES  ARE  IN  BRACKETS 


PAGE 

A  common  absurdity 243 

Abstract  truth  distinguished  from 

facts 305,  [186 

Absurdity  of  some  objections  to 

Christianity 245 

Abuse  of  our  natural  endowments  217' 
Accidental,   what   events   are    so 

called 226 

Accountability  gradually  increases  251 
Actions, 

definition  of,  in  morals 261 

distinguished  from  things  done  261 
their  bad  consequences  some- 
times escaped 232 

virtue  and  vice  consist  in  them  261 
Advantage,  as  proper  a  considera- 
tion in  religion  as  in  tem- 
poral affairs 298 

variously  bestowed 249,  312 

Analogy 

a  confirmation  of  all  facts  to 

which  it  can  be  applied,  .  306 
affords  no  argument  against  the 

scheme  of  Christianity.  .  203 
nor  against  miracles.  .  .  203 
answers  presumptions  against 

miracles 207 

does  not  prove  the  wisdom  of 

God 301 

Hoes  not  teach  that  the  ichole 
of  God's  government   is 
like  that  on  earth.  .....  204 

easily  cavilled  at,  but  unan- 

gwerable ,  .  .  >  .  306 


?aQ1 

Analogy,  {continued.) 

between  natural  information 
and  that  derived  from 
inspiration 212 

between  the  remedies  of  nature 

and  those  of  grace 219 

between  the  gospel  and  human 

discoveries 219 

between  the  light  of  nature  and 

of  revelation 218 

between   the    use    of   natural 

gifts,  and  miraculous.  .  .  217 

between  the  government  of  God 
and  that  of  a  human  mas- 
ter  261 

its  small  influence  on  men.  .  .  303 

how  used  in  this  treatise.  .  .  .  306 

may  show  our  duty,  but  not  the 

design  of  the  requirement  246 

objections    to    this    mode    of 

arguing chap.  viil. 

shows  that  there  may  be  infinite 
reasons  for  things,  with 
which  we  are  not  ac- 
quainted  188 

the  only  ground  for  some  of 

our  knowledge 306 

Antidote  to  heresies [191 

Apocalypse,  its  principal  object.  .  [249 
Appearances  of  men  and  things 

deceptive 248 

Arguments   proper   as  to  human 
writings,  are   not   so  as 

to  Scripture 214 

343 


344 


INDEX  TO  PART  11. 


PAGE 

Atonement, 

how  held  by  the  ancients.  .  .  .  241 
makes  the  innocent  suffer  for 

the  guilty 243 

Author  of  nature  taken  for  granted  298 
Authoritativeness  of  revelation.  .  189 

Baptism 

a  test  of  obedience [199 

commanded  and  important.  .  .  194 

why  the  form  of  words 194 

Bible,  how  to  be  interpreted.  [202,  215 

Brutes,  their  great  sagacity 216 

Boundary  of  human  inquiry.  .  .  .  [223 

Candor  necessary  in  judging  of 

Christianity 302 

Chance,  really  no  such  thing.  .  .  226 
Characters    drawn    in    Scripture 

evidently  unfeigned  .  .  .  287 
Christ 

a  mediator chap.  v. 

a  prophet 240 

a  priest  and  king 241 

his  history,  as  given  in  Scrip- 
ture  285 

his  pre-existence  taught 282 

bis  satisfaction 239 

his  sufferings  voluntary 243 

manner  of  his  interposition.  .  .  238 
not  merely  a  teacher  and  ex- 
ample  242 

offered  himself  a  propitiatory 

sacrifice 241 

Christianity 

a  fearful  curse,  if  it  give  no 
more  light  than  natural 

religion [196 

a  question  of  fact 301 

a  remedial  system [193 

an  authoritative  republication 
of  the  religion  of  na- 
ture  188,  189 

a  particular   scheme  under  a 

general  plan 194,  224 

a  scheme  imperfectly  compre- 
hended  CHAP.   IV. 


Pi  OB 

Christianity,  [eontimied.) 

a  scheme  revealed  but  in  part.  226 
brings  life  and  immortality  to 

light 190 

could  not  possibly  be  a  contri- 
vance  [222,  294 

demands   attention,  if  barely 

probable 253 

has  evidences  besides  miracles 

and   prophecy 263 

in  what  degree  remedial.  .  .  .  [193 

is  a  real  revelation 213 

is  conformable  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  things .295 

its  benefits  require  the  use  of 

means 197 

its  establishment  and  preva- 
lence, the  most  conspicu- 
ous and  important  event 

in  history 286 

its  evidences chap.  vir. 

its  good  effects  not  small.  ...  192 
its  precepts  plain  and  obvious.  218 

its  proof  historical 304 

its  proofs  liable  to  objection.  .  260 
men  bound  to  examine  its  evi- 
dence  197 

miracles  and  prophecy  its  direct 

and  fundamental  proofs.  263 

must  have  mysteries [223 

no  objection  to  the  morality  of 

it 214,  220,  222 

not  merely  a  republication  of 

natural  religion.  ......  [196 

not  primarily  designed  to  re- 
medy the  defects  of  na- 
ture  [193 

not  the  discovery  of  reason.  .  .  188 
objections  to  its  evidence.  .  .  .  210 

objections  to  its  nature 210 

offered   to  some  in  a  corrupt 

state 250 

prescribes  new  duties 194 

preserves  natural  religion    in 

the    world 191 

propagated  against  all  obstruc- 
tions  [294 


INDEX  TO  PART  II. 


345 


PAGE 

Christianity,  (continued.) 

rashness  of  treating  it  light- 
ly  194,  196,  197 

requires  means  to  accomplish 

ends 225 

reveals  a  particular  dispensa- 
tion of  Providence 194 

reveals  important  facts 196 

eome  of  its  dark  parts  may  be 
cleared  up,  others  can- 
not   [223 

teaches  more  than  natural  re- 
ligion  194 

the   evils  ascribed  to   it,   are 

not  its  evils 192 

the  one  great  question  concern- 
ing it 213,  214 

the   only  religion  professedly 

confirmed  by  miracles.  .   268 

to  be  transmitted  by  Chris- 
tians  [190 

universal,  in  nature  and  in- 
tention  [248 

what  alone  could  disprove  it.  .  295 

•why  not  remedial  to  a  greater 

degree 193 

■why  not  sooner  promulgated.  .  219 
Christians 

bound  to  spread  Christianity.  190 

primitive,  their  testimony.  .  .  .  267 
Church 

men  bound  to  support  it 193 

preserves  a  knowledge  of  reli- 
gion  191 

visible,  its  design 190,  191 

Circumstantial  evidences  of  Chris- 
tianity  263,  281 

often  as  convincing  as   direct 

testimony 294 

Clemens  Romanus,  testimony  of.  266 

his  letter  to  the  Corinthians.  .  [266 
Climax  of  infidel  extravagance.  .  [294 
Coincidence    of    natural    and   re- 
vealed  religion 211,  218 

Coincidences  of  Scripture 266 

Comparison,  how  it  may  mislead 

us 201 


PAGB 

Compassion  distinct  from  goodness  233 
visible  in  the  constitution  of 

the   world 233 

Consequences  of  infidelity;  more 
dangerous  than  those  of 

faith. : 294 

of  sin,  often  averted 233 

Conversational  objections  to  reve- 
lation  295 

Conversion,  how  produced [225 

Course  of  nature 

diflerent  from  what  we  might 
have  supposed,  previous 

to  experience 211 

none  at  the  beginning 205 

our   total   darkness   as   to   its 

causes 208 

Creation 

Mosaic  account  of,  referred  to 

by  John 282 

a  different  exertion  of  power 

from  government 205 

why  Scripture  describes  it.  .  .  281 
Creatures  of  like  moral  qualities 
placed  in   different  reli- 
gious situations 251 

Credulity    of    mankind    acknow- 
ledged  269 

Cumulative  proof  of  Christianity.  [20/ 

Daniel 

his  book  had  more  evidence  of 
authenticity     than     has 

come  to  us 279 

his   predictions   a   support  of 

Jewish  faith [249 

quoted  by  Christ 279 

Dark  parts  of  revelation [223 

Degrees  of  evidence  have  degrees 

of  weight 255 

require  nice  examination.  .  .  .  258 
Deistical  explanation  of  Christ's 

miracles [206 

Deists,  why  do  they  oppose  Chris- 
tianity  [196 

Depravity  of  man  obvious 238 

doctrine  of. [218 


346 


INDEX  TO  PART  II. 


Desert  of  gDod  and  ill,  the  notion 

of. 305 

Development,  of  truth 218 

modern,  doctrine  of. [218 

Differences  of  religious  advantages 
may  have  like  reasons  as 
those  for  different  tem- 
poral advantages 251 

would    remain    if     revelation 

were  universal 252 

Difficulties 

absurdity  of  requiring  them  to 

be  all  removed 297 

as  to  the  evidence  of  religion, 
analogous    to    those   at- 
tending the  practice  of  it  256 
cannot  be  solved  by  analogy.  .  296 
speculative,  may  be  the  chief 

trials  of  some 257 

the  discernment  which  can  see 
them,    might    suffice    to 

see   through  them 260 

Direct  and  circumstantial  evidence 

must  be  taken  together.  280 
Diseases  of  body  and  mind,  analo- 
gous  as  to    their   reme- 
dies  220 

Disobedience,  without  possible  ex- 
cuse  253 

Dispensations,  preparatory  one  to 

another 310 

Disregard  of  religion  a  great  pro- 
fligacy  233 

Distinction    between   moral    and 

positive  obligation.  198,  [198 
^between  acts  and  principles.  .  [235 
between  temporary,  individual, 

and  universal  commands  [188 
Doubt 

affords  scope  for  probation.  .  .  262 
exercises  our  virtuous  princi- 
ples  256 

implies  some  evidence.  252, 254,  283 
involves  some  obligation.  .  .  .  .  263 

puts  us  upon  probation 253 

Doubtful    evidence    should    have 

some  influence 255 


Duties  arising  from  revealed  rela- 
tions  195 

moral  and  positive 194 

Earth,   its    appearances    confirm 

Scripture 238 

Effect  of  Adam's  transgression.  .  .  238 
of  combined  probabilities.  294,  [294 

Efficacy  of  repentance [190 

not  taught  by  the  light  of  na- 
ture  190 

End,  God's  not  known 246 

Enthusiasm 

is  not  peculiar  to  religion.  .  .  .  272 
impairs  no  testimony  for  Chris- 
tianity  271 

may  often  weaken  testimony.  .  271 
sometimes  mixed  with  knavery  272 
the  absence  of  all  sign  of  it  in 
Christianity,  a  presump- 
tive proof  in  its  fiivor.  .  .  222 
will  not  account  for  the  spread 

of  Christianity 270 

Enthusiasts  make  as  great  sacri- 
fices   as  Christians.  .  .    .  270 

Epistles  of  Paul,  proof  from 266 

Eternal  retribution  not  taught  by 

natural  religion [190 

Ethics  of  natural  religion  distin- 
guished from  its  objects  [194 

Events  expound  Scripture 219 

Evidence 

of  Christianity  impregnable.  .  295 
collateral    and    direct    to    be 

viewed  together 294 

from  miracles  and  prophecy.  .  267 
imperfect,  should  yet  influence 
practice  in  proportion  to 

its  degree 255 

of  circumstances  may  be  most 

direct 294 

of  religion,  open  to  all 260 

of  religion,  the  same  in  kind 
as  that  which  controls  us 

in  temporal  things 258 

much  lower  than   satisfactory 

often  determines  us.  .  .  ,  303 


INDEX  TO  PART  11. 


347 


JHJvidence,  (continued.) 

not  only  increased  but  multi- 
plied by  a   combination 

of  probabilities 294,  [294 

reason  the  proper  judge  of.  .  .  221 

requires  careful  sifting 256 

candor  in  judging.  .  .  302,  [303 
safety  always  in  admitting  it.  294 

why  liable  to  objection 257 

Evil,  remedies  provided  for  it.  219,232 
Exaggeration  practised  by  many 

who  will  not  lie 272 

External  manner  of  heart  worship  195 
Experience 

affords  no  presumption  against 

Christianity 203 

corroborates      Christian     doc- 
trines  245 

teaches  the  effects  of  actions.  .  246 
Extravagance     of     some     objec- 
tions  187, 1S8 

Facts 

analogy    the     only    proof    of 

some 306 

distinguished     from     abstract 

truths 305 

of     revelation     distinguished 

from  its  principles [235 

Fall  of  man,  assumed  as  a  fact.  .  .  236 
confirmed  by  appearances.  .  .  .  238 
Falsehood,  its  degrees  and  induce- 
ments  272 

False  miracles  have  deceived  many  273 
have  some  historic  evidence.  .  273 
Fatalists,  their  principles  argued 

upon 304 

Fear  cast  out  by  love [301 

Fitness,  moral 304,  305 

Flippant  objections  to  Christianity  295 

Folly,  a  real  vice 280 

Foresight  of  brutes 216 

Future  punishments, 

all  the  reasons   for  them  not 

known 234 

not  arbitrarily  appointed.  .  .  .  232 
natural  sequences 231,  232 


I  PA.aB 

Future  punishments, 

rendered  cr  'dible  by  temporal 

punishments 300 

Genealogy  of  mankind  given   in 

Scripture 283 

General  laws 

a  wise  arrangement 227 

do  not  render  miracles  in- 
credible  227 

control  the  Christian  dispensa- 
tion  226 

few  events  can  be  traced  up  to 

them 226 

miracles  may  be  their  re- 
sults  226,  227 

the  ground  of  believing  there 

are  such 226 

things  called  accidental  go- 
verned by  them 226 

Geology,  its  impressive  lessons.  .  [229 
GOD 

a  master  giving  laws 261 

all  his  reasons  for  giving  a 
command  must  be  cer- 
tainly known,  and  known 
to  have  passed  away,  be- 
fore we  can  safely  disre- 
gard it 188 

duties    towards    him    as     the 

Father 194,  195 

governs  by  mediation 230 

his  government  shows  com- 
passion  233 

progressive 229 

his  means  and  ends  we  cannot 

distinguish 228 

his  providence,  objections  to  it 

idle 300,  301 

his  reasons  not  assigned 246 

his  will,  as  absolute  or  con- 
ditional  261 

how  he  would  act  in  contingen- 
cies, unknown [222 

how   to  be  worshipped,  a  pure 

matter  of  revelation.  .  .  .  195 

instructs  us  by  experience.  211,  246 


348 


INDEX  TO  PART  11. 


PAGE 

GOD,  (continued.) 

little  known [222 

not  indifferent  as  to  who  suflFer.  2i3 
reveals    our    duties,    not    his 

plans 246 

the  real  author  of  the  prophe- 
cies  276 

Good  and  evil  unequally  distri- 
buted  248 

Government  of  God  sometimes, 
apparently,  tardy  in  its 

results 224,  225 

Gradual  growth  of  causes [208 

Happiness  not  always  secured  by 

well-laid    schemes 247 

Hazard  of  neglecting  Christianity.  262 
Heathen  world,  condition  of.  186,  250 
Hieroglyphic  and   figurative  lan- 
guage of  Scripture 210 

Hinderances  to  natural  and  spiri- 
tual knowledge  similar.  .  218 
History 

of  miracles 264 

^  of  the  Jews  confirmed  by  their 

condition 289,290 

of  the  origin  of  religion 206 

furnishes  no  parallel  to  revela- 
tion  207 

prophecy  is  history  anticipated  281 
Scripture,  has  not  been  inva- 
lidated  283 

Holy  Spirit,  its  operations  on  the 

heart [225 

Human   contrivance    unequal    to 

some  things [222 

Human  life,  in  what  sense  it  may 

be  called  poor 297 

Human  testimony,  reliable  not- 
withstanding the  preva- 
lence of  falsehood 273 

Identity  of  principle  between  na- 
tural and  revealed  re- 
ligion  [2  35 

Ignorance 

of  heathen  writers [187 


Ignorance 

of  other  worlds,  forbids  objec- 
tions  to    Christianity  on 
the   ground  of  miracles.  207 
of    the  laws  of   miracles,   not 
greater  than  of  natural 

laws 256 

of  the   reason  of  our  present 

condition 251 

much  of  it  our  own  fault.  ...  259 
Imagination     may    fancy   unreal 

coincidences 293 

Immorality    not     authorized     in 

^         Scripture 221,  222 

Impassable  limit  to  human  know- 
ledge  [223 

Imperceptible    accumulation     of 

forces [20S 

Imperfect  knowledge,  better  than 

acting  in  the  dark 297 

Imperfection  of  language 216 

Importance  of  revelation.  .  .  chap.  i. 

an  abstraction [186 

precludes  the  idea  that  the  first 

witnesses  were  careless.  .  274 
Improbability  before  and  after  an 

event [207 

of  the  Deistical  theory  greater 

than  that  of  miracles.  .  .  [206 

Inadequacy  of  repentance [236 

Inattention  to  religion,  real  depra- 
vity  252,  307 

prevents  convincement 258 

Incarnation  an  invisible  miracle.  204 

cannot  be  paralleled [23-5 

Influence  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  .  .  .  [225 
of  the  analogical  argument.  .  303 
Innocent  sometimes  suffer  for  the 

guilty 243 

Inspiration,  the  proper  kind  and 
extent  of  it  not  discover- 
able by  reason 212 

not  to  be  interpreted  like  other 

writings 2]  I 

Inspired    writers,    key    to    their 

meaning [276 

their  one  great  schem©.     .  .  .  [276 


INDEX  TO  PART  II. 


349 


Inspired  writers,  (continued.) 
show    a   foresight  more    than 

human 278,  279 

Instruction  from  God  to  savages.  [206 

Intercession  by  the  good  for  the 

bad [232 

Interest,    temporal,    not    always 

apparent .302 

Interpositions    of    men    for    each 

other [232 

Internal   improbabilities   weaken 

external  proof. 215 

Interpretation  of  Scripture [215 

Irregularity,  really  no  such  thing.  226 
whence  the  appearance  of.  .  .  .  227 

Irregularities  of  men,  conse- 
quences proportioned  to 
magnitude 233 

Irreligion  an  aggravated  sin.  .  .  .  233 
especially  in  persons  in  high 

standing 254 

not    justifiable    on    any   pre- 
tence  256,  312 

Invention  an  irregular  way  of  in- 
formation  216 

Invisible  miracles [204 

things  of  God,  how  learned.  .  [230 

Jews 

God's  dealing  with  them  ....  290 
their  continuance,  a  standing 

miracle 290 

their  history  confirmed  by  facts  291 

their  system  of  Theism [206 

Jewish   miracles,  a  part  of  civil 

history [265 

John,  his  allusion  to  Christ,  in  the 

beginning  of  his  gospel.  282 
his  doctrine  agrees  with  that 

of  Paul 282 

Kingdom  of  Christ  on  earth 241 

Knowledge 

profound,    not     necessary    to 

piety 218 

Bcientific    and  religious,  have 

the  same  difficulties.  ...  218 


Knowledge  of  Scripture,  improved 
in  the  same  way  as  know- 
ledge of  the  sciences.  .  .  218 
unequally  distributed 249 

Language  necessarily  ambiguous.  216 
of  the  prophecies,  often  figura- 
tive  210 

Laplace,  error  of. [207 

Levity    destructive    to    religious 

influence 259 

Liberty 

belief  of  our,  unavoidable.  .  .  .  304 
of  the  will,  not  discussed,  note  304 
necessary   to  the  progress   of 

knowledge 218 

the  principle  so  natural  that 
language   is   formed    on 

it 304 

Life 

future,  brought  to  light  by  the 

gospel 190 

may  be  taken  away  by  com- 
mand  221 

not  thrown  away  because  suc- 
cess is  uncertain 302 

whether  desirable  or  not 301 

Light  of  nature 

displayed  in  the  Scriptures.  .  .  188 
does  not  teach  our  future  con- 
dition  190 

favors  the  doctrine  of  a  Me- 
diator  230 

has  left  the  greatest  heathen 

in  doubt 186 

Ludicrous  turn,  danger  of. 259 

Mahometanism   not   received   on 

the  footing  of  miracles.  [268 

Mahometans  and  ancient  Per- 
sian 6,  how  situated  as  to 
revelation 250 

Man 

accepted  according  to  what  he 

hath 251 

his  circumstances  no   ground 

of  complaint 252 


30 


S5y> 


INDEX  TO  PART  II. 


Man,  (coMtiniied.) 

liis    obligation    to    study   the 

Scriptures 202,  262 

must  be  renewed 197 

Manasses,  prayer  of. [237 

Manner  of  -worship  a  matter   of 

pure  revelation 195 

Martyrs 

could  not  have  been  impostors  272 
had  full  knowledge  of  facts  269, 271 
the  full  force  of  their  testimony  269 
their  obligations  to  veracity.  .  274 

were  not  enthusiasts .  .  271 

Means  as  related  to  ends 225 

Mediation  seen  everywhere 230 

exemplified  in  social  life.  .  .  .  [232 
Mediator, 

appointment  of. chap.  v. 

the  notion  of,  natural 230 

the  Scripture  doctrine  of.  238-2-iO 
whether  one  was  necessary.  .  .  243 

why  most  objected  to 243 

Medium  between  full  satisfaction 
of  a  truth  and  full  satis- 
faction to  the  contrary.  .  313 
Memory,    eloquence,    &c.   impru- 
dently used 217 

Men   apt  to   be  deluded  by  pre- 
tences  273 

their  conduct  may  be  guessed 

at [222 

Mercy  seen  in  the  constitution  of 

the  world 233 

Messiah  came  at  the  expected  time  285 

his  mission 224 

Minuteness  of  predictions  touch- 
ing Christ 207 

Miracles 

admitted  evidence  for  such  as 
are  false  does  not  impair 
the    evidence   of    Chris- ^ 

tian 273 

contrary  to  the  course  of  na- 
ture ?  206 

denying       them       leads       to 

Atheism [205 

disorderly  use  of. 217 


PAau 

Miracles,  [continued.) 

distinct  reasons  for  them.  .  .  .  208 

large    historical   evidence   for 

their  truth 270 

manner  in  which  related  ....  264 

no  argument  of  analogy  against 

them 205-207 

none  parallel  to  those  of  Scrip- 
ture  207 

not  mere  embellishments.  .  .  .  264 

not  to  be  compared  to  common 

events 209 

nowise  incredible 209 

occasions  for  them  likely  to 
arise  in  the  course  of 
ages 208 

of  the  Old  Testament,  insepa- 
rable from  history [265 

operate  by  general  laws 226 

Pagan  and  Popish,  were 
wrought  after  those  sys- 
tems had  obtained 268 

peculiar   to    the    Jewish    and 

Christian  religions 268 

received  as  genuine  from  the 

first 268,  269 

regulated  by  general  laws.  .  .  .  227 

satisfactorily  account  for  the 

existence  of  Christianity  265 

should  be  compared  to  uncom- 
mon events 209 

the  credentials  of  Christianity  267 

the  evidence  of  their  truth  at 

first 249 

the  question  of  their  truth  only 
one  of  degree  in  point  of 
evidence 208 

the   only  satisfactory   account 

of  some  events 265 

the  real  nature  of  presump- 
tions against  them 208 

the  term  a  relative  one 205 

their  direct  proof  of  Chris- 
tianity  264 

their  evidence  the  same  as  that 

for  common  facts 264 

their  force  as  proofs.  ...;...  189 


INDEX  TO  PART  II. 


351 


Miracles,  (continued.) 

visible  and  invisible.  .  .  .  204,  [204 
■what  evidence  arises  from  their 
having  been  accepted  as 
true   by  the  first  Chris- 
tians  268 

writers  upon [264,  268 

Miraculous  power 

creation  not  properly  an  act  of  205 

misused  by  some 217,  267 

pretences    of,    have     deluded 

some 273 

why  bestowed 190 

Misconduct  creates  need  of  assist- 
ance  235 

Mistake  of  some  of  Hume's  oppo- 
nents  207 

Mistakes    of    philosophers    dan- 
gerous  [230 

of  transcribers,  <fcc 228 

Modern  geology,  lesson  from. .  .  .  [229 

Moral  action,  the  nature  of.  ...  .  261 

an   action    becomes    such    by 

command [221 

Moral  duties.     See  Positive. 

Moral  faculty,  its  object 305 

Moral  government.     See  Govern- 
ment. 
Moral  precepts.     See  Positive. 
Moral    system   revealed  to  man- 
kind  190 

Morality    of   Scripture,   reason   a 

judge  of. 220 

Mysteries  to  be  expected  in  reve- 
lation  223,  224 

as  many  in  nature  as  ia  Scrip- 
ture  246 

Mystery  of  godliness 225 

Mythological    writings    resemble 

prophecy 276 

Narratives  of  Scripture  unadorned  228 
Natural  consequences  of  vice  are 

judicial  punishments.  .  .  197 
and  spiritual  things  analogous 

in  importance 219 

©naowmeuis  often  abused.  .  .  .  217 


PAQB 

Natural  light  compared  to  revela- 
tion  218 

Natural  religion 

and  revealed,  coincide 211 

as  much  perverted  as  Chris- 
tianity  192 

could  not  have  been  reasoned 

out 192 

discloses  no  Redeemer [194 

its  ethics  and  objects  distin- 
guished  [194 

its  light  wholly  insufficient.  .  .  187 
might    be     authenticated     by 

miracles 190 

moral  system  of. 187 

taught  and  confirmed  by  Chris- 
tianity  188,  286,  292 

what  it  does  not  teach. .  .  [190,  194 
Nature    carried    on    by   uniform 

laws 226 

implies  the  agency  of  God.  .  .  231 

its  light  insufficient 186 

Nature  and  obligation  of  sacra- 
ments  note  195 

Necessity  of  revelation [186 

Negligence  prevents  the  recogni- 
tion of  truth 258 

wholly  inexcusable 197 

Obedience  from  dread [301 

or  disobedience,  an  important 

matter 188 

to  a  positive    rite,   especially 

indicative  of  piety 199 

Objections 

to  certain  precepts  of  Scrip- 
ture, as  immoral 221 

to  prophecy,  from  its  obscurity  275 
to    revelation,    are    of    equal 
weight    against    natural 

religion 97 

to  the  analogical  argument,  as 

such CHAP.  VHI. 

to  the  distribution  of  good  and 

evil 248-250 

to  the  doctrine  of  media- 
tion  CHAP.    V. 


352 


INDEX  TO  PART  II. 


PAGE 

Objections,  (continued.) 

to  the  evidence  for  mi- 
racles  CHAP.  II. 

to  the  unequal  distribution  of 

religious  knowledge.  .  .  .  249 
Objections  to  Christianity 

as  a  matter  of  fact 301 

as  a  remedial  system. .  .  .  [19.S,  219 
as    a    roundabout,    perplexed 

contrivance 228 

as  deficient  in  point  of  truth.  .  247 

as  a  scheme 209 

as  mysterious [223 

as  to  its  wisdom  and  good- 
ness   CHAP.  IV. 

as  unimportant chap.  i. 

atonement  makes  the  innocent 

suffer  for  the  guilty.  227,  243 
contains     things     unlike     the 

course  of  nature 204 

does  not  remove  difficulties  .  .  [223 

has  been  perverted 192 

has  been  productive  of  evils.  .  192 
has  internal  improbabilities  225-227 
disclosed  to   the  world  so  re- 
cently  219 

disorderly   use   of  miraculous 

gifts 227 

has  small  influence 192,  303 

if  true  would  not  be  left  doubt- 
ful  299 

is  not  satisfactory 260,  261 

its  doctrine  of  mediation,  chap.  v. 
its   external   proof    weakened 
by  internal  improbabili- 
ties  215 

its  lack  of  evidence.  .  .  .  chap.  vi. 

its  late  introduction 219 

may  be  advanced  flippantly, 
but  cannot  be  so  an- 
swered  295 

natural  things  too  unimportant 
to    furnish    analogies    in 

its  favor 219 

not  just  and  good chap.  iv. 

not  necessary 147 

not  universal chap.  vi.  248 


PAQB 

Objections  to  Christianity,  (con- 
tinued.) 

slowly  developed 219 

some  of  its  precepts  immoral. .  221 
suflBciency  of  natural  religion.  187 

vicarious  sufferings 245 

Obligation  arises  from  the  bare 
supposableness  of  Chris- 
tianity  253,  262 

Obligations  to  God  arising  out  of 

relationship 196 

Obscurity  in  part  of  a  prophecy, 
does  not  impair  the  evi- 
dence of  foresight 275 

Offenders  often  shielded  by  friends  [232 
OflBces  of  Christ  as  a  mediator  238-240 
Opinions   must   be   distinguished 

from  facts 270 

Ordinary  rules  of  interpretation. .  [215 

Pagan  and  Popish  miracles  easily 

accounted  for 268 

Parables   show  what   the   author 

intended 276 

Partial  views  give  an  appearance 

of  wrong 309 

Passion  hinders  correct  judgment  259 

Paul,  his  separate  testimony.  .  .  ,  266 
how  he  received  the  gospel.  .  .  267 
summary  of  his  testimony.  .  .  267 

Perfection  of  religion,  what  ?  chap.  Vlil. 

Persons  for  whom  this  treatise  is 

written 309 

Philosophy,  its  true  mode  of  pro- 
ceeding  [230 

Piety  superior  to  ritual  observ- 
ances  201 

Pleasures  and  pains,  which  over- 
balance ? 301 

Political   events,  how   mentioned 

in  Scripture 282 

Popish  doctrine  of  a  miracle  at 

the  Eucharist [204 

Popular  conversational  objections  295 

Porphyry's  mode  of  interpretation 

frivolous note  279 

objections  to  the  book  of  Daniel  279 


INDEX  TO  PART  II. 


35a 


PAGE 

Chris- 

CHAP.  VII. 


200 


246 
201 


200 


Positive      evidence      of 

tianity 

«sitive  institutions 
belong    to    the    notion    of    a 

church 192 

\aj  us  under  the  strictest  obli- 
gation  202 

means  to  moral  ends 199 

men   disposed   to   depend   on 

them 

necessary  to  keep  up  and  pro- 
pagate religion 

not  to  be  made  light  of. 

not   to  supersede   moral  obe- 
dience  

the  reason  of  them  often  ob- 

•  vious 198 

two  modes  of  viewing  them. . .  198 
Positive  precepts  compared  with 

moral 198,  201 

create  moral  obligations 221 

Power  of  healing [217 

Practice  should  be  influenced  by 

probability 254 

Predictions  of  Christ  very  nume- 
rous and  minute.  .  .  207,  208 
Prejudice  a  hinderance  to  know- 
ledge  

a  mark  of  weakness 

as  hostile  to  truth  as  enthu- 
siasm, .  .  T ■ 

operates  contrary  ways 

Preservation  of  the  Jews  as  a  dis- 
tinct race 291 

Presumptions 

against  miracles 205 

against  revelation  as  miracu- 
lous  CHAP.  II. 

none      against      the     general  • 

scheme  of  Christianity.  .  203 
n*^e  peculiar  to  miracles.  .  .  .  207 
strong,     overcome     by     weak 

proof. 207,  [207 

Priesthood  of  Christ 238 

Jewish,  typical  of  Christ 239 

Principles    argued  upon  in   this 
treatise f  •  • 


258 
280 


272 
294 


PAGK 

Progressions  in  our  existence. . .  .  229 
Progress  in  theology  probable. .  .  [218 
Probable  proofs,  by  being  added, 
not    only    increase    evi- 
dence, but  multiply  it.  . .  294 
Probability  should  influence  prac- 
tice  254 

Profane       history       corroborates 

Scripture  statements.  .  .  287 
Proofs  of  Christianity 

a  touchstone  of  honesty [259 

level  to  common  men 260 

some  important  ones  omitted 

in  this  treatise,  and  why.  304 

why  not  more  plain 261 

Prophecy 

a  joint  review  of  prophecies 
furnishes  a  far  stronger 
proof  than   examination 

in  detail 294 

a  series  of,  being  applicable  to 
certain  events,  is  proof 
that  it  was  intended  of 

them 276 

compared  to  compiled  me- 
moirs  278 

created   the  expectation  of  a 

Messiah 284 

confirmed  by  appearances.  .  .  .  292 

evidence  from 275 

expressed  in  figurative  lan- 
guage  275 

how    understood    by    ancient 

Jews 277 

in  relation  to  the  Jews 284 

is  history  anticipated 281 

its  obscurity 275 

its  proofs  amazingly  strong.  .  [207 
may  not  always  have  been  un- 
derstood by  the  writer.  .  278 

proves  foresight 276,  279 

sometimes  obscured  by  inter- 
preters  210 

summary  of,  concerning  Christ  284 

use  of,  to  future  ages 249 

writers  upon 277,  285 


304 


Prophet,  Christ  a. 


240 


30^ 


354 


INDEX  TO  PART  11. 


PAGE 

Prcpbets 

not  the  authors  of  what  they 

wrote 278 

their  sense  of  their  predictions 
not  necessarily  the  whole 

sense 278 

whether  they  had  in  view  the 
events  which  Christians 
consider  fulfilments.  .  .  .  277 

Proverbial,  use  of  the  word 201 

Providence,  never  hasty [229 

objections  to  it  useless.  .  .  300,  301 
the  course  of,  progressive.  .  .  .  229 

Province  of  reason 220 

Prudence,    its    best    plans    often 

frustrated 247 

often  requires  us  to  act  with 
.  uncertain     prospect     of 

success 247,- 248 

Punishment 

follows  wickedness,  o/ course.  .  231 

instances  of  vicarious 244 

not  always  avoided  by  reforma- 
tion  235 

not  promiscuously  inflicted.  .  .  243 
provision   made   for   escaping 

it 232,  311 

we  cannot  of  ourselves  escape 

it 234 

we  cannot  know  why  such  and 

such  are  inflicted 231 

Quotations. 

Angus [202,  223 

Augustine note  187 

Arnobius [269 

Clemens  Romanus [266 

Davidson [294 

Fitzgerald [303 

Grotius [259 

Guizot [229 

Hurd [276 

Dr.  Johnson [288 

Mahomet [268 

Powell [230 

Warburton [217,  223 

Whately [206 


PAGE 

Rashness  of  interpreters 210 

of  treating  religion  lightly.  .  .  197 
Reason 

could  not  have  invented  Chris- 
tianity  206 

could  not  ascertain  the  power 

of  penitence 194 

discovers  our  relation  to  God 

the  Father 194 

but  not  our  relation  to  the  Son 

and  Holy  Ghost.  .  .  194,  196 

its  limits  very  narrow [223 

its  proper  province 220 

must  have  right  principles.  .  .   220 

needs  the  aid  of  experience  in 
judging  of  the  conse- 
quences of  actions 246 

not  suflBicient  to  construct  a 
system  of  natural  reli- 
gion free  from  supersti- 
tion  1&6 

our  only  faculty  for  judging 

even  revelation 210 

requires  the  importance  of  a 
question  to  be  taken  into 
account 295 

teaches  nothing  of  the  certain 
means  of  either  temporal 
or  spiritual  good 197 

very  incompetent  to  judge 
what  a  revelation  ought 

to  be 210-212 

Reasoning    by   analogy    to    any 
extent,  leaves  the  mind 

unsatisfied 29fl 

Redemption 

agreeable  to  our  natural  no- 
tions  235 

analogous  to  natural  remedies.  232 

conjectures  about  it  must  be 

uncertain 242 

mode  of,  not  discoverable  by 

reason 243 

men  not  competent  judges  of 

its  plan 24£ 

on  whom  are  its  benefits. .  note  237 

Scripture  account  of  ...  .  239,  24C 


INDEX  TO  PART  II. 


855 


PAGE 

Kedemption,  (continued.) 

we  should  be  thankful  for  it, 
•without  disputing  how  it 
was  procured 242 

Keferences  to  other  authors. 

Alexander [269 

Apthorpe [285 

Bayle [301 

Benson [215 

Birk. : [266 

Blaney [285 

Blunt [266 

Boiingbroke [265 

Boswell [288 

Boyle [264 

Butler [190,  272 

Campbell [264 

Celsus [287 

Chalmers [187, 194,  242 

Colliber 195 

Damascenus [287 

Davidson [285 

Diodorus  Siculus [287 

Eupolemus [287 

Featley [215 

Fitzgerald [193,  206,  207 

Fleetwood [264 

Fuller [285 

Gibbon [268 

Graves [266 

Grotius [266 

Gulick [277 

Hengstenburg [277 

Horseley [277 

Howe [236 

Kurd [285 

Jortin [264,  285 

Julian [257 

King [215,  277 

Lardner [264 

Leland [187 

Longinus [287 

Lyall [277 

McCosh [187 

Mackintosh [223 

Magee [236,  242 

Manasses [237 


PAQB 

References,  (cojitlnued.) 

Menander [287 

Michaelis [215 

Mills [207 

Newman [235 

Numenius [287 

Owen [24? 

Paley [205,  266,  268 

Pascal [187,  223 

Pfaffius [264 

Phlegon [287 

Phoenician  Annals [287 

Pliny [287 

Porphyry. 279,  [287 

Samuel  Stanhope  Smith [206 

Solinus [287 

Spinoza [215 

Stapfer [242 

Storr [215 

Strabo [287 

Suetonius [287 

Tacitus [287 

Taylor [264 

Tindall [196,  248 

Tucker [264 

Turretin [242 

Vitringa [276 

Warburton [187 

Waterland [195 

Watson [264 

Waugh [277,  285 

Wayland [188,  236 

Whately [206,  268,  288 

Witsius [264 

Reformation  does  not  always  pre- 
clude punishment 235 

Regard  due  to  the  Son  and  Holy 

Spirit 195 

Regard  to  God  as  Creator,  the 
essence  of  natural  reli- 
gion  195 

Rejection  of  Christ  by  many,at  first, 

the  argument  from  it. .  .  [269 
foretold 285 

Relations,   being   learned,    duties 

are  perceived 194 


356 


INDEX  TO  PART  II. 


Relatif/os  of  man  to  Deity 194 

to  fche  Son  and  Holy  Ghost.  .  .  195 
Religion 

a  practical  thing 298 

a  question  of  fact 301,  304 

aflfords  particular  reasous  for 

miracles 208 

confirmed  hy  the  establish- 
ment of  a  church 191 

considered    as    external     and 

internal 195 

doubt  of  its  evidence  does  not 
release  from  moral  obli- 
gation  254 

has  its  end  on  all  persons  to 

whom  proposed.  .  .  303,  [303 
if  true,  why  susceptible  of  any 

possible  doubt? 299 

its  acceptance  safe 295 

its  general  spirit  intimated  200,  201 

its  great  importance 254 

its  introduction  into  the  world  206 
its  reasonableness  fully  shown, 
if  it  can  only  be  proved 
that  it   may  be   reason- 
able  301 

its  very  nature  overlooked  by 
those  who  insist  that  it 
should  have  overwhelm- 
ing evidence 302 

may  be  true,  though  doubtful.  299 
must  be    judged   by   its   evi- 
dences taken  together.  .  .  294 

not  a  thing  reasoned  out 206 

not  equally  taught  to  all  men.  206 
objections   to   it   removed   by 

analogy 300 

presupposes   candor   in   those 

who  examine  it  256,302,  [303 
reason  may  judge  of  its  mo- 
rality  220 

reasonable,  for  aught  which 
can    be    shown    to    the 

contrary 301 

the  perception  of. 302 

the  view  of  it  taken  in  this 

treatise 299 


Religion,  {continued.) 

the  evidence  for  it  may  be 
lessened,  but  cannot  be 
destroyed 295 

why  its  evidences  are  allowed  to 

admit  of  doubt.  249,  253,  299 

Relief  for  evils  provided 232 

Remedial  nature  of  Christianity.  [193 
Remedies 

provided  in  nature 219,  232 

may  be  unskilfully  used 220 

show      the      compassion      of 

God 233 

and  also  his  strictness 234 

Repentance 

cannot  cancel  guilt 236,  [236 

general  sense  of  mankind  on 

the  subject 236 

its  efiicacy  not  taught  by  na- 
tural religion [190 

its  efficacy  taught  in  the  Scrip- 
tures  190 

not     sufficient     to     preclude 

disaster 234,  235 

Revelation 

a  particular  part  of  a  great 

plan 224 

accounts  for  the  Theism  of  the 

Jews [206 

at  the  beginning  of  the  world, 

would  not  be  miraculous  205 

cannot  be  neglected  with  im- 
punity   260-262 

considered  as  miraculous,  chap.  ii. 

considered  historically 281 

difference    between    its    facts 

and  its  principles [235 

discovers  new  relations,  and  so 

new  duties 194 

distinguished  from  natural  re- 
ligion  195 

does  not  compel  assent 253 

has  twice  been  universal.  .  .  .  [248 

how  it  could  be  overturned.  .  .  214 

its  disclosures,  of  course,  could 
not  have  been  antici- 
pated  211,  21J 


INDEX  TO  PART  II. 


357 


Revelation,  {continued.) 

its  measure  of  evidence  puts 

us  on  probation 253 

its  facts  necessarily  singular.  [235 

no  more  dififerent  from  the 
course  of  nature  than 
some  parts  of  the  course 
of  nature  are  different 
from  other  parts 312 

necessar}'^ chap.  i. 

republishes  and  confirms  na- 
tural religion 188,  189 

nothing  incredible  in  it 271 

teaches   that   God's   laws   are 

compassionate 236 

the  use  of  unwritten  revela- 
tion  213 

what  is  to  be  expected  in  reve- 
lation  210,  212 

Reverence  for  the  will  of  God. .  .  [199 
Ridicule  of  Scripture 

an     offence     against     natural 

piety 286 

easier  than  examination 259 

the  great  weakness  of  being 

influenced  by  it 280 

Roman  Empire  mentioned 279 

Rules  for  health  very  fallible  and 

inexact 302 

of  Biblical  interpretation.  .  .  .  [215 

Sacrifices 

commanded •.  .  .  .  241 

expiatory 239 

how     the    ancients     regarded 

them 242 

learned  by  the  heathen  from 

tradition 241 

really  efficacious 242 

the  prevalence  of. 236 

Sacrifice  of  Christ 

an  objection  to  it 243 

how  efficacious,  not  taught. . . .  242 

proper  and  real 239-241 

puts    us   into   a   capacity   for 

salvation 242 

voluntary 244 


Safety  an  important  consideration 

in  judging 294 

Satirical    writings,    how     under- 
stood  276,  27? 

Scheme  of  nature,  vast 20* 

progressive 229 

Scheme  of  providence,  if  under- 
stood, would  justify  facts 
which  are  objected  to.  .  .  300 
Schemes,  the  best  may  be  discon- 
certed  247 

Science  confirms  Scripture  history  287 

Scorn  of  prophetic  diction 210 

Scripture 

announces  a  general   restora- 
tion of  things 282 

antiquity  of, 287 

characters  evidently  not  feigned  287 
confirmed  by  profane  authors.  288 
confirmed  by  the  state  of  the 

earth 287 

considered  historically 281 

contains  an  abridged  history 

of  the  world 282 

exposed  to  criticism 283 

expounded  by  itself. [202 

gives  a  history  of  this  world  as 

God's  world 281 

gives  an  account  of  civil  go- 
vernments only  as  they 

affected  religion 282 

has  internal  evidence  of  truth  287 

history  genuine 265 

how  distinguished  from  other 

books 281-283 

how  to  be  interpreted [202 

if   false    could    be   shown    to 

be  so 283 

includes    a    history   of    thou- 
sands of  years 283 

includes     the    chronology    of 
nearly     four     thousand 

years 284 

its   authority  the  great  ques- 
tion, not  its  contents.  .  .  214 
its    chronicles    confirmed    by 

history 287 


858 


INDEX  TO  PART  11. 


PAGE 

Sv-ripture,  (continued.) 

its  evidences  comprise  a  series 
of  things  of  great  variety 
and  reaching  to  the  be- 
ginning of  time 263 

its  evidences  not  intended  to 

be  overpowering 253 

its    great  proofs   are   miracles 

and  prophecy 26i 

its  relation  to  miracles  only 
to  be  accounted  for  on 
the  supposition  of   their 

truth 265 

its  strangeness  not  surprising.  288 

its  style  objected  to 210 

its  truth  must  be  judged  of  by 
the  evidence  taken  to- 
gether  295 

may    contain    things   not   yet 

discovered 218 

miracles,  their  first  reception. .  265 
naturalness  of  its  statements.  .  287 
not  composed  by  rules  of  art.  .  210 
nothing  improbable  related  in 

any  part 287 

not  to  be  judged  by  precon- 
ceived expectation 215 

not  to    be  judged  exactly   as 

other  books 214 

ordinary  rules  of  interpreta- 
tion  [215 

our  duty  to  search  it.  .  .  .  202,  262 
precepts,  some  give  offence.  .  .  210 
reveals  our  relation  to  the  Son 

and  Holy  Spirit 194 

the  possibility  of  its  truth  de- 
mands investigation.  .  .  .  258 
truths     not     discoverable    by 

reason 203 

variety  of  topics  introduced.  .  283 

written  in  a  rude  age 283 

why  it  describes  creation.  .  .  .  282 
Searching  the  Scriptures  a  great 

duty 202 

Self-deceit,  our  liability  to  it.  .  .  .  262 
Serious    apprehension   may  com- 
port with  doubt 313 


PAQK 

Shameful  mistakes  of  philosophers  [230 

Similarity  of  objections  to  reli- 
gion and  nature 298 

Sincerity    of    belief    proved    by 

dying  for  it 270 

Skepticism  no  justification  of  irre- 

ligion 253 

Sorrow   cannot   of    itself    restore 

abused  benefits 234 

Speaking  with  tongues [217 

Speculative  difficulties  similar  to 

external  temptations.  .  . .  256 
the  chief  trial  of  some.  .  .  257,  259 

Spread  of  Christianity  unaccount- 
able if  it  were  an  im- 
posture  290 

Standing  ministry,  what  for.  .  .  .  [191 

Strangeness    of     some    Scripture 

events 288 

Stupidity  of  the  martyrs,  if  in- 
sincere  [269 

Subserviences,  the  world  a  system 

of. 229 

Success,  temporal,  always  uncer- 
tain  302 

Suffering,  ignorance  does  not  pre- 
vent it  either  in  tempo- 
ral or  spiritual  things.  .  .  196 

Sufferings     of    Christ     vindicate 

God's  law 244 

of  the  early  Christians 269 

SufBciency  of  light  of  nature  pre- 

.tended 186 

Summary  of  Jewish  history 284 

of  the   historical  evidence    of 

Scripture 292 

Supernatural  instructions  neces- 
sary from  the  first. ....  [206 

Temporal    interests     not    always 

discerned 247,  248 

managed  by  prudent  persons 
on  the  very  principles 
proposed  by  religion  as 
to  spiritual  interests  298,  299 

Temporal  interests  often  decided 
by  considerations  which 


INDEX  TO  PART  II. 


359 


fall  short  of  demonstra- 
tion  299 

Temporary     commands,      distin- 
guished from  perpetual.  [188 
Temptation 

a  wholesome  discipline 256 

earthly  and  spiritual  similar.  .  256 

calls  forth  virtuous  effort 257 

Testimony 

oan  be  destroyed  only  by 
counter-testimony,  or  by 
the  incompetency  of  the 

witness 274 

for  miracles  not  mentioned  in 
Scripture,  does  not  im- 
pair the  testimony  for 
those  there  recorded.  .  . .  273 
of  Paul,  separate  and  inde- 
pendent  266 

of  profane  authors  to  the  truth  1 

of  Scripture  history.  .  .  .  [287  I 
of  the  first  Christians.  .  .  .  269,  271  j 
must  be  judged  candidly.  .  .  .  [259  ' 
none  counter  to  Christianity.  .  275  I 
slight,  overcomes  strong  pre.  | 

sumptions 20S  i 

unconfuted,  must  be  admitted.  273  I 
value   af,  lessened   by  enthu- 
siasm  271 

Theism  of    the    Jews    accounted 

for [206 

Theology  of  the  Bible,  not  to  be 

corrected [202 

Things  which   it  is  unreasonable 

to  dispute 307 

Thoughtlessness  of  men 233 

Tradition  teaches  that  there  was 
a  revelation  at  the  be- 
ginning  205 

of  the  fall  of  man 311 

Transubstantiation [205 

Trial   by  speculative   difl&culties, 

analogous  to  other  trials.  256 

True  philosophy  inductive [230 

Truth 

of  Christianity  proved,  unless 
the  whole  of  its  history 


PAGE 

and  influence  can  be  ac- 
counted for  by  accident.  .  295 

Truth,  how  developed [218 

the,  of  an  event  may  be  fully 
proved,  though  no  one 
of  sundry  proofs  may  be 

complete 296 

whether    there    is    any    such 

thing,  denied  by  skeptics  305 

Twofold  efi"ect  of  the  analogical 

argument 306 

Unbelievers,  acknowledgment  of  .  289 
cannot  deny  a  conformity  be- 
tween     prophecy      and 
events 293 

Understanding,  its  right  use 245 

Undesigned  coincidences  in  Bible 

history [266 

Un  determinate  language  deceives 

many 297 

Unequal  distribution  of  religious 

knowledge 249 

Unfair  dealing  of  objectors 297 

Unreasonableness  of  applying  to 

passion  for  guidance.  . . .  295 

Unsatisfactory  evidence,  men 
often  obliged  to  act 
upon  it 302 

Variety    in    the    distribution    of 

God's  gifts 249,  312 

Vastness  of  the  scheme  of  nature.  204 
Veracity  of  the  first  Christians.  .  .  274 
Vicarious  punishments  witnessed 

every  day 244 

deter  from  sin ,.  245 

Vice 

appointed  to  be  punished.  ...  231 
blinds  men  to  just  evidence.  . .  255 
its  eflFects  in  the  present  world  234 
its    natural    consequences    are 

God's  judicial  inflictions.  197 

its  real  enormity 234 

not  palliated  by  any  supposed 
lack  of  evidence  for  reli- 
gion  256 


860 


INDEX  TO  PART  11. 


Vindication  of  religion   by  ana- 
logy impossible 296 

of  the  character  of  God,  not 
attempted  in  this  trea- 
tise  299,  300 

Way  of  salvation  for  the  helpless  [186 
"Will  of  God,  as  absolute  or  con- 
ditional  261 

World,  wickedness  of. 238 


"Worship,   mode   of,   a  matter   of 

pure  revelation 195 

Writers 

on  the  atonement [242 

Christian  sacraments [195 

miracles [264,  268 

necessity  of  revelation [187 

prophecy [277-285 

Scripture  difficulties [215 

undesigned  coincidences.  .  .  .  [266 


xju  siro. 


Date  Due 


>  // 


